Canada in Africa
300 Years of Aid and Exploitation

By

Yves Engler

Fernwood Publishing, RED Publishing

Copyright © 2015 Yves Engler

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form by any means without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer, who may quote brief passages in a review.

First printing August 2015

Cover design by Working Design

Printed and bound in Canada by Marquis Printing

A co-publication of

RED Publishing

2736 Cambridge Street

Vancouver, B.C. V5K 1L7 and

Fernwood Publishing

32 Oceanvista Lane, Black Point, Nova Scotia, B0J 1B0

and 748 Broadway Avenue, Winnipeg, Manitoba, R3G 0X3

www.fernwoodpublishing.ca

Fernwood Publishing Company Limited gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Canada Book Fund and the Canada Council for the Arts, the Nova Scotia Department of Communities, Culture and Heritage, the Manitoba Department of Culture, Heritage and Tourism under the Manitoba Publishers Marketing Assistance Program and the Province of Manitoba, through the Book Publishing Tax Credit, for our publishing program.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication

Engler, Yves, 1979-, author

Canada in Africa : 300 years of aid and exploitation / Yves Engler.

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 978-1-55266-762-0

1. Canada — Foreign relations — Africa. 2. Africa — Foreign relations — Canada. I. Title.

FC244.A35E54 2015 327.7106 C2015-900667-8

Table of Contents

5 Acknowledgements etc.

6 Introduction

13 1. Profiting from Slavery

21 2. Brute Capitalism

49 3. Providing Ideological Cover

67 4. Canadian Colonialism

87 5. Liberator or Defender of Colonialism

112 6. Aid Against Independence

117 7. Canadian Coups

127 8. Neoliberalism

139 9. A Mining Superpower

151 10. Mining Conflict

183 11. The Spoils of Privatization

200 12. Mythology and Reality

219 13. A Sordid Tale

231 14. Carrying a Big Stick

248 15. Whose Corruption?

262 16. Our Shared Environment

268 Conclusion

270 Notes

315 Bibliography

Acknowledgements etc.

I would like to thank Nadia Hausfather who has long encouraged and enabled my research habit. I would also like to acknowledge Dru Oja Jay and Nik Barry Shaw for allowing me to draw from Paved with Good Intentions.

While writing this book I moved between Ottawa, Toronto, Montréal and East Africa. A number of individuals allowed me to stay at their places along the way: Rose Marie Whalley, Paul Tetrault and Sally Teich; Dan Rosen and Jessica Haber (as well as Evan and Denise) Araceli Gonzalez Reyes and Diego Hausfather; Angela Schleihauf, Nadia Hausfather and Tareq Shahwan.

I would also like to acknowledge my uncle Al Engler for looking over the manuscript and my father Gary for his endless help. I’d like to thank my wonderful partner Bianca Mugyenyi whose rigorous judgement greatly improved the manuscript.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge the dozens of individuals (Nikki Baker, Scott Harris, Mark Haley, Peter Eglin ...) who’ve set up public events for my books. In a hostile media climate, their work makes it possible and worthwhile to continue researching and publishing. Their activism gives us hope for developing a genuinely justice-oriented Canadian foreign-policy.

***

The English spelling of many African place names and other words has changed over the years. I have tried to use current commonly accepted “mid-Atlantic” spelling, but have respected historical use in quotes and titles.

***

Writing using voice recognition software has been a wonderful solution to old hockey injuries worsened by repetitive strain. But along with beneficial health effects comes danger — speaking “continent” can easily be transcribed as “content”, for example — and cleaning up this technologically-induced minefield can be a daunting task for any editor. I take full responsibility for any such errors and apologize in advance to any upset readers.

Introduction

“Judge me by my actions, not my words.”

Lord Byron, nineteenth century poet

At the end of 2014 I spent a brief, but exciting, five weeks traveling through Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The trip provided a glimpse of life in East Africa. One striking contrast with Canada was the freedom kids had to roam. Siblings, older children and neighbourhood adults supervised the littlest ones. I admired the social trust regarding children, but held my breath every time I saw a six or seven-year-old grasping a toddler’s hand mere feet from a road.

A highlight of my travels was running into a group of kids playing football in Mwanza, Tanzania, who were happy to have a “Muzungu” join their game. Rather than chase the ball, the youngest in the group spent most of the game doing flips. It was fun, but didn’t do my team any favours!

After 3,000 km in three countries I can confidently say that the buses are less comfortable than those in Canada. Bumps repeatedly sent me flying. But while the road jolted me from my seat the stops made it so one needn’t get out. At every stop individuals sold nuts, fruits, popcorn, drinks and other goodies through the window or aisle. Crossing Tanzania a young man got on with a large bag of warm corn and slowly made his way up the aisle peeling a cob to whet the appetite of anyone who looked his way. By the time the driver let him off he was tens of kilometers from his starting point though carrying a much lighter load. The corn seller was lucky. Another vendor ended up miles from where he started without selling a single biscuit.

The entrepreneurial spirit is much stronger in East Africa than Canada. Notwithstanding certain ideological claims, however, it’s highly inefficient. It may be convenient to purchase a bag of nuts from the comfort of one’s bus seat, but a large number of sellers at every stop reflects limited opportunities and is a poor use of people’s capacities.

***

This book details Canada’s role in exploiting Africa and undermining the sovereignty of its people. Canadian policy provides a unique window into Western exploitation of Africa and this book can hopefully contribute to overcoming widespread ignorance of African affairs.

The first half of the book is largely organized chronologically while each chapter in the second half covers a region or theme in Canada-Africa relations. I focus on sub-Saharan Africa, but the northern part of the continent has been included where it fits the general pattern.

Prior to Confederation in 1867 the territories of current day Canada played a small part in the transatlantic slave trade. For over 200 years, New France and the British North America colonies held Africans in bondage and Canadians helped suppress Caribbean slave rebellions. Most significantly, the Atlantic provinces literally fed the slave system, generating great wealth selling cheap, high-protein cod to keep thousands of “enslaved people working 16 hours a day.”

As the European powers transitioned from stealing Africans to taking the continent’s resources, Canadians helped Britain and the Belgian King conquer various parts of the continent. Four hundred Canadians traveled halfway across the world to beat back anti-colonial resistance in the Sudan in 1885 while a decade and a half later thousands more fought in defence of British imperial interests in the southern part of the continent. Usually trained at Kingston’s Royal Military College, Canadians also led military expeditions, built rail lines and surveyed colonial borders across the continent.

At the same time as Canadians fought with the imperial forces, Canadian missionaries helped the colonial powers penetrate African society. Gripped by a desire to rid “darkest Africa” of “heathenism”, in 1893 a couple of Torontonians founded what later became the largest interdenominational Protestant mission on the continent. By the end of the colonial period as many as 2,500 Canadians were proselytizing across Africa.

These Christian activists sometimes worked alongside Canadian colonial officials. Hundreds of Canadians administered British colonies, even rising to become governor in Ghana, Northern Nigeria and Kenya. Throughout the various stages of the colonial project, Canada provided political, military, economic and moral support.

As independence struggles grew, Ottawa opposed or abstained on many anticolonial resolutions at the UN and repeatedly called for independence movements to be patient. Canadian officials regularly condemned liberation movements for engaging in armed struggle and despite delivering (free of charge) weaponry to the colonial powers, Ottawa never sold, let alone gave, arms to anticolonial movements.

Upon independence Canada immediately promoted participation in the Commonwealth (and later La Francophonie) as a way to keep African countries within the colonial fold. Ottawa also delivered aid in the hopes of dissuading newly independent countries from following wholly independent paths or falling under the influence of the Communist bloc.

But when African leaders strayed too far from Western dictates, Ottawa backed more coercive methods of maintaining its influence. The Canadian military played a significant role in overthrowing African independence leaders Patrice Lumumba and Kwame Nkrumah.

As the post–independence anticolonial spirit dissipated, the leading capitalist nations took the offensive. Since the mid-1980s Ottawa has pressed African countries to follow neoliberal economic prescriptions, spending tens of millions of dollars in Canadian “aid” to promote International Monetary Fund structural adjustment policies.

Canadian companies grabbed a significant share of the spoils of the neoliberal war on government. A number of Canadian corporations promoted, facilitated or profited from the privatization drive across the continent. While some prominent Canadian public utilities took over or managed state-owned companies, one relatively unknown Ottawa-based consulting firm led corporate Canada’s assault on Africa’s public sector.

Canadian mining corporations have been the main beneficiaries of “free market” reforms on the continent. Since the late 1980s Canadian mining investment in Africa has grown 150 fold, surpassing $30 billion. Extractive companies have benefited from aggressive government lobbying and a slew of “aid” initiatives to advance their interests. Yet Canadian mining companies are often bitterly resisted by local communities.

Nowhere have Canadian extractive companies been linked to more rights violations than in eastern Congo. Canadian officials also exacerbated conflict in that country and, with Senator Romeo Dallaire in the lead, have promulgated a remarkable deception about the terrible violence that has engulfed Africa’s Great Lakes region.

At the same time as the Canadian military became involved in Rwanda, racist Canadian soldiers tortured and killed Somalis in 1993. Then in 2006 Ottawa supported the violent US-Ethiopian invasion of Somalia.

Alongside the emerging US Africa Command (AFRICOM) Canadian forces have played a growing role in African military affairs. Ottawa exerts influence on the continent through its training initiatives and participation in regional security initiatives. Canadian naval vessels also patrolled the coast while the military sought to house equipment and soldiers in a number of African countries.

While deeply involved in African military affairs, Canadian officials largely turned a blind eye to the continent’s leading threats, namely corporate tax evasion and climate change. While Western commentators are quick to denounce corruption in Africa, they generally ignore the role multinationals play in it and the fact that the continent loses more from corporate tax evasion. Starving governments of much-needed income, many Canadian companies evade their African taxes through various morally and legally questionable means.

More than elsewhere, anthropogenic global warming poses a particularly profound threat to large swaths of the continent. Demonstrating near total indifference to the impact of global warming in Africa, the Canadian government has pushed to grow the global “carbon bomb”.

***

The twin political purposes of this book are to engender solidarity with Africans and antipathy towards Canada’s foreign-policy intelligentsia. Since 2012 at least three books have been published on Canadian foreign policy in Africa: Canada-Africa Relations: Looking Back, Looking Ahead, Canadian Foreign Policy in Africa: Regional Approaches to Peace, Security and Development and Canada and Africa in the New Millennium: The Politics of Consistent Inconsistency. Purported to be serious investigations, they instead demonstrate academia’s broad subservience to state and corporate power.

In the opening chapter of Canada-Africa Relations: Looking Back, Looking Ahead editors Rohinton Medhora and Yiagadeesen Samy write: “Even if very ad hoc and reactive, Canada’s engagement, whether it was for developmental reasons, peacekeeping, nation building, democracy promotion or human rights, reflected familiar Canadian values. Commercial interests, although present, have never been a defining feature of that relationship.”1 One wonders how the dispossession of First Nations fits their definition of “Canadian values”, but leaving this aside, Ottawa has repeatedly demonstrated its indifference to both democracy and human rights in Africa. Additionally, anyone with access to Google can easily find examples of corporations, particularly the mining industry, shaping Canadian policy in African countries.

Echoing Medhora and Samy, the author of Canadian Foreign Policy in Africa: Regional Approaches to Peace, Security and Development, Edward Akuffo, theorizes the “moral identity” supposedly driving policy. “Canada’s overall foreign-policy orientation is embedded in the maintenance of moral identity — the pursuit of humane oriented foreign-policy objectives, including human rights, human security and poverty alleviation.” For Akuffo “Canada’s moral identity is the core element of the non-imperial internationalist approach to Canadian foreign-policy in Africa. Non-imperial internationalism draws on constructivists’ approach to international relations and focuses on the role of ideas in shaping the identity and interests of actors in the international system.”2

According to Akuffo, Canadian politicians who make lofty pronouncements about aiding Africans are compelled to fulfill them otherwise they may lose their “moral identity”, which largely motivates Canadian policy towards the continent. The logic may be circular and his argument obviously downplays the influence of corporations and Washington over policy, but at least Akuffo is making clear the underlying assumption of most liberal foreign commentators: Listen to the high-minded statements Canadian officials make not what they actually do.

Academics can wax lyrical about the “Canadian values” or “moral identity” shaping policy in Africa because mainstream scholarship has largely sanitized Canadian foreign policy history. Ottawa’s decades long endorsement of colonialism in Africa, for instance, is almost entirely unacknowledged in the foreign-policy literature. In a chapter of Canada-Africa Relations: Looking Back, Looking Ahead devoted to diplomatic relations with the continent, Queens Professor David C. Elder notes that Canada opened its first trade office on the continent in South Africa in 1902 and that trade offices were established during the colonial period in the Congo, Egypt and Rhodesia.3 But he fails to point out how this represented a tacit diplomatic (among other realms) endorsement of colonial rule.

Elder is unable to mention this politically salient point because it runs counter to the large body of liberal scholarship glorifying Canadian foreign policy, especially the post-World War II period. For example, prominent foreign affairs writers Andrew Cohen and Jennifer Welsh call the 1940s and 50s the “Golden age” of Canadian diplomacy.4 Either these critics of Stephen Harper’s aggressive foreign policy back Ottawa’s support for colonialism in Africa, are ignorant of it or feel compelled to mythologize Canadian foreign policy history. (In scanning the literature one of the only explicit comments on Canada’s diplomatic endorsement of colonial rule I came across was in a PhD thesis titled At Arms Length: Canada’s Relations with Commonwealth West Africa 1957-1977. Chukwudi Pettson Onwumere notes, “direct official contact with black Africa was nonexistent, probably due to the colonial status of the African states and Canada’s close association with the African colonial powers, particularly Britain.”5 A few pages later Onwumere adds: “Ottawa had neither made any public utterances condemning British colonial policy nor had it requested the speeding up of the giving of independence to members of the Commonwealth either.”6)

While mainstream scholarship rarely strays far from the state and corporate perspective, the dominant media is even less critical. The corporate media (and CBC) permit only a narrow spectrum of opinion regarding Canadian policy in Africa.

Since 2008 Canada has concluded and/or signed fifteen African Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (FIPAs), which give Canadian corporations the right to sue governments internationally for pursuing policies that interfere with their profit making. But I was unable to find a single criticism of an African FIPA in a major Canadian news outlet. Even when Ottawa signed a long-lasting FIPA with an interim, military-dominated regime in Burkina Faso the media ignored it. Four major dailies refused to publish a (tame) opinion piece I submitted on this flagrant disregard for electoral democracy in Burkina Faso.

In probably the most remarkable example of media bias, criticism of Senator Romeo Dallaire’s actions in Rwanda have been almost entirely ignored by the Canadian media even though his commander published a book criticizing the Canadian general’s bias in favour of the Rwandan Patriotic Front. As mentioned in Chapter 12, a Canadian news search found only three mentions of Le Patron de Dallaire Parle (The Boss of Dallaire Speaks) by Jacques-Roger Booh Booh, a former Cameroon foreign minister and overall head of the mid-1990s UN mission in Rwanda. (A National Post review headlined “Allegations called ‘ridiculous’: UN boss attacks general,” an Ottawa Citizen piece headlined “There are many sides to the Rwanda saga” and a letter by an associate of Dallaire). Other critical assessments of Dallaire’s actions in Rwanda have fared no better including Enduring Lies: The Rwandan Genocide in the Propaganda System, 20 Years Later in which the authors “suggest that Dallaire should be regarded as a war criminal for positively facilitating the actual mass killings of April-July, rather than taken as a hero for giving allegedly disregarded warnings that might have stopped them.” On the other hand, a Canadian news search of “Romeo Dallaire Rwanda” elicited over 6,000 articles that generally provide a positive portrayal of Dallaire. Similarly, a search for mention of Dallaire’s 2003 book Shake Hands with the Devil elicited 1,700 articles.

While the dominant media rarely says so, western geostrategic interests and corporations generally drive policy. Popular opinion and pressure has played little role in shaping policy towards the continent. In Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64 Kevin Spooner provides a striking example. “At the departmental level, public opinion rarely seems to have been a concern. One External Affairs departmental memo enumerated no less than 10 major considerations in Canada’s Congo policy — public opinion did not make the list. Moreover, documents prepared by External Affairs and National Defence never emphasized public opinion as a significant matter.”7 Spooner is referring to Canada’s substantial role in the UN military mission that enabled the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, dealing a significant blow to that country, and the continent’s post-independence aspirations.

Since that time a number of social movements have emerged to challenge different elements of Canadian foreign policy on the continent. At the end of the 1960s some agitated against Canadian support for Portuguese rule in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau while in the 1970s and 80s a more significant movement campaigned against Canadian complicity with apartheid South Africa. More recently, diaspora communities have questioned Canadian backing of Rwandan dictator Paul Kagame and Ottawa’s silence concerning the illegal 2006 US/Ethiopian invasion of Somalia. A number of groups have also worked to expose Canadian mining abuses on the continent.

But we need a great deal more public engagement. Anthropogenic global warming and technological innovation has made it more important than ever for us to see ourselves as part of a collective humanity. We share a single planet and must begin to act like good neighbours to all who call Earth their home.

1. Profiting from Slavery

Ask Canadians what they know about the era of African slavery and most would mention the horrors of slave ships or the Underground Railway that brought American slaves to freedom. Far fewer would know that the colonies of present-day Canada played a role in the transatlantic slave trade. Almost none would understand the effects that slavery had on generations of Africans and the economic development of that continent.

The truth is that for over 200 years, New France and the British North America colonies held Africans in bondage. The first known African slave set foot in New France in 1605. The first recorded slave sale took place in 1628.1 There were at least 3,000 African slaves in present-day Québec, Ontario and the Maritimes.2 Leading historical figures such as René Bourassa, James McGill, Colin McNabb, Joseph Papineau and Peter Russell all owned slaves and some were strident advocates of the practice.3

Slavery was legal in New France. The 1709 Raudot Bill noted: “Negroes who have been purchased and who will be purchased, shall be property of those who have purchased them and will be their slaves.”4 Similarly, when the governor general of New France surrendered to the British in 1763 the treaty included a passage asserting that slaveholders “shall be at liberty to keep them in their service in the colony or sell them.”5

The French needn’t have worried about Britain ending slavery. In the 1760s and 1770s Nova Scotia offered extra land to prospective New England immigrants who brought slaves. Additionally, after conquering Quebec, Britain strengthened the laws that enabled slavery.6 In The Blacks in Canada, Robin Winks explains: “On three occasions explicit guarantees were given to slave owners that their property would be respected, and between 1763 and 1790 the British government added to the legal structures so that a once vaguely defined system of slavery took on clearer outlines.”7 It wasn’t until 1833 that slavery was abolished in today’s Canada and across the rest of the British Empire.

With no large-scale plantations, European settlers mainly employed slaves as house servants and farmworkers. Though not as brutal as plantation life in Haiti or Alabama, there was still significant resistance. In The Hanging of Angelique: The Untold Story of Canadian Slavery and the Burning of Old Montreal, Afua Cooper writes of a Montreal slave who set fire to her owner’s home upon learning she would be sold and separated from her lover. In the end, the fire destroyed forty-six buildings. After two months on the run, Marie-Joseph Angelique was captured, paraded through the city, tortured until she confessed and then hung.

It is little known that in the late 1700s, many Canadian slaves took an “underground railroad” southbound to Vermont and other Northern US states that had abolished slavery.8 Even more slaves journeyed to freedom in Michigan and New England after the war of 1812.9

“Canadians” propped up the transatlantic slave trade in a number of other ways. Canada helped the British quell Caribbean slave rebellions, most notably at the end of the 1700s. In 1791 the largely African-born slaves of Haiti (then called Saint-Domingue) revolted en masse in the world’s first and only successful large-scale slave revolution. Their uprising rippled through the region and compelled the post-French Revolution government in Paris to abolish slavery in its Caribbean colonies.

In a bid to crush the ex-slaves before their example spread to the English colonies, British forces invaded Haiti in 1793. For five years, London struggled to capture one of the world’s richest colonies, which had 450,000 slaves before the revolt.10

Halifax, which housed Britain’s primary naval base in North America, played its part in London’s efforts in the Caribbean. Much of the Halifax-based squadron arrived on the shores of the West Indies in 1793, and many of the ships that set sail to the Caribbean at this time were assembled in the town’s naval yard.11 Additionally, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick provided “sticks for the furnishing of a variety of naval stores, especially masts and spars, to the West Indies squadron at Jamaica, Antigua, and Barbados.”12

A number of prominent Canadian-born (or based) individuals fought to capture and re-establish slavery in the French colonies. Dubbed the “Father of the Canadian Crown”, Prince Edward Duke of Kent departed for the West Indies aboard a Halifax gunboat in 1793.13 As a Major General, he led forces that captured Guadalupe, St. Lucia and Martinique.14 Today, many streets and monuments across the country honour a man understood to have first applied the term “Canadian” to both the English and French inhabitants of Upper and Lower Canada.15

Other “Canadians” played a part in Britain’s effort to corner the lucrative Caribbean slave plantations. Born into a prominent Québec military family, Charles Michel Salaberry “was part of successful invasions of Saint-Dominique [Haiti], Guadeloupe and Martinique.”16 A few years after these conquests, Sir Gordon Drummond was dispatched to Jamaica and made second in command of British forces there from 1806 and 1808. Afterwards the Québec City born general returned to Montréal and became commander of British forces in North America.17 Many monuments still commemorate Drummond and Salaberry, including the city names of Drummondville and Salaberry-de-Valleyfield in Québec.

In the aftermath of the Haitian uprising the Maritimes was also used as a venue to release pressure on slaveholders. Jamaican plantation owners, increasingly fearful of slave resistance, sought to eradicate isolated settlements of Africans who escaped plantation life. After an uprising, 600 maroons and their families were expelled to Halifax in June 1796.18

In what may be “Canada’s” most significant contribution to the British war effort in the Caribbean, a dozen Nova Scotia privateers captured at least 57 enemy vessels in the West Indies between 1793 and 1805.19 Licensed by the state to seize enemy boats during wartime, “privateers were essential tools of war until the rise of large steam navies in the mid-nineteenth century.”20 But Nova Scotia privateers weren’t solely motivated by reasons of state. They sought to protect a market decimated by French privateers. In “A Private War in the Caribbean: Nova Scotia Privateering, 1793-1805”, Dan Conlin writes that “in a broader sense privateering was an armed defence of the [Maritimes’] West Indies market.”21

Outside of its role in suppressing Caribbean slave rebellions, the Maritimes literally fed the slave system for decades. In Emancipation Day, Natasha Henry explains: “Very few Canadians are aware that at one time their nation’s economy was firmly linked to African slavery through the building and sale of slave ships, the sale and purchase of slaves to and from the Caribbean, and the exchange of timber, cod, and other food items from the Maritimes for West-Indian slave-produced goods.”22

A central component of the economy revolved around providing the resources that enabled slavery. Nova Scotia and Newfoundland generated great wealth selling cheap, high-protein food to keep millions of “enslaved people working 16 hours a day.”23 In Cod: A Biography of the Fish that Changed the World, Mark Kurlansky explains: “In the 17th century, the strategy for sugar production, a labor-intensive agro-industry, was to keep the manpower cost down through slavery. At harvest time, a sugar plantation was a factory with slaves working 16 hours or more a day — chopping cane by hand as close to the soil as possible, burning fields, hauling cane to a mill, crushing, boiling. To keep working under the tropical sun the slaves needed salt and protein. But plantation owners did not want to waste any valuable sugar planting space on growing food for the hundreds of thousands of Africans who were being brought to each small Caribbean island. The Caribbean produced almost no food. At first slaves were fed salted beef from England, but New England colonies [as well as Newfoundland and Nova Scotia] soon saw the opportunity for salt cod as cheap, salted nutrition.”24

In Capitalism and Slavery, post-independence Trinidad and Tobago Prime Minister Eric Williams highlights the role of cod in the Caribbean plantations: “The Newfoundland fishery depended to a considerable extent on the annual export of dried fish to the West Indies, the refuse or ‘poor John’ fish, ‘fit for no other consumption’.”25

High quality cod from today’s Atlantic Canada was sent to the Mediterranean while the reject fish was sold to Caribbean slave-owners. In time “West India cure” became the commercial name for the lowest quality salt cod, which “represented a steadily increasing percentage of the output of New England, Nova Scotia, and to a lesser degree, Newfoundland.” Kurlansky further explains that Nova Scotia had a specialized role in providing the Caribbean with low-quality dried cod.26

The fish was often of such poor quality it induced illness. In The Cod Fisheries: The History of an International Economy, famed Canadian economist Harold Innis quotes a politician’s 1832 speech: “These slave owners talk of high feeding and low feeding their slaves … Those who low feed them will purchase for them any cheap article of food, no matter how stale or unpalatable it may be so that it will support nature and prolong their miserable existence.”27

From 1770-1773 Newfoundland and Nova Scotia sent 60,620 quintals (one quintal equals 100 pounds) and 6,280 barrels of cod to the West Indies, which comprised 40% of all imports.28 These numbers increased significantly after the American Revolution resulted in a ban on US trade to the British Caribbean colonies.29 In 1789 alone 58 vessels carried 61,862 quintals of fish from Newfoundland to the Caribbean Islands.30

(A century later Newfoundland’s cod industry once again shaped West African history. In 1904 France renounced fishing privileges in Newfoundland, which included the right to dry cod on land, for British territorial concessions in West and Central Africa. The 1904 Anglo-French Newfoundland Fisheries Convention notes: “France gained favourable adjustments of both the Nigerian and Gambian boundaries, a right of transit on the River Gambia, and the Iles de Los off French Guinea.”31)

The cod industry suffered after the abolition of slavery in the British West Indies.32 Between 1833 and 1834 the price of Nova Scotia cod dropped from fifteen shillings per quintal to ten shillings and six pence.33 In Halifax: Warden of the North, Thomas Raddall recalls the impact of slavery’s end on the Atlantic provinces: “It is strange to reflect that the abolition of Negro slavery in parts of the Caribbes had changed the lives of a province of free whites two thousand miles to the north. Abolition in the British West Indies in 1833 ruined the old system of vast sugar plantations with their ever busy distilleries, and dried up the Gulf Stream of cheap rum which for nearly a century had flowed to Nova Scotia in the holds of the fish and lumber traders.”34

Halifax capitalists exporting fish, lumber and flour to the slave colonies during the latter half of the 18th century and early part of the 19th made great fortunes.35 Arguably the wealthiest and most powerful businessman operating in mid-1700s Halifax, Joshua Mauger, made his fortune trading in the Caribbean. He shipped fish and lumber to the West Indies obtaining molasses and sugar in exchange.

Mauger imported slave-made products as well as human cargo. Raddall notes, “another settler well supplied with Negro labour was Joshua Mauger, a diligent and artful schemer who had laid the foundation of a fortune in the West Indian slave trade and still manned his ships with faithful blacks.”36 In May 1752 alone, Mauger advertised six slaves for sale.37 In Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia, John Brebner notes: “The early [Halifax] newspapers reveal a constant business in Negro slaves, either by an importer like Mauger or by individuals.”38 To this day, Mauger remains honoured. There is a beach named after him on McNab Island in Nova Scotia and the small New Brunswick town of Maugerville keeps his memory alive.39

As could be expected in a country with such a large financial sector, Canadian banks also had a connection to African slavery. Much of the capital used to establish the current incarnation of the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce came from supplying the Caribbean slave colonies. The Halifax Banking Company was the first bank in Nova Scotia and the founding unit of today’s CIBC. Still one of Canada’s five largest banks, this institution held a grand open house in 2010 to celebrate its 185th anniversary at the Barrington and Duke branch, which they proudly described as “the very first opened by the Halifax Banking Company on September 3, 1825.”40

The Halifax Banking Company’s leading shareholder and initial president, Enos Collins, was a ship owner and privateer. Considered one of the richest men in North America by the end of his life, a biography notes how Collins recalled, “there were many things that happened [during his time in the West Indies] that we don’t care to talk about.”41 The book speculates that as a privateer in the Caribbean during the early 1800s he likely captured and resold slaves.42

Uninterested or unaware of his ties to slavery, in February 2013 Stephen Harper’s Conservative government renamed a federal government office in Amherst, Nova Scotia, the Enos Collins Building. “I am delighted that this building is being named in honour of Enos Collins, who played a crucial role in the War of 1812,” said Minister of Public Works and Government Services Rona Ambrose.43

Another one of the eight founding shareholders of the Halifax Banking Company was steamship pioneer Samuel Cunard. In the early 1800s, Cunard’s vessels brought cod and lumber to the West Indies and returned with rum, molasses and sugar.44 He made great sums of money off this trade and set up one of the most important transatlantic steamship lines, which continues to operate as part of the multinational Cunard Cruise Line.

As a reflection of the business communities’ ties to the Caribbean trade, the Halifax Banking Company set up operations in the West Indies before establishing itself in Montréal or Toronto. In 1837, the Halifax Banking Company developed formal ties with the Colonial Bank — now Barclays — in the Caribbean.45 A History of the Canadian Bank of Commerce, which spends a hundred pages on the Halifax Banking Company, explains: “It may well be imagined that this agreement gave great satisfaction to Enos Collins, the old seafarer, who had traded in all these ports, and who now saw the bank which he had been instrumental in founding, equipped with a network of connections extending all over the scene of his early exploits.”46

But the CIBC is not the only Canadian bank with a connection to the slave trade. According to Canadian Banks and Global Competitiveness, the first President of Scotia Bank, William Lawson, “had extensive dealings in the West Indies” when the bank opened in 1832.

And, of course, the shipbuilding industry, still a pillar of the Halifax economy, owes a great deal of its growth to the late 1700s West Indies carrying trade. In Maritime Capital, Eric W. Sager explains, “the West Indies trade was a major stimulus to shipbuilding and ship owning in the Maritimes. Natural advantages by themselves did not create this stimulus.”47

While capitalists in the colonies that became Canada grew rich off the slave economy, the people of Africa were profoundly scarred. And that’s not even counting those who were directly enslaved.

As John Charles Hatch, writing in The History of Britain in Africa, describes it: “The slave trade retarded orderly progress and development in West Africa. Concentration on the profitable nature of the trade discouraged the development of agriculture and industry. Tools, clothing and manufactures were more easily obtainable by selling men and women to the Europeans than by producing them in Africa itself. The art of ironworking, pottery, textiles, the production of brass and copper wares, all deteriorated in the face of this cheap competition. Slave raiding and slave warfare destroyed political progress and created such uncertain conditions as to make any constructive future planning impossible. Life was for the moment; society itself had no stability or continuity.”

The trans-Atlantic slave trade was incredibly destructive for Africa. Over ten million Africans were taken from the continent between 1600 and 1850.48 Some two million more were killed before leaving the continent and another two million Africans died during the Atlantic crossing.49

Very few slaves (or their descendants) returned. In How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Walter Rodney writes, “on every other continent from the fifteenth century onwards, the population showed constant and sometimes spectacular natural increase; while it is striking that the same did not apply to Africa.”50 Between 1650 and 1850 sub-Saharan Africa’s population remained constant while Europe’s rose fourfold and Asia’s three and a half times.51 In Slavery and African Life Patrick Manning calculates that Africa’s population in 1850 was half of what it would have been without the slave trade.52 But, the population loss, of mostly young, able-bodied individuals explains only a small part of this stagnation. The slave trade undermined agricultural and industrial development. It drove communities to exchange human beings for tools, weapons and other goods rather than produce them. Fear of enslavement also exacerbated ethnic fractionalization on the continent. In The Archaeology of Slavery C. M. Kusimba writes “insecurity confined people within ethnic boundaries, thus constricting spheres of interaction.”53

European demand for human chattel abetted violence across Africa. With most of those sold into bondage captured in warfare, the transatlantic slave trade spurred war. Some African wars were fought, Rodney notes, “for the sole purpose of getting prisoners for sale to Europeans.”54

A good number of human beings were captured to acquire the weaponry to wage future wars. African bodies served as a main currency for which Europeans would exchange their guns in what’s been dubbed the “gun-slave cycle”. Eric Williams writes, “It was a common saying that the price of a Negro was one Birmingham gun.”55

To acquire weapons, numerous African nations and chiefs were compelled to capture others to protect their communities. Enslaving people, in other words, gave African kingdoms access to the weaponry that could deter others from enslaving them.

While the colonies that became Canada played but a small part in the transatlantic slave trade, it is important to confront the reality of our history and not simply pretend that we were the “good guys” compared to our southern neighbours. Canadians took part in an economy that maimed, tortured and killed millions. It also sowed instability, division and underdevelopment in much of Africa while spurring commerce and generating wealth here.

2. Brute Capitalism

“In former years the universal aim was to steal the African from Africa. Today the determination of Europe is to steal Africa from the African.”

– Alexander Mackay, British missionary to Uganda, 18891

Around the same time as Confederation, when Canadian businessmen decided it was in their economic interest to create a new country from the Atlantic to the Pacific, European capitalists were looking for opportunities in Africa. And some of the skills learned in dispossessing First Nations, putting down the Riel Rebellions and transforming the northern most part of North America into a vast profit-generating economy would prove useful in the conquest of Africa.

But the story used to justify this economic and political conquest, and Canadian participation therein, was generally cloaked in fine sounding phrases, religion, or the rhetoric of pseudo-science. (In an example of social Darwinism an 1899 editorial in the Toronto Mail and Empire, which later merged with The Globe, explained that “partly by the process of natural selection of the fittest, there had devolved upon Britain the task of controlling and administering vast territories in the tropics with enormous populations.”2)

Interestingly, after dominating the slave trade for much of a century, the British shamelessly justified colonial expeditions through the need to stop slavery. Three hundred years of draining Africa of its people quickly morphed into a bid for the continent’s natural resources.

Previously stuck on the coast, in the mid-1800s European ‘explorers’ were now reaching ever further into the continent. Largely representing various business interests, hundreds of Europeans mapped the continent and began staking their claims. Individuals such as David Livingstone, Henry Morton Stanley, Carl Peters, Henry Hamilton Johnston and Pierre Paul de Brazza became world famous as African “explorers”.

As these individuals pushed their way across the continent, governments began taking on a greater role. The European “scramble for Africa” was formalized at a multi-country conference held in Germany in 1884-85. Nominally convened to discuss eradicating the slave trade, controlling arms sales and protecting missionaries, the “Berlin Conference” established the ground rules for carving up the continent.3 In a bid to avoid war among themselves, the European powers decided African territory could only be formally claimed once effectively occupied. The fourteen states represented in the German capital also agreed to notify each other about their territorial plans and granted Belgian King Leopold II the area along the Congo River to administer as a free trade/navigation zone.

Prime Minister Salisbury (Robert Cecil), head of the British delegation to the Berlin Conference, later explained the European powers’ actions: “We have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no white man’s foot has ever trod; We have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small impediment that we never knew exactly where the mountains and rivers and lakes were.”4

Europeans controlled about 10 percent of the continent in 1870 but by 1914 only Ethiopia was independent of European control (with Liberia effectively a US colony).5 During this defining period of European colonialism thousands of Canadians helped Britain (and the Belgian King) conquer Africa. Four hundred Canadians traveled halfway across the world to beat back anti-colonial resistance in the Sudan while thousands more fought in defence of British imperial interests in the southern part of the continent. Canadians also led military expeditions, built rail lines and surveyed colonial borders.

The Royal Military College (RMC) in Kingston, Ontario, was the training ground for many of the Canadians who helped colonize Africa. Opened in 1876, the RMC was partly designed to train “proper white gentlemen”, in the words of Canadian Army Journal editor Andrew B. Godefroy, to be officers of British imperialism.6 “Suffering from its own shortage of officers, especially those with technical educations and military training, the British Army offered over a dozen commissions annually to graduates of RMC during the 1880s.”7 And the annual allotment was supplanted with more sizable recruitment drives on a number of occasions. In its first decade and a half, four times more graduates of “Canada’s West Point” were commissioned into the British army than the Canadian Permanent Force or Royal Canadian Mounted Police.8

Between 1880 and 1900 RMC-trained soldiers participated in at least 28 imperial campaigns, mostly in Africa.9 Over the next 15 years ex-RMC cadets fought in dozens more expeditions.

Most of the RMC graduates who fought in Africa were commissioned to the Royal Engineers, Royal Artillery or Royal Infantry. But many Canadian soldiers in Africa remained officers in the Canadian Permanent Force (militia) and were simply seconded to British units. In Bush Warfare Godefroy notes, “Canadians serving both in the Canadian and British Armies played a substantial role there in shaping the future of that continent.”10

The editor of the Canadian Army Journal further describes the importance of Canadian officers to British policy in Africa. “As the British Empire continued to expand its influence across the African continent, its forces and in particular its officer corps were overstretched. Constantly increasing demands for new subalterns since the end of the Second Afghan War (1870-1880), especially technically trained ones such as artillery officers and engineers, pushed the War Office in London to begin scouting for new officers among its colonies to fill the widening gap. Canada offered a tempting and easy source. With a nascent army of its own and a recently created Royal Military College that showed great promise and focused on technical education and training, the country soon became the preferred audience for targeted recruiting for British operational needs overseas.”11

Thrusting the “scramble” forward, Britain invaded Egypt in 1882. In Canadians on the Nile, 1882-1898 Roy MacLaren describes Canada’s connection to this conquest: “[British commanding General Garnet] Wolseley and his two lieutenants in Egypt, Graham and Buller, had all served in Canada. Two future Governor Generals of Canada and the commanding officer of the Canadian militia served under Wolseley in Egypt in 1882, and a former Governor General was assigned the conundrum of what to do with Egypt. And Egypt in 1882 did not merely involve British officers who had served in Canada. Canadians serving in British forces were also present.”12

At least 10 Canadians helped Britain assert control over North East Africa. RMC graduate Wyatt Rawson played a substantial role in the final defeat of Egyptian nationalists at Tel-el-Kebir. An aide-de-camp to General Wolseley, the Québec City born Rawson led a brigade of men on an important silent night march across a flat desert. The Royal Navy lieutenant used his knowledge of celestial navigation, acquired during an expedition in the Arctic, to gain enemy positions without being easily spotted.13

About 2,000 Egyptians were killed at Tel-el-Kebir, while only 57 British troops died in this final battle of a two-month campaign to crush the nationalist resistance.14 In its celebration of the battle at Tel-el-Kebir the Ottawa Daily Citizen declared, “Belonging to the Empire” is “our proudest political boast. Ours its greatness, ours its wealth, ours its treasure, ours its security, ours its renown.”15

London’s immediate aim in Egypt was to ensure debt repayments continued to flow northwards. They also wanted to secure control over the recently built Suez Canal, which had become a strategic route to Britain’s lucrative Indian and Far East colonies. Britain would maintain predominant influence over Egypt for seven decades.
The British conquest of Egypt accelerated intra-European rivalry in Africa. It also led Canada to participate in a major military expedition on Egypt’s southern border.

When Britain occupied Egypt it took control of the Sudan, which had been under Egyptian rule for half a century. But indigenous forces increasingly challenged foreign rule. Tens of thousands of Sudanese laid siege to British/Egyptian controlled Khartoum from March 13, 1884, to January 26, 1885. After cutting the 60,000-person city off from its supplies, the indigenous forces wrested control of Khartoum from famed English General Charles Gordon.

Four hundred Canadian boatmen were recruited to transport soldiers and supplies to rescue Gordon and defend Britain’s position on the upper Nile.16 A veteran of the 1870 Red River expedition to defeat Louis Riel in Manitoba, the British General in charge of the mission to save Gordon explicitly requested “Canadian Voyageurs”. General Wolseley believed these Canadian watermen, with experience in the fur trade, were best suited to navigate the raging cataracts of the Nile River.17

Revealing their racist sentiment, some Voyageurs told the Toronto Globe that Egyptians were “filthy”, “detestable” and “dirty”.18 Another more sympathetic Voyageur described the impact of the expedition on communities along the Nile. “We unavoidably did more or less damage to the crops, which must’ve caused serious loss to these poor people by whom… every inch of the spare soil is utilized.”19

Arguing in favour of the expedition, the Toronto Daily Mail claimed “Central Africa is not destined to remain always in the condition in which it is found today. The interest which is beginning to be concentrated upon the valley of the Nile are [sic] watched. There are also many indications of the feeling that exists throughout the civilized world that the Dark Continent is to be the next great theater upon which the dominant races of man are destined to play a conspicuous and important part.”20

The Voyageurs were deployed to Sudan under the British flag. But Canadian officials helped recruit the men, got some of them leave and organized a farewell for the expedition.21 They also celebrated the expedition’s return and provided them with a special commemorative medal.22 John A. McDonald’s government was even prepared to help Britain recruit three battalions if further reinforcements were needed in Sudan.23

Militaristic minded Canadians celebrated the Voyageurs’ contribution to creating a sense of Canadian nationhood. In a history of the expedition Roy MacLaren notes, “the Canadian boatman had shown in a unique fashion that Canada was indeed becoming a nation.”24

Benefiting from the mission’s profile, Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Denison, who led the Canadian boatmen, became a Conservative Member of Parliament (West Toronto) two years afterwards and today the names of the Canadians who ventured to Sudan are recorded in the book of remembrance in the memorial chamber of the Peace Tower on Parliament Hill.25

The Voyageurs weren’t the only Canadians deployed to Sudan. A Canadian Regiment of Artillery Major-General James “Cupid” Wilson fought with the Royal Artillery. His fighting was “Mentioned in Dispatches”, a form of recognition for bravery in action, and he was decorated with Egypt’s Khedive Star.26 Wilson was recalled from the Sudan to help quell the Métis-led North West Rebellion in Saskatchewan.27 Throughout these missions Wilson received his pay from Ottawa.28

Son of an influential Toronto politician, Commander Edmund Van Koughnet held a number of positions with the Royal Navy in Sudan.29 Van Koughnet led his unit on a long desert trek, commanded a navy steamer and was in charge of a vessel’s machine gun battery during a bloody battle near Khartoum. Under General Wolseley’s command, Van Koughnet was awarded the campaign medal and Khedive Bronze Star.30

Another Canadian helped plan the Nile expedition from London. As Director of Supplies and Transport at the War Office, Nova Scotia’s Arthur Lawrence Haliburton was “intimately connected with its complicated planning and organization.”31 Director of supplies and transport from 1878 to 1888, the King’s College (Halifax) educated Haliburton was assistant under-secretary of state for war and under-secretary at the War Office between 1888 and 1897.

As director of supplies and transport, Lord Halliburton oversaw the provisioning of a half-dozen British wars in Africa. His biography notes, “In 1879 came the Zulu war: this was followed in rapid succession by the first Transvaal War, by the Tel-el-Kebir campaign, by General Graham’s operations in the Sudan in 1884, by the Bechuanaland Expedition, and by the operations up the Nile and round Suakin, undertaken in the vain hope of relieving general Gordon and ‘smashing the Mahdi at Khartoum.’”32 As assistant under-secretary of state for war and under-secretary at the War Office, Halliburton planned numerous other military campaigns in Africa.

While this author found little information about Halliburton’s specific planning actions, a footnote from a biography published in 1913 provides a sense of his attitude towards Africans. “[Charles Dickens character] Caddy Jellyby, whose views on Africa were summed up in the comprehensive verdict that Africa was a beast, was one of Lord Halliburton’s favorite characters in fiction.”33 Dickens’ portrayal of Africa has been criticized as racist.34 For his significant contribution to British imperialism, the Queen conferred the peerage on Arthur Halliburton. According to his biography, “as a loyal Canadian he took the title of ‘Baron Haliburton of Windsor, in the province of Nova Scotia and Dominion of Canada.’”35

Despite failing to save Gordon or maintain control of Khartoum, British forces left a great many dead. In one battle 300 to 400 Sudanese died with 14 killed on the Egyptian/British side.36 In another confrontation 1,100 Sudanese lost their lives in contrast to the 74 British/Egyptian fighters who died.37

While Britain had overwhelming superiority of arms, moving men and supplies up the Nile was incredibly laborious. As such, the Sudanese “Mahdist” forces captured Khartoum before the British reinforcements reached the city. With Gordon dead and the expedition having various logistical difficulties, they put off attempting to recapture Khartoum.

Though defeated in the Sudan, the British were ultimately undeterred. A decade later, in Queen Victoria’s words, they “avenged” the death of Gordon and secured control of the Upper Nile.38

RMC graduate Lieutenant James Jay Bleecker Farley participated in the 1896 Dongola Expedition into northern Sudan. Up to 1,000 Mahdist soldiers were killed by the British-led forces (20 Egyptians died on the British side). In a speech at the RMC, Farley described participating in a number of skirmishes. “One of our patrols, after a very exciting chase, succeeded in capturing three ‘suspicious looking niggers,’ but they only turned out to be harmless villagers and rather badly frightened ones at that.”39

Montreal-born Sir Edouard Percy Girouard made a significant contribution to reconquering Sudan. The RMC graduate and former junior civil engineer with the Canadian Pacific Railway oversaw the construction of two hard-to-build rail lines from southern Egypt towards Khartoum. Queen Victoria’s Little Wars explains, “The problems involved in building a railway into a desert inhabited by hostile tribesmen were formidable. Railway experts and experienced soldiers alike agreed that it was an impractical idea but [British commander Herbert] Kitchener disagreed and Girouard made it a reality.”40

The railway allowed British forces to bypass 800 km of treacherous boating, which made moving troops and supplies much easier than during the time of the Canadian Voyageurs. Describing the strategic value of the rail he helped build, Girouard wrote: “It had now become possible with convenience and speed to send into the heart of the Sudan great armies independent of the season of the year and of the resources of the country; to supply them not only with abundant food and ammunition, but with all the varied paraphernalia of scientific war. … Though the battle was not yet fought, the victory was won.”41

The British re-conquest of the Sudan was a slaughter. At least three Canadians participated in the final battle at Omdurman where some 11,000 Sudanese were killed and 16,000 wounded.42 Forty-eight British/Egyptian soldiers were killed and about 400 wounded. According to Winston Churchill and other witnesses, at least 100 injured Sudanese were murdered after the battle.43 Additionally, British gunboats shelled civilians in Omdurman and the city was subsequently looted.44

Winston Churchill reported on the aftermath of the battle. “Here was where the artillery had opened on the swarming masses. Men had fallen in little groups of five or six to each shell. Nearer to the zeriba — about 1000 yards from it — the musketry had begun to tell, and the dead lay evenly scattered about — one every 10 yards. 200 yards further the full force of the fire — artillery, Maxims and rifles — had burst on them. In places desperate rushes to get on at all costs had been made by devoted fearless men. In such places the bodies lay so thickly as to hide the ground. Occasionally there were double layers of this hideous covering. Once I saw them lying three deep. In a space not exceeding 100 yards square more than 400 corpses lay festering.”45 Girouard’s rail enabled this killing and paved the way to six decades of British rule.

After successfully laying track towards Khartoum, Girouard was appointed president of the Egyptian State Railway and was given the British military’s prestigious Distinguished Service Order.46 Some considered Girouard’s contribution to the re-conquest of the Sudan second in importance only to General Kitchener.47 At an 1899 dinner in Montréal Canadian minister of militia Frederick Borden celebrated Girouard’s work. “Major Girouard has added luster, not only to his own name, but also to Montréal, to the dominion of Canada. He has also added luster to that military Institute of learning, the Royal Military College of Canada, which has sent out so many able graduates, a number of whom are in the Imperial Army and who have distinguished themselves.”48

British officials agreed with this assessment, as Girouard would be called on to oversee rail construction in south, west and east Africa. “Girouard occupies a central place in the historiography of railway development in Africa,” explains John Mwaruvie in an article on the Canadian imperialist’s career.49 “As the most experienced and successful authority on railway construction in Africa”, adds A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, Girouard would write several books detailing the strategic importance of railways.50

Girouard wasn’t the only Canadian tasked with building railway during the Scramble for Africa. To the south of Sudan, a number of Canadians helped survey possible rail routes from the East African Coast to Lake Victoria Nyanza on the border between modern Uganda and Kenya. The objective was to strengthen Britain’s grip over recalcitrant indigenous groups and to better integrate the area into the Empire’s North East Africa-India corridor.51 The railway also enabled the movement of commodities to international ports.52

Halifax-born Sir Philip Geoffrey Twining was sent by the Royal Engineers to Mombasa in 1891 to survey railway routes inland.53 The 29-year-old led a 10-month expedition that surveyed over 4,000 km.54 Twining was joined by another RMC-trained cadet, Huntley Brodie MacKay.55 Having already served British imperialism in West and South Africa, the Kingston-born MacKay was appointed acting administrator of the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC).56 Owned by British India Steam Navigation Company founder William Mackinnon, the IBEAC was granted the right to tax, administer justice and make treaties in 1888. The forerunner of the East Africa Protectorate, which became Kenya, in 1891 the IBEAC applied to the Commandant of the RMC for graduates to enter their service.57

To extend IBEAC control northwards from Mombasa the British Admiralty led the Witu Expedition in 1890. IBEAC leader Huntley MacKay was first over the wall and into the town in the decisive battle that left 100 locals dead and wounded (12 were hurt on the British side).58 British forces also burned Witu and a number of other “minor villages that offered resistance as well as [the second biggest centre] Mkonumbi.”59 After the Witu Expedition the IBEAC garrisoned the area with an Indian Police force.60

The IBEAC was bought out by London and soon thereafter British officials began promoting white settlement. The British encouraged European migration to modern Kenya by giving land to settlers on leases as long as 999 years.61 In White Mischief James Fox explains, “the first wave of settlers arrived in 1903 from Britain, Canada, Australia and South Africa. The photographs depict them as ‘Fortyniners’ from the Yukon [gold rush].”62

Many of the Canadians who settled in Kenya migrated from South Africa after fighting in the Second Boer War (see below).63 Just after the war RMC graduate George Henry Ronald Harris worked as a mining engineer for the East Africa Syndicates. After a stint with the Canadian Mounted Rifles in South Africa Walter D.M. Bell hunted elephants and sold ivory in British East Africa. In one single day he killed nine bull (male) elephants and over two decades of hunting he felled another thousand.64

Canadian/American businessman Sir Northrup McMillan was a prominent member of the white settler community. According to Origins of European Settlement in Kenya, McMillan “was allowed to purchase 14,351 acres in addition to the 15,000 acres acquired from the Crown in his own and his wife’s name.”65

The former “Cattle King of Ontario” did even better. Origins of European Settlement in Kenya explains that “Canadian timber merchant, F. R. Lingham received a 50-year lease over 128,000 acres of the Eldama Ravine forest and 50 acres of valuable waterfront land at Kilindini harbor.”66 Among the largest estates in the colony, this property was shared between Lingham and Ewart Grogan, president of the Colonists Association. While little is recorded about Lingham’s attitude towards Africans, his partner in the “Grogan and Lingham syndicate” was notoriously racist and brutal. Grogan wrote “the African native… is fundamentally inferior in mental development and ethical possibilities… to the white man… On principle he never tells the truth.”67

From Kenya to the Congo Canadians helped conquer Africa. Canadian doctor Rolph Leslie participated in an expedition organized by Belgian King Leopold II into the Congo in 1884. For his services the University of Toronto graduate was decorated with the Order of Leopold and the Congo Star.68

William Grant Stairs played an important role in two controversial expeditions to expand European influence over Central Africa. Like many in Halifax, the Stairs family’s wealth was partly accrued by stocking the Caribbean slave system. A family biography explains: “By 1787-88 he [John Stairs] was sending cargoes of fish, hogsheads (barrels), salmon, shingles, lumber and cod liver oil to Grenada, in exchange for rum… Much of what John was shipping to Grenada was either to construct houses for slave masters or to make containers to export sugar and molasses and other commodities to Britain, and much of the food went to feeding slaves.”69

In 1887 Stairs joined the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition, which was ostensibly designed to “rescue” the British-backed governor of Equatoria, the southern part of today’s South Sudan. An appointment of General Charles Gordon, the Emin Pasha was thought to be threatened by the “Mahdist” forces that displaced the British from Khartoum in 1885. The aforementioned Scottish merchant, William MacKinnon, asked famed American “explorer” Henry Morton Stanley to lead a relief effort. Framed as a mission of mercy, according to The Last Expedition, “MacKinnon wanted Stanley to act as British East African Company agent, negotiating treaties and trading agreements on behalf of the company with the kings and chiefs through whose territories the expedition passed.”70 Partly successful on this front, another aim of the expedition was to get access to the area’s ivory.71

At the time of the expedition King Leopold II, for whom he had helped carve out the “Congo Free State”, employed Stanley. Seeing an opportunity to add to his already large personal colony, Leopold wanted Stanley to take a circuitous route all the way around South Africa, up the Congo River and across the interior of the continent.

While not an official British expedition, the War Office supported Stanley’s mission.72 One of ten whites, Stairs quickly became second-in-command of “the most ambitious, most expensive, and, ultimately, most disastrous expedition in Anglo African history.”73

Read from a humanistic or internationalist perspective, the RMC graduate’s diary of the three-year expedition is incredibly damning. Or, as prominent poet George Elliott Clarke put it, “Stairs’ account of his atrocities establishes that even Canadians, blinded by racism, can become swashbuckling mass murderers.”74

Stairs’ extensive diary, which he asked to be published upon his and Stanley’s death, makes it clear that locals regularly opposed the mission. One passage notes, “The natives made a tremendous noise all night and canoes came close to us, the natives yelling frantically for us to go away” while another entry explains, “the natives destroyed their food rather than let it fall into the hands of the invaders.”75

Stairs repeatedly admits to “ransacking the place”.76 A December 11, 1887 diary entry notes: “Out again at the natives, burned more houses and cut down more bananas; this time we went further up the valley and devastated the country there. In the afternoon [white officer, A. J. Mounteney] Jephson and I went up to some high hills at the back of the camp and burnt all we could see, driving off a lot of natives like so much game. I managed to capture some six goats and yesterday I also got six, which we gave to the men. The natives now must be pretty sick of having their property destroyed in the way we are doing, but it serves them right as they were the aggressors and after taking our cloth, fired on us.”77

On a number of occasions the expedition displayed mutilated bodies or severed heads as a “warning” to the locals.78 Stairs notes, “I often wonder what English people would say if they knew of the way in which we go for these natives; friendship we don’t want as then we should get very little meat and probably have to pay for the bananas. Every male native capable of using the bow is shot. This, of course, we must do. All the children and women are taken as slaves by our men to do work in the camps.”79

Stairs led numerous raiding parties to gather “carriers”, which were slaves in all but name.80 According to The Last Expedition, “[the mission] routinely captured natives, either to be ransomed for food, to get information, or simply to be used as guides for a few days.”81

To cross the continent the expedition relied on its superior firepower, which included the newly created 600-bullet-per-minute Maxim gun. Stairs describes one battle, stating that his men were “ready to land and my Maxim ready to murder them if they should dare to attack us.”82 On another day the firearm aficionado explained, “I cleaned the Maxim gun up thoroughly and fired some 20 or 30 rounds at some howling natives on the opposite bank.”83 Twenty months into the mission Stairs coyly admits “by what means have we traveled over 730 miles of country from the Congo to the lake? Why by rifle alone, by shooting and pillaging.”84

Beyond the immediate death and destruction, the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition opened new areas of the African interior to Arab slave traders and it is thought to be the source of a sleeping sickness epidemic that ravaged the region.85 The expedition was also devastating for its participants. With little food and much abuse from the white officers, only 253 of the 695 African porters and soldiers who started the mission survived.86 Additionally, hundreds of other Africans who became part of the expedition at later stages died as well.

There are disturbing claims that some white officers took sex slaves and in one alarming instance even paid to have an 11-year-old girl cooked and eaten. This story scandalized the British public.87

For his part, Stairs became almost pathologically inhumane. His September 28, 1887 diary entry notes: “It was most interesting, lying in the bush and watching the natives quietly at their days work; some women were pounding the bark of trees preparatory to making the coarse native cloth used all along this part of the river, others were making banana flower by pounding up dried bananas, men we could see building huts and engaged at other such work, boys and girls running about, singing, crying, others playing on a small instrument common all over Africa, a series of wooden strips, bent over a bridge and twanged with the thumb and forefinger. All was as it was every day until our discharge of bullets, when the usual uproar of screaming of women took place.”88

Even with some criticizing the expedition in Britain, Stairs’ efforts were celebrated in Canada. An honouring committee established by the mayor of Halifax decided to give him a sword made in London of Nova Scotia steel and the city organized a reception attended by the Lieutenant-Governor with a military band playing “Here the Conquering Hero Comes.”89

Within two years of the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition Stairs helped King Leopold II conquer the resource-rich Katanga region of the Congo. Suggested to Leopold by British investors and having already impressed Stanley with his brutality, Stairs headed up a heavily armed mission that swelled to 2,000.90

The goal of the expedition was to extend Leopold’s authority over the Katanga region and to get a piece of the copper, ivory and gold trade. Stairs’ specific objective was to get Msiri, the ruler of the region, “to submit to the authorities of the Congo Free State, either by persuasion or by force.”91 In his diary Stairs says more or less as much, writing that his goals were “above all, to be successful with regard to Msiri ... to discover mines in Katanga that can be exploited ... to make some useful geographic discoveries.”92 Investigating the area’s suitability for European settlement and for raising domestic animals were other aims of the mission.

As leader of the mission Stairs prepared a daily journal for the Compagnie du Katanga. It details the terrain, resources and inhabitants along the way as well as other information that could assist in exploiting the region.93 It also explains his personal motivations for taking on the task despite spotty health. “I wasn’t happy [garrisoned with the Royal Engineers in England] in the real sense of the word. I felt my life passing without my doing anything worthwhile. Now I am freely making my way over the coastal plain with more than 300 men under my orders. My least word is law and I am truly the master.”94 Later, he describes his growing force and power. “I have thus, under my orders, 1350 men — quite a little army.”95

Stairs admitted to using slaves even though Leopold’s mission to the Congo was justified as a humanistic endeavour to stop the Arab slave trade.96 He wrote about how “the anti-slavery society will try and jump upon me for employing slaves as they seem to think I am doing… however, I don’t fancy these will disturb me to a great extent.”97 The RMC graduate also regularly severed hands and reportedly collected the head of an enemy.98

The expedition accomplished its principal objective. Stairs had Msiri killed and threatened Msiri’s brothers with the same fate unless they accepted Leopold as sovereign. After securing their submission Stairs divided the kingdom between Msiri’s adopted son and brothers.99

Stairs used a series of racist rationalizations to justify conquering Katanga. He describes the population as “unfortunate blacks who, very often, are incapable of managing their own affairs” and asked in the introduction of his diary: “Have we the right to take possession of this vast country, take it out of the hands of its local chiefs and to make it serve the realization of our goals? … To this question, I shall reply positively, yes. What value would it have [the land he was trying to conquer] in the hands of blacks, who, in their natural state, are far more cruel to one another than the worst Arabs or the wickedest whites.”100

At another point Stairs cites another standard colonial justification: “Only rarely do the natives think of improving their lot — that’s the great weakness among the Africans. Their fathers’ ways are theirs and their own customs will be those of their sons and grandsons.”101

Stairs found official support for his mission. The Royal Engineers gave him a leave to conquer Katanga. They did so because Stairs was working to colonize the Congo on behalf of Leopold and the British preferred Belgian control over the area rather than French possession.102

While Stairs died in the Congo his exploits were lauded in Ottawa when Senator W.J. Macdonald sought to move “a parliamentary resolution expressing satisfaction for Stairs’ manly conduct.”103 Two brass plaques honour Stairs at the RMC (one for him alone and another dedicated to Stairs as well as the aforementioned Huntley Brodie McKay and William Henry Robinson). The main plaque reads: “William Grant Stairs, Captain the Welsh Regiment. Born at Halifax Nova Scotia 1 July 1863. Lieutenant Royal Engineers 1885-91. Served on the staff of the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition 1887 under the leadership of H.M. Stanley and exhibited great courage and devotion to duty. Died of fever on the 9 June 1892 at Chinde on the Zambesi whilst in command of the Katanga Expedition sent out by the King of the Belgians.”104 Another plaque was erected for Stairs (as well as McKay and Robinson) at St. George Cathedral in Kingston, Ontario. And a few hundred kilometres to the southwest “Stair’s Island” was named in his honour in Parry Sound.105

Stairs’ mission to Katanga added 150,000 square kilometres to Leopold’s massive Congo Free State.106 In a bid to extract rubber and other commodities from his personal colony, Leopold instituted a brutal system of forced labour. Individuals and communities were given rubber collection quotas that were both hard to fulfill and punishable by death. To prove they killed someone who failed to fulfill a quota soldiers from the Force Publique, the colonial police, were required to provide a severed hand. With Force Publique officers paid partly based on the number collected, severed hands became a sort of currency in the colony and baskets of hands the symbol of the Congo Free State.

Between 1891 and 1908 millions died from direct violence, as well as the starvation and disease, caused by Leopold II’s terror.107 Up to half the population died during Leopold’s reign, which sparked a significant international solidarity movement that forced the Belgian government to intervene and buy the colony.

While the Congolese were brutalized, Leopold and some other European capitalists did quite well. According to Belgian scholar Jules Marchal, Leopold extracted some 220 million francs (or US $1.1 billion in 1998 money) from the Congo and there are many monuments in Brussels that attest to this wealth.108

Canadians also played a role conquering Western Africa. In an article titled “Canadian Soldiers in West African Conflicts 1885-1905” Godefroy details how “Canadian officers both in British and Canadian service were present in [pacification] operations in Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast [Ghana], and Northern and Southern Nigeria.”109 They also helped survey rail lines and demarcate colonial borders.

Before becoming administrator of the Imperial British East Africa Company Huntley Brodie Mackay was Commanding Royal Engineer in West Africa. In 1887 the 29-year-old RMC graduate took charge of all Royal Engineers in the region.

During his time there Mackay was part of an expedition to destroy the Yonnie stronghold of Robari in what is now southeast Sierra Leone.110 In the fighting the British employed the first ever Maxim gun, reported MacMillan’s magazine. “Maxim, which here administered rather than received its baptism of fire, was turned on them, and they dropped off the roofs by dozens… When the leading troops entered the gates … there was not a living Yonnie left in the town, although there was no lack of their dead.”111

The relatively obscure expedition is mentioned in a 2005 United States Army command paper titled “Punishment, Revenge, and Retribution: A Historical Analysis of Punitive Operations”. It explains: “After the defeat of Yonni natives in Sierra Leone in 1887, Colonel [Sir Francis de] Winton told the assembled chiefs ‘the Queen has shown you her power by sending her force and taking her country which now belongs to me and the governor. When the people make war, those who have been conquered have to suffer for their misdeeds.’ Winton followed up this speech with some Maxim fire, to impress upon the natives his almost supernatural power.”112

Soon after this display of military prowess, the British convinced a number of chiefs in the region to build roads into their communities. At no cost to the colonial administration, these roads strengthened British control over the area.113

For his courage in fighting the Yonnie, Captain Mackay won the British military’s Distinguished Service Order and two memorial plaques honour him in Kingston, Ontario.114 Upon his death from “fever” in Mombasa the Montréal Star lauded Mackay. Describing him as “the best authority on Africa”, the paper praised his role in saving the “life of a wretched, naked little savage” and “work under a broiling tropical sun, with no assistance but that of the ignorant indolent natives.”115

Saint John-born William Henry Robinson replaced Mackay as West Africa’s Commanding Royal Engineer in 1889.116 In 1892 the 29-year-old RMC graduate led a small force to destroy a rebellion not far from the former Yonnie stronghold. Godefroy explains: “When Robinson and his party of Sierra Leone Frontier Police attacked his stockade on 14 March, however, [rebel leader] Karimu was ready to receive them and repulsed their initial assault. The momentum lost, Captain Robinson tried to rally the attack by personally setting explosive charges at the gates, hoping to blow them open and allow for his men to rush through.”117 Robinson was shot in the battle and ultimately became the first RMC graduate to give his life fighting for British colonialism.

Two years later Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Gerard Fairtlough also died fighting in Sierra Leone.118 An RMC graduate, turned instructor, Fairtlough “distinguished” himself fighting Fodi-Silah.119

Captain Bertie Harold Oliver Armstrong was a Royal Engineer intelligence officer during the 1898-1899 “Hut Tax War”, which mainly took place in the north of Sierra Leone. The RMC graduate helped assess enemy strengths and develop plans to defeat what Walter Rodney described as “the expression of widespread resistance against the imposition of colonial rule.”120

The Hut Tax War was a response to a tax imposed on all dwellings to pay for British administration. Established just after London declared Sierra Leone a Protectorate in 1896, the tax often amounted to more than the value of the dwelling and was coupled with a much-disliked demand for peasants to maintain roads. (The imposition of tax by colonial authorities precipitated major socio-economic changes across the continent, forcing ordinary people to earn money usually by seeking employment on a plantation or in a mine.)121

Colonial forces killed hundreds suppressing a well-orchestrated guerrilla campaign led by Bai Bureh. The British destroyed entire towns, no matter whether they resisted or not.122 Ten months into the uprising, British forces exiled Bai Bureh and hanged a number of his comrades.123 Still, resistance spread to the southern provinces of the protectorate and today Bai Bureh is a revered figure with his picture on several Sierra Leonean paper bills.

After the revolt was suppressed, Bertie Armstrong was appointed Commanding Royal Engineer for West Africa. He was the fourth Canadian to hold this post between 1887 and 1899.124 (RMC graduate Henry Sloggett was the third Canadian Commanding Royal Engineer during this period.)125

Just before the Hut Tax uprising the British consolidated their forces in the region into one command. Partly in response to growing competition with France, in 1897 the British military created the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), which Walter Rodney called, “The most important force in the conquest of West African colonies by the British … The [WAFF] soldiers being Africans and the officers English.”126 Or Canadian.

At the start of the 1900s Canadian Militia officers, Robert Cockburn, A.W. Boddy and F. Homer-Dixon, fought with the WAFF.127 So did Canadians G.M. Sutherland, W.F.W. Carstairs and W.H. Gundry. Two brothers from the Canadian Militia, Captain B.M. Read and Lieutenant Henry Read, as well as a member of the Canadian Engineers, J.T.M. Burnside, joined these men.128

Seconded to the WAFF, Toronto-born Lieutenant Archibald Hayes Macdonell served as a scout as well as a platoon and company level commander in seven separate expeditions between 1901 and 1904.129 Throughout his time in West Africa Macdonell was an officer of the Canadian Militia and he would later command the Royal Canadian Regiment. After he retired from the military Macdonell was appointed to the Senate.130

Among numerous flashpoints the WAFF helped extend British influence over the valuable Gold Coast colony. Between 1820 and 1900 England fought numerous battles/wars to conquer the Ashanti in today’s northern Ghana. A difficult adversary, London was prepared to spill significant blood to get more of Greater Ashanti’s vast quantities of gold.

Godefroy writes that “Canadians began entering this theatre sometime after [1873], with many seeing action against the Ashanti at one point or another.”131 Prior to helping conquer Egypt, the aforementioned Wyatt Rawson fought in the Third Anglo-Ashanti War of 1873-1874.132 Wounded during the capture of Amoaful, Wyatt was promoted to lieutenant afterwards.133

During the fighting in Ghana the British employed the first rapid-fire Gatling gun in Africa, killing thousands of Asante.134 The war was commanded by General Grant Wolseley, notes The Fall of the Asante Empire, who believed “‘the African’ was an ‘objectionable animal’ who was intended to be ‘the white man’s servant.’”135 African Times described another element driving British thinking. The newspaper published an article titled “The Ashanti War: Gold, Gold, Gold” that claimed victory would bring tens of millions of pounds worth of gold to Britain each year.136

As part of the peace London demanded, “The King of Ashanti promises to pay the sum of 50,000 ounces of approved gold as an indemnity for the expenses he has occasioned to Her Majesty the Queen of England by the late war.”137 In the years after the war, according to The Fall of the Asante Empire, “Danish, Canadian and Scottish gold prospectors” made their way to the area.138

When the Ashanti refused to accept a British Protectorate two decades later, London claimed they’d failed to fulfill their financial obligations under the 1874 peace treaty and launched another invasion. Casimir van Straubanzee was a special service officer with the Royal Artillery during the fourth Ashanti war of 1895-1896.139 Another RMC graduate, Captain Duncan Sayre MacInnes, who was responsible for communications and logistics, as well as a number of engineering duties, joined the 28 year old.140 MacInnes helped construct an important fort at the Ashanti capital of Kumasi.141 Son of a senator, MacInnes participated in a number of subsequent expeditions to occupy the hinterland of modern Ghana.142 For more than half a century a selected fourth year RMC cadet has been awarded the Duncan Sayre MacInnes Memorial Scholarship.

A Royal Canadian Artillery captain seconded to the Gold Coast Regiment of the West African Frontier Force, John F. Crean fought against the Asante in 1900.143 After artefacts he compiled appeared in a controversial 1990 Royal Ontario Museum exhibit titled Into the Heart of Africa John Crean’s relative called her great-uncle someone who “spent his entire adult life in one part or another of the globe killing native people on behalf of God, Queen and Empire. His job was to provide the brute force necessary to keep open ‘Pax’ Britannica operating in the interests of the British merchant class.”144

A few years thereafter the Canadian militia’s Hugh Albert Kortright joined the Gold Coast Constabulary, which oversaw internal security and policing in the colony.145 From 1900 to 1918 Kortright held various positions including Assistant Inspector Gold Coast Constabulary and then became the colony’s District Commissioner Volta River District.146

Control over the Gold Coast brought significant wealth to some British capitalists. Ashanti Gold Corporation, for instance, extracted six million ounces of gold from the colony between 1898 and 1946.147

In a bid to locate resources and solidify its control, the Colonial Office employed Galt Ontario born Sir Frederick Gordon Guggisberg to survey Ashanti and the Gold Coast Colony in 1902.148 Three years later he was appointed director of surveys in the colony. During his time surveying the Gold Coast Guggisberg helped mark over 300 mining and timber concessions and mapped almost the entire colony.149

A decade earlier RMC graduate John Irvine Lang-Hyde helped survey the Gold Coast Railway and the most western boundary of the colony.150 During his time in the region he was also second-in-command of the Attabalu Expeditionary Force. For his contribution to the conquest of Ghana, Lang Hyde was made a Companion of Saint Michael and St. George.151

A few years later Lang-Hyde participated in the 1900-1901 Anglo-French boundary commission that demarcated territory between today’s Nigeria and Niger.152 Subsequently, Lang-Hyde became commissioner of Lagos, which was then its own separate colony.153 In praise of his efforts, Lang-Hyde was made a Companion of the Order of the Military Garter.154

A couple of Canadian military men helped survey Nigeria. Captain L.C.A. de B. Doucet, an expert geographer, played a prominent role in the 1906 Yola to Lake Chad Boundary Agreement. This accord between the United Kingdom and Germany demarcated the border between today’s southern Nigeria and Cameroon.155

After his role in Ghana the aforementioned Sir Frederick Guggisberg was appointed director of surveys in southern Nigeria in 1910.156 The next year he published The Handbook of the Southern Nigeria Survey. When the southern and northern protectorates were combined in 1913 Guggisberg became surveyor-general of Nigeria.157

But it wasn’t just mapping and surveying; many Canadians helped the British conquer Nigeria. A History of Nigeria explains how this was accomplished: “The use or threat of violence on the part of the British must be seen as the single most important factor allowing them to assume political control over the territories that made up the various protectorates of Nigeria.”158

A lieutenant in the West African Frontier Force, Canadian Gore Munbee Barrow was one of 25 European officers who led a thousand-man expedition in 1903 to conquer the Sokoto Caliphate in northern Nigeria.159 With four Maxims and four 75mm cannons, it took a 90-minute battle to capture the capital of Sokoto, which had been West Africa’s largest single state in the nineteenth century. According to Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830-1914, “as the WAFF column neared the city, hordes of horsemen and footmen armed with swords, spears, old guns and bows and arrows appeared, charging the square over and over again, only to be mown down by machine gun and carbine fire.”160

In 1894 RMC graduate Kenneth Jeffrey Campbell was “Mentioned in Dispatches” and awarded the Distinguished Service Order for fighting to capture the town of Brohemie (Ebrohimi) on the Benin River. Speaking to the Royal Military College Club about the attack, Campbell described how “a hail of led [was] ‘pumped’ on them from our Maxim guns, together with rockets discharged into the town from the rocket party.”161 The gunboat HMS Phoebe fired 1,100 4 x 7 shells onto the secluded town.162

For weeks the British blocked food from entering the town and ultimately, as they’d done to a number of villages on route, they burned Brohemie.163 Campbell told the RMC audience, “It was fired and so effectually razed to the ground that not a stick remains standing. The rebel Nanna is now confined … Half measures are of no avail in dealing with the West African. If obliged to strike, hit hard.”164 According to the area’s chief/governor, 500 of his followers were killed in the attack on Brohemie.165

The aim of the campaign was to destroy a ruler, Nanna, whose economic prowess impeded the Royal Niger Company and other British business interests from capturing more of the area’s wealth and trade. In Merchant Prince of the Niger Delta: The Rise & Fall of Nana Olomu, Last Governor of the Benin River Obaro Ikime notes: “This struggle was occasioned by the determination of the British to impose their rule effectively on the Nigerian peoples, and the equally strong determination of the Nigerian people to resist the imposition of British rule. The Nana episode must be seen therefore as only one act in the drama that was to be enacted throughout southern Nigeria in the period from 1891 to 1914.”166

At the time of the expedition Campbell served as deputy consul-general and acting commissioner of the Oil River Protectorate (and ultimately became its consul general).167 Taking its name from the area’s palm oil riches, the Oil Rivers Protectorate was established in the delta of the Niger River in modern Nigeria in 1885. Campbell explained, “Britain true to [her] instincts annexed the Oil Rivers, the largest and best share of that part of West Africa, but with a feeling that we should have had [it] all.”168

A few years after destroying Nanna’s power, London moved to extend its writ further into the interior of Nigeria. Born in Sherbrooke, Quebec, William Heneker helped conquer this part of the Benin Empire. After the British took charge of the area during the Benin Expedition of 1897 Captain Heneker guarded an imprisoned chief, Oba.169 Not long thereafter Heneker helped capture Oba’s son. Benin Under British Administration explains, “The exiled Oba’s son, Aiguobasimwin, was also dislodged from Igbanke by troops under Captains Heneker and Sheppard.”170

In May 1898 Heneker was part of a small force that conquered the town of Ehor and surrounding villages. One account notes how British forces “seized the opportunity to utterly destroy it [Ehor], burning it and knocking down the walls.”171

The next year Heneker was an intelligence and survey officer in the Benin Territories Expedition, which the overall commander described as “the sequel” to the larger campaign two years earlier. In Correspondence Relating to the Benin Territories Expedition, 1899 consul general Sir R. Moor mentioned Heneker leading a force that destroyed the towns of Udo and Idumere and a company under the RMC graduate’s command “burnt and completely destroyed the large town of Ugiami, including the king’s house.”172

The invasions of Benin gave the British access to valuable commodities. Author William N. M. Geary remarks, “the results of the operations opened up 3000 or more square miles rich in rubber forests and other African produce.”173 After the expedition British capitalists intensified efforts to exploit the area’s rubber forests and the Royal Niger Company expanded deeper into Benin. 174

As he rose through the ranks of the Southern Nigeria Regiment, which was part of the West African Frontier Force, Heneker led ever more soldiers. With a force of more than 200 men, he commanded the Ulia and Ishan Expeditions.175 In his 1906 book Bush Warfare Heneker described the scorched-earth policy the Ishan Expedition employed: “A fighting column left camp every morning, and one after another each town in the country was attacked and taken. All the juju groves [sacred natural forests] were cut down, and stores of food either destroyed or carried back to camp.”176

Heneker and other Canadians’ role in the region steadily grew. “Canadian participation in the pacification of West Africa,” notes Godefroy, “appeared to climax in late 1901 when the British launched a substantial civil-military operation against the Aro group of the Ibo tribe.”177 At least a dozen Canadians were among the white officer corps who led a force of some 2,000 soldiers and 2,000 porters to open a 193 km wide and 144 km long area of today’s eastern Nigeria to British directed commerce.178 Early planning for the Anglo-Aro War was actually initiated by the Royal Niger Company, which wanted a bigger piece of the area’s trade.179

Canadian Militia Lieutenant J.L.R. Parry was “Mentioned in Dispatches” for his services during the Aro Expedition.180 So was Canadian Militia Lieutenant James Wayling.181 During a major battle at Edimma, wrote overall British commander A. F. Montanaro, “Lieutenant A.E. Rastrick, Canadian Militia … who was in command of the Maxim [gun], used it with great effect, and so good was the fire control and discipline that the enemy was forced to retreat.”182

Heneker was the senior Canadian during the Aro campaign. Second in authority to Montanaro, the RMC grad led one of the four columns dispatched in November 1901 towards Arochukwu, the capital of the Aro families. His force consisted of 19 European officers, one local officer, 479 local rank and file, one Maxim gun and crew, 13 gun carriers and 225 general carriers.183

The capture of Arochukwu was a brutal, one-sided affair. S. O. Onwukwe describes the “total destruction of the Empire” in The Rise and Fall of the Arochukwu Empire, 1400-1902.184 “The British invaders did not spare Arochukwu, they were waging a punitive war and had no respect for any shrine. The order to the troops was ‘attack, destroy and burn’. The field force took this instruction literally.”185

Afterwards the British hanged some Aro leaders and blew up what they thought was an important religious site. The defeat of the Aro Confederacy extended British control further into the interior of Nigeria but resistance would continue for a number of years.

Between 1897 and 1906 Heneker fought in a dozen separate campaigns in West Africa. During this time he received several “Mentions in Dispatches” and a series of awards including the Distinguished Service Order.186 “One of the most successful British combat leaders on the West African coast”, Heneker would later be promoted to major general, lieutenant general and finally general.187

After completing his service in West Africa Heneker published Bush Warfare, which for years was “required reading and a resource for all commanders” and would inform the later War Office manual Notes on Imperial Policing.188 In a section of his book titled “General Dealings” Heneker writes: “Savage nations have, as a rule, to be cowed, either by having their warriors severely beaten in action and made to suffer heavy losses, as, in the case of the taking of Benin City, and in the advance on Ulia in the Ishan Expedition, or, should the nation avoid a stand-up fight, and resort to guerrilla warfare, the power of the invading force must be shown by advancing into the most inaccessible and sacred juju parts of the country, eating up the food supplies and raiding rapidly to all points of the compass.

“The great thing is to impress savages with the fact that they are the weaker, and that it is intended to occupy the country, enforce the will of the white man, and accomplish the object for which the expedition is organized. No leniency or half measures are of any use until the savage has felt the power of force. Leniency is treated as a sign of weakness, and half measures as an undecided and wavering policy.”189

Like other parts of the continent, Canadians helped Britain colonize southern Africa. In 1879 the British moved to conquer the Zulu Empire in what is now most of the South African state of KwaZulu-Natal. A former Northwest Mounted Police officer, Captain Montague White Fraser fought there and the aforementioned Edmund Van Koughnet headed up a series of boat expeditions during the Zulu war.190 The aforementioned Lord Arthur Halliburton was made a Companion of the Order of Bath for his role as the War Office’s Director of Supplies and Transport during the Zulu war.191

Upwards of 10,000 Zulus died in the fighting, as did 1,000 British troops.192 During their “heroic” victory at Rorke’s Drift British forces committed war crimes. According to a 2003 Guardian article, “In the hours after the battle senior officers and enlisted men of a force sent to relieve the garrison are said to have killed hundreds of wounded Zulu prisoners. Some were bayoneted, some hanged and others buried alive in mass graves.”193

London’s desire to conquer the Zulu was motivated by a mix of economic, political and geostrategic considerations. The discovery of diamonds near the Vaal River in 1867 led to massive growth in Kimberley and in 1873 London annexed the area as part of Griqualand West. Some colonial officials wanted Griqualand West to unite with the other colonies in the area similar to the Confederation of Upper and Lower Canada established a few years earlier. But the Zulu (and Boer) were an obstacle to such a plan, which would have strengthened Britain’s position over an important naval passageway.

Having nearly defeated the Boer two years earlier, the large Zulu army was viewed as a threat to white domination of the region.194 By crushing the Zulu the British removed this threat and also sped up the process of turning these Bantu people into a source of cheap labour for British capitalists.195

As part of its bid to dominate southern Africa, London conquered the interior. Before becoming administrator of the Imperial British East Africa Company and Commanding Royal Engineer in West Africa, Huntley Brodie Mackay served as a Special Service Officer in the Bechuanaland Expedition.196 The 1884-1885 military expedition gave the British control over a large area to the north of today’s South Africa, which was eyed by the Germans and Boers. Beyond this competition, the British wanted to stop Boer “freebooters” from dissuading black labourers from traveling to work in the diamond mines. In White Men’s Dreams, Black Men’s Blood Christopher Paulin argues that “the possibility of the [the Boer state of] Transvaal shutting off an important supply of labour to the diamond mines … played the most prominent role in [British general] Derby’s decision to force a settlement on [President of the Transvaal, Paul] Kruger.”

After asserting control of the area the British worked to drive the Tswana people from their land and onto reserves to increase the pool of cheap labour. Paulin notes, “The proletarianization of the southern Tswana occurred between 1885 to 1887. The Bechuanaland Land Commission officially laid the foundations of the native reserves as labour pools and initiated what would be called apartheid in the second half of the 20th century.”197 The British Bechuanaland Protectorate lasted until the 1960s when modern Botswana was created.

Within a few years of its conquest, Bechuanaland would be the staging ground for an unsuccessful British invasion of the two Boer republics (Orange Free State and Transvaal).198 In the late 1800s these descendants of Dutch settlers increasingly found themselves at odds with British interests in southern Africa.199 Large quantities of gold were found thirty miles south of the Boer capital, Pretoria, in 1886 and the prime minister of UK’s Cape Colony, Cecil Rhodes, and other British miners wanted to get their hands on more of the loot. There was also a geostrategic calculation. The Boer gold and diamond fields were drawing the economic heart of southern Africa away from the main British colonies on the coast. If this continued London feared that the four southern African colonies might unite, but outside of the British orbit, which threatened its control of an important shipping lane.200

Between 1898 and 1902 London launched a vicious war against the Boer. With Cecil Rhodes’ Imperial South African Association promoting anti-Boer sentiment in this country, some 7,400 Canadians fought to strengthen Britain’s position in southern Africa.201 Similar to the Voyageurs in the Sudan, militaristic-minded Canadians claimed the battles in South Africa were a sign of nationhood, a declaration “to the world that a new power had arisen in the West.”202

Many previously mentioned RMC graduates fought in the Boer War. After his success in Sudan Edmund Van Koughnet was responsible for Naval Transport at Durban and was made a Companion of the Order of St. Michael and St. George in recognition of his fighting.203 For his part, Montréal’s Girouard was Director of Imperial Military Railways during the war and received awards for his service. Afterwards he became Commissioner of Railways for the Transvaal and Orange River colonies, which are now part of South Africa.204

The war was devastating for the Boers. As part of a scorched-earth campaign the British-led forces burned their crops and homesteads and poisoned their wells.205 About 200,000 Boer were rounded up and sent to concentration camps. Twenty-eight thousand (mostly children) died of disease, starvation and exposure in these camps.206

In Another Kind of Justice: Canadian Military Law from Confederation to Somalia Chris Madsen points out: “Canadian troops became intimately involved in the nastier aspects of the South African war.”207 Whole columns of troops participated in search, expel and burn missions.208 Looting was common. One Canadian soldier wrote home, “as fast as we come up the country … we loot the farms.”209 Another wrote, “I tell you there is some fun in it. We ride up to a house and commandeer anything you set your eyes on. We are living pretty well now.”210 There are also numerous documented instances of Canadian troops raping and killing innocent civilians.211

The British brutalized the Boer during the war but out of racial solidarity and a need to draw them into the British orbit (rather than the German) they reversed course immediately afterwards. In The Great War in Africa Byron Farwell writes: “The conquerors behaved with remarkable magnanimity and generosity, pouring millions of pounds into the new colonies to rehabilitate the people and resettle them on the land; agriculture and mining were reestablished. … Even more remarkable, in 1907, only five years after the end of the war, free elections were permitted, first in the Transvaal and then in the Orange River colony, as the Orange Freestate had become, and the old Boer leaders again took up the reins of political power. … In 1910 all four South African colonies united to become the Union of South Africa with [former Boer leader Louis] Botha as prime minister.”212

As with the Boer, the war was devastating for many Africans. Over 100,000 blacks were held in concentration camps but the British failed to keep a tally of their deaths so it’s not known how many died of disease or starvation.213 Some estimate that as many as 20,000 blacks were worked to death in camps during the war.214

Unlike the Boer, the Africans’ plight didn’t improve much after the war. In Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War, 1899-1902 Carman Miller notes, “Although imperialists had made much of the Boer maltreatment of the Blacks, the British did little after the war to remedy their injustices.”215 In fact, the war reinforced white/British dominance over the region’s indigenous population.

The peace agreement with the Boer included a guarantee that Africans would not be granted the right to vote before the two defeated republics gained independence. In The History of Britain in Africa John Charles Hatch explains: “By the time that self-government was restored in 1906 and 1907, they [the Boer] were able to reestablish the racial foundations of their states on the traditional principle of ‘No equality in church or state.’”216 Blacks and mixed race people were excluded from voting in the postwar elections and would not gain full civil rights for nine decades.

In the years after the war British forces also suppressed any sign of African resistance. Some Canadians participated in this repression. No Colours, No Drums: Canadians in the South African Constabulary explains, “A number of Canadians remained in the Constabulary until 1908 when it was divided and continued into the South African police in 1913.”217 Established at the end of 1900, the South African Constabulary was a paramilitary police force designed to take over once British forces pacified the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies during the Boer War. At least 1,500 Canadians served in the South African Constabulary during and after the war.218

In 1906 the South African Constabulary repressed an anti-tax uprising in Natal and when Swaziland appeared on the verge of insurrection two mobile columns of the constabulary were deployed there.219 Canadian Lieutenant John French helped put down the rebellion in Natal, as did trooper Walter Bradley who was part of the Natal police.220 Morrisburg Ontario’s Sergeant Lorne Bouck was part of a squadron that killed 21 Zulus and was himself killed soon after.221

After the war Henry Rivington Poussette joined the constabulary. The RMC graduate was appointed Durban District Commandant and later became the first Canadian Trade Commissioner in that city.222

During this period Captain George Beer became inspector and deputy commissioner in the South African police.223 The aforementioned Duncan Sayre MacInnes served as assistant director of works to the South African Constabulary in the Cape Colony.224 The aforementioned West African commander William Heneker, who was deputy assistant adjutant and quarter-master-general of the Orange River Colony District from 1906 to 1910, joined him.225

In addition to suppressing African resistance to white rule, the South African Constabulary tracked down Chinese workers brought in to do the most backbreaking jobs after the war. With no right to property or free movement, many of the 60,000 Chinese miners fled their worksites in the hopes of returning home or simply finding a better life elsewhere.226

In 1913 Mahatma Gandhi organized a march from Natal to Johannesburg to draw attention to the Indian community’s legally enforced disenfranchisement. Victoria, B.C.’s Charles Slingsby Fall, a district commandant along the way, arrested Gandhi and then the 2,000 civil rights protesters accompanying him.227 In the years after the war Colonel Fall held a number of top policing posts, including deputy commissioner of the South African police.228

South Africa was a major prize. Its resources and geostrategic location greatly enhanced British power on the continent. During World War I South Africa led the conquest of two German African colonies. A largely South African force conquered German South West Africa (Namibia) and German East Africa (Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi).

Canada was modestly involved in two African theatres of World War I, which arguably represents the end of the European Scramble for Africa. From the Queen Charlotte Islands (Haida Gwaii) in British Columbia, naval air serviceman H. J. Arnold helped destroy a major German naval vessel, the Königsberg, during the British/Belgian/South African conquest of German East Africa.229 Two other Canadian airmen, London’s John Robinson and Toronto’s Rudolf Delamere, also served in what is now mostly Tanzania/Rwanda/Burundi.230

Commandant of the RMC from 1909 to 1913, Colonel J.H.V. Crowe commanded an artillery division for famed South African General Jan Christiaan Smuts and later published General Smuts’ Campaign in East Africa.231 Crowe, English born, but an individual with deeper roots in this country, commanded the force that extended Britain’s control over the other side of the continent.

The son of a Québec City MP and grandson of a senator, Sir Charles MacPherson Dobell commanded an 18,000 man Anglo-French force that captured the Cameroons and Togoland.232 Gazetted as Inspector General of the West African Frontier Force in 1913, the RMC grad’s force defeated the Germans in fighting that destroyed many villages and left thousands of West Africans dead.233 Early in the two-year campaign Dobell’s force captured the main centres of Lomé and Douala and he became de facto governor over large parts of today’s Togo and Cameroon. A telegram from London said “General Dobell should assume Government with full powers in all matters military and civil.”234

British officials justified seizing the German colony as a response to the war in Europe, but to a large extent World War I was the outgrowth of intra-imperial competition in Africa and elsewhere. In The Anglo-French “Condominium” in Cameroon, 1914-1916 Lovett Elango points to “the imperialist motives of the campaign”, which saw the two allies clash over their territorial ambitions. Elango concludes, “the war merely provided Britain and France a pretext for further colonial conquest and annexation.”235 After the German defeat the colony was partitioned between the two European colonial powers.

For his part Dobell was praised for helping to extend the British Empire. He was knighted, promoted to lieutenant general and given a command position in the 1917 Egyptian Expeditionary Force.236

Beyond Dobell and Crowe, 600,000 Canadians fought in World War I. Nearly 60,000 died and another 150,000 returned home wounded fighting in a war with no clear and compelling purpose other than rivalry between up-and-coming Germany and the imperial powers of the day, Britain and France.237 In fact, support for the British Empire was Ottawa’s primary motive in joining the war. As Prime Minister Robert Borden saw it, the fight was “to put forth every effort and to make every sacrifice necessary to ensure the integrity and maintain the honour of our empire.”238

Canada’s massive contribution to World War I propped up British (as well as French, Belgian and South African) rule in Africa. It also added to it. Similar to the Berlin Conference of 1885, after World War I European leaders gathered to redraw Africa’s borders. But this time the Canadian prime minister attended.

World War I greatly reshaped colonial borders in Africa. Germany lost what is now Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi and part of Mozambique (German East Africa) as well as Namibia (German West Africa) and Cameroon and Togoland. South Africa gained Namibia, Britain gained Tanzania and part of Cameroon, France gained Togo and part of Cameroon while Belgium took Burundi and Rwanda.

The other British Dominions (Australia, New Zealand and South Africa) that fought alongside London were compensated with German properties. With no German colonies nearby Ottawa asked the Imperial War Cabinet if it could take possession of the British West Indies as compensation for Canada’s defence of the Empire.239 London balked.240

Ottawa was unsuccessful in securing the British Caribbean partly because the request did not find unanimous domestic support. Prime Minister Borden was of two minds on the issue. From London he dispatched a cable noting, “the responsibilities of governing subject races would probably exercise a broadening influence upon our people as the dominion thus constituted would closely resemble in its problems and its duties the empire as a whole.”241 But, on the other hand, Borden feared that the Caribbean’s black population might want to vote. He remarked upon “the difficulty of dealing with the coloured population, who would probably be more restless under Canadian law than under British control and would desire and perhaps insist upon representation in Parliament.”242

3. Providing Ideological Cover

“What should have been made clear was that the role of missionaries, like that of the soldiers, was to be agents of the Crown. The Crown was acting on the behalf of the colonial industry. In short, the Holy Trinity, no disrespect intended, was made up, not of the ‘Father, Son, and Holy Ghost,’ but instead, ‘the Missionary, Mercenary, and Merchant.”

– The Toronto Coalition for the Truth about Africa responding to the 1990 Royal Ontario Museum exhibit Into the Heart of Africa 1

The first Canadian missionary arrived on the continent in 1860.2 Dozens followed in subsequent decades and by the end of the colonial period as many as 2,500 Canadians were proselytizing across Africa.3

Canadian Christian activists helped the colonial powers penetrate African society. In “Christian Missionary Activities in Africa in the Age of Imperialism and the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885”, Horst Grunder explains: “Christian missionary work and colonial conquest were closely related.”4 More bluntly, 19th century British imperialist adventurer Henry Johnson said “each mission station is an exercise in colonization.”5

Missionaries generally aligned themselves with the colonial state. They tended to promote “obedience” to European rulers, encouraging Africans to see colonialism as a “blessing”.6

Christian activists in Africa overwhelmingly believed in the superiority of European ways. This was fed by mid-19th century pseudoscientific racism, which classified human populations into superior and inferior races. Many missionaries were also informed by an anti-African interpretation of the Bible. Grunder explains that “blacks had inherited Noah’s curse (Genesis 9:25) from their alleged ancestor, Ham.” He further explains the “Ham theory” by arguing “the divine ‘chastisement’ of Africa had become a missionary dogma, allegedly verified by the black skin color of the Negro and historical fact of slavery.”7

Gripped by a sense of cultural and racial superiority, as well as religious dogma, most early missionaries came “to despise both African culture and African capacity”, wrote Adrian Hastings in A History of African Christianity.8 As such, they undermined African familial customs, lifestyle and economic systems.

In their home countries missionaries attacked African ways, encouraging imperialist sentiment among the general public. Notwithstanding a few notable exceptions, their speeches and publications denigrated African traditions and authorities, while ignoring European abuses and the greed and self-interest driving colonial policy.

(Of course, what transpired in Africa mirrored what took place inside Canada with missionaries providing ideological cover for the destruction of First Nations’ culture and economy.)

Canadians played a sizable role in the Africa missionary movement. Prominent Québec historian Lionel Groulx found that 1,500 French Canadian Catholics from 48 different religious societies worked on the continent in 1959.9 By the end of the colonial period there were at least nine Canadians bishops in African dioceses.10

While Catholic Québec led the missionary charge, Protestant Ontario followed close behind. In 1888, for instance, 43 Torontonians pursued missionary work globally.11 By the late 1950s approximately 1,000 Protestant Canadians were proselytizing in Africa and, according to a mid-1970s study, 22 separate Canadian Protestant societies had at some point operated in Africa, either directly or through a counterpart foreign mission.12

Canadian churches raised substantial sums of money to support missionaries and to construct mission stations. Initially, Canadian churches worked through US, British and French societies such as the Society of Missionaries of Africa (White Fathers), Plymouth Brethren or American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. The first missionary sent to the continent by a Canadian denomination departed for Angola in 1886.

The earliest Canadian missionaries hailed from Québec. According to Les relations Entre le Québec et L’Afrique 1880-1905, an unknown Roman Catholic Trappistine monk from today’s Québec joined French colleagues in founding an Algerian monastery in 1860.13 Two years later Francois Allard, a French missionary who laid roots in Québec, brought Catholicism to Basutoland (present-day Lesotho).14

Québec priest Arthur Bouchard arrived in Khartoum in 1879 where he spent two years. He returned to Canada to cross the country lecturing and fundraising for African missions. In 1884 Bouchard was the chaplain who accompanied the 400 Canadian Voyageurs sent to defend British control of Khartoum.15

Four Québec Jesuit fathers left for the Zambesi Mission in southern Africa beginning in 1883.16 Two died in the 1880s but the other two, Alphonse Daignault and Louis LeBoeuf, became prominent members of the Catholic male congregation. LeBoeuf worked in the region for three decades. A veteran of the 1870 papal state war, Daignault rose through the ranks to become Prefect Apostolic of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia).17 Then Superior of the Jesuits’ Zambezi Mission, Daignault backed the British South Africa Company’s invasion of Mashonaland (Zimbabwe) in 1890. With their evangelizing shunned by the Ndebele people, the Jesuits and other foreign missionaries supported the “destruction of [the] Ndebele system.”18

Granted a charter from London in 1889, Cecil Rhodes’ British South Africa Company offered white men in Kimberley, South Africa, 3,000 acres of land and mining rights if they joined the Company’s fight to conquer part of today’s Zimbabwe. Daignault offered the invading force chaplaincy services, mobile ambulances and nurses.19 The British South Africa Company paid the Jesuit nurses’ costs and compensated Daignault’s mission with conquered territory, including a major piece of land on the outskirts of today’s Harare. In A History of Christian Missions in Zimbabwe C. J. M. Zvobgo writes that the Harare “farm which consisted of 12,000 acres, beautifully surrounded by hills, was given to the Jesuits by the BSA Company in recognition of FR Alphonse Daignault’s service to the [Company’s] sick.”20

The Jesuits fully partook in the colonialist theft of African land, livestock and resources. In The Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe A. J. Dachs and W. F. Rea characterize the Jesuits’ land gains as “part of a process which dispossessed Africans and reduced them to a state of dependence.”21

The Québec Jesuit leader worked with Rhodes and British officials for years. He also supported the colonial authorities’ efforts to drive Africans from their traditional economies into wage work.22 Reflecting the settler community’s attitude in 1897, Daignault told the deputy administrator of the city of Bulawayo in 1897 that the “natives of this country … are but grown-up children” prone to “idleness”. “Men in authority who have the true interests of the natives at heart ought to treat the natives not only as children but are also to do all they can to make them acquire habits of work. As this cannot be obtained by mere moral persuasion, authority must necessarily be used.”23

To the north, Hamilton Ontario’s William Henry Faulknor and a fellow Plymouth Brethren missionary arrived in southeast Katanga at the end of 1887. They relieved the first white missionary to establish a mission station in eastern Congo. Until 1891 Faulknor worked under the ruler of the Yeke kingdom, Mwenda Msiri, who would later meet his death at the hand of RMC graduate William Stairs. In 1890 the Plymouth Brethren explicitly called for European rule (either Belgian or British) over Katanga, concluding: “The one great hindrance to the gospel was the lack of settled government.”24 They were correct. In Plymouth Brethren and the Occupation of Katanga, 1886-1907 Robert Rotberg notes: “Msiri’s death at the hands of soldiers of the Belgian Katanga Company meant that the Brethren were free to evangelise as they wished to do.” Rothberg adds that local people came to see “all white people as chiefs” who “could help them with the authorities … and so, for the first time, gravitated to the missionaries.”25

Following Faulknor, Mother Marie-Bernadette (born Bernadette Beaupré) left for north-western Congo in 1900.26 Trained in typesetting, Marie-Bernadette published the first (religious) books in Lingala, which is now the country’s lingua franca.

Toronto-born Henry Grattan Guinness II established the Congo Balolo Mission (CBM) in 1889. Based in London, England, the CBM sent a number of Canadians to its mission stations along the tributaries of the Lulonga River near the equator in north-eastern Congo. Toronto-based Reverend T. Hope Morgan took charge of CBM operations in Stanleyville (now Kisangani) and spent a great deal of time traveling to isolated mission posts between 1891 and 1911. During this period, Morgan and his wife ran an open house for traveling missionaries passing through Leopoldville, sparking the creation of a Union Mission House.27

CBM missions were located in remote areas of the colony, where King Leopold’s Anglo-Belgian Rubber Company obligated individuals and communities to gather rubber latex. The rubber economy was barbarous. Company and state officials chopped off the hands of thousands of individuals who failed to fulfill their quotas.

Faced with the violent disruption of their lives, the Lulonga, Lopori, Maringa, Juapa and Burisa were increasingly receptive to missionaries, who became “the interpreter of the new way of life”, writes Ruth Slade in English-Speaking Missions in the Congo Independent State.28 A CBM missionary wrote home that “it is very pathetic to hear the question often asked in the districts worked by the Rubber Company: has the Savior you tell us of any power to save us from the rubber trouble?”29

Not wanting to jeopardize their standing with the Congo Free State authorities, the CBM refused British-based solidarity campaigners’ appeals to publicly expose the abuses they witnessed. In 1895, the CBM Council privately agreed that “it would probably be more effective not to make the matter known through the press, but to appeal direct to the King of the Belgians, who controls the laws that bring about such desolation and the wholesale slaughter of human lives for the purpose of procuring rubber.”30

The CBM remained silent for years. But the Protestant society found itself increasingly at odds with the Congo Free State, which favoured Catholic Belgian missionaries. Once they’d lost hope for improved relations with the Congolese authorities, the CBM joined the growing international humanitarian campaign.31 In A Civilized Savagery Kevin Grant explains, “it was only after years of failed attempts to expand in land, that the executive of the Congo Balolo Mission condemned the Congo Free State in the British press in April 1903.”32

Congo Free State officials responded to missionary criticism by claiming the Christian activists were themselves complicit in the rights violations they condemned, notably the redemption of slaves as servants. Grant concludes that there is “significant evidence that supports the [Congo Free] State’s charges.”33 In 1902, for instance, the CBM Council felt the need to explicitly forbid the use of the chicotte, “a long whip made of dried hippo hide that cut the skin like jagged glass.”34

After the international solidarity movement forced King Leopold II to relinquish the Congo in 1908, the CBM abandoned its campaign allies. They did so before the new Belgian administration promised to stop the abuses. Grant writes, “the Congo Free State, now under Belgian national authority, offered new stations to the CBM, and the mission’s brethren in the field began to report a decrease in state violence. As a result, the CBM Home Council expressed public support for the new regime and instructed its missionaries to stop publicizing their evidence of continuing abuses.”35

John Forbes, a priest from Vaudreuil, Québec, was the first Canadian “White Father” as well as the North American founder of the Catholic missionary group. In 1885 he traveled to the Society of Missionaries of Africa training centre in Algiers, which had been under French control since 1830. Prior to leaving, Forbes wrote: “Is God really calling me to Africa? Should I not rather work for the conversion of our poor savages of Canada?” For his part, John’s brother, Guillaume, chose to proselytize among the Iroquois of Kahnawake.

After a decade of training and fieldwork, Forbes returned to build support in North America for the White Fathers whose popular nickname came from their Arab-style dress. In 1895 and 1896 he toured Québec, Ontario and parts of the US to recruit missionaries and solicit donations for the Society of Missionaries of Africa. He returned to North Africa for four years and in 1900 began establishing a Canadian chapter of the White Fathers, which included a recruitment and training house in Québec City. A few years later a training house for White Sisters was also built in the city.

Dozens of Canadians studied in Québec City, traveled to the White Fathers training centre in Algiers and onto mission stations across the continent. By 1914 more than 30 Canadian White Fathers had become missionaries in Africa and at the end of the colonial period 330 Canadian members of the missionary society operated across the continent.36 There were also 300 Canadian White Sisters in Africa in 1960.37

At the ceremony where Forbes was ordained bishop in 1918 one White Father described the Québec City school as a place a “where he trained a magnificent cohort of good soldiers to combat against the demons in Africa.”38 In a letter to his brother detailing plans for the recruitment house, Forbes linked the school to British conquest. He wrote that his superior, Bishop Livinhac, asked if it would “not be a good idea for Canadians to join our efforts to convert the countries that have submitted to Great Britain.” Forbes’ letter to his brother included an article from the London Tablet Catholic newspaper sent to him by Bishop Livinhac concerning the proposed school and Britain’s violent conquest of the Sudan. It stated: “Isn’t it providence that the British are being asked to carry out a civilizing and Christianizing mission in central Africa? It permits English Catholics to show their zeal at the opportunity to increase adherents to their faith in these regions. If they aren’t able to provide enough apostles for conversions in such a vast country they have the resources to ask fellow apostles from other colonies to aid them. Canada in particular should be invited to look at the centre of Africa to express the fervor of its zeal, as Canadians have always been distinguished by their generosity to the apostolate and are proud citizens of the British Empire.”39 Excited by the prospect, Forbes wrote: “Hey! Well, dear brother, is this not tempting? There must be, in our great, big and dear Canada young people who have a generous heart, as Bishop Livinhac said, ‘to join our small society to help Jesus Christ conquer the countries, through us missionaries, that have submitted to England?’”40

After building the White Fathers in Canada for a decade and a half, Forbes left for Uganda. He rose to the position of Bishop and coadjutor vicar apostolic, making him second in charge of over 30 mission posts.41

A 1929 biography describes his “good relations” with British colonial authorities and the “important services Forbes rendered the authorities of the Protectorate.”42 Chief Secretary of Uganda Edward Blackwell Jarvis wrote to thank Forbes and the White Fathers for their help during World War I and “admirable loyalty towards the Empire.” Forbes responded to Jarvis’ letter by saying it “encouraged them to work even harder with your government for the prosperity of the Empire and Protectorate.”43

In 1918 Forbes participated in a major conference in the colony, organized by Governor Robert Coryndon in the hopes of spurring indigenous wage work. He wrote home that “it’s a big question. The European planters in our area, who cultivate coffee, cotton and rubber need workers for their exploitation. But the workforce is rare. Our Negroes are happy to eat bananas and with a few bits of cotton or bark for clothes, are not excited to put themselves at the service of the planters and work all day for a meager salary.”44 British officials offered to subsidize the White Fathers schools as part of a bid to expand the indigenous workforce.45 Forbes led negotiations with authorities and traveled to Europe and Canada to build support for their school project.46

After his 1926 death L’Action Populaire, L’Action Catholique, Le Devoir and other Canadian papers honoured him with obituaries. La Presse wrote that “Bishop Forbes did great things and his name will live on.”47

A Forbes disciple, Francis-Xavier Lacoursière departed to the British East African Protectorate in 1913. Born near Trois-Rivières, Lacoursière joined his sister, Mother Marie du Bon Secours, who worked with the White Sisters. Lacoursière was later ordained first Bishop of Rwenzori Vicariate in Mbarara and spent a half-century in Uganda. Another Canadian White Father, Bishop Edouard Michaud, was made Vicar Apostolic of Uganda from 1933-1945.48 In the years that followed, three more Canadian White Fathers went on to make the rank of bishop in Uganda and many more Québec City-trained Canadians proselytized across the British protectorate.49

According to the Foreign Affairs website, “In 1906, Québec missionaries established a church in Navrongo in northern Ghana, thus marking the arrival of a Canadian presence in the country.”50 Oscar Morin and Leonide Barsalou set up the first White Fathers post in the Gold Coast where Canadians would dominate the church for half a century.51 One of the first students to attend the White Fathers school in Québec City, Morin would become Prefect Apostolic, Bishop of Uthina and Regional Superior of the White Fathers in West Africa.52 He worked in Africa for more than 40 years.

During World War I, Canadian White Fathers Ernest Paradis and Wilfred Sarrazin helped Brigadier General Edward Northey conquer German East Africa. Serving as civilian transport officers, Paradis and Sarrazin focused on organizing African carriers, who were generally press ganged into service.53 Paradis became senior transport officer for all British forces east of Nyasaland and North of Zambesi in today’s Malawi and Zimbabwe.54 “Mentioned in Dispatches” to the high command, Paradis “was constantly getting himself mixed up in battles, much to the embarrassment of his superiors.”55 In Empires in World War I, Andrew Jarboe explains “in the excitement of one such occasion he so far forgot himself as to get hold of a rifle and begin firing madly in the direction of the enemy.”56

By volunteering to join the war, the White Fathers sought “respectability … in the eyes of planters and government officials.”57 Afterwards, Paradis used his heightened status from his swashbuckling antics to gain the colonial administration’s support for the White Fathers’ educational work.58

Paradis evangelised in Malawi for several decades. He led the White Fathers campaign to supress “the Nyau”, a religious belief among the Chewa and Nyanja people that included elaborate dances.59 In May 1929 Paradis wrote an East Africa article titled “Devil Dancers of Terror” that claimed Nyau dances were seditious.60

Another Canadian missionary engaged in the White Fathers’ efforts to outlaw Nyau customs in Nyasaland. Father Superior David Roy called on colonial officials to criminalize their dances and in 1928 Christians in the Likuni district, which he oversaw, killed two Nyau.61

The Spiritans, also known as the Holy Ghost Fathers in English-speaking countries, were founded in Paris in 1703. The first Canadian Spiritan left for Cameroon in 1924.62 Country-mate, and member of the Holy Ghost Fathers, Pierre Patenaude, soon joined Charles Chalifoux.63 Appointed Vicariate of Efok, Patenaude was in charge of a sizeable part of the French colony for most of his 18-year stint.64

Thomas Buchanan Reginald Westgate was a Canadian missionary who joined the Church Missionary Society in German East Africa. A graduate of Huron College in London, Ontario, Thomas Westgate was dispatched to Tanzania in 1902. With the support of the Ontario branch of the Church Mission Society, Westgate remained in the German colony for over a decade. The Watford, Ontario, born missionary translated parts of the Old Testament into Cigogo, the language spoken by the Gogo nation in the central region of the colony.65 Westgate worked with the colonial administration. His son, Wilfrid Westgate, authored a book about his father’s life titled T. B. R. Westgate: A Canadian Missionary on Three Continents. In the biography, Westgate writes: “Governor [Heinrich] Schnee looked upon the mission as an asset to this part of the German colonial empire.”66

German soldiers protected the Canadian’s mission post when the population rose up in 1905 against the colonial authority. Dissent was sparked by measures to force Africans to grow cotton for export, and an uprising known as the Maji Maji rebellion swept across the vast colony. It lasted two years. During the rebellion, Westgate coordinated with German Captain von Hirsch. Westgate’s wife, Rita, later wrote, “at times we feared the Germans could not suppress the rising.”67 The Germans succeeded, however, and the Westgate’s fears did not come to pass. In The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective, Isabel Hull writes that 15 Europeans and 389 allied African soldiers were killed by the rebels. By contrast, writes Hull, whole areas of the colony were depopulated with 200,000 to 300,000 Tanzanians killed between 1905 and 1907.68

In 1913, Westgate was awarded an honorary degree from the University of Western Ontario.69

Born in Sherbrooke, Québec, Reverend Herbert Edward Randall was the first missionary dispatched by the Ontario-based Holiness Movement Church. Randall arrived in Egypt in 1899 and would be part of a missionary effort that stretched southward along the Nile into Sudan. Three Canadian women joined Randall’s expedition: Cora Van Camp, Edith Burke and Carrie Reynolds. A biographical account of his life noted that Randall’s “departure for Egypt was precipitated by the results of the Anglo-Sudan War” in which British forces killed tens of thousands between 1896 and 1898.70 Conquering Khartoum, where they had previously been defeated, was an important victory for British imperialism. Randall praised the first British military victory on the Nile in Egypt. “The entrance of the English in 1882,” he argued, “made a great change for the Copts [Christian Egyptians], which literally meant their deliverance from bondage, and they are not slow in expressing their thankfulness to their deliverers.”71

Randall later joined the Pentecostal Assemblies of Canada (PAOC). In 1908, PAOC dispatched missionaries to Liberia and South Africa. Among the members sent to Liberia was a Canadian woman named Sophie Nygard, who evangelised there for four decades.72

Another missionary affiliated with PAOC, Charles W. Chawner served for over four decades in South Africa where he died in 1949.73 During his time, he established churches in the Natal and Transvaal. His son Austin followed in his footsteps, spearheading the first Pentecostal Bible colleges in South Africa and Mozambique, as well as a publishing house that distributed Pentecostal literature in a number of African languages.74

South Africa was home to another Canadian Pentecostal missionary for five years. John G. Lake, originally from St. Mary’s, Ontario, Lake followed his church’s racist baptism policy whereby whites were put in the immersion pool before blacks.75 Having moved to the US at 17, Lake complained about American missionaries who taught “race equality” without understanding that the “African native is very different from the American Negro. The African man is a heathen. He does not wear anything but a blanket until he is taught.”76 He levelled even harsher criticism against politicized African churches. Lake described so-called Ethiopian (or African-led) churches as “breeding grounds for anti-European political propaganda. Instead of teaching freedom from sin and self, they… teach freedom from the European rule, and sing … ‘Africa for the Africans’ and ‘drive all white men into the sea’.”77

Another Ontario native by the name of Marion Wittich (later Marion Keller) felt called to missionary work while working as an Anglican schoolteacher in Parry Sound. She set off with her husband to proselytize in Tanzania in 1913. Her husband died in Tanzania and several years later she remarried a man by the name of Otto Keller, a German born US émigré, who the PAOC sponsored to set up a mission station in western Kenya. In 1914 Otto Keller claimed that “here [Africa] we see the power of the devil in an astonishing form, almost beyond belief. The noise of drunken men and women, fulfilling the lusts of the flesh come to our ears. All seemingly bound and determined to fulfill the cup of their iniquity.”78 By the time Marion Keller died in 1942, the socially conservative PAOC had over 200 branch churches in Kenya.79

An official history of PAOC attacked the anticolonial movement in Kenya as “a resurgence of primitive animism.”80 Published in 1958, What God Hath Wrought: A History of the Pentecostal Assemblies of Canada notes: “Unfortunately, sinister forces were bidding high for the souls of Kenya’s millions. In the 1950s there was to be a resurgence of primitive heathenism which had as its aim the expulsion of the white man from Kenya and the extinction of everything Christian in their land. This was the Mau Mau uprising.”81 In putting down the uprising the British killed tens of thousands.

In western Africa, Canadian missionaries played a central role in Christianizing fervently religious Nigeria. It was here that the Bethany Missionary Church in Kitchener, Ontario, sent Emma Hostetler in 1907. “Greetings from dear dark Africa”, Hostetler wrote in her first annual report to home supporters.82

A few years earlier, in 1905, the Ontario Conference of the Mennonite Brethren in Christ sent Toronto’s Alexander Woods Banfield to proselytize among the Nupe of north-western Nigeria. It was their first foreign mission. Banfield took it upon himself to learn the language and translated the Bible into Nupe. He also founded the Niger Press, which aimed to secure “in printed form the word of God in Nigerian languages.”83 Banfield’s personal writings were not free from outbursts of racism, including an assertion that “people along the banks of the Niger are almost wild … almost entirely untouched by the white man.”84 He also expressed support for colonial authorities. “The British government”, said Banfield, “is deserving of much praise for the developments that have been made in northern Nigeria since 1900.”85 Banfield established the United Missionary Society (UMS) in Nigeria.86 Jebba, the largest town in the UMS’ area of operations in Western Nigeria, became its unofficial headquarters “since it was a centre of the colonial government.”87 In 1915, Banfield was appointed General Secretary for West Africa of the British and Foreign Bible Society, a non-denominational Protestant umbrella group.88 During his two decades in the field, Banfield’s journeys to mission posts took him hundreds of thousands of miles throughout West and Central Africa.89

The largest interdenominational Protestant mission on the continent was founded several decades earlier in 1893 by Torontonians Walter Gowans and Rowland Victor Bingham. This would ultimately become the Sudan Interior Mission (SIM). (Though SIM initially focused on modern-day Nigeria, at the time “Sudan” generally referred to the area south of the Sahara and North of the equator from the east to west coast of the continent.) A Flame of Fire describes a scene before Bingham’s departure to the continent: “In his room that night God gave Rowland Bingham a vision of ‘Darkest Africa’ as it was then, a continent of unspeakable horror and darkness where the souls of great multitudes still lay bound in affliction and iron awaiting the gospel.”90

Bingham and Gowans, together with an American missionary, traveled up the Niger River in 1893. Only Bingham survived. Seven years later, a second SIM expedition failed as well, and the fledgling missionary society’s future looked bleak. The mission and its new recruits eventually caught a break when the High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria decided to support their efforts. According to Bingham’s biography, Commissioner Sir Frederick Lugard said “he would do whatever he could to help missionaries enter southern Nigeria. He even suggested that the four missionaries sail back to Africa on the same ship with him so that he could assist them in traveling up the Niger River upon their arrival and help them settle inland.”91

A 1911 report from colonial administrators praised SIM. It argued that “the converts” were “well behaved and eager to carry out all government instructions.”92 That year a chief Oba Asalu, who resisted a SIM mission in Yagbaland, lost a power struggle with the Christian activists. In Christian Missionary Activity in Colonial Nigeria, Adeleye Liagbemi writes that formerly British-backed chief Asalu “discovered too late that the colonial regime placed greater value on the mission than on him.”93 Writing about northern Nigerian missionaries, Brad Faught surmises that Governor “Lugard and the colonial state were the guarantors of the SIM’s operations.”94

Head of SIM for four decades, Bingham expressed a colonialist outlook. He reflected a preoccupation with a “dark Africa” typical of his day. At different points in his writing and speaking, the pre-millennialist described “facing millions of people in the darkness of their heathenism” and “seeing the people in all their savagery and sin.”95 His stated goal was to “lay siege to the … devilry hitherto undisturbed.”96

A year after its first successful mission, SIM dispatched Toronto physician Andrew P. Stirrett to West Africa. In transit through Liverpool in 1902, Stirrett secured a letter from a representative of the Royal Niger Company granting him permission to travel on the company’s boat up the Niger River.97 (London chartered the Royal Niger Company to operate as a quasi-state in parts of today’s Nigeria.) The doctor preached among the northern Nigerian Hausa for four and a half decades. A fellow SIM missionary, Douglas Percy paid tribute to him in the 1948 biography, Doctor to Africa: The Story of Stirrett of the Sudan. The work reflected an anti-African sentiment common among missionaries. “For the next half-century,” wrote Percy, “he was to know the foul huts of pagan Africa, the acrid stench from wood-smoke and sweating bodies mingled in one nauseating fetid, mal odour to test the strongest stomach, the unspeakable orders of ulcerated bodies — the whole miasma of evil living and loathsome smells of native villages.”98 As a leading missionary in the region, Stirrett participated in numerous government functions.99 In 1936 Stirrett received a coronation medal from King George VI.100

Beginning his fieldwork alongside Stirrett, Toronto pharmacist Thomas Titcombe spent more than two decades proselytizing among the Yagba of central Nigeria. Describing his first night in a SIM station Titcombe wrote: “I couldn’t sleep as I thought how deep was the darkness, not only of the tropical night around us, but of the hearts of these people bound by Satan. How I longed to tell them of Jesus Christ, who could break their bonds of sin and superstition.”101

After learning their language and gathering converts, Titcombe worked to shape Yagba life according to his interpretation of the Bible. He pushed for dowry and a strict relationship between husband and wife, which his biography claims, “resulted in a much happier and scripturally-acceptable marriage relationship among the believers.”102 Titcombe didn’t approve of African ways. In 1908 he claimed his Yagba hosts “had no moral standards. Their lives were little above the beasts.”103 Later, he wrote: “Every time I hear anyone talk lightly about Satan, it almost makes my blood run cold. They do not realize who or what he is. … Those of us who have lived in Africa, who have seen his power made manifest in the lives of vast multitudes of people, and how he can drag them down to the level of animals themselves, are not in the least impressed by the easy verdicts of 20th century science based on the testimony of enlightened and progressive nations that demon possession just does not exist. Let them go to Africa, let them have their dwelling for a year amongst a people where belief in the devil is universal, where he may see such strange and shaking things as we have recorded here and many others among the devil-worshipers, and we venture to say it will not be long before he is convinced that there is some evil Power in the universe whose base designs are being effected through weak, unfortunate human instruments.”104

For nearly a half-century Manitoba’s Guy Playfair was a leading member of SIM. Field director for 27 years and general director for another 13, Playfair later wrote “when I joined the mission and came to Nigeria in 1911, I made the 13th member of our staff. I was appointed to the office of Field Director in 1917. When I turned over the office of General Director to Dr. A D Hesler in October 1957, the Sudan Interior Mission numbered 1260.”105 By the end of the colonial period SIM missionaries operated in Nigeria, Niger, Dahomey (Benin), Liberia, Ghana, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Ethiopia, Sudan and the Somali Republic.106 At the time the Toronto-based mission was considered the largest nondenominational missionary society on the continent.107

In the 1950s SIM described growing Nigerian nationalism as “dark and threatening”.108 Adeleye Liagbemi writes that “the nationalist upsurge of the post Second World War era engendered a new spirit of independence and experimentation; positive, forward-looking, purposeful and militant. The situation sent chills down the spines of some Christian missionary organizations in the country — including the S.I.M.”109 In response SIM ramped up its literature output, deciding to “take the offensive out of Satan’s hands”, which it felt had “been winning the war of words among the new literates” of Africa.110

Alongside their support for colonialism, SIM promoted various controversial views. They openly espoused aggressive religious views. They openly and aggressively criticized Islam. In a 1943 book titled From Cannibalism to Christ: a story of the transforming power of the gospel in darkest Africa, SIM missionary John S. Hall claimed “the 10 or more millions of pagans” in Nigeria were “threatened from the north, by Moslem invasion and absorption.”111

For decades SIM aimed to confine educational activities to those serving narrow religious purposes.112 Andrew Stirrett explained that “care must be exercised not to introduce subjects on the curriculum other than reading of the Bible and writing, because if subjects such as English, mathematics, commercial arithmetic, bookkeeping and other worldly arts and sciences are taught, they become a source of temptation to the pupil to enter government service, receive lucrative positions and often to spend his substance on riotous living … As soon as a young man has been taught to read his Hausa Bible fluently and to write, let him go.”113

In keeping with its religious fundamentalism, SIM withdrew from the Conference of Missions in the Northern Provinces of Nigeria, complaining about the other Christians’ insufficient devotion to scripture. The missionary society explained: “The Sudan Interior Mission seeks always to ensure that each of its members holds and teaches the whole Bible as the infallible word of God (involving belief in the authenticity of the Genesis account of Creation as opposed to modernistic theories of evolution).”

SIM was boldly fundamentalist. In a book about the organization titled Evangelical Christians in the Muslim Sahel, Barbara M. Cooper notes that to be a SIM missionary one had to accept that “the Bible is the ‘inerrant’ word of God (a rejection of historically grounded Biblical criticism); God consists of three persons (father, son, and Holy Spirit); all humans suffer from original sin and must be reborn; humans will go to heaven or hell in the afterlife as a consequence of their spiritual condition (their rebirth or failure to be ‘born again’); Jesus was born of the Virgin Mary, he atoned for human sin with his bodily resurrection, and his second coming is imminent; Satan exists literally (not simply figuratively) and acts in the world; the Christian church is the whole body of those who have been reborn (implicitly excluding Christians who are not ‘born again’); and Christ’s great commission was to order his followers to share these ‘truths’ to every people (therefore to be a Christian is to evangelize).”114

The Canada Congregational Foreign Missionary Society (CCFMS) was formed in 1881. Formerly part of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, CCFMS dispatched Toronto Reverend Walter T. Currie to Angola in 1886. He was the first Canadian sent to Africa by a Canadian society, and was joined by eight other Canadian Congregationalists over the next decade.115 His biography, Currie of Chissamba, compared him to famed brethren, describing him as “an ideal missionary. He ranked with Moffat, Livingston, McKay and others who opened Africa to the Christian message.”116 Before venturing away from the Portuguese-dominated coast to establish himself among the Ovimbundu people, Currie wrote: “We turn our backs on the last traces of civilization and our faces toward the centre of the Dark Continent.”117 In the end, however, the Torontonian only survived due to the goodwill of the Ovimbundu.

Currie, the sole missionary in his region, depended on locals for charity and recruitment was slow in central Angola. It took Currie seven years to perform his first baptism.118 Interest picked up as Portuguese influence traveled inland and by the early 1900s about 700 Ovimbundu attended Sunday congregation.119 Most of the initial converts were of marginal socio-economic status and generally attracted to the positions offered by Currie (who had become akin to a local chief).120 In Canadian Missionaries and the Ovimbundu of Angola, 1885-1915 John C. Butcher explains: “The terms of their conversion stressed their willingness to be loyal and obedient to the ways of the white man rather than reflecting an understanding of Christian principles.”121 The mission pushed men to work in a carpentry shop and flourmill that produced white bread, an alien food, for their consumption. Women converts were pressed to take up “modest” European dress and become “homemakers” who set the table with local versions of Western goods.122 Currie also moved to replace “drumming and dancing” with sports.123 Currie set up a small town in Cisamba where he lived for more than two decades. The town introduced a new style of house meant for nuclear families that came with doors to keep neighbours out.124

Currie resided in a large North American-style home and gained neighbours amongst the growing number of Canadian missionaries, who built houses on higher ground. Butcher writes “by 1900 Cisamba’s form had become that of the new colonial era — with an upper town for the whites and a lower town for the blacks.”125

Between 1886 and 1961 Canadian Congregationalists sent more than 60 missionaries to Angola.126 Many spent half their lives working at mission sites in the colony.127

As Portuguese influence grew, Currie depended less and less on local rulers. The CCFMS mission repeatedly sought the aid of Portuguese authorities. After a heated disagreement with a local leader over spoils from a joint trade caravan, for instance, Currie turned to Portuguese officials to mediate.128 Currie pulled his own weight as well. During a major uprising in 1902, Currie and several Ovimbundu Christians visited a rebel chief and “implored him to desist” his resistance to European rule.129

In 1930, the CCFMS (then United Church of Canada) and its US partner, the West Central Africa Mission of the American Board, celebrated a 50-year jubilee that included a “Portuguese Day”. The day of festivities paid homage to early Portuguese explorers and commemorated colonial rule.130

As part of his legacy, Currie established an institute in Dindo, Angola. The first principal of the Currie Institute, John Taylor Tucker, founded the Angola Evangelical Alliance in 1922. Trained at Montréal’s Congregational College, Tucker would represent all Angolan Mission Societies and Protestant churches vis-à-vis Portuguese authorities (except the Seventh-day Adventists). In 1948, Tucker moved to the capital, Luanda, where he expanded his role in the Angola Evangelical Alliance. Not long after he was appointed representative of all missions in the Portuguese Empire, for which he relocated to Lisbon.131

Often close to authorities, Canadian missionaries failed to publicly criticize Portugal’s brutal rule in Angola until the 1960s.132 In New Wine in a Very Old Bottle: Canadian Protestant Missionaries as Facilitators of Development in Central Angola, 1886-1961 Paul Byam explains: “These Protestant missionaries were never official agents of the Portuguese State; yet in submitting to the requisites of Portuguese colonial policy and by maintaining for many decades an official line of silence on the atrocities such as forced labour and excessively brutal forms of punishment committed by the colonial regime they were accomplices in the promotion of Portuguese colonialism.”133

Regardless of experiences or personal opinion, missionaries had a self-interest in relaying desperate messages about African “heathenism” and “nakedness” to Canadians. Adeleye Liagbemi wrote that “missionaries must paint a dismal picture of the communities among which they are labouring, and exaggerate their own hardships and dangers in order to enlist the support of their people and attract generous donations, which, in the case of the S.I.M., — a ‘faith’ mission — formed the sole basis of support for its workers.”134

A supporter from home asked Walter Currie “how great are the needs of your field?” He responded “they are as great as the superstitions of the people are dark, blinding their eyes. The immorality is horrible, destroying their souls; the slavery is devilish, hastening their ruin.”135 Another piece of CCFMS promotional material reported: “In the pagan villages, disorder, filth, immorality; in the Christian villages, streets laid out in squares; houses of several rooms, with doors, windows and furniture; a family life centering in the common meal; a community life, taking its color from the daily prayer service in the church; on every side cleanliness, intelligence, prosperity, morality. To travel in Angola is to know the social power of Christianity.”136

Canadian missionaries and their supporters published dozens of books and pamphlets from the late 1800s to mid-1900s. The content was often racist and self-serving.

A SIM missionary for two decades, Douglas C. Percy was probably the most prolific of these authors, writing a trilogy of novels set in 1950s Nigeria.137 In When the Bamboo Sings Percy writes that “there was no thanks in his words, for none existed in the language of his people.” But 27 pages later a Hausa woman thanks a missionary, employing what one commentator points out is probably the most common phrase in the language.138 In an ostensibly nonfictional tract Percy argued “the people of Africa have associations with demonic powers that are not readily acceptable or credible to the Occidental mind. Behind the face of Africa looms a dark, evil intelligence, the shadow of Satan, the great enemy of God and man.”139

Official Canada generally supported these Christian activists. Missionary leaders were well-regarded and received sympathetic media coverage. Leading business people financed mission work and Ottawa sometimes looked to missionaries for advice. In A World Mission: Canadian Protestantism and the Quest for a New International Order, 1918-1939 Robert Wright explains: “In the 1920s and the 1930s, when government representation abroad was minimal and non-governmental organizations as we know them today were nonexistent, foreign missionaries were widely, and appropriately, heralded as Canada’s ‘ambassadors’ to the world. Officials in Ottawa regularly sought their opinions on world events and, indeed, missionaries were not above lobbying the government on international matters of particular concern to the churches. More than this, missionaries were well known to the churchgoing public — many Canadians got their first exposure to the cultures of Asia, South America, and Africa, in fact, at lectures and slideshows given by furloughed [on leave] missionary personnel.”140

The ideas of Christian missionaries were shaped by the needs of mid-nineteenth century European/American capitalism and imperialism, but those ideas also took on a life of their own, becoming powerful tools both in Canada and Africa. At home they motivated engagement in imperial adventure; abroad they justified poor behaviour and were an ideological tool used to undermine resistance. In fact, many of the Canadians who participated in the imperial system in Africa were “good Christians” who saw themselves as helping to “civilize the dark continent” while largely benefiting themselves.

4. Canadian Colonialism

“Local territorial agents of colonial states exercised essentially unrestricted arbitrary authority over their African subjects, circumscribed only by their practical capacity to enforce it.”

– Crawford Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective1

Throughout various stages of the colonial project, Canada provided political, military, economic and moral support. Though little known, hundreds of Canadians even engaged in the task of administering the British colonies.

Leading British colonial historian Anthony Kirk-Greene points out “at the top of the Dominions dimension stands Canada’s contribution to the prestigious post of the governorship of major African territories.”2 Between 1907 and 1929, a trio of Canadians held this top position.3

Percy Girouard’s efficiency in the Sudan and South Africa impressed Winston Churchill. Then serving as British under-secretary of state, Churchill promoted the Canadian rail expert to high commissioner of Northern Nigeria in 1906.4 Two years later Girouard became governor of the colony, sparking a Toronto Globe headline that read: “Northern Nigeria: the country which a Canadian will rule”.5

Girouard enjoyed lording over a territory he described as “perhaps the most interesting of all the developing colonies — 400,000 square miles with a population of 10 to 20 million.”6 In a letter to his father in Montréal, he wrote, “there is no other part of the empire I would sooner be in and excepting the hold of the Secretary of State, I am a little independent king.”7 Girouard’s ascent to “king” of Northern Nigeria was the fruit of his railway building successes in the Sudan and South Africa.

In their struggle against resistance from various tribes, the British empire needed a rail line to strengthen its grip over the interior of the colony. In a 177-page Masters thesis titled Sir Percy Girouard: French Canadian proconsul in Africa, 1906-1912, Michael Smith writes that the British government “had become fully aware of the fragile military situation in the Protectorate and was now convinced that a railroad was necessary to ensure security in the region.”8

In addition to its military considerations, Britain needed a railway line to the coast to access “a cheap, reliable source of raw cotton” in service of the textile industry in northern England.9 An article titled “Sir Percy Girouard, Canada’s Governor of Northern Nigeria, 1907-1909” notes, “the British handed the Northern Nigeria governorship over to our man from Canada, Percy Girouard in order to literally lay the groundwork for a natural resource export economy, and it worked.”10

The 550-km railway stretching from the city of Kano to the port of Baro increased raw cotton exports considerably. British capitalists, however, determined prices in ways that limited benefits to Nigerians.11 The rail line also increased imports of European manufactured fabrics, undermining the traditional cloth industry.

Constructing the Baro-Kano railway was a considerable challenge and Girouard needed help. He hired Canadian mechanical engineer A.W. Robinson, and two Canadian axmen, Jules Lachapelle and A. S. Choun.12 While Canadians received clear contracts, many African labourers were forced to work. One author contrasted the Canadian governor’s pay with that of the Nigerian rail workers — Girouard earned 800 times as much as the local labourers were paid — if they were paid at all.13 In Working on the Railway: Forced Labor in Northern Nigeria, 1907-1912 Michael Mason explains, “by 1907 [the British] had begun to drive local peasants and slaves to build a river port at Baro on the Niger and a railway line to link that town to the economic heart of the Protectorate, Kano.”14 Mason adds “workers on the railway line were to be pressed into service by political means, that is, through the combined intervention of the European officials and the indigenous chiefs.”15

Forced labour practices led to a major uprising against at least one of the chief’s responsible for recruiting rail workers at Britain’s behest. During the course of two battles, as many as 200 villagers were killed by colonial forces suppressing this opposition.16 An internal British communiqué described this conflict, stating: “This resistance [to the chief] increased, owing apparently to orders being issued for the Gussoro people to build some canoes for placing at the various rivers where the railway would cross, and the hostile faction increased in the early part of this year when Gussoro was called on to supply labour for earthworks [moving or processing parts of the earth].”17

Girouard explained the colonial administration’s employment of pre-colonial authority as follows: “If we allow the tribal authority to be ignored or broken, it will mean that we … shall be obliged to deal with a rabble, with thousands of persons in a savage or semi-savage state, all acting on their own impulses and making themselves a danger to society generally.”18

After completing his duties in Northern Nigeria, Girouard became governor of British East Africa (present day Kenya). From 1909 to 1912 Girouard threw himself into ongoing efforts to turn Kenya into a “white man’s country”.19

Girouard’s unchecked colonial zeal made him a liability, eventually prompting the Colonial Office to relieve him of his duties. In Moving the Maasai: A Colonial Misadventure Lotte Hughes writes that Girouard “alarmed London by being unashamedly pro-settler.”20 Another scholar writes that the governor “doubted the wisdom of emphasizing African [export] production and increasingly placed the colonial state behind the productive efforts of Kenya’s European settlers.”21

Girouard championed the vision of Kenya as a white man’s country. He pushed to remove London-appointed officials at odds with white settlers and argued for parity between local whites and government officials on the Protectorate’s Legislative Council.22 Turning history on its head, Girouard declared Kikuyu settlements on white farms “nothing but nests of thieves.”23

On multiple occasions, Girouard went as far as defying the Colonial Office on important settlement related issues. When a prominent British settler confessed to the murder of an African suspected of stealing a sheep, a white jury rejected the judge’s counsel and acquitted the killer after five minutes of deliberation.24 London wanted the assailant deported, fearing political fallout in the UK from the judicial farce. Girourd not only refused to condemn the murder and the jury’s decision, he attempted to block the deportation.25 In an internal telegram, the Colonial Office’s H. J. Read wrote: “In spite of Sir P. Girouard’s apologetics it seems to me that murder is murder and that it is out of the question to let the matter slide in the easy manner which he appears to contemplate.”26

Girouard’s indifference to this crime caused a rift with London, but it was his underhanded abrogation of the sole treaty the East African protectorate had ever signed with an African tribe that spurred his political demise.27 Weakened by disease and confronting an ascendant Britain, in 1904 the Maasai agreed to give up as much as two thirds of their land.28 In exchange, the cattle rearing, semi-nomadic people were assured the fertile Laikipia Plateau for “so long as the Maasai as a race shall exist.”29 By Girouard and Britain’s odd calculation, the agreement expired seven years later. About 10,000 Maasai, with 200,000 cattle and 2 million sheep, were forced to march 150 km southward to a semiarid area near German East Africa.30 An unknown number of Maasai and their livestock died on this “trail of tears”.

In Origins of European Settlement in Kenya, M. P. K. Sorensen describes the Canadian’s effort to sell London on scrapping the agreement. “Girouard had to abrogate the 1904 Masai treaty and pretend to the Colonial Office that the Masai wanted to move south. At the same time he had to disguise the fact that he was acting in the interests of the settlers, some of whom had been promised land on Laikipia.”31

Concerned about the impact of Girouard’s actions, some British officials in the protectorate bypassed the governor to communicate their disagreement to London. One official in East Africa cabled the Colonial Office with a message: “Girouard was simply yielding to settler pressure in his wish to move the Maasai.”32

Girouard’s deception and abrogation of the treaty caused tensions within the Colonial Office, which would be his downfall. His actions also led to court battles. In 1913 the Maasai sued to recover the land they lost two years earlier and a century later there is still talk of reviving the case.33

But European settlers weren’t satisfied with taking good East African land. They also wanted cheap labour. To assist the white community’s search for African labour, Girouard put forth a number of proposals strongly influenced by racist South African policy.34 Sorensen explains: “He decided that South Africa provided more suitable precedents than West Africa, since the presence of white settlers in the highlands made the protectorate’s racial problems similar to those of South Africa. Girouard intended to follow the recommendations of the South African Native Affairs Commission Report of 1905. This envisioned four stages of African evolution towards civilisation: at first Africans lived in a tribal society in reserves; then they laboured for European farmers; next they obtained urban employment; and, finally, they moved into professional occupations.”35

As in Northern Nigeria, the Canadian governor allowed the practice of using compulsory labour on some public and private projects. One chief explained how he supplied 50 workmen for the Girouard-promoted Magady Soda Works project by “sending out his spearman and asking for volunteers.”36

In an article titled “Canada in Africa: Sir Percy Girouard, Neglected Colonial Governor”, Oxford historian Anthony Kirk-Greene dubs him “Canada’s most distinguished yet least-known colonial governor.”37 Sympathetic to imperialism, the author further explains: “In the whole of the 20th century and in all Britain’s African territories put together, there is not another governor who was knighted when he was just turned 30 or who could point to outstanding service in North and South, West and East Africa.”38

The son of a long serving Member of Parliament and Supreme Court of Canada judge, Girouard remained honorary lieutenant colonel of the Chicoutimi-based 18th (Saguenay) regiment throughout his time in Africa. In 1903, Montréal Herald readers ranked Girouard seventh among “the ten greatest living Canadians.”39 The next year Banff National Park named Mount Girouard in his honour.40 The RMC cited him as a distinguished graduate in a 1924 House of Commons debate and 53 years later created a Girouard Academic Building.41 More than half a century later the accolades continued to accumulate with the Historic Sites and Monuments Board of Canada erecting a plaque in his honour at the RMC in 1985, the same year the Montréal Gazette published an article titled “Maybe Africa needs another Percy Girouard.”42

Canada had a foot on the ground on the west coast of Africa as well. While Girouard ruled the great landmasses of both Northern Nigeria and British East Africa, Galt Ontario born Sir Frederick Gordon Guggisberg governed for longer. In 1914, the brigadier general was appointed director of public works in the Gold Coast. In 1919, he became governor of the colony, a position he held until 1927.

Guggisberg is remembered as a pro-African governor. A 1998 biography is titled Beloved Imperialist: Sir Gordon Guggisberg, Governor of the Gold Coast while his Wikipedia page argues, “the aim of Guggisberg’s policy was the development of the country by and for the natives rather than for the benefit of European capitalists.”43 Paradoxically, Guggisberg’s highly sympathetic 1966 biography says he would be “shocked by the notion of ‘one man one vote’.”44 At another point the book notes, “Guggisberg was not a democrat, and the Gold Coast was not a democracy.”45

Guggisberg’s comparatively pro-African legacy speaks volumes about the authoritarian character of British colonialism. In one treatise published after leaving the governorship he writes, “it is clear, therefore, that trusteeship, as used in connection with the rule of a European over a backward race, involves the development of the latter’s country for the benefit of its indigenous inhabitants.”46 During his rule he wrote to a friend in the Colonial Office regarding a British Labour Party election victory. His 1966 biography summarized his concerns that the election “would lay waste the work of generations by greeting Africans prematurely as equal citizens in the Commonwealth and giving them the vote.”47 Guggisberg wrote, “we are safe as long as you keep the Labour party out of power.”48 The Canadian born governor took up the same theme regarding the Labour Party during a speech in northern England. According to A Political History of Ghana: “He expressed the fear in Manchester that someday the idealists might get a little power in England and would then turn round and say to the Gold Coast, ‘You are men, and brothers with us. Some of you are very finely educated. We will give you self-government and see how you can govern yourselves.’ If that moment were to come ‘within the next 100 years … Manchester merchants would be wise to cut their losses and start trade with some other part of the world’. ”49

Guggisberg also disliked labour unions. In 1920, the Colonial Office advised all colony administrations to treat workers organisations in accordance with the International Labour Convention of 1919. In response, Guggisberg cautioned the secretary of state to “do nothing to hasten the growth of unionism.”50 A strike the previous year at the Sekondi port lasted five weeks despite the colonial administration’s efforts to intimidate the workers. “By 1920-1 strike action had spread to Accra and the outstations,” notes Christian Tsey in Gold Coast Railways: the Making of a Colonial Economy, 1879-1929. “However, Guggisberg who at the time was still calling the workers’ demands ‘exorbitant’, was committed to a hard line.”51

Any wage increase is “exorbitant” when labour can be free. Guggisberg used forced labour for a number of public projects. At a conference of public works officials in November 1919 he announced that the colonial administration needed to recruit 27,000 labourers, half of whom Tsey explains, “were to be provided by the Ashanti through unpaid communal labour.”52 Forcing able-bodied peasants to provide several days of free labour on public projects predated the Canadian governor. It was, however, “the first time the system was being used for railway construction. The aim was to enable the Government to overcome the labour supply problem while placing the onus of recruitment on the Chiefs.”53 Guggisberg would boost the power of the chiefs, notes Tsey, so they could better “mobilize their subjects for forced communal labour.”54

The colonial administration’s push to widen its pool of free labour was driven by a desire to expand exports of what Guggisberg dubbed the colony’s “immensely valuable resources”.55As part of an effort to increase cocoa, timber and gold exports, Guggisberg pushed the construction of a huge new port.56 He asked the secretary of state for the colonies if he could “hire a Canadian engineering firm, Stewart and McDonnell, to survey the Gold Coast’s shoreline, propose possible harbour sites, and craft a plan for its construction.”57

But building a port at Takoradi Harbour near Accra became mired in controversy. The African members of the colony’s Legislative Council preferred to spend any money available for the port on schools and railways.58 Additionally, those displaced from their homes to make room for European settlement, which was to accompany the port, were unhappy.59 One of the most expensive projects the Colonial Office undertook anywhere during the 1920s, construction costs far surpassed the budget and one official at the Colonial Office accused Guggisberg of “irresponsibly endorsing the ousted engineers,” who were replaced by a British firm.60

Guggisberg’s biggest impact was in the official political arena where he engaged in a mix of divide and rule and co-opting critical forces to maintain overwhelming British control. He undercut growing nationalist sentiment by pitting formally educated, mostly urban, Africans against traditional chiefs. Guggisberg convinced a major chief, Nana Sir Ofori Atta, to criticize a West African National Congress delegation that traveled to England to push for greater political rights and then used the chief’s statement to lobby Secretary of State for the Colonies Alfred Milner to ensure the Congress delegation was not received by either him or the King.61

But the 1925 “Guggisberg Constitution” couldn’t completely dismiss the growing nationalist movement, which the governor denounced for “widening day by day and month by month the gap between the black man and the white man; they were increasing and creating this racial feeling.”62 In The Gold Coast Revolution George Padmore explains: “Recognizing that the [West African National] Congress could not be entirely disposed of, Sir Gordon Guggisberg evolved a plan to counter the Congress agitation by giving the Africans a larger voice in the Central Government. He side tracked Congress agitation by increasing the representation of the Colony chiefs in the Legislative Council. By making them salaried Native Authorities of the British Government, subject to official discipline under the District Commissioners, they could be depended upon to support official policies and rebut criticism from the educated Africans associated with the Congress and the Aborigines Rights Protection Society, then under the influence of a group of Cape Coast intellectuals.

“All this was achieved through the Native Authorities Ordinance and the Provincial Councils of Chiefs, which gave the chiefs the right to nominate themselves on to the Central Legislative Council. They were allowed twice the number of members granted to the educated Westernized Africans inhabiting the principal coastal towns. It was a clever move, which served the aims of the imperialists by divorcing the chiefs from the intelligentsia and driving a wedge between the educated urban and illiterate rural communities. This manoeuvre of Sir Gordon Guggisberg blunted the political agitation of the West African National Congress for radical constitutional changes, and had the effect of arresting for many years the onward march towards self-government.”63

A few months after leaving his post as Gold Coast governor, Guggisberg spoke to an audience at the Canadian Military Institute in Toronto. His 1966 biography notes, “one question which caused a ripple of laughter was whether Canada had any exports to West Africa other than engineers, officers and governors.”64

While only Guggisberg and Girouard achieved governorship, other Canadians assumed various lesser colonial positions. After a stint with the West African Frontier Force, RMC-graduate Arthur Leith-Ross became chief transport officer in the Nigeria Protectorate.65 He was not the only Canadian military man to enter colonial service. Former Royal Canadian Air Force pilot John C. Cairns spent six years in the colonial administration, rising to become a district officer in Tanganyika (Tanzania). In 1921 former Canadian Lieutenant E.F.L. Penno was appointed assistant commander of the Gold Coast police and was later made overall commander.66 After two decades with the British military, RMC graduate Sir Godfrey Rhodes relocated to become chief engineer and general manager of Kenya and Uganda Railways and Harbours in 1928.67 The Victoria native would remain in the position for over a decade and in 1939 received an appointment as chief commissioner of scouts in Kenya.68

Canadians were assigned a broad array of roles, from a veterinary officer in the Ado-Ekiti Division in southwest Nigeria to work in the agricultural department in Mauritius.69 Also dispatched to Nigeria, Dr. Beatty Rose oversaw its health department. Rose was the first Canadian posted under the Dominion Selection Scheme.70

A.H.M. Kirk-Greene describes the creation of a formal structure to recruit Canadian university graduates into the colonial administration in an article titled “Taking Canada into Partnership in ‘The White Man’s Burden’: The British Colonial Service and the Dominion Selection Scheme.” As part of the formation of the Dominion Selection Scheme, a 1923 Conference of Canadian Universities held a session on “British Colonial Service as a Career for Canadian University Graduates.”71 With Ottawa’s backing, the universities established procedures to recruit students and communicate with the Colonial Office about prospective candidates. In the late 1940s, for instance, the Provost of Trinity College at the University of Toronto, Professor R.S.K Seely, also acted as the Colonial Office’s recruiting representative for eastern Canada.72 The recruitment scheme would last nearly 40 years.73

In one memorandum, Major Ralph Furse, chief recruitment officer for the Colonial Service, framed the process of instituting the scheme as valuable to Canada, arguing that it would help the country learn “the problems of administration of native countries.”74 More crudely, the Colonial Office’s Parliamentary Under Secretary of State Leo Amery ended a letter to the principal of McGill University, Sir Arthur Currie, by noting that he looked forward “to the result of this modest little experiment in taking Canada into partnership in ‘The White Man’s Burden.’”75

In a 1926 report to the Imperial Conference, Amery announced that a “small but steady stream of very satisfactory young candidates from Canada … have entered the West and East African and other Colonial Services.”76 Between 1923 and 1955 at least 169 Canadians joined the colonial administration through the scheme.77 (According to On Crown Service, this figure underestimates the total, since “Canadians who graduated from British universities would have been recruited through the standard Colonial Office procedure.”78)

A number of Dominion Selection Scheme recruits went on to work in the Canadian foreign service. Ian Hodson was part of the Nyasalanda (Malawi) administration and was later responsible for Canadian External Aid Office programs in Africa.79 On the other side of the continent, Hugh Vernon-Jackson worked in northern Nigeria’s education department and later became a Canadian International Development Agency representative in Lagos with “repeat assignments to Addis Ababa, Khartoum and Cairo.”80 For his part, Walter Bazley was a colonial administrator in Bunyoro, Uganda, from 1950 to 1963 and after independence worked in the Canadian federal public service for three decades.81

Outside of colonial administrators, Canada threw its diplomatic weight behind European, mainly British, colonialism in Africa. As a Dominion without full control over its foreign policy until 1931, Canada ipso facto adhered to British colonialism. But Ottawa was not required to contribute to imperial endeavours and if Canadian policymakers disapproved of British policy they could have pushed for full autonomy decades earlier.

After 1931, Ottawa continued to follow a decidedly pro-colonial policy in Africa. In the lead-up to World War II, Italy invaded Abyssinia (Ethiopia), the only independent African country. (Ethiopians beat back an Italian invasion three decades earlier.) Employing mustard gas and other brutal tactics, the Italians killed tens of thousands of Ethiopians directly with many more dying as a result of dislocation.82 The 1935 invasion contravened a series of “friendship treaties” signed by the two countries. It also violated Article X of the League of Nations, which explicitly forbade aggression among the organization’s members. Nonetheless, Ottawa’s overall position opposed collective League action against Italy and ultimately recognized Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia.83

As the crisis unfolded, Ottawa undermined the push for oil sanctions against Italy. Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs Ernest Lapointe, explicitly distanced Canada from a sanctions proposal drafted by a Canadian member of the League’s Committee of 18.84 Clarifying his country’s position, Lapointe said: “The suggestion which has appeared from time to time, that the Canadian government has taken the initiative in the extension of the embargo upon exportation of key commodities to Italy, and particularly in the placing of a ban upon shipments of coal, oil, iron and steel, is due to a misunderstanding. The Canadian government has not and does not intend to take the initiative in any such action; and the opinion which was expressed by the Canadian member of the Committee — and which has led to the reference to the proposal as a Canadian proposal — represented only his own personal opinion, and his views as a member of the Committee — and not the views of the Canadian government.”85

Responding to the federal government’s refusal to support oil sanctions against Italy, Canadian Cooperative Federation (CCF) MP Tommy Douglas told the House of Commons: “Is it because those people who make their profits out of oil have a great deal more weight in the councils of the governments of the world than the dictates of humanity? The people of Canada are asking that we take a stand with the forces of peace rather than with those of financial interests desiring a greater sale of oil.”86

In his 1959 PhD thesis titled Some Reactions to Canadian Government Policy During the Italo Ethiopian Crisis, Leo Friman Kristjanson puts the diplomatic battle at the League of Nations into its broader context: “The black races throughout the world were of course hoping that the League would take strong action. This would represent a decision of the white man to aid the black against white domination and the League would then become one place in which they were treated as equals. There was of course some reaction of whites in the other direction. They recognized that a grievous wrong was being committed but thought it best to allow it to go on rather than have the black races demand equality.”87

In a clear indication of Ottawa’s orientation towards the “white races”, by the start of 1939 External Affairs had opened diplomatic missions in France, Belgium, US, Japan, Netherlands and the UK.88 These six countries ruled almost all of Africa and were among the most important colonial/imperial powers globally. Ottawa ignored dozens of independent countries in Latin America, Eastern Europe and Asia. Rather than establish missions in the colonial/imperial powers, Canada could have refused to open an embassy with any country that occupied another.

Alongside its effective diplomatic endorsement of African colonialism, Canada supported Britain militarily throughout the colonial period. Just after the Boer War Ottawa established formal ties between Canadian militia units and British regiments.89 The objective was to create opportunities for Canadian soldiers to fight alongside Britain, a goal that effectively meant securing the Empire.

Canada-British Air Force relations began during World War I and officer exchanges continued thereafter.90 Beginning in 1914 the Royal Naval College of Canada provided cadets with a “course of study that would qualify them for eventual service on British warships.”91 Close naval ties continued to build throughout much of the colonial period. In the Two-Edged Sword: The Navy as an Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy, Nicholas Tracy points out that in the 1920s and 30s Canadian officers spent almost a third of their time in the Royal Navy and at any point 10% of the Canadian Navy’s ratings and warrant officers were on course or sea duty with the Royal Navy. British staff officers on the Canadian Naval staff, and the provision for Canadian Naval officers to fill staff positions at the Admiralty, ensured a unity of technical control.”92

Ottawa officially accepted the principle of military cooperation put forward by British politicians at the Imperial Conference of 1907.93 Present at the conferences were representatives from Britain, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand and Canada.

Canada wholeheartedly followed through on this commitment during World War I and II. As mentioned earlier, between 1914 and 1918 six hundred thousand Canadians fought in a war with no clear or compelling purpose other than rivalry between up-and-coming Germany and the imperial powers of the day, Britain and France.94 In fact, support for the British Empire was Ottawa’s primary motive in joining the war. As Prime Minister Robert Borden saw it, the fight was “to put forth every effort and to make every sacrifice necessary to ensure the integrity and maintain the honour of our empire.”95

Over one million Canadians fought in World War II. The historical record shows that Nazi expansionism’s threat to British interests, not opposition to fascism or anti-Semitism, led Ottawa to war. (Only two years before the war Prime Minister Mackenzie King visited Hitler and in his diary King repeatedly expressed sympathy towards the Nazis.96) Canada and the Two World Wars explains that “Canada went to war in September 1939 for the same reason as in 1914: because Britain went to war.”97

By land, sea and air Canadians fought in Africa during the Second World War. More than a dozen Royal Canadian Navy Corvettes escorted convoys from the UK to North Africa in 1942. Describing a larger follow-up support mission in 1943 a Hamilton Spectator headline noted: “Canada Supplied 29 Ships and 3000 of Her Sailors for North African Action”.98

Many Canadian fighter pilots also operated over the continent. “During the Second World War,” notes Canadian African studies scholar Douglas Anglin, “considerable numbers of Canadian airmen served in R.A.F. [Royal Air Force] squadrons in various parts of the continent, particularly North Africa.”99 More than a half-dozen Canadian pilots defended the important Royal Air Force base at Takoradi, Ghana, and others traveled there to follow the West African Reinforcement Route.100 As part of this effort thousands of fighter jets were assembled in Ghana and flown to Nigeria then to Sudan and onto Egypt to participate in the Middle East and North African theatre of the war.

Without Canada’s major contribution to the two World Wars Britain and France may not have held (let alone expanded) their African colonies. After Germany invaded during World War II part of the French government relocated to the south. The Vichy Regime continued to control France’s colonies. In a bid to prod Philippe Pétain’s Vichy regime to re-enter the war alongside the Allies, Canadian diplomat Pierre Dupuy visited on three occasions between 1940 and 1941.101 Describing Dupuy’s mission and the thinking in Ottawa at the time, Robin Gendron notes, “for the Canadian government as for the Allies in general, the colonies had no separate existence outside of France. In practical terms, the colonies were France.”102 Later in the war Prime Minister Mackenzie King expressed a similar opinion regarding Britain’s colonies. “In December 1942,” Gendron reports, “King informed the British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs that colonial policy must remain the responsibility of the colonial powers, and he reiterated this position in late 1944 when the British government asked for Canada’s input on the latest proposals for the postwar settlement of colonial issues.”103

In a significant sign of support for colonialism, Ottawa enabled Canadian companies to profit from African subjugation. In 1893 the Department of Customs opened a Trade Return Category to calculate Canadian trade to “British possessions in Africa” and a few years later the French, Spanish and Portuguese colonies in Africa were added to the list.104 Canada’s first African Trade Office was opened in Cape Town in 1902 and by August 1904 James G. Jardine, the trade commissioner, reported that he visited “all the principal places from Cape Town to Zanzibar”, reaching halfway up the East African coast.105 As part of his bid to drum up business, Jardine met with politicians, journalists and business leaders from across the southern part of the continent.106

To spur African trade the Department of Trade and Commerce also subsidized a shipping line from Québec to Cape Town.107 The official history of the trade department, Canada’s Salesman to the World, notes “Canada extended the British preferential tariff to the [South African territories of] Cape of Good Hope, Natal, Orange River Colony, Transvaal, and Southern Rhodesia [Zimbabwe]. In 1910 Canada extended special treaty rates to all British colonies including those in Africa.”108

After fighting in the Boer War and commanding the Durban branch of the South African Constabulary, the aforementioned Henry Rivington Poussette was appointed Canadian trade commissioner in that city.109 His “jurisdiction extend[ed] from the Cape to the Zambesi, including Uganda, British East Africa [Kenya], Portuguese East Africa [Mozambique] and German Southwest Africa [Namibia].”110

Following Ottawa’s aggressive outreach, Canadian exports to British Africa rose sharply in the first two decades of the 1900s. They reached $15.5 million in 1921, which was only a million dollars less than trade to then independent Newfoundland.111

Canada’s participation in British imperialism spurred business at home. In a stark example of this dynamic, Canada’s Salesman to the World notes, “the Governor of the Gold Coast was a former Canadian and he suggested to the Canadian government to send someone to look into trade potential there.”112 Prior to taking up his governorship in what is now Ghana, Frederick Guggisberg met the Canadian trade commissioner in London. Afterwards he wrote the Colonial Office “that both Mister Lloyd Harris (the head of the mission) and I are convinced that we can open a large mutual trade direct between the Gold Coast and Canada.”113

In response to Guggisberg’s outreach, Canada’s trade commissioner in Cape Town, W. J. Egan, visited nine countries in West Africa over a 3½ month period in 1920-21. Egan’s report West Africa and its Opportunities for Canadian Trade was published in the department’s weekly bulletin and reprinted as an 80-page booklet.114 Egan makes it abundantly clear that the colonial apparatus facilitated his trip. “It is impossible to say too much in appreciation of the cooperation and up to date business methods shown by the Colonial Office in London, as regards the writer’s trip to the British colonies of West Africa. While in West Africa, every official was courteous itself; there was nothing asked for in the shape of information that was not supplied, or a suggestion made as to where it could be secured. The Commissioner enjoyed the hospitality of the Governor of each colony, and in every case Their Excellencies, with their Colonial Secretaries, helped enthusiastically in making a success of the visit. Thanks and appreciation are also do to the general managers of the railways in Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, and Nigeria; the manager of the latter road, Mr. Bland, who is a Canadian, placed a special car at the writer’s disposal for his trip up to Kano, which is 700 miles inland.”115

Opportunities for Canadian business continued to expand. A few years after Egan’s trip the new Canadian trade commissioner in South Africa, G.R. Stevens, traveled to the Congo and reported on the Katanga region’s immense resources.116 In 1930 a trade office was opened in British-dominated Egypt. The commissioner there was also responsible for Sudan as well as parts of the Middle East.117

Without a permanent trade/investment generating outpost on the west of the continent, the assistant trade commissioner in London, H. Leslie Brown, built upon Egan’s earlier visit there. In 1938 he spent a week in Gambia, two weeks in Sierra Leone, three weeks in the Gold Coast and five weeks in Nigeria investigating opportunities for Canadian business. As part of the mission he published a series of reports in the department’s Commercial Intelligence Journal.118 According to the official history of the Trade Department, at the time of Brown’s West African tour, “the promotion of Canadian exports to colonial Africa was a secondary responsibility of three offices — Cairo, Johannesburg, and Cape Town. In addition, the offices in London, Liverpool, and Paris were involved because these cities housed the head offices or buying offices of the trading companies that controlled the bulk of the trade in West Africa.”119

In 1946 a trade commission was opened in the Belgian Congo and another in Rhodesia nine years later.120 During World War II the minister of trade and commerce gave preliminary approval to a trade agreement with the Congo that would have given the Belgian colony preferential tariff rates on par with those of the British Empire (London’s opposition ultimately scuttled the agreement).

Canadian investment in Africa was modest compared to those in the British Caribbean or US-dominated Latin America. But it continued to grow as the colonial era progressed. Direct Canadian investment in Africa reached $48 million in 1954 and $68 million in 1960 ($600 million today).121 For part of this period — 1939 to 1951 — companies wanting to invest money in Africa required the approval of Canada’s Foreign Exchange Control Board.

Towards the end of the colonial period Thomson International Limited, publisher of the Globe and Mail, acquired half of the Amalgamated Press of Nigeria.122 For their part, Rio Tinto and Chromium Mining and Smelting Corporation had mining concessions in Southern Rhodesia.123

Business ties to companies pillaging the Congo grew during the final decade of Belgian rule. Canada-based Brockville Chemicals, Neelon Steel, McAllister Towing, Iroquois Glass and Fastcut Bits all did business with Belgian behemoth Société Générale, which controlled much of the Congolese economy, including mining giant Union Minière.124 In 1951 Société Générale created Canadian subsidiary Sogemines. A Belgian businessman Felix Notebaert put Société Générale honorary governor Gaston Blaise in touch with James Muir, the president of the Royal Bank of Canada and Jules Timmins, head of Hollinger mines.125 Muir, Royal Bank Vice President H. Howard Q.C. and a partner in a law firm close to the Royal Bank, F. Campbell Cope, all became directors of Sogemines.126

A Montréal registered company, Sudkat, had six board members who also sat on the board of Société Générale. Another two also sat on the board of Union Minière.127

At the end of 1957 the Royal Bank (with eight other banks) financed a $40 million ($350 million today) World Bank loan to the Belgian colony largely to import machinery to build roadway.128 Anatomy of Big Business explains the link between the Royal Bank and exploitation of the Congo: “The full picture shows a large Canadian bank, linked at home with Sogemines Ltd. which is owned by the Société Générale the owners of the Union Minière, lending money to build roads in the Congo (to the undoubted benefit of Union Minière interests…) while Union Minière profits find their way back through the Société Générale into Sogemines and interests connected with the Royal [Bank] and other banks.”129

Canadian banks were also tied to the British companies driving colonial policy. A number of Canadian banks bought into or developed partnerships with British banks operating in Africa. According to Canadian Banks and Global Competitiveness, “in 1920, a substantial interest in the Colonial Bank was purchased [by the Bank of Montréal] to fill out the branch network and to provide representation in the West Indies and West Africa.”130 A year earlier the Royal Bank of Canada established an association with the Westminster Bank and towards the end of the colonial period Scotia Bank cultivated a relationship with the Midland Bank.131 Both of these British banks had operations in Africa.132

Of course, Canadian banks were prominent around the world. Near the end of the colonial period in 1960 three of the world’s twelve biggest banks were Canadian and Canadian banks oversaw 15% of the international foreign currency market.133

One major Canadian company also forayed into large-scale footwear production in Africa. With operations dating back to the 1930s Toronto-based Bata Shoes set up shop across the continent. By the end of the colonial era it had production or retail facilities in Nigeria, Kenya, Morocco, South Africa, Egypt, Sierra Leone, Libya, Sudan, Algeria, Senegal, Congo, Tanzania and Rhodesia.134 In the 1940s and 50s, notes a company history, “the organization’s expansion was especially great in francophone Africa. As Mr. Bata himself noted, there was no country in that part of the world where his company was not established as the number-one supplier of footwear.”135 While “Mr. Bata” may not be the most objective source on the shoemaker, a government study just after independence found the company controlled 70% of the footwear market in British East Africa (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania).136

In a 1974 Saturday Night article titled “Canadians Too, Can Act like Economic Imperialists”, Steve Langdon described the company’s operations in Kenya: “Bata seems to be undercutting decentralized rural development in Kenya, to be blocking African advance in other areas, and to be throwing its weight around politically — all at a handsome profit.”137 In a bid to subvert the establishment of a domestic competitor, the Toronto-based multinational wrote its overseas suppliers to discourage sales to its challenger and asked Kenyan government officials to intervene on its behalf.138

Bata’s mechanized production methods squeezed out indigenous footwear producers all the while increasing imports of plastics and machinery, which came at the expense of local materials (leather) and employment. In the 1975 article “Canada’s Relations with Africa” Robert Matthews notes that Bata drained “money and opportunity from poor rural areas” to the benefit of a small group of locals and Toronto head office.139

When the post-independence Tanzanian government announced that it would acquire a 60 percent share of a multitude of major foreign firms Bata was the only hold out.140 The Toronto firm attempted to sabotage Tanzania’s push to acquire a controlling interest in the local company’s operations. In Underdevelopment and Nationalization: Banking in Tanzania James H. Mittelman explains: “Bata Shoes (a Canadian-based concern), for example, ran down stocks, removed machinery, supplied imperfect items, and later withdrew all staff, supposedly closing down for annual repairs! The Company refused to relinquish more than 49 per cent of its controlling interests, tried to set up a new wholesaling operation dependent on its firm in Kenya, and urged other foreign investors to fight.”141

Bata’s aggressive reaction to Tanzania’s efforts aimed to dissuade other newly independent African countries from following a similar path.142 The shoemaker no doubt feared for its significant operations across the continent.

In 1960 Toronto-based Frobisher Limited (Falconbridge) had some $14 million ($140 million today) invested in various parts of Africa.143 They had small operations in the two Rhodesias (Zimbabwe and Zambia), a phosphate and columbite concession on the Uganda-Kenya border as well as a 52-million-acre oil concession in Somalia-Kenya.144 Adding to their investments at the start of the 1950s Frobisher discovered a large iron ore deposit in Mauritania.145

A decade before Uganda won its independence, Falconbridge acquired a 70% stake in the Kilembe copper-cobalt mine in the western part of the country. The London controlled Colonial Development Corporation and Uganda Development Corporation owned the rest of the mine and provided the “necessary” financing to bring it into production.146 This massive project included a hydroelectric station and only became viable once the colonial authority constructed a railway to the site. The highly profitable mine produced more than $250 million ($1 billion today) worth of copper yet paid no income tax until its capital was fully recovered in 1965.147 In 1968, post-independence leader Milton Obote increased the country’s copper export tax and then moved to gain majority control of the mine. Falconbridge quickly stripped out $6 million in special dividend payments and threatened to withdraw its management from the country.148 Falconbridge: Portrait of a Canadian Mining Multinational explains: “Although Kilembe Copper was both profitable and socially important in the Ugandan economy, this did not prevent the Falconbridge group from withdrawing capital as rapidly as possible just before president Obote forced it to sell Uganda a controlling interest in 1970. The implication was that its management team would be withdrawn entirely if the government did not restore Falconbridge’s majority ownership. Dislocation in the lives of Ugandan people was a price the company seemed willing to pay in this tug-of-war over the profits from Uganda’s resources.”149

The Kilembe mine also contaminated Elizabeth National Park and tailings seeped into Lake George, near Uganda’s western border with the Congo. Though it closed in 1978, the arsenic deposited in the lake continues to worry scientists.150

Upon taking office, General Idi Amin returned control of the Kilembe mine to Falconbridge. (This was maintained for several years, after which Amin returned the mine to his government.) He had managed to overthrow Obote’s government in January 1971 with the aid of Britain, Israel and the US. Popular UK historian Mark Curtis explains: “Britain consciously supported and connived in the rise of Idi Amin because of long-standing British interests to get rid of governments like that of Obote” whose economic policies threatened its corporate interests.151 A Foreign Office memo noted that Obote’s nationalizations, which also included Bata, had “serious implications for British business in Uganda and Africa generally … other countries will be tempted to try and get away with similar measures with more damaging consequences for British investment and trade.”152

Little has been published about Ottawa’s position on Amin’s rise to power. The available documentation suggests Ottawa passively supported the putsch. On three occasions during the early days of the coup (between January 26 and February 3, 1971) the Pierre Trudeau government responded to inquiries from opposition MPs about developments in Uganda and whether Canada would grant diplomatic recognition to the new regime.153 Within a week of Obote’s ouster, both External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp and Prime Minister Trudeau passed up these opportunities to denounce Amin’s usurpation of power. They remained silent as Amin suspended various provisions of the Ugandan Constitution and declared himself president, commander in chief of the armed forces, army chief of staff and chief of air staff. They failed to condemn a leader, now infamous, for plunging the nation into a torrent of violence.

In African Pearls and Poisons: Idi Amin’s Uganda; Kenya; Zaire’s Pygmies, Alberta bureaucrat Leo Louis Jacques describes a conversation he had with the CIDA liaison officer in Uganda who facilitated his 1971-73 appointment to the Uganda College of Commerce. Asked whether the change in government would affect his CIDA-funded position, the aid agency’s liaison officer in Uganda, Catrina Porter, answered Jacques thusly: “‘Yes, there was a coup on January 25th, 1971 and it was a move that promises to be an improvement. The new administration favours Democracy and Western Civilization’s Democracy, while the former one favoured the Communists.’ I [Jacques] said, ‘I understand the present government is being run by the Ugandan army under the control of a General named Idi Amin Dada. What is he like?’ Porter said ‘General Amin’s gone on record as saying he loves Canada and the Commonwealth. He also vowed that his country of Uganda would have democratic elections soon. The British and Americans have recognized him as the Ugandan government and so do we.’”154

In mid-1973 the Canadian high commissioner in Nairobi visited Uganda to ask Amin if he would attend the annual Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting taking place in Ottawa. But, the primary objective of the high commissioner’s meeting was to convince Amin to reverse his nationalization of Bata. A cable published by WikiLeaks read: “CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER OLIVIER MET WITH PRESIDENT AMIN JUNE 29 TO DISCUSS GOU TAKE-OVER OF BATA SHOE FIRM. AMIN REVERSED EARLIER DECISION AND ORDERED THAT A NEW PARTNERSHIP ARRANGEMENT (51 PERCENT BATA, 49 PERCENT GOU) BE WORKED OUT.”155

The meeting took place merely 10 months after Amin gave Uganda’s South Asian community 90 days to leave the country, perhaps his most widely publicized human rights violation. The high commissioner, however, appears to have ignored the matter. But, the cable notes: “OTHER MAJOR CANADIAN INVESTMENT IN UGANDA, KILEMBE MINES (70 PERCENT FALCONBRIDGE OWNED) IS DOING WELL.”156

In 1977 Amin’s government established Uganda’s first resident high commissioner in Ottawa.157 External Affairs didn’t object, claiming it would be an opportunity to register criticism of human rights violations. The nationalizations during Obote’s first turn at governance were perceived as a threat to Western corporate interests established during the colonial period. As a result, Ottawa heaved a sigh of relief at Obote’s demise. The immediate result was Idi Amin’s violent and maniacal regime.

The largest Canadian investor in colonial Africa was Aluminum Limited (Alcan) with some $30 million in property.158 In 1937 the company appointed its first resident representative for Africa and later assigned top executive Edwin J. Mejia to oversee relations with the French colonial authorities. Mejia later received France’s Legion of Honour.159

Towards the end of the colonial period Alcan opened operations in Port Harcourt and Lagos, Nigeria.160 A decade earlier the company commenced operations in the Gold Coast through its purchase of West African Aluminum Limited in 1947.161 But their initial interest in colonial Africa dates back three decades earlier. In 1916 the company started exploring in Guinea and a dozen years later began operating through a French subsidiary.162 In 1938 Alcan opened a bauxite mine on the Island of Tamara in the Isles de Los. (As noted in Chapter 1, in 1904 London gave the island — and some other African territory — to France in exchange for its relinquishment of fishing rights in Newfoundland.) To construct a wharf on this island just off the coast of Conakry the Canadian company turned to the colonial penal system with most of the 170 workmen pressed into service from the local penitentiary.163

Fifteen years later Alcan opened a modern plant on the island to supply its smelters in Québec.164 Les Mines et la Recherche Minière en Afrique Occidentale Française describes the island just off the Guinea coast as “a Canadian enclave” at the beginning of production in 1951.165 Alcan employed some 1,200 workers to build the site with the African labourers paid 5,000 Fr. ($20 Canadian) a month.166

In 1953 the director of mines for French West Africa granted Alcan exclusive prospecting rights over 2,000 km² of territory in Western Guinea.167 The company discovered one of the richest bauxite deposits in the world in the Boké region. During a 1956 visit to France’s West African colonies Canada’s ambassador to France, Jean Désy, inspected the nascent Boké site.168

After Guinea’s 1958 independence the Boké project became highly contentious.169 In January 1961 much of the workforce went on a weeklong strike to demand the dismissal of a dozen white managers.170 Later that year the mine was nationalized. Negotiating the Bauxite/Aluminium Sector under Narrowing Constraints notes, “in November 1961, the government took possession of the Kassa and Boké sites because of the failure of the private firm, Les Bauxites du Midi (a 100% subsidiary of Alcan) to observe its agreement to transform locally bauxite to alumina by 1964.”171 When the government voided its contract Alcan illegally secreted out company files from Guinea.172

As colonialism came under pressure from those seeking to govern themselves, Canadian corporate involvement in Africa grew. Foreign policy was becoming ever more directly tied to the interests of specific Canadian firms. This trend continued as Canadian governments manoeuvred to protect “our interests” as newly independent nations and liberation movements struggled to break free from imperialism.

5. Liberator or Defender of Colonialism?

“With respect to the issue of decolonization [in Africa], Canada has followed a policy of ‘disinterested detachment.’ Only when it became a safe as well as compelling thing to do, did Canada move in the direction of support for the anti-colonial point of view.”

– Robert Matthews, “Africa in Canadian Affairs”

Contrary to mythology, official Canada was a latecomer to supporting African political independence. Ottawa opposed or abstained on many anticolonial resolutions at the UN and repeatedly called for liberation movements to be patient. Canadian officials regularly condemned liberation movements for engaging in armed struggle and despite delivering (free of charge) weaponry to the colonial powers, Ottawa never sold, let alone gave, arms to anticolonial movements.

While Africans had always resisted foreign domination, anticolonial struggles swelled after World War II. In the British colonies, Ghanaians spearheaded the independence struggle in the late 1940s, and were joined by groups in Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda who increasingly demanded freedom from British rule. Ghana won its independence in 1957.

Throughout its reign on the continent British forces suppressed nationalist protests. In Kenya, with about 30,000 white settlers, the British were responsible for horrific massacres in a near genocidal campaign against the Kikuyu people.1

At the end of the 1940s, the French brutally suppressed anticolonial protests in Madagascar.2 In Cameroon tens of thousands were killed. As others gained their independence, anticolonial agitation strengthened. To pre-empt nascent nationalist sentiment, Paris offered each of its West African colonies a referendum on staying part of a new “French community”. When Guinea voted for independence in 1958, France withdrew abruptly, broke off political and economic ties, and destroyed vital infrastructure.3

By the start of the 1950s the French colonies in North Africa were aggressively pushing for independence. While the French killed dozens suppressing protests in Tunisia and Morocco, Paris’ bid to maintain control over Algeria stands out at as one of the most brutal episodes of the colonial era. With over one million settlers in the country, French forces killed hundreds of thousands of Algerians.4

In Rwanda, the Hutu majority rose up against the Belgian-backed Tutsi monarchy in 1959 and three years later the country gained its independence under majority rule. Joined with Rwanda until 1961, Burundi won its independence on July 1, 1962. But there, the Tutsi minority, which represented about 15% of the population, continued to dominate military, economic and political affairs.

To the west, the much larger Belgian colony exploded in protest at the start of 1959. That year colonial forces killed hundreds, suppressing protests in Leopoldville (Kinshasa), but the rapid growth of anticolonial sentiment shook Belgian authorities. The Congo won its independence on June 30, 1960.

In a remarkable turn of events between 1957 and 1964 Africans liberated the northern three quarters of the continent from colonial rule. Nonetheless, decolonization moved south much more slowly. It would take three more decades until the southern tip of the continent was nominally free.

With the staunch support of the white supremacist regime in South Africa, the Portuguese ruthlessly suppressed independence movements on both coasts of southern Africa until the mid-1970s. The white minority regime in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) only relinquished political power in 1980 and it took Namibians another decade to gain their independence from South Africa. The black majority in South Africa only won full political and civil rights in 1994.

All through this period Canadian governments took a consistent position towards African liberation — contrary to revisionist propaganda this country was a strong supporter of the colonial status quo. Arguing against international involvement in colonial affairs, in December 1952 external minister Lester Pearson told Parliament, “the [UN] charter accepts and establishes them [the colonial powers] as the instruments for achieving this [independence]. … But it gives no comfort to the illusion that the immediate and unconditional abandonment of the dependent territories would be a good thing for the international community.”5

With anticolonial sentiment spreading across Africa in 1953, Pearson lauded the United Kingdom’s “big contribution” to “the defence of freedom generally” and in January 1957 he told the House of Commons: “No people in the world have proved themselves more ‘dependable defenders of freedom’ than have the British.”6 In that speech he added: “Those countries which still have direct responsibilities for non self-governing territories [colonies] should not be made to feel at the United Nations or elsewhere that they are oppressors to be deprived arbitrarily of their rights or indeed their reputations.”7

A few years later a new minister took charge at External Affairs but the rhetoric remained largely the same. Questioned in the House regarding British policy toward southern Rhodesia, in 1960 Howard Green said, “the government of the United Kingdom does not need any prompting by Canada or any other nation on the question of promoting democracy in the various parts of the Commonwealth. I am greatly surprised that [the Honourable Member] would suggest that we should try to prevail upon the United Kingdom to do something about speeding up the giving of independence to members of the Commonwealth.”8

To get a sense of the attitude at External Affairs, the head of the department’s European division, Robert Ford, actually criticized Britain in an internal memo for “rushing ahead too fast in the plans to give independence to a number of colonies which have very little in the way of their civilization or training at self-government behind them.”9 Ford argued that the Soviet Union or even India would take advantage of the situation to the detriment of Western interests.

External Affairs’ sympathy for colonialism was also expressed in international votes. In 1957, Canada opposed a UN resolution calling for African independence “at an early date”. It passed 38 to 13 with 11 abstentions.10 In a 1960 article titled “Towards a Canadian Policy on Africa” Douglas Anglin notes, “at the ‘African session’ of the U.N. General Assembly a year ago, she [Canada] found herself in opposition to the African bloc on nearly every African issue, notably Algeria, the Cameroons, South-West Africa and apartheid. The only important exception was the resolution concerning French nuclear tests in the Sahara; and even this was more a case of opposing the French rather than supporting the Africans. (Ottawa was not persuaded that Africans were justified in protesting the use of their continent for this purpose, but it was opposed to all tests on principle.)”11

Years after African decolonization had begun, Canadian officials continued to caution restraint. In August 1962, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker stated he desired “early independence for all dependent people”, but went on to declare that “the orderly achievement of freedom and independence for all people in all lands will not be brought about through hasty and impractical measures, adopted in response to emotional and immoderate demands.”12

Canada’s external affairs minister echoed this sentiment in a decidedly novel spin on the British Empire. At the start of the 1962 UN General Assembly session Howard Green declared it was “very hard to understand the bitter and sometimes unfair attacks” directed at British colonialism and then applauded the UK for “the successful launching” of over fifteen nations into independence.13

More important than its diplomatic defence of colonialism, Canada helped found a military alliance with the powers that ruled Africa. In 1960, leading Canada-Africa scholar Doug Anglin noted, “the fact that Canada is allied in NATO with all the great colonial powers has compelled her to consider the significance of the breakup of their empires in Africa for the strength and unity of purpose of the alliance.”14 In a thesis titled Canada’s relations with Commonwealth West Africa Chukwudi Pettson Onwumere argues that Canada’s “non-involvement attitude in colonial questions” was “partly necessitated by its participation” in NATO.15

Established in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strengthened European colonial authority (and brought it under a US-led system). After Europe’s second great war, the colonial powers were economically devastated while anti-colonial movements could increasingly garner support from the Soviet Union and Mao’s China (or Egypt and Cuba, as was the case for Algeria and Angola respectively). The international balance of forces had swung away from the colonial powers. To maintain their colonies, the European powers increasingly depended on North American diplomatic, military and financial assistance.

NATO largely accepted European colonial authority and in the years just after its founding, Canadian officials repeatedly connected the North Atlantic alliance to the defence of the imperial status quo. (See my Lester Pearson’s Peacekeeping for details.) In 1956 NATO established a Committee for Africa and in June 1959 NATO’s North Atlantic Council, the organization’s main political decision-making body, warned that the communists would take advantage of African independence to the detriment of Western political and economic interests.16 The Nigerian Labour Party’s 1964 pamphlet The NATO Conspiracy in Africa documents that organization’s military involvement on the continent from bases to naval agreements.

Through NATO Canada was militarily engaged on the continent. A Royal Canadian Air Force squadron operated from US bases in Morocco until just after its 1956 independence.17 Additionally, Canadian soldiers participated in NATO exchanges with militaries engaged in Africa.

More significantly, Canada delivered a huge amount of weaponry to the colonial powers through NATO’s Mutual Aid Program. Between 1950 and 1958, Ottawa donated $1,526,956,000 ($8 billion today) in “aid” to NATO countries.18 The deliveries included anti-aircraft guns, military transport vehicles, ammunition, minesweepers, communications and electronic equipment, armaments, engines and fighter jets.19 Three quarters of all Canadian Mutual Aid was military equipment and supplies (the rest was mainly training).20 The Canadian Way of War explains: “During the early 1950s, Canada outfitted several Dutch, Belgian, and Italian divisions with old British pattern equipment. Ottawa also initiated a smaller Mutual Aid program for others in Europe. This eventually included newly manufactured munitions. And there were many NATO military personnel trained in Canada.”21

Through the NATO Air Training Plan, the Royal Canadian Air Force trained 5,500 pilots and navigators from ten NATO countries.22 It was primarily British and French pilots who received instruction over Canada’s vast terrain but there were also trainees from Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Turkey and Portugal.23 This program was a successor to the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. During World War II, tens of thousands of British, Belgian and French pilots trained in Canada.24

Canadian-trained airmen armed with Canadian weaponry likely participated in the murderous suppression of Algerian, Cameroon, Congolese and Kenyan independence movements. In the years following, Portugal’s use of NATO weaponry to maintain its African colonies generated significant controversy amongst Canadian supporters of African liberation.

In 1952, the Kikuyu people, Kenya’s largest ethnic group, launched an anti-colonial struggle and over the next eight years the British would employ horrific violence in a bid to suppress what became known as the “Mau Mau Uprising”. The British detained most of the 1.5 million Kikuyu in camps and fortified villages.25 Thousands of prisoners were tortured to death or died from malnutrition and disease and in some camps most children perished. Tens of thousands of Kenyans were killed by British forces.26

Compared to the vast African loss of life, only 32 European civilians among the 30,000 white settlers were killed by the Mau Mau.27 More settlers died in car accidents during this period.28 The British and Canadian press, however, focused their coverage on lurid stories detailing purported Mau Mau violence. On a number of occasions the uprising in Kenya was brought up in the House of Commons but External Affairs Minister Pearson said little.29

As they unleashed terrible violence in Kenya, Ottawa strengthened the British military. In 1953, Canada provided the Royal Air Force with 370 “top-of-the-line” F-86 Sabre fighter jets built at Canadair’s plant in Montréal.30 The planes cost $71 million ($600 million today) with the US footing 30% of the bill.31

Some 55,000 British troops fought in Kenya, along with many battalions of the King’s African Rifles from other parts of East Africa.32 They employed a great deal of weaponry, some of which originated in Canada. Several squadrons of Royal Air Force bombers dropped 50,000 pounds of bombs on Mau Mau forest hideouts.33 It’s almost certain that some of the British pilots were trained in Canada as part of the NATO Air Training Plan or British Commonwealth Air Training Plan.34

Canada also had men on the ground involved in the colonial violence in Kenya. Former RCMP officer John Timmerman served as assistant commissioner of police in Kenya during the Mau Mau insurgency. Between 1951 and 1955, Timmerman helped reorganize the police force and oversaw Nairobi’s Criminal Investigation Department (CID).35 In October 1952, Timmerman oversaw the arrest of Jomo Kenyatta, who would later become Kenya’s independence leader.36 To justify imposing a state of emergency, which began with the arrest of Kenyatta and other Kikuyu political figures, Governor Evelyn Baring explained to London: “Kenyatta has succeeded in building up right under the nose of authority a powerful organization affecting all sides of life among the Kikuyu.”37

A July 1954 Ottawa Citizen article headlined “Terror Shadows Kenya Beat” reported “a Canadian just back from three years’ police work among the Mau Mau of Kenya says the terrorists are the most savage and bestial killers in the world.”38 Timmerman’s claim may represent what a Freudian psychologist would call a “projection”. Kenyan historian Bethwell Allan Ogot puts forth a different — and considering what’s been abundantly documented — more plausible account of the RCMP officer’s actions. “Beating of suspects to obtain evidence was rampant especially in Nairobi where Mr. John Timmerman, the notorious C.I.D. Chief (the Himmler of Kenya as he was called) and his henchman G. Heine presided over the torture chambers.”39 In Imperial Reckoning Caroline Elkins also compares the CID to the secret police in Nazi Germany and German-occupied Europe. “The Criminal Investigation Department… were effectively the colony’s Gestapo, according to one member of the force.”40

At CID-operated centres, a favoured interrogation method was to hold a man upside down with his head in a bucket of water and ram sand into his rectum. In a bid to spread fear, men were raped with knives, snakes and scorpions while women were gang-raped or had their breasts mutilated with pliers.41

A former settler who was a member of the Kenya Regiment explained: “We would go and pick up a few of the filthy pigs and bring them to one of the interrogation centers set up by the CID. These were the hard-core scum, the ones who wouldn’t listen to anyone and [were] causing trouble. So we would give them a good thrashing. It would be a bloody awful mess by the time we were done. … never knew that a Kuke [Kikuyu] had so many brains until we cracked open a few heads.”42

While Timmerman carried out British policies, his post-Kenya rise through the ranks suggests his actions found support in Ottawa. A Canadian Intelligence Corps officer in Europe prior to Kenya, afterwards Timmerman led the security and intelligence liaison at External Affairs, which included the politically sensitive task of making sure External Affairs officials were not spying or acting on behalf of foreign states.43 Then Timmerman became the first RCMP officer ever appointed head of a Canadian mission, serving as consul general in Chicago in the 1970s.44

Ottawa was also broadly offside with Congolese decolonization. An internal 1957 debate between External Affairs officials offers a window into their perspective. The high commissioner in India, Escott Reid, argued for self-government within 20 years but was countered by Canada’s ambassador to Belgium who called for nearly indefinite colonial rule. Charles Hébert wrote: “the Congo … is inhabited by very backward peoples few of whom can have any conception of government … In the circumstances it is inconceivable that, 20 years from now, these people should be asked to assume direction of their own affairs through a grant of self-government. … If, in spite of the existing situation, Belgium is forced to yield to UN pressures and grant to the Congolese self-determination in 20 years time, the consequences are not difficult to imagine. … The resultant regime would be far from stable economically or politically and would soon be in the hands of semi-trained Congolese who would either exploit their fellows for their own benefit or for the benefit of some other foreign power, possibly the USSR.”45

While Canadian officials debated whether the Congolese deserved independence in two decades or two generations, the people pressed the issue. Protests erupted in Leopoldville (Kinshasa) in January 1959 and a series of anti-colonial demonstrations rocked the country throughout the year. The Belgians killed hundreds suppressing this wave of protest.46 In response to the uprising Canadian Trade Commissioner K. Nyenhuis reported to External Affairs “savagery is still very near the surface in most of the natives.”47 An example of the attitude in ruling circles in Canada was a Toronto Star editorial responding to the January 1959 protests that claimed “forces are loose in Africa that even the enlightened Belgians could not control.” It added that the Congo “was to be an example to all other colonial powers on how to civilize a backward, savage people and make them industrious, prosperous, and contented.”48

While Canada’s commercial representative in Kinshasa and the media regurgitated colonialist talking points, the protests rattled Belgian authorities. Brussels moved to grant independence, but the haste of the move exposed the depravity of its rule. Much worse than British and French colonial policy, Belgium’s rule ensured that the Congolese were almost entirely excluded from higher education. Fewer than 20 out of 12 million Congolese were university educated at the time of independence.49 No Africans were part of the “trained professional cadre” that administered the colony and Belgians held all officer positions in the police and army.50 Whites also dominated the economy. Though comprising less than 1% of the population, foreigners controlled 95% of the Congo’s assets, 88% of savings, 47% of cattle stock and 37% of agricultural output.51

The near complete exclusion of Congolese from positions of authority didn’t dissuade Canadian officials from praising an allegedly enlightened colonial power. In February 1960 External Affairs Minister Howard Green declared he had “the greatest respect and admiration” for the way Belgium helped Congo “prepare for the eventual responsible exercise of sovereignty.”52

In addition to modest diplomatic and economic support, Ottawa backed Brussels militarily. Hundreds of Belgian pilots were trained in Canada during and after World War II and through the 1950s Belgium received tens of millions of dollars in Canadian Mutual Aid.53 This included fifty-three “Canuck” (long-range CF 100) fighter jets. These Canadian-designed planes “formed the backbone of the Royal Belgian air forces” writes military historian Sean Maloney in Canada and UN Peacekeeping.54 At least a few “Canucks” were employed in the Congo. In response to growing nationalist protests, four CF 100s were dispatched from Belgium in July 1959 as part of Operation Simba. They flew at low altitude above a number of cities in the mineral rich Katanga region where anticolonial protests had erupted.55 Belgian Lieutenant Colonel Sam Verheire praised Operation Simba as “an impressive manoeuvre of the Belgian government to show the Air Forces possibilities in case of insurgent turmoil.”56

Canadian Mutual Aid weaponry was likely employed by Belgian troops in the Congo as well. Amidst an initial outburst of protests in January 1959 Belgian’s elite 2nd Commando Battalion was deployed in the middle of the night and thousands more soldiers were dispatched over the following 18 months.57 Even after independence, Belgian troops were sent to disarm Congolese forces, occupy Kinshasa’s airport and bolster secessionist forces in the east of the country. (See Chapter 7.)

Meanwhile in North Africa the French delayed granting Tunisia and Morocco independence. To avoid antagonizing Paris, Ottawa backed the French position. In Towards a Francophone Community Robin Gendron explains: “In autumn 1952 ... the Canadian delegation voted against all the resolutions introduced by African and Asian states that urged France to recognize the independence of Tunisia and Morocco and sought to create a committee of good offices to assist in negotiations between France and the North African nationalists. Instead, the delegates expressed Canada’s faith in France’s intentions towards Tunisia and Morocco and stressed that it should be allowed to fulfill them without interference from the United Nations.”58

Canada waited until June 1956 to offer formal Canadian recognition to Morocco and Tunisia and External Affairs opposed the Department of Citizenship and Immigration’s bid to facilitate French immigration from Morocco and Tunisia, which could have lessened anti-colonial tension.59 External minister Lester Pearson opposed French immigration, notes Gendron, because he “believed that Canada’s overriding interest in the area was to maintain its friendship for the West and its close ties with France.”60

More significantly, Ottawa sided with France against Algeria’s independence movement. In November 1954, the Front de Libération Nationale officially began its struggle against the colonial authority. The French had ruled Algeria since 1830 and over a million French settlers lived there, many for generations. In their campaign to suppress the resistance, French forces killed hundreds of thousands while displacing many more. Prominent historian Pierre Vidal-Naquet believes the French military were responsible for “possibly hundreds of thousands of instances of torture” in Algeria.61

Ottawa supported the French diplomatically, even conceding when Paris demanded that Algeria be included in NATO despite being a colony and outside the North Atlantic region.62 In a March 1949 House of Commons speech on NATO, Pearson implied that Algeria was part of France. A minute after saying Article 6 of the organization included the “Algerian departments of France”, the external minister said NATO “does not include colonial possessions.”63

In 1955, when African and Asian states tried to have the Algerian conflict debated at the UN, Canada opposed the move.64 Four years later Canada’s UN delegation was still instructed to vote with France on Algeria.65 Ottawa’s support for French colonialism in Algeria included pressuring the media. When Paris complained in 1959 about the CBC’s coverage of Algeria (they interviewed a Front de Libération Nationale representative in New York and two Algerian students in Montréal) External Affairs offered to consult the network concerning events in France and Algeria.66

Towards a Francophone Community explains: “Increasingly concerned for France’s political stability, in January 1957 [External Affairs Undersecretary] Jules Leger again tried to persuade [minister] Lester Pearson that the time had come to get the French government to accept the eventual independence of Algeria as the basis for a negotiated end to the war. Pearson was not convinced, arguing that no country could exert enough pressure to change France’s Algerian policy and that any attempt to do so would run afoul of the strength of French national feeling ... Pearson did not want to jeopardize France’s enthusiasm for NATO by an ill-advised attempt at peace brokering in Algeria.”67

Between 1950 and 1960, the Canadian government provided $127 million in military equipment to France under NATO’s Mutual Aid Program.68 Robin Gendron reports: “Even with 400,000 troops in Algeria, in autumn 1956, Canada continued to provide the French military with extensive gifts of armament. … From 1955 to 1958, Canada gave France mutual aid that included 300,000 rounds of 20mm ammunition, 1 million rounds of .303 ammunition, trucks, dynamite, sub-machine guns, 90mm shells, pistols, and Harvard training aircraft ... Given that a majority of the French army was stationed in Algeria all these years, the St. Laurent government could not ignore the embarrassing probability that most of this equipment was probably being used against the nationalist movement in Algeria.”69

To avoid embarrassment and allow France to use Canadian equipment in Algeria, the federal government modified the Defence Appropriation Act, which required Canadian Mutual Aid supplies to be used to defend Western Europe.70

Further south, as anticolonial sentiment simmered, the French minister of overseas territories invited the Canadian ambassador in Paris to visit its West African colonies. Jean Desy visited Senegal, Mali, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) and Mauritania at the start of 1956.71 That same year, Canadian Chargé d’Affaires in Paris, G. G. Crean, argued “most objective observers would agree that a further period of tutelage and of large-scale economic assistance is desirable if chaos is to be avoided in the area [French West Africa].”72

As a way to punish the people for choosing independence, France severed all relations with Guinea. “What could not be burned,” noted Robert Legvold, “was dumped into the ocean.”73 When independence leader Sékou Touré visited the UN in 1959 his government requested an invitation to Ottawa. Despite pressure from Alcan, which was courting Touré, the Diefenbaker government did not grant Touré’s request until Paris showed its support.74

Offering support to another NATO ally, Ottawa backed Portuguese colonialism in Africa. As independence swept the continent in the late 1950s, “Canada quite openly adopted an explicitly pro-Portuguese, pro-colonial stance, supporting Portugal’s contention that it alone was competent to determine the status of its dependent territories,” explains Words and Deeds: Canada, Portugal, and Africa.75 From 1960 to 1973 over 50,000 people were killed and tens of thousands more displaced. Working closely with apartheid South Africa, Portugal steadily increased its troop presence in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. By 1970 some 60,000 personnel were deployed to its African colonies.76

Rather than work to undermine Portuguese colonialism, Canada expanded its economic ties to the colonies.77 Canadian trade officials promoted the incentives Portugal offered in its “overseas provinces.”78 The collectively penned Words and Deeds notes: “Canada’s rapidly growing trade with Portugal’s African colonies supported the exploitation and oppression of African workers in the plantations and settler farms which produce coffee, tea, and sisal, and it supported the low-price policy which Portugal used with respect to payments to African growers of coffee, cashews, and cotton. Canada’s purchases of Angolan oil contributed to the expanding system of theft of non-renewable natural resources from African peoples who could ill afford to waste their birthright for the benefit of foreign oppressors.”79

Ottawa opposed UN resolutions calling on members to stop trading with Portugal and investing in its colonies. In 1966 the General Assembly, for instance, voted 75 to 12 (with 16 abstentions) to condemn financial interests active in the Portuguese territories. The Canadian government voted no.80 Later that year Canada also voted against a UN resolution calling for self-determination in the Portuguese territories. The Liberal government argued its objection on the grounds that the resolution called for mandatory action.81 In supporting Portugal, Ottawa ignored both international and domestic opinion. An internal June 1968 External Affairs file noted “a vocal segment of the Canadian public has recently been critical of the government’s continuing reluctance to adopt a clearer policy towards Portuguese colonialism.”82

During the wars of liberation in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau, Canada greatly expanded its economic ties to the colonies.83 Canada’s most controversial economic dalliance in the colonies was Alcan’s sale of aluminum rods to the Portuguese for the Cabora Bassa Dam, a project devised to create a barrier to further penetration by the liberation movement FRELIMO and to deepen relations with white-led Rhodesia.84 Alcan won contracts to provide rods, along with Toronto-based Reynolds. This happened, however, “only after several other potential suppliers backed out because their governments were unwilling to face the pressures of being known as a breaker of the economic sanctions against Rhodesia.”85 A UN General Assembly resolution condemned the Cabora Bassa scheme as “contrary to [the] vital interests of the people of Mozambique” and described it as a “plot designed to perpetuate the domination, exploitation and oppression of the peoples of this part of Africa and southern Rhodesia, and which would lead to international tensions.” The resolution passed 85-11 with Canada voting against.86

As Portugal continued to wage brutal wars against the liberation movements in its African colonies, Ottawa continued to oppose UN resolutions calling upon members to stop trading with Portugal and investing in its colonies.87 Words and Deeds explains: “Canada opposed anything that smacked of action against Portugal and aggressively harped upon the advisability of ‘non-violence’ in a situation which had never known anything else but violence and where all peaceful routes had been tried by the Africans and rejected by the Portuguese.”88

Ottawa was still diplomatically aligned against the liberation movements into the 1970s. On September 24, 1973, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) declared Guinea Bissau an independent state. Ottawa refused to recognize the new state, implicitly favouring Portuguese sovereignty over the region. Ninety governments granted recognition to Guinea Bissau before the fall of Salazar Caetano in Portugal in 1974, when junior officers ousted the dictatorship. But Canada only conceded recognition once it was clear that the new Portuguese government was about to do so.89

In the winter of 1973, Canada opposed a “resolution which directly challenged Portugal’s claim to represent Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau at the United Nations. Four of Portugal’s twenty-two-member delegation were listed as citizens of Portugal’s ‘African territories’, a totally unacceptable formula to most delegations. This provoked member states to press the issue in the plenary session of the General Assembly and introduce a motion to exclude these members from the Portuguese contingent. They reaffirmed the obvious and crucial point that neither the Portuguese-dominated colonies of Angola and Mozambique, nor independent Guinea-Bissau, could be considered a part of Portugal.”90 The vote passed 94 to 14 with 21 abstentions. Canada voted against, triggering criticism in FRELIMO’s official English-language publication.91

Canada’s complicity in Portuguese colonialism ran deeper than diplomatic and economic support. Throughout the 1950s the relatively weak Portuguese military dictatorship received Canadian Mutual Aid weaponry.92 Words and Deeds reflects on the impacts of this assistance, noting “arms given or sold to Portugal by the Western powers, ostensibly for such NATO purposes as the defense of the North Atlantic, were regularly deployed against African peoples struggling for the right to rule themselves.”93

Ottawa had no qualms about placing NATO weapons in Portugal’s hands. On the contrary, Canadian officials refused to back Dutch and Scandinavian efforts within NATO to end arms deliveries.94 While Ottawa officially ended its NATO Mutual Aid shipments to Portugal in 1961, military sales continued. In 1967 the minister of trade and commerce told his cabinet colleagues that it was “unrealistic to refuse orders when they would quickly be taken up by the United States or the United Kingdom. Portugal has bought many piston-engine aircraft from us and expected to get them serviced at the large United Aircraft Company factory established in Longueil for the purpose.”95

The liberation movements, bordering states and Organization of African Unity repeatedly publicized the origins of weaponry captured in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau.96 On a number of occasions, Canadian technologies were found in Portuguese armaments, including parts made by Computing Devices of Canada and Aviation Ltd. in the wreckage of a Fiat G-91 fighter, shot down by PAIGC.97 Words and Deeds concludes: “Through uncritical acceptance of the NATO connection, which married the arsenal of the west to Portuguese colonial purposes, Canada made itself, willy-nilly, a partner of the Portuguese.”98

Not long after Angola won its independence from Portugal, apartheid South Africa invaded. In an important display of international solidarity Cuba came to Angola’s defence. Thousands of Cuban troops, most of them black, voluntarily enlisted to fight the racist South African regime. Contrary to Western claims, Cuba decided to intervene in Angola without Soviet input (Washington knew this at the time).99 Cuba’s intervention helped halt South Africa’s invasion.

This successful military victory by black forces also helped bring down apartheid in South Africa. The famous township rebellion in Soweto took place three months after South Africa’s initial defeat in Angola.100 Nelson Mandela’s ANC noted “their [the South African army’s] racist arrogance shrank when our MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] comrades thrashed them in Angola.”101 For its part, Johannesburg’s Rand Daily Mail warned that the legacy of Angola resulted in “blows to South African pride.” The paper viewed the defeat as, “the boost to African nationalism which has seen South Africa forced to retreat.”102 In a similar vein another South African analyst observed “whether the bulk of the offensive was by Cubans or Angolans is immaterial in the colour-conscious context of this war’s battlefield, for the reality is that they won, are winning, and are not white: and that psychological edge, that advantage the white man has enjoyed and exploited over 300 years of colonialism and empire, is slipping away. White elitism has suffered an irreversible blow in Angola and Whites who have been there know it.”103

Ottawa freaked out, diplomatically speaking. Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau stated: “Canada disapproves with horror [of] participation of Cuban troops in Africa” and in May 1978 Trudeau announced that CIDA would terminate its small aid program in Cuba as a result.104

Conversely, Ottawa funnelled aid to Zambia during this period partly to support its “moderate” position in southern Africa’s racial conflict. In Canadian Development Assistance to Zambia Sinkala Sontwa explains: “The liberation wars by the blacks, and the accompanying competition for influence by the West and East in the region resulted in Soviet and Cuban involvement in the Angolan civil war and in the establishment of socialist governments in both Angola and Mozambique. With these developments, Western policy towards the region changed drastically. To counter this growing Eastern bloc influence, Canada and other Western countries lent support to what they considered as Zambia’s moderate stand among the Front Line States on Southern African politics.”105

A few years earlier Ottawa expressed apprehension about providing indirect backing to Ghanaian and Tanzanian proponents of what it dubbed a “war of liberation” in southern Africa. At the end of the 1960s, Ottawa failed to renew its military training in Tanzania partly because the government provided limited support to the liberation movement on its southern border in Mozambique. In “The Canadian Armed Forces Advisory and Training Team Tanzania 1965-1970”, Andrew Godefroy writes: “Given the very likely possibility that Tanzania was going to continue its active though indirect support of liberation forces, CAFATTT’s [Canadian Armed Forces Advisory Training Team to Tanzania] role as advisor to the TPDF [Tanzanian People’s Defense Force] may have created possible future political difficulties for Ottawa and maybe even serious embarrassment. Canada was, after all, a member of both NATO and the Commonwealth.”106

Canadian officials expressed similar concerns on the other side of the continent. A July 1963 memo to Cabinet noted: “The Canadian Government might consider it inadvisable to sell military equipment to Ghana” since it “might be used with those of other African states in a war of ‘liberation’ against Portugal, South Africa and, conceivably, Southern Rhodesia.”107

Zimbabweans won their political freedom after most of the continent had gained independence. As decolonization spread, the white settlers who largely governed this British colony since the 1920s worried that Britain might grant independence under majority rule. One twentieth of the population, whites in southern Rhodesia owned 70% of the best farmland.108 They also benefited from a plethora of discriminatory laws, everything from the line-up at the post office to public employment. While the franchise was not explicitly racist, it was based on financial and educational qualifications that resulted in whites comprising over 90% of registered voters.109

Canada played a minor role in propping up the white minority regime. From 1935 to 1953 the Southern Rhodesian leadership was invited to Imperial Conferences and most Commonwealth prime minister’s meetings, including the assembly that took place in Canada.110 Ottawa opened a Trade Commission in Rhodesia in 1955 and possessed a preferential tariff agreement with the territory until the 1960s.111 Rhodesia also received a small amount of Canadian aid through the Commonwealth Technical Assistance Program and Special Commonwealth Africa Assistance Plan.112
In the early 1960s, there were growing international calls for Britain, which had control over the Rhodesian Constitution, to protect the rights of the African majority.113 As pressure mounted on Britain to intervene in Southern Rhodesia, notes The Centre Cannot Hold: Canada, Colonialism and the ‘Afro-Asian Bloc’, “Ottawa decided [in 1962] to ‘give every possible support’ to the United Kingdom by opposing any ‘extreme’ moves in the General Assembly [on Rhodesia].”114 That year, alongside NATO allies, Canada abstained on two UN resolutions (1747 and 1760) asking London to rescind Southern Rhodesia’s constitution and call a constitutional conference to establish a government run by the black majority.115

London refused to intervene and over the next three years negotiated with the Rhodesian whites. As the situation came to a head, Canada opposed a November 1965, General Assembly resolution that was adopted 82 to 9 (with 18 abstentions and Britain staying away).116 It stated: “Considering that the administering Power has not implemented the above resolutions and that no constitutional progress has been made, Noting that the increasing co-operation between the authorities of Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal is designed to perpetuate racist minority rule in southern Africa and constitutes a threat to freedom, peace and security in Africa, Noting with grave concern the manifest intention of the present authorities in Southern Rhodesia to proclaim independence unilaterally, which would continue the denial to the African majority of their fundamental rights to freedom and independence. … Reaffirms the right of the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence and recognizes the legitimacy of their struggle for the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations.”117

The ambivalence displayed by Britain and other Western powers, emboldened Rhodesia. A week after the resolution passed, the white minority in Rhodesia unilaterally declared independence from Britain on explicitly racist terms. In a near unanimous vote, the General Assembly immediately condemned the move and called on Britain to end “the rebellion by the unlawful authorities in Salisbury.”118
While Ottawa backed this resolution condemning the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, in February 1966 the external affairs minister warned the House of Commons about “over interference” with London on this issue.119 Seven months later, Ottawa opposed an African proposal for blanket UN sanctions on Rhodesia and South Africa.120 Prime Minister Pearson said these conditions “would tie that country to South Africa, and would link a satisfactory solution of the Rhodesian problem with a long and difficult economic siege of South Africa.”121

Black nationalists in Rhodesia and elsewhere demanded Britain remove the white minority government through force (it was thought that simply massing troops in Zambia would convince the white minority to relinquish political power). To get London off the hook, Ottawa worked to convince African and Asian countries to give sanctions a chance. At the January 1966 Commonwealth Conference in Lagos, Pearson echoed Britain’s claim that economic sanctions would end the white rebellion “within a matter of weeks rather than months.”122 Sinkala Sontwa describes Pearson’s intervention at the conference: “The Canadian Prime Minister succeeded in persuading the Afro-Asian-Caribbean camp (which was sceptical about the effectiveness of sanctions without the use of military force) to put sanctions to test before they could evaluate them. Here, Canada supported British initiatives in the Rhodesian UDI crisis and managed to secure African compliance with sanctions as the most appropriate way to secure an end to the crisis. This meant, therefore, that the use of force, which most Afro-Asian-Caribbean countries were advocating, was abandoned and resulted in the intensification of the liberation war.”123

African governments were far from enthused with Canada’s position on Rhodesia. African history scholar Linda Freeman explains Ottawa’s response: “To shift attention from the unpalatable aspects of this stance [against British intervention], Pearson pledged Canadian support for a program of assistance in the form of scholarships for Rhodesian Africans and capital assistance for Rhodesian railways and irrigation.”124 Additionally, Ottawa channelled funds to a number of African countries in the hopes of easing tension between them and the leader of the Commonwealth, Britain, which empowered the white minority in Rhodesia.125

After pushing sanctions as an alternative to armed intervention, Ottawa refused to enforce them. South Africa and Portugal flagrantly undermined the sanctions but Ottawa and the Western powers did little.126 Furthermore, a number of major Canadian companies sustained their business in Rhodesia into the 1970s.127 Some of these companies continued to operate in Rhodesia even after Canadian law prohibited it. Yet the federal government still did nothing.128 Falconbridge’s annual report, for example, discussed in detail the operations of its Blanket Mine in Rhodesia.129 Still, the parliamentary secretary to the minister of industry, trade and commerce claimed, “our records reveal no evidence that there are direct corporate ties between Falconbridge Nickel Co. Ltd and Blanket mines.”130

Montréal Gazette journalist Hugh Nangle visited Falconbridge’s main Rhodesian property in 1973 and later told an interviewer: “The Blanket Mine is a disgusting example of a Canadian company exploiting black workers. It is not unfair to charge that Falconbridge is operating a slave labour mine. Living conditions for blacks are appalling while the white workers luxuriate over the hill in attractive homes with beautiful gardens and at least one automobile to a house. The ‘houses’ for blacks consist of two-room, asbestos-corrugated sheeting. They are crowded together, one upon the other, in an area of the country where there is plenty of space. Shanties in many cases double as cooking areas and sleeping quarters.”131

Also in the southern part of the continent, South Africa occupied Namibia during World War I. Soon after, poorer white South Africans proceeded to gobble up Namibian land and Pretoria imposed its laws, including its apartheid policy. In 1948, Ottawa joined four other countries in abstaining on a UN vote that passed 43 to 1 (only South Africa voted no) criticizing South Africa’s refusal to negotiate a trusteeship agreement for Southwest Africa (Namibia).132 Three years later Canada once again abstained on a resolution concerning Namibians’ rights. That vote to hear the grievances of petitioners from Southwest Africa passed 37 to 7 with 7 abstentions.133

After decolonization swept the northern two-thirds of the continent, African and Asian countries pushed for the UN to assume direct responsibility over Namibia. Canada abstained on a 1967 vote to establish the UN Council for Namibia to administer the territory until independence.134 Passed by a strong majority, Ottawa then refused to recognize the legal authority of the Council for Namibia. The Secretary-General of the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), Toivo ja Toivo, decried this position: “The UN Council for Namibia is at the center of the UN plan to wrestle authority from the racist Pretoria regime. The South Africans are plundering Namibia, and Canada refuses to support the only body that would have protected the resources of the people of Namibia. Canada cannot have it both ways — refuse to recognize the legal authority of South Africa and the legal authority of the UN Council.”135

Six years after the Council vote, Canada took an even more hostile position towards Namibian independence. In 1973 Canada voted against a resolution giving UN observer status to SWAPO, the main Namibian liberation movement.136

In 1971 the International Court of Justice found the occupation of Namibia illegal. The court ruled “that States Members of the United Nations are under obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa’s presence in Namibia and the invalidity of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia, and to refrain from any acts and in particular any dealings with the government of South Africa implying recognition of the legality of, or lending support or assistance to, such presence and administration.”137

At odds with the International Court of Justice ruling and despite a Canadian-backed UN resolution that declared South Africa’s presence unlawful, Ottawa accepted South Africa’s jurisdiction over Namibia. The Canada-South Africa trade agreement applied to the “Mandated territory of Southwest Africa” and the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce spent public money promoting economic relations with Namibia.138 In a 1985 article, Linda Freeman describes how “government officials assured the Hudson’s Bay Company that its major involvement in the production and export of karakul pelts in Namibia was not illegal.”139

During the mid-1970s at least nine Canadian companies had investments in Namibia.140 In 1971 Falconbridge partnered with the South African government in a Namibian silver-copper mining company, Oamites.141 Falconbridge paid taxes to Pretoria and received credits from Ottawa for these payments to the apartheid regime. The issue of taxes was highly political since not taxing Canadian firms operating in Namibia implied recognition of South Africa’s mandate over that country.142

A crown corporation, El Dorado Nuclear Ltd., processed uranium from mines in Namibia, which contravened a 1970 UN resolution against trade with Namibia.143 Eldorado obscured the origins of its Namibian uranium by falsely labeling it South African, which made it difficult for countries such as Japan to observe the UN Security Council decree opposing the exploitation of Namibian natural resources.144 The 1983 article “Canada and Namibian Uranium” cited an External Affairs statement that “there are no impediments in Canada to the importation and processing of Namibian uranium. Canadian crown corporations, like Eldorado Nuclear, are also entirely free to handle Namibian origin uranium, as long as their activities do not stand in contravention of the government’s policy not to recognize South African jurisdiction over and occupation of the territory of Namibia.”145

For a time Ottawa was more lenient than Washington toward South Africa’s occupation of Namibia. When the US passed regulations to deter corporate involvement in Namibia, some US companies opened holding companies in Toronto to take advantage of Canadian policy.146 President of SWAPO S. Nuyoma explained: “The people of Namibia strongly condemn the policies of the Canadian companies working with the cooperation of American and British companies who are mercilessly exploiting Namibian natural resources. Especially, we strongly condemn the Canadian companies like Falconbridge and Etosha Petroleum … [that] employ African slave labour. The Canadian-American companies are not only helping the South African government to perpetuate white supremacy, economic exploitation and the permanent enslavement of the African people of Namibia, but also support South Africa through providing capital, goods and industrial aid. We therefore appeal to the people and government of Canada, who believe in freedom and human equality, to demand an immediate withdrawal of all Canadian companies now operating in and exploiting Namibia.”147

Along with Britain, France, Germany and the US, in 1977 Canada joined the five-nation Contact Group on Namibia. Ostensibly designed to bring about a peaceful and just independence, it abetted South Africa’s efforts to stall for time and set up a controlled “independent” administration. Six years into the negotiations, SWAPO criticized the Contact Group’s efforts “to protect racist South Africa through endless and fruitless negotiations.”148 The Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility noted: “Unwilling to back armed resistance, and in an effort to avoid a Security Council sanctions resolution, the Contact Group asked for time to seek South Africa’s cooperation in a settlement for Namibia. The five years of inconclusive negotiations have given South Africa time to consolidate its administrative and military hold over Namibia, and the West a tactical excuse to ignore United Nations resolutions concerning Namibia.”149

Canadian officials claimed that ongoing Contact Group negotiations meant they had to abandon punitive measures towards South Africa and adopt a state of impartiality.150 Canada’s principal representative to the Contact Group, William Barton, later suggested all five Western countries used it “as a stalking horse to conceal their unwillingness to act against South Africa under any circumstances.”151

Part of Pretoria’s goal was to drag out negotiations concerning its occupation of Namibia to avoid even greater scrutiny of its internal apartheid policies.

In “Contact Africa: Canadian Foreign Policy, the Contact Group, and Southern Africa”, Grant Dawson describes “[South African Prime Minister B.J.] Vorster’s intention to retain as much power in Namibia as possible and not free Namibia until absolutely politically necessary. He recognized that once Namibia gained independence, international attention would turn to the apartheid system within South Africa itself.”152

Beyond gaining political autonomy, the liberation movement wanted to reverse the inequality in land ownership. A tiny minority, 0.2% of the country, 4,000 white commercial farmers owned 74% of Southwest Africa’s arable land.153 With the end of South African rule, the Contact Group countries pushed for a clause whereby the state could only acquire land if the owner wanted to let it go.154 According to a 2013 New African article, “this condition, it is widely accepted, came about as a result of the efforts of the ‘Contact Group’… as a means of ensuring SWAPO could not deliver on its key liberation grievance of large-scale land redistribution.”155

Between 1990 and 2002 only 1% of commercial land changed hands from whites to blacks.156 In 2013, whites, 6% of Namibia’s population, still controlled 90% of land in the country.157

That same year the death of Nelson Mandela led to an outpouring of commentary about Canada’s supposed role in defeating South African apartheid. “Canada helped lead international fight against Apartheid”, read a Toronto Star headline while a National Post piece declared: “Canada’s stance against apartheid helped bring freedom to South Africa.”158

Notwithstanding this self-congratulatory revisionism, Ottawa was heavily complicit in South Africa’s system of racial discrimination. After decades of white supremacist policy, in 1948 the National Party solidified the discriminatory legal framework classifying South Africans by race and “barring people from living, operating businesses or owning land anywhere else but in the areas designated for each race.”159 These laws strengthened the white minority’s grip over most of the country’s land and created a large pool of easily exploitable black labourers. South Africans who protested were met with repression.

Official relations with South Africa date to before that country’s creation. A Canadian Trade Commissioner was dispatched to Pretoria in 1902 and it was the first African country in which Ottawa established full diplomatic relations at the start of World War II.160 According to Commerce over Conscience, “the first Canadian trade mission to South Africa occurred in 1947 and its success led to a large number of subsequent missions. By the 1970s such missions became virtually yearly events.”161

Ottawa maintained an explicitly pro-South Africa diplomatic position until the late 1950s.162 But as decolonization took root, Ottawa echoed growing international condemnation of its white supremacist policies. For the next quarter century Canada expressed opposition to apartheid all the while continuing to engage in significant business with this former British Dominion.

Proponents of the notion that Ottawa wholeheartedly opposed apartheid point out that in 1961 John Diefenbaker’s Conservative government called for South Africa to be expelled from the British Commonwealth. But this position was not a moral rebuke of apartheid. “Nothing has been more constant in Diefenbaker’s approach than his search for a tolerable way of averting South Africa’s withdrawal,” commented an External Affairs official at the 1961 Commonwealth meeting where South Africa left the organization.163 Diefenbaker pushed for South Africa’s exclusion in an attempt to save the Commonwealth. The former British colonies — notably in Africa and South Asia — threatened to leave the organization if South Africa’s status was renewed. This would have been the death of the British Commonwealth.

Diefenbaker’s lack of principled opposition to apartheid helps explain his refusal to cancel the 1932 Canada-South Africa trade agreement.164 Finally, in 1979 Ottawa ended preferential tariff rates to the apartheid regime, but this was as much an economic decision (the trade balance favoured South Africa) as it was a reprimand for its racist policies.165

Widely viewed as a progressive internationalist, Pierre Trudeau’s government sympathized with the apartheid regime not the black liberation movement or nascent Canadian solidarity groups. In the mid-1970s the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources included South African officials in secret negotiations to establish a uranium cartel and throughout Trudeau’s time in office, Canadian companies were heavily invested in South Africa, enjoying the benefits of cheap black labour. The federal government’s 1970 White Paper recognized that Canadian corporations were in South Africa because of the “better than normal opportunities” for economic returns.166 A Falconbridge official explained to a parliamentary committee “in fact the whites are in the … senior positions and the blacks in junior positions. I am not denying that. That is just the way it is in South Africa … the system automatically segregates the jobs … there is no question of whether you want to or whether you do not want to. It is a law.”167

In the early 1980s Canadian banks participated in international consortia that lent $2 to $3 billion to South African companies and underwrote another $700 million for agencies of the South African government.168 To avoid pressure from unionized black workers and stronger restrictions in the US, some American companies invested in South Africa through their Canadian subsidiaries (notably Ford Motors).169

In October 1982 the Trudeau government delivered 4.91 percent of the votes that enabled Western powers to gain a slim 51.9 percent majority in support of South Africa’s application for a billion-dollar IMF credit. Sixty-eight IMF members opposed the loan, as did 121 countries in a nonbinding vote at the UN General Assembly. Five IMF executive directors said South Africa did not meet the standards of conditionality imposed on other borrowers.170 The Canadian minister of finance justified support for the IMF loan claiming that “the IMF must be careful … not to be accused of meddling in the internal affairs of sovereign states.”171 A few months later, Ottawa opposed IMF funding for Vietnam because it invaded Cambodia to stop the Khmer Rouge’s slaughter and, as we’ll see, Canada backed the IMF’s usurpation of African economic sovereignty.172 (To add further offence, Canada’s vote at the IMF represented itself and a block of largely black nations: Barbados, Bahamas, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Jamaica as well as Ireland.)

Officially, the Trudeau government supported the international arms embargo against South Africa, but his government mostly failed to enforce it.173 As late as 1978, Canadian-government financed weapons continued to make their way into South Africa.174 Canadair (at the time a Crown company) sold the apartheid regime amphibious water bombers, which according to the manufacturer were useful “particularly in internal troop-lift operations.”175 (The official buyer was the South African forestry department.)

In the early 1970s, the Montréal Gazette discovered that the RCMP trained South African police in “some sort of liaison or intelligence gathering” instruction.176 As apartheid came to an end, it was discovered that Canada had assisted South Africa in developing its capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons.177 Additionally, Toronto-based Space Research Corporation (SRC) shipped artillery shells and helped South Africa develop a highly advanced artillery system. Part of the military, the Armaments Development Corporation of South Africa bought 20 per cent of SRC and in 1979 South Africans came to Canada to run tests. “By 1982,” notes Linda Freeman, “South Africa was in a position to launch an international campaign to promote South African exports of this new system and was able to test the artillery system in combat in Namibia and southern Angola.”178

Apologists for apartheid would say anything to slow opposition to this cruel system. At a 1977 Commonwealth meeting, Pierre Trudeau dodged press questions on post-Soweto South Africa suggesting that Idi Amin’s brutal regime in Uganda should be discussed along with southern Africa.179

Canadian officials came up with a way to minimize African criticism of their policy toward South Africa. In the 1970s Ottawa increased aid to African states as a way to mitigate their criticism of Canada’s economic and political relations with the apartheid system. According to Canadian Development Assistance to Tanzania, “the government has concluded that Canadian interests would be better served by maintaining its current policy framework on the problems of southern Africa, which balances two policy themes [social justice and economic relations] of importance to Canadians. The government intends, however, to give more expression to the social policy theme. To this end the Canadian government will make available further economic assistance to black African states of the area to assist them to develop their own institutions and resources.”180

After decades of protest by Canadian unions, churches, students and leftist organizations, Brian Mulroney’s Conservative government finally implemented economic sanctions on South Africa in 1986. The Conservatives only moved after numerous other countries had already done so. “The record clearly shows”, explains Freeman, “that the Canadian government followed rather than led the sanctions campaign.”181 Unlike Canada, countries such as Norway, Denmark, New Zealand, Brazil and Argentina also cut off diplomatic ties to South Africa.182 Even US sanctions, due to an activist Congress, were tougher than those implemented by Ottawa.183 From October 1986 to September 1993, the period in which economic sanctions were in effect, Canada’s two-way trade with South Africa totalled $1.6 billion — 44 percent of the comparable period before sanctions (1979-1985).184 Canadian imports from South Africa averaged $122 million a year during the sanctions period.185

Reflecting on the two countries trade relations in a 2010 article, David Hornsby and Oscar van Heerden noted: “Canada, as an export destination for South Africa, was more important in the 1980s than the current situation: an amazing thing to consider in light of Canada’s supposed intolerance for the apartheid regime.”186

Canada did business with the apartheid regime and opposed liberation movements. Ottawa’s relationship with the African National Congress (ANC) was initially one of hostility and then ambivalence. Often describing it as a “terrorist” entity, Canada failed to recognize the ANC until July 1984 and then worked to moderate their direction.187 In an August 1987 letter to the Toronto Star, Foreign Affairs Minister Joe Clark explained the government’s thinking: “Canada has been able to develop a relationship of trust with the … African National Congress that it is hoped has helped to strengthen the hand of black moderates.”188

With apartheid’s end on the horizon, Ottawa wanted to guarantee that an ANC government would follow pro-capitalist policy, contrary to what was outlined in its Freedom Charter and the wishes of many of its supporters. The man in charge of External Affairs’ South African Taskforce said that Ottawa wanted an early IMF planning mission to the country to ensure that the post-apartheid government would “get things right” from the start.189 One author notes: “The Canadian state has entered fully in the drive to open South Africa to global forces and to promote the interests of the private sector.”190

Ottawa set up the South Africa/Canada Program on Governance in 1995. As part of this effort, the “[Canadian government-funded] Development Research Centre played a strategically important role in assisting the ANC-led democratic movement to plan for the post-apartheid era through support for research on such key areas as macroeconomic policy, urban policy, environment policy, and science and technology.”191

Canadian officials also pressed to get the new South African government to sign a Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA) in 1995. (See Chapter 8 for more details.) An initial agreement was drafted, but the ANC-led government ultimately refused to sign an accord that would have undermined its capacity to pursue Black economic empowerment and land reform policies.

Ottawa’s supportive policy towards apartheid South Africa was controversial among Canadians. An active solidarity movement opposed Canadian support for the racist regime but the federal government used its influence to minimize opposition.

Many NGOs receiving government assistance began to self-censor on South Africa.192 “CIDA specified, for example, that CUSO could not use CIDA funds to criticize Canadian foreign policy or to draw parallels between struggles against oppression in developing countries [particularly in Southern Africa] and struggles by powerless groups in Canada.”193

Another way it undermined NGO criticism was by encouraging the creation of new organizations more amenable to its policy. In an important history of the aid agency, Cranford Pratt explains, “CIDA secured creation of the South African Education Trust Fund because it did not think the strong NGOs already active vis-à-vis South Africa sufficiently sensitive to Canadian foreign policy concerns.”194

This overriding concern for Canada’s self-interest (primarily defined as the interests of Canadian corporations or Western capitalism in general) was to grow stronger in the post-colonial era.

6. Aid Against Independence

Canada’s post-colonial policy in Africa was an interesting mix of the tried and true and some twists resulting from particular domestic politics.

Ottawa responded to African independence by promoting the Commonwealth and la Francophonie and delivering aid. The objective was to dissuade newly independent African countries from following wholly independent paths or falling under the influence of the Communist bloc. In a memo to minister Lester Pearson regarding Ghana’s forthcoming independence, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Jules Léger called for a major African aid program as a means of “holding the line against communism in Africa and removing from the West the taint of colonialism.”1

Once newly independent British colonies joined the Commonwealth they became eligible to receive Canadian aid. After its independence Canada initiated the Commonwealth Technical Assistance Program for Ghana.2 In fact, before granting Ghana independence in March 1957 London sought Ottawa’s support for its plan to grant Ghana “independence within the Commonwealth.”3 At the time of the initial aid allotment to Ghana then External Affairs Minister Sidney Smith warned the House of Commons that unless Ottawa stepped in to help, “these underdeveloped countries … may be prone to accept blandishments and offers from other parts of the world.”4

The African aid program was modeled after its Asian effort. With Mao’s triumph in China in 1949, Canada began its first significant (non-European) allocation of foreign aid through the Colombo Plan. The Plan’s primary aim was to keep the former British Asian colonies, especially India, within the Western fold. Or as a 1957 internal department assessment of the Colombo Plan explained: “It is to offer some hope, and to provide a sense of international cooperation, to the ruling and politically effective groups in Asian countries … to reduce the attractiveness of Communism to these groups.”5

Extending the Ghana program to other African countries, Canada, Britain, Australia and New Zealand established the Special Commonwealth Africa Assistance Plan in 1960. By 1968-69 Canada had delivered $25.5 million ($190 million today) in aid to Commonwealth African countries.6

As part of the country’s aid efforts, Canadian troops trained armed forces in various African countries. In Ghana, Nigeria, Zambia and Tanzania, Canada endeavoured “to fill in the vacuum left by the withdrawal of British officers and training facilities,” notes Professor Robert Matthews.7 Military historian Sean Maloney further explains: “These teams consisted of regular army officers who, at the ‘operational level’, trained military personnel of these new Commonwealth countries to increase their professionalism. The strategic function, particularly of the 83-man team in Tanzania, was to maintain a Western presence to counter Soviet and Chinese bloc political and military influence.”8 By the end of the 1960s Canada had spent over $23 million (around $170 million today) training the military forces of seven African and Asian countries.9

After Tanzania gained independence in 1961, Ottawa worried this former British colony, led for two decades by socialist leaning Julius Nyerere, would develop an independent path. To blunt its break from the West and capitalism, Canada began a significant aid program, which included $15 million for the Canadian Armed Forces Advisory Training Team Tanzania (CAFATTT).10

Up to 90 Canadian trainers were in Tanzania at any given point from 1965 to 1970.11 Additionally, Ottawa built a military academy, delivered a dozen transport aircraft and trained Tanzania’s army and air cadets in Canada.12 In “The Canadian Armed Forces Advisory and Training Team Tanzania 1965-1970”, Andrew Godefroy writes that the “Canadian contingent built the Tanzanian People’s Defence Force (TPDF) from the ground up, creating everything from Tanzania’s National Defence Act to the instructional pamphlets used for teaching weapons classes.”13

Arms interests and geopolitical considerations drove CAFATTT. The Department of Defence argued that military training would strengthen the “Canadian aircraft industry which has been adversely affected by the reduction in our [NATO] Mutual Aid Programme.”14 As part of the agreement with Tanzania, Ottawa offered a dozen aircraft in the hope that building military relations with African countries would spur future weapons sales.

More important to Ottawa than the arms industry, London and Washington pushed Canada to initiate CAFATTT. In August 1964 British Prime Minister Alec Douglas-Home asked Prime Minister Lester Pearson to respond favourably to Tanzania’s request for military training assistance. “I hope you will not mind my saying how immensely valuable it would be if you were able to respond to this request. It might indeed be the only way of preventing the communists from gaining virtual control of the local training of the United Republic’s ground forces.”15

Fearing loss of influence, British officials needed help maintaining Western power within the Tanzanian Armed Forces. Canada obliged and over the next five years, notes Godefroy, “every opportunity to retain influence over the TPDF [Tanzanian People’s Defense force] was seized” by Canadian officials.16 When West Germany withdrew its air force trainers in a failed bid to dissuade Tanzania from establishing diplomatic relations with East Germany, Canada took over. Justifying the need for Canada to train the Tanzanian Air Force, an internal memo explained, “a real danger has arisen of a communist country being given this golden opportunity to increase very substantially its influence in East Africa.”17

Competition with China also motivated CAFATTT. Tanzania’s 1964 request for Chinese trainers disturbed Washington and Ottawa. A July 1969 Canadian Interdepartmental Military Assistance Committee memo explained: “Although it is clear from Tanzania’s decision to terminate our military assistance program that we have not succeeded in preventing the swing to virtual full reliance on China, we did succeed in postponing this development until the Tanzanian forces were basically organized and had acquired their own internal cohesion, which should leave them in a much better position to deal with possible Chinese subversion.”18

As Canadian hostility towards African liberation became ever clearer, Tanzanian officials no longer wanted Canadian trainers. “Tanzania was becoming suspicious of the Canadian training team’s cooperation with Western strategic interests in southern Africa,” notes Grant Dawson.19

Their suspicions were well placed. Canadian military trainers gathered information on the operations of guerrilla movement Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) based in Tanzania, which waged war to liberate Mozambique from Portuguese rule. Canadian trainers also spied for the US, notes Godefroy. “The CAFATTT dispatched valuable messages on the MIG issue [the possibility of Tanzania acquiring Russian fighter planes] to Ottawa on a daily basis, allowing the decision-makers in Ottawa to keep Washington well-informed of the situation on the ground.”20

In the first years after independence, Canadian aid was largely focused on former British African colonies, but the growth of Québec nationalism soon changed that. Partly to weaken the sovereignty movement in Québec, Ottawa began an aid program to French Africa. In a January 1962 memo, long time External Affairs official Marcel Cadieux wrote: “[Quebeckers] are going through a period of intense nationalism. In their present mood they are critical of the degree of influence that they have in national affairs and in particular in the field of external affairs. If a scheme of aid for African states should be developed in such a fashion as to provide an outlet to the French-Canadian interests in French-language states, the results in terms of national unity might be quite substantial ... due to the fact that there is little prospect that French-Canadian aspirations are likely to be satisfied as quickly and as easily in other fields of interest to them; e.g. a national flag, repatriation of the constitution, bilingual checks, the status of French in other provinces, etc.”21

Cadieux’s argument that channelling foreign aid to “French” Africa was a politically expedient means of demonstrating concern for Quebecker’s aspirations convinced Ottawa decision-makers. Between 1964 and 1971 Canadian aid to Francophone African countries increased more than 200 fold from $300,000 to $64 million annually.22

As the second biggest contributor to l’Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, Ottawa ploughed hundreds of millions of dollars into its various French language cultural and educational institutions. Between 1970 and 1983 Canada provided as much as a third of the budget for the institutions of the Francophonie, including the Council of African Higher Education, the Agency of Cultural and Technical Cooperation and the Association of Francophone Universities.23

Expanding aid to la Francophonie was designed to convince Quebeckers that Ottawa was sympathetic to francophone culture. It was intended, notes Canadian Development Assistance to Senegal, as “an outward looking expression of the bilingual character of Canada.”24

Even more so than the English had done, the French used language as a tool of colonial control in Africa. Schooling, for instance, was almost entirely in French, which stunted the written development of local languages as well as the rise of a common African language. It also oriented the intellectual milieu towards the colonial metropole. In Decolonizing the Mind Kenyan writer Ngugi wa Thiong’o argues “the domination of a people’s language by the languages of the colonizing nations was crucial to the domination of the mental universe of the colonized.”25

After independence, the place of French in society was politically fraught. According to Patrick Manning in Francophone sub-Saharan Africa 1880-1995, “French was written in the city on street signs, posters, newspapers and government documents. French was the language of the national anthem. French was used in vertical relationships among people of uneven rank; people of equal rank tend to speak African languages among themselves.”26

At the same time as some newly independent countries attempted to promote indigenous languages, Ottawa spent heavily to link Québec with “French” Africa. After Algeria won its independence, for instance, the government moved to Arabize the nation. Simultaneously, however, Canadian aid to Algeria was channelled through French-speaking Canadians. Efforts to strengthen “common linguistic heritage” between Québec and Algeria stunted its moves towards strengthening Arabic. Though less stark, the same dynamic played out in the Congo with the local language of Lingala, in the Central African Republic with Sango and in Senegal with Wolof.

Québec-based businesses benefited from Ottawa’s focus on French-speaking Africa. One of Québec’s leading French language proponents and former head of CIDA, Paul Gérin-Lajoie, used the aid agency to strengthen Québec-based companies. Montréal’s SNC, for instance, was hired “to manage offices on behalf of CIDA in Francophone African countries where there was no Canadian diplomatic representation.”27 In 1968, SNC’s vice president of development Jack Hahn described their plan to enter Algeria: “They might be interested in North American technology offered in French.”28

Geopolitics also influenced Canadian aid policy to “French speaking” Africa. Or as Robin Gendron put it in Canada’s Relations with France and French Africa, 1945-1968, “External aid to French Africa came to be seen as a means for the Canadian government to demonstrate its commitment to keeping communism at bay while simultaneously responding to the needs of French Canadians.”29

In the late 1960s Ottawa focused a disproportionate amount of its aid on Senegal and Niger whose leaders promoted the Paris-dominated la Francophonie and its predecessor organization, the African and Malagasy Common Organization.30 Patrick Manning notes that the African and Malagasy Common Organization was developed partly “to oppose radical, socialist and pan-African visions of African politics, which were personified by such Anglophone leaders as Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania.”31 In a bid to isolate Nkrumah, for instance, the African and Malagasy Common Organization countries all refused to attend a major 1965 Organization of African Unity conference held in Accra, Ghana.32

Once countries won their independence Ottawa began to deliver aid as a way to maintain its influence on the continent. Canadian officials were particularly concerned about blunting radical decolonization.

How far Canada was prepared to go to do so is revealed by this country’s role in killing Patrice Lumumba.

7. Canadian Coups

“The Belgian administration and Christian missionaries never quite stamped out the belief among the isolated and primitive tribes that eating your enemy will strengthen you. … human flesh is again being eaten in secret tribal rituals — not as a delicacy or for nourishment but for the magic properties of a dead enemies limbs and organs. The heart brings courage, the brain intelligence and the leg speed, according to the witch doctors.”1

Toronto Star and Globe and Mail, 1960 — No evidence was presented that a missing Irish UN soldier in the Congo was eaten2

Most Canadians would probably be surprised to know that the Canadian military played a significant role in coups that overthrew African independence leaders.

Events in the early 1960s in the Congo (now known as the Democratic Republic of the Congo or DRC) provide a stark case study in the fluid transition from formal colonialism to a new form of imperialism and provide a window into the nature of Canada’s role on the continent.

In the final days of a hastily organized independence, the Congolese people elected Patrice Lumumba, a stridently anti-colonial leader who had been imprisoned by the Belgian authorities. But he would only be prime minister for 81 days.3 The political forces Lumumba galvanized threatened Belgium’s plan to maintain control over the newly independent country’s resources and in particular the behemoth Union Minière. To undermine the elected prime minister the former colonial power backed a secessionist movement, a coup and Lumumba’s assassination. During this time Ottawa was a willing partner in Belgian/US policy.

The Belgians oversaw a particularly oppressive colonial regime. As noted earlier their colonial authority largely excluded Africans from higher education and professional positions while their corporations pillaged the Congo’s natural resources.4

While Washington and UN officials pressed Lumumba to request a UN force to quell social disturbances in Kinshasa, Lumumba ultimately asked for an international force to halt a rebellion in the east of the country.5 Twelve days after independence the resource rich eastern province of Katanga declared independence and immediately Union Minière began paying tax to the secessionist government rather than the proper legal authority in Kinshasa. That payment totalled 70% of Katanga’s entire budget.6

Nearly 2,000 Canadian troops served in the Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) despite Congolese authorities’ reservations about their participation. Lumumba expressed a desire for “considerations of nationality and race” in the UN force, which was ignored by Canadian officials who were themselves ultimately quite race conscious.7 According to internal files unearthed by Wilfrid Laurier University’s Kevin Spooner, military officers were concerned about Canadian troops living with “the native troops serving under United Nations.” They did not, however, want to be “accused of refusing to quarter Canadian soldiers with coloured soldiers.”8 Army officials insisted that “it would not be a matter of a colour bar so much as not wishing to quarter our troops with foreign troops who speak a different language whose customs may be widely different from our own.”9

While Lumumba never openly argued that Canadian soldiers were undesirable, Soviet officials did. Prior to their deployment the Soviet Union’s ambassador to the UN, Vasily Kuznetzov, explained: “Canada is a member of the NATO military block which also includes Belgium which has committed an aggression against the independent Congo. In these conditions the dispatch of Canadian troops, or of troops of any other state belonging to a military bloc of which Belgium is a member, would constitute nothing but assistance to the aggressor from his military ally.”10

Canadian archives suggest Moscow’s criticism wasn’t far from the mark. In a private exchange, external minister Howard Green told the Belgian ambassador that Ottawa “would do all [it] could [through its role in ONUC] to avoid making the situation more difficult for the Belgian government.”11 In A role for Canada in an African Crisis Daniel Galvin explains how Ottawa “shaped policy in a manner that offered some support for Belgian actions. They were consistently concerned with the impact of Canadian policy on their [NATO] ally.”12

Ottawa promoted ONUC and UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold’s controversial anti-Lumumba position. Around 1,900 mostly Francophone Canadian troops participated in ONUC from 1960 to 1964, making this country’s military one of its most active members.13 For a time, Canadian Brigadier General Jacques Dextraze was Chief of Staff for the UN mission and there were nearly always more Canadian officers at ONUC headquarters then those of any other nationality.14 Canadian troops within the UN force were also concentrated in militarily important logistical positions, including chief operations officer and chief signals officer.15 Describing the mission, military historians David Bercuson and Jack Granatstein wrote: “At headquarters, which operated in both French and English when sufficient bilingual officers could be found, the Canadians handled everything from telephones to phones to dispatch riders. Indeed, to read Canadian messages to Ottawa, it often seemed as if Canadians were running everything.”16

Canada’s strategic role wasn’t simply by chance. Ottawa pushed to have Canada’s intelligence gathering signals detachments oversee UN intelligence and for Colonel Jean Berthiaume to remain at UN headquarters to “maintain both Canadian and Western influence.”17(A report from the Canadian Directorate of Military Intelligence noted that “Lumumba’s immediate advisers … have referred to Lt. Col. Berthiaume as an ‘imperialist tool’.”18)

To bolster the power of ONUC, Ottawa joined Washington in channelling its development assistance to the Congo through the UN.19 Ghanaian president Kwame Nkrumah complained that this was “applying a restriction to Congo which does not apply to any other African state.”20 Ottawa rejected Nkrumah’s request to channel Congolese aid through independent African countries and to send 20 French-speaking members of the Canadian Armed Forces to help train Congolese cadets.21 Either ignorant or aiming to offend, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker denied the extremely impoverished country’s request for assistance, arguing “Canada, in a stage of great development, needed capital itself.”22 In response, Lumumba told a crowd he went to Canada “to seek bilateral aid in belief that it was a truly democratic land but had been disappointed to find that although honest Canada was just another imperialist country.”23

Diefenbaker and Lumumba had a public dispute on another occasion. When Canadian troops, mistaken for Belgian forces, were beaten by government soldiers Diefenbaker drafted a letter of protest to Lumumba described as being “as strong as any employed by a Canadian head of government to a foreign leader.”24 To maximize the publicity, reporters were then called to Diefenbaker’s office and shown the letter.25

For his part, Lumumba accused the Canadian troops of provoking the incident by refusing to identify themselves. He complained that the “unimportant” affair had been “blown up out of all proportion … so that [Hammarskjold] could influence public opinion.”26

Unlike many ONUC participants, Canada aggressively backed Hammarskjold’s controversial anti-Lumumba position. External Affairs Minister Green told the House of Commons: “The Canadian government will continue its firm support for the United Nations effort in the Congo and for Mr. Hammarskjold, who in the face of the greatest difficulty has served the high principles and purposes of the charter with courage, determination and endless patience.”27

Ottawa supported Hammarskjold even as he sided with the Belgian-backed secessionists against the central government. On August 12 the UN Secretary General traveled to Katanga and telegraphed secessionist leader Moise Tchombe to discuss “deploying United Nations troops to Katanga.”28 Not even Belgium officially recognized Katanga’s independence, provoking Issaka Soure to note that, “[Hammarskjold’s visit] sent a very bad signal by implicitly implying that the rebellious province could somehow be regarded as sovereign to the point that the UN chief administrator could deal with it directly.”29

The UN head also worked to undermine Lumumba within the central government. When President Joseph Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba as prime minister — a move of debatable legality and opposed by the vast majority of the country’s parliament — Hammerskjold publicly endorsed the dismissal of a politician who a short time earlier had received the most votes in the country’s election.30

Lumumba attempted to respond to his dismissal with a nationwide broadcast, but UN forces blocked him from accessing the main radio station.31 ONUC also undermined Lumumba in other ways. Through their control of the airport ONUC prevented his forces from flying into the capital from other parts of the country and closed the airport to Soviet weapons and transportation equipment when Lumumba turned to Russia for assistance.32 In addition, according to The Cold War, “[the Secretary General’s special representative Andrew] Cordier provided $1 million — money supplied to the United Nations by the US government — to [General Joseph] Mobutu in early September to pay off restive and hungry Congolese soldiers and keep them loyal to Kasavubu during his attempt to oust Lumumba as prime minister.”33

To get a sense of Hammarskjold’s antipathy towards the Congolese leader, he privately told officials in Washington that Lumumba must be “broken” and only then would the Katanga problem “solve itself.”34 For his part, Cordier asserted “[Ghanaian president Kwame] Nkrumah is the Mussolini of Africa while Lumumba is its little Hitler.”35

(Echoing this thinking, in a conversation with External Affairs Minister Howard Green, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker called Lumumba a “major threat to Western interests” and said he was “coming around to the conclusion” that an independent and Western-oriented Katanga offered “the best solution to the current crisis”.36)

In response to Hammarskjold’s efforts to undermine his leadership, Lumumba broke off relations with the secretary general.37 He also called for the withdrawal of all white peacekeepers, which Hammerskjold rejected as a threat to UN authority.38 A number of ONUC nations ultimately took up Lumumba’s protests. When the Congolese prime minister was overthrown and ONUC helped consolidate the coup, the United Arab Republic (Egypt), Guinea, Morocco and Indonesia formally asked Hammerskjold to withdraw all of their troops.39

Canadian officials took a different position. They celebrated ONUC’s role in Lumumba’s overthrow. A week after Lumumba was pushed out prominent Canadian diplomat Escott Reid, then ambassador to Germany, noted in an internal letter, “already the United Nations has demonstrated in the Congo that it can in Africa act as the executive agent of the free world.”40 The “free world” was complicit in the murder of one of Africa’s most important independence leaders. In fact, the top Canadian in ONUC directly enabled his killing.

After Lumumba escaped house arrest and fled Leopoldville for his power base in the Eastern Orientale province, Colonel Jean Berthiaume assisted Lumumba’s political enemies by helping recapture him. The UN Chief of Staff, who was kept in place by Ottawa, tracked the deposed prime minister and informed Joseph Mobutu of Lumumba’s whereabouts.41 Three decades later the Saint-Hyacinthe, Québec, born Berthiaume told an interviewer: “I called Mobutu. I said, ‘Colonel, you have a problem, you were trying to retrieve your prisoner, Mr. Lumumba. I know where he is, and I know where he will be tomorrow. He said, what do I do? It’s simple, Colonel, with the help of the UN you have just created the core of your para commandos — we have just trained 30 of these guys — highly selected Moroccans trained as paratroopers. They all jumped — no one refused. To be on the safe side, I put our [Canadian] captain, Mario Coté, in the plane, to make sure there was no underhandedness. In any case, it’s simple, you take a Dakota [plane], send your paratroopers and arrest Lumumba in that small village — there is a runway and all that is needed. That’s all you’ll need to do, Colonel. He arrested him, like that, and I never regretted it.”42

Ghanaian peacekeepers near where Lumumba was captured took quite a different attitude towards the elected prime minister’s safety. After Mobutu’s forces captured Lumumba they requested permission to intervene and place Lumumba under UN protection.43 Unfortunately, the secretary-general denied their request. Not long thereafter Lumumba was executed by firing squad and his body was dissolved in acid.

After conspiring to eliminate Lumumba, the UN helped imprison Antoine Gizenga, formerly Lumumba’s deputy prime minister.44 Upon Lumumba’s death Gizenga established a government in Orientale province that was recognized by 20 African and Asian countries, but was crushed in 1962 by the UN and Congolese army. 45

With the country’s progressive forces weakened by Lumumba’s death and Gizenga’s imprisonment, Katanga’s secessionists were no longer useful to the Western powers, so the UN proceeded to violently suppress the same movement they tacitly supported while Lumumba was in power. At least 300 UN soldiers died fighting to maintain the Congo’s territorial integrity.46

Foreign resource companies and Western geopolitical interests were the main beneficiaries of UN operations in the Congo. The leading Congolese beneficiary of the UN mission was Joseph Mobutu who went on to run the country for over three decades.

Mobutu developed close ties to Canadian political and military officials. In a 1992 interview Canadian diplomat Michel Gauvin said, “During my time in Leopoldville as Chargé d’Affaires [from 1961 to 1963] I got to know Mobutu very well, I was one of the only whites invited to the baptism of one of his girls.”47In the Eye of the Storm: A History of Canadian Peacekeeping, Fred Gaffen explains: “Mobutu learned to trust the Canadian officers. This trust was of inestimable value in arranging ceasefires between Congolese and UN forces, negotiating the release of prisoners as well as liaising between UN and Congolese authorities. Mobutu, who became president of the Democratic Republic of Zaire, visited Canada in May of 1964. At that time, he thanked those Canadian officers who had contributed so much to the maintenance of the unity of the country.”48

Kwame Nkrumah, who Canada would help overthrow a few years later, described the UN’s complicity in Lumumba’s murder: “Somewhere in Katanga in the Congo … three of our brother freedom fighters have been done to death. … About their end many things are uncertain, but one fact is crystal clear. They have been killed because the United Nations whom Patrice Lumumba himself as Prime Minister had invited to the Congo to preserve law and order, not only failed to maintain that law and order, but also denied to the lawful government of the Congo all other means of self-protection. History records many occasions when rulers of states have been assassinated. The murder of Patrice Lumumba and of his two colleagues, however, is unique in that it is the first time in history that the legal ruler of a country has been done to death with the open connivance of a world organization in whom that ruler put his trust … instead of preserving law and order, the United Nations declared itself neutral between law and disorder and refused to lend any assistance whatsoever to the legal government in suppressing the mutineers who had set themselves up in power in Katanga and South Kasai. When, in order to move its troops against the rebels, the government of the Congo obtained some civilian aircraft and civilian motor vehicles from the Soviet Union, the colonialist powers at the United Nations raised a howl of rage while, at the same time maintaining a discreet silence over the build-up of Belgian arms and actual Belgian military forces in the service of the rebels … when Lumumba [after Kasavubu’s coup] wished to broadcast to the people explaining what happened, the United Nations in the so-called interest of law and order prevented him by force from speaking. They did not, however, use the same force to prevent the mutineers of the Congolese army from seizing power in Leopoldville and installing a completely illegal government … the United Nations sat by while the so-called Katanga government, which is entirely Belgian controlled, imported aircraft and arms from Belgium and other countries, such as [apartheid] South Africa, which have a vested interest in the suppression of African freedom. The United Nations connived at the setting up, in fact of an independent Katanga state, though this is contrary to the Security Council’s own resolutions. Finally, the United Nations, which could exert its authority to prevent Patrice Lumumba from broadcasting, was, so it pleaded, quite unable to prevent his arrest by mutineers or his transfer, through the use of airfields under United Nations control, into the hands of the Belgian-dominated government of Katanga.”49

The UN mission to the Congo, in which Canada participated actively, facilitated a major injustice and crime against the Congolese people. But it wasn’t the only time that a “Canadian coup” overthrew a popular African leader.

During a visit to Ghana in 2012 Canadian Governor General Michaëlle Jean laid a wreath on the tomb of former President Kwame Nkrumah. But, in commemorating this leading pan-Africanist, she failed to acknowledge the role her country played in his downfall. In February 1966 Ghana’s Canadian-trained army overthrew Nkrumah, a leader dubbed “Man of the Millennium” in a 2000 poll by BBC listeners in Africa.

Washington, together with London, backed the coup.50 Lester Pearson’s government also gave its blessing to Nkrumah’s ouster. In The Deceptive Ash: Bilingualism and Canadian Policy in Africa: 1957-1971, John P. Schlegel writes: “the Western orientation and the more liberal approach of the new military government was welcomed by Canada.”51

The day Nkrumah was overthrown the Canadian prime minister was asked in the House of Commons his opinion about this development. Pearson said nothing of substance on the matter. The next day External Affairs Minister Paul Martin Sr. responded to questions about Canada’s military training in Ghana, saying there was no change in instructions. In response to an MP’s question about recognizing the military government, Martin said: “In many cases recognition is accorded automatically. In respective cases such as that which occurred in Ghana yesterday, the practice is developing of carrying on with the government which has taken over, but according no formal act until some interval has elapsed. We shall carry on with the present arrangement for Ghana. Whether there will be any formal act will depend on information which is not now before us.”52

While Martin and Pearson were measured in public, the Canadian high commissioner in Accra, C.E. McGaughey, was not. In an internal memo to External Affairs just after Nkrumah was overthrown, McGaughey wrote “a wonderful thing has happened for the West in Ghana and Canada has played a worthy part.” Referring to the coup, the high commissioner added “all here welcome this development except party functionaries and communist diplomatic missions.” He then applauded the Ghanaian military for having “thrown the Russian and Chinese rascals out.”53

Less than two weeks after the coup, the Pearson government informed the military junta that Canada intended to carry on normal relations.54 In the immediate aftermath of Nkrumah’s overthrow, Canada sent $1.82 million ($15 million today) worth of flour to Ghana and offered the military regime a hundred CUSO volunteers.55 For its part, the International Monetary Fund, which had previously severed financial assistance to Nkrumah’s government, engaged immediately after the coup by restructuring Ghana’s debt. Canada’s contribution was an outright gift.56 During the three years between 1966 and 1969 the National Liberation Council military regime, received as much Canadian aid as during Nkrumah’s ten years in office with $22 million in grants and loans. Ottawa was the fourth major donor after the US, UK and UN.57

Two months after Nkrumah’s ouster the Canadian high commissioner in Ghana wrote to Montréal-based de Havilland Aircraft with a request to secure parts for Ghana’s Air Force. Worried Nkrumah might attempt a counter coup, the Air Force sought parts for non-operational aircraft in the event it needed to deploy its forces.58

Six months after overthrowing Nkrumah, the country’s new leader, General Joseph Ankrah, made an official visit to Ottawa as part of a trip that also took him through London and Washington.59

On top of diplomatic and economic support for Nkrumah’s ouster, Canada provided military training. Schlegel described the military government as a “product of this military training program.”60 A Canadian major who was a training advisor to the commander of a Ghanaian infantry brigade discovered preparations for the coup the day before its execution. Bob Edwards said nothing.61 After Nkrumah’s removal the Canadian high commissioner boasted about the effectiveness of Canada’s Junior Staff Officers training program at the Ghanaian Defence College. Writing to the Canadian under secretary of external affairs, McGaughey noted, “All the chief participants of the coup were graduates of this course.”62

After independence Ghana’s army remained British dominated. The colonial era British generals were still in place and the majority of Ghana’s officers continued to be trained in Britain. In response to a number of embarrassing incidents, Nkrumah released the British commanders in September 1961. It was at this point that Canada began training Ghana’s military.

While Canadians organized and oversaw the Junior Staff Officers course, a number of Canadians took up top positions in the Ghanaian Ministry of Defence. In the words of Canada’s military attaché to Ghana, Colonel Desmond Deane-Freeman, the Canadians in these positions imparted “our way of thinking”.63 Celebrating the influence of “our way of thinking”, in 1965 High Commissioner McGaughey wrote the under secretary of external affairs: “Since independence, it [Ghana’s military] has changed in outlook, perhaps less than any other institution. It is still equipped with Western arms and although essentially non-political, is Western oriented.”64

Not everyone was happy with the military’s attitude or Canada’s role therein. A year after Nkrumah’s ouster, McGaughey wrote Ottawa: “For some African and Asian diplomats stationed in Accra, I gather that there is a tendency to identify our aid policies particularly where military assistance is concerned with the aims of American and British policies. American and British objectives are unfortunately not regarded by such observers as being above criticism or suspicion.”65

Thomas Howell and Jeffrey Rajasooria echo the high commissioner’s assessment in their book Ghana and Nkrumah: “Members of the ruling CPP tended to identify Canadian aid policies, especially in defence areas, with the aims of the U.S. and Britain. Opponents of the Canadian military program went so far as to create a countervailing force in the form of the Soviet equipped, pro-communist President’s Own Guard Regiment [POGR]. The coup on 24 February 1966 which ousted Kwame Krumah and the CPP was partially rooted in this divergence of military loyalty.”66

The POGR became a “direct and potentially potent rival” to the Canadian-trained army, notes Christopher Kilford in The Other Cold War: Canada’s Military Assistance to the Developing World, 1945-1975.67 Even once Canadian officials in Ottawa “well understood” Canada’s significant role in the internal military battle developing in Ghana, writes Kilford, “there was never any serious discussion around withdrawing the Canadian training team.”68

As the 1960s wore on Nkrumah’s government became increasingly critical of London and Washington’s support for the white minority in southern Africa. Ottawa had little sympathy for Nkrumah’s pan-African ideals and so it made little sense to continue training the Ghanaian Army if it was, in Kilford’s words, to “be used to further Nkrumah’s political aims”. Kilford continued his thought, stating: “that is unless the Canadian government believed that in time a well-trained, professional Ghana Army might soon remove Nkrumah.”69

When it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it probably is a duck, or in the case of planning a coup ...

While many champions of “Canada as a good guy in international affairs” would be upset to learn that their country helped overthrow popular leaders, they would generally be less concerned about more subtle, but equally damaging, tools powerful governments use to get their way. And Canada proudly proclaims itself a leader in this modern form of imperialism.

8. Neoliberalism

Coups, invasions and other forms of obvious violence are generally less favoured means for the powerful to get their way around the world. Less direct tools that offer the cover of agreement between parties are preferred. Of course, as the fable relates, when a frog makes a deal with a crocodile to hitch a ride across the river it generally ends poorly for the smaller creature. But it was still an agreement freely entered into, says the crocodile. Or to quote the former coordinator of the United Nations Development Programme Aminata Dramane Traoré: “We are no longer, at least not in theory, colonies. But our countries are submitted to draconian economic and structural reforms that we didn’t ask for, and about which the majority of the population was not consulted, and which in addition, impoverish and subjugate us.”1

After independence many African countries attempted to reverse the foreign domination of their economies. They implemented protectionist policies in an attempt to build up domestic industries and overcome the weak, dependent economic structure left behind by colonialism. Many post-colonial governments also tried to reverse deep social inequities by redistributing wealth and improving the living standards of the poor. Nationalist governments imposed regulations on foreign investors while socialist regimes nationalized multinationals and enacted land reforms to break up large plantations and redistribute land to peasants. But corporate interests in the West (and Africa) generally opposed these efforts. In time they launched a concerted counterattack to promote “neoliberal” policies, which include the privatization of state assets, weakening of labour regulations and the liberalization of trade and investment.

The Third World debt crisis was the signal event that ushered in the neoliberal era. At the beginning of the 1980s many African countries were weighed down by debts they were unable to pay. Governments and businesses had borrowed from Western banks and governments to finance investments and imports but a sudden spike in US interest rates in 1979, combined with rising oil prices and falling commodity prices, greatly increased the financial burden. By 1982, indebted countries throughout the South were teetering on the brink of default, threatening a world financial crisis.

Ottawa joined the IMF-led creditor cartel that ensured the debtor, not the creditor, nations bore the brunt of the debt crisis.2 In The Use of Canadian Aid to Support Structural Adjustment in Africa Carolyn Bassett explains: “By promoting structural adjustment in debtor countries, the Canadian government minimized creditor responsibility for the crisis by forcing most of the burden of adjustment on the debtors. The major Canadian banks were large creditors to Third World countries and so were vulnerable to debtor actions such as full public default or debtor cartels forcing systematic changes in the debt management strategy.”3

For Ottawa and other wealthy capitalist countries the first priority was to prevent a major financial crisis and ensure that their banks were repaid. (While Canadian banks had loaned some money to a number of African countries in the late 1970s, most Canadian debt in Africa was held by government agencies such as the Canadian International Development Agency, the Wheat Board and Export Development Corporation. Canadian banks were, however, highly exposed to Latin American and Caribbean default.) But, they also sought to turn the precarious financial situation of the Third World to their advantage. The IMF and World Bank, dominated by the finance departments of the G7 countries, offered to lend money to the debtor countries on the condition that they radically reform their economies along neoliberal lines. Bilateral aid agencies, including CIDA, quickly aligned their policies with the IMF and World Bank, making aid conditional on the implementation of far-reaching changes known as Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs).

These policies emphasized repaying debts, attracting foreign investment and producing for export markets. SAPs focused on weakening labour protections, dismantling regulations, lowering taxes on big business and privatizing public enterprises. In order to free up resources to pay the debt and promote export production, governments were required to slash social programs, end “price distorting” subsidies and lay off state employees. These policies were supposed to allow poor countries to pay off their debts while spurring economic growth, the benefits of which would then trickle down to the poor.

Though much of the debt had been used to finance luxury consumption, military spending or capital flight, the IMF demanded cuts to public programs that benefited the poor. As Noam Chomsky emphasizes, the debt was largely “odious” (i.e. possessing no legal or moral standing) since it had been “imposed upon people without their consent, often serving to repress them and enrich their masters.”4

Structural adjustment was an assault on living standards that produced deep and enduring social and economic crises. The huge reductions in public investment, combined with anaemic private sector growth, sent much of Africa into a deflationary crisis. Unemployment increased, capital flight accelerated and the productive base of many countries crumbled. Rising import prices, falling wages, disappearing jobs and decaying social services expanded the ranks of the poor and worsened the grinding poverty of the poorest. Nutritional status, education, health and other social indicators declined in the wake of SAPs.

For many African countries the structural adjustment period was worse than the Great Depression. Across the continent GDP contracted 0.79% in the 1980s and 0.46% through the 1990s compared to growth of 1.04% during the 1960s and 0.86% in the 1970s.5

In an incredible indictment of the structural adjustment period, the number of Africans living on less than one dollar a day increased substantially. The 2004 World Development Indicators found that between 1981 and 2001 the number of Africans living on less than one dollar a day rose from 160 million to 314 million. Employing a slightly different timeframe and data, a 2015 African Union and UN report concluded that the number of people on the continent living on less than $1.25 a day increased from 290 million to 414 million over the past quarter-century.6 After more than three decades of neoliberal economic policy, more than four in five Africans live on less than five dollars a day.7

Neoliberal policies didn’t harm all Africans (that is, if you leave aside the insecurity and social stress that generally accompanies growing inequality). Not a single African was identified as a billionaire in 1980 yet there were 55 of these superrich individuals from that continent by 2012.8 In their 2012 World Wealth Report Merrill Lynch and Capgemini estimated that there were 100,000 “high net worth individuals” in Africa with $1.2 trillion in liquid assets.9 Superrich West African oligarchs spent more than £600 million on London property between 2011 and 2014, typically spending between £15 million and £25 million on each home.10

Ottawa was a major proponent of the shift towards neoliberal policies imposed by the various international financial institutions. In a 2010 article on Canada-US relations in Africa, David Black and Clement Adibe note: “Canada became a strong supporter of the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and continues to express confidence in market-oriented reforms.”11

At the start of the 1980s Department of Finance officials representing Canada at the World Bank/IMF backed these institutions’ shift towards structural adjustment.12 (Ottawa has significant clout within the World Bank. Alongside its counterparts from the US and Britain, Canadian officials participated in the 1944 Bretton Woods negotiations that established the post-World War II international financial institutions and as of 2008 Canada was the seventh largest donor among the World Bank’s 185 countries. In 2015 this country’s voting share at the World Bank was nearly 6 times greater than Canada’s proportion of the global population.)

As the decade wore on Canada’s aid agency increasingly aligned its policies with those of the multilateral donor institutions. In 1986 CIDA announced a five-year moratorium on debt payments owed to it by low-income African countries that adopted an SAP.13 The next year CIDA’s Winegard Report placed structural adjustment second of six new aid agency priorities.14

After five years as executive director of the IMF, Marcel Massé returned to the presidency of CIDA in 1989 and openly stated his desire to shape economic policy in impoverished countries. “As CIDA we cannot merely look at a series of projects as development,” noted Massé. “We have to be concerned about the overall economic policies, and we have to try to influence them.”15

In her 1991 thesis The Use of Canadian Aid to Support Structural Adjustment in Africa Carolyn Mary Bassett summarizes the many ways in which the Canadian aid agency backed SAPs. “CIDA now channels resources towards countries which have adopted structural adjustment programs, makes resources available specifically for projects related to a country’s structural adjustment agreement, and penalizes countries which do not maintain their agreement by slowing disbursements and cancelling some aid.”16
Tens (perhaps even hundreds) of millions of dollars in Canadian aid supported SAPs in Africa. According to two different estimates, between 20 and 25 percent of Canadian aid to Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s was channelled towards structural adjustment.17 In a particularly striking example, a 1987 CIDA memo explained, “approximately 35-40 percent of cash flow for the next five-year period will be transferred as unstructured program aid to support balance of payments … all elements under this theme will be tied to satisfactory performance by Ghana under an internationally accepted SAP.”18

In the early 1980s Ghana was seen as one of the only IMF/World Bank “success stories” in sub-Saharan Africa. Elsewhere on the continent, adjustment policies immediately exacerbated economic difficulties. But in Ghana, after a military coup brought Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings to power, the government adopted IMF reforms in 1983 and the economy appeared to turn around. As the 1980s wore on, however, opposition to the SAP intensified. Trade unions, students and left-wing intellectuals organized large strikes and demonstrations against layoffs of public sector workers and the imposition of user fees for public services. They denounced the military government’s acceptance of IMF conditions as a betrayal of the Ghanaian state’s historic commitment to equality and anti-imperialism.

Growing opposition caused donor countries to worry that the government might back off from implementing further reforms. Concerned their star pupil may go astray, CIDA President Margaret Catley-Carlson promised Ghana’s leaders increased aid to “help you out over this very difficult period … We know that if you take on this [IMF] program of reform it will cost you. Your food prices are going to shoot up, and in the urban areas that is going to be very destabilizing.”19

The centerpiece of this effort was the Program of Actions to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD), an $85.7 million social fund designed to help Ghana’s military leaders maintain political momentum for further neoliberal reforms while lessening their impact on the poor. CIDA was a key player in setting up PAMSCAD and contributed $8.4 million to the fund.20

PAMSCAD was widely perceived in Ghana as a “huge public relations exercise” for the Rawlings regime. Measured by jobs, access to social services or inequality, PAMSCAD was a failure. Economist Frances Stewart estimated that PAMSCAD created about 7,000 person-years of employment, “only a fraction of the 61,000 redundancies in the civil service and the education service” caused by the SAP.21

The layoffs led to growth in the informal sector but as the number of jobless Ghanaians increased the prospects for making a decent living from activities like street vending declined.22 Rural women traders were one of the few “winners” of adjustment among the poor, yet even here the victory was Pyrrhic. The success of traders was a result of the flood of imports that followed trade liberalization. While low priced imports produced short-term profits for traders, these same imports caused the hollowing out of industry, with the result that “under the impact of liberalization, Ghana was progressively ‘turned into a nation of shoppers and storekeepers with very little manufacturing or industrial activity.’”23

Thanks in part to PAMSCAD, Ghana remained a star pupil of the IMF and World Bank. The opening of Ghana’s market produced a profit bonanza for Canadian mining corporations, which capitalized on the newly liberalized mining law to buy up huge concessions and privatized state mines. While the mining-led boom produced impressive GDP growth, it caused significant ecological devastation and led to a “boom for the few and a bust for the many.” NGO worker Ian Gary explained the impacts of structural adjustment: “Ghana’s traditional sources of income — gold, cocoa, and timber — have benefited from the program, but this has only exacerbated the colonial legacy of dependence. Nearly all of the $1.5 billion worth of private foreign investment has been in mining, with most of the profits being repatriated overseas. ‘User fees’ for health care services and education have been introduced. Disincentives to food producers, and the damage caused to local rice producers by cheap rice imports, led to increased malnutrition and lower food security. Rapid and indiscriminate liberalization of the trade regime hurt local industry, while cutbacks in the public sector shed 15 per cent of the waged work force.”24

The principle preoccupation of the Ghanaian regime and the international donors was not to tackle poverty and inequality, but to mitigate the political costs of adjustment. In this respect, PAMSCAD was quite effective. The temporary influx of aid made it easier for the military government to permanently cut back social services, allowing it to divert funds towards debt repayments.

As was the case in Ghana, SAP promotion usually consisted of making money available to countries that followed the rules. But sometimes getting African countries to reform their economies along neoliberal lines took a stick. Ottawa withdrew food aid to Tanzania to pressure its government to follow IMF scriptures. In the Politics of Economic Reforms in Tanzania: 1977-1988 A. S. Z. Kiondo explains: “Canada also followed suit, and by 1985 its attitude towards Tanzania had become openly harder, complaining that its development assistance was being jeopardised by Tanzania’s ‘stubbornness’ in undertaking proper reforms. In February 1986, during annual meetings between CIDA and Tanzania, CIDA issued a very strong statement to the effect that no further development assistance would be considered for Tanzania if an agreement with the IMF was not reached.”25

CIDA took a similar attitude towards Tanzania’s southwest neighbour. In the latter part of the 1980s Ottawa slowed aid to Zambia in a successful bid to change the government’s attitude to neoliberal reforms. “Following Zambia’s break with the IMF [in mid-1987], CIDA ceased to develop new projects or to expand existing ones, although it stopped short of cancelling ongoing projects. Any disbursements to Zambia slowed considerably, and the Canadian line of credit supporting the World Bank program to restructure Zambia’s agricultural, industrial and manufacturing sectors was cancelled,” Carolyn Bassett writes.26 “In 1987 Canada had decided not to make any new aid commitments to Zambia for the time being because [President] Kaunda had abandoned a structural adjustment program for its economy favoured by the IMF, the World Bank, and major donors.”27 After Zambia fell into line with the IMF, CIDA recharged its aid program.28

As part of a push for economic reform Ottawa secured an agreement that gave a former vice president of the Bank of Canada the role of governor of the Bank of Zambia, where he oversaw the country’s monetary policies and “responses to the IMF”.29 In her thesis Bassett notes, “instrumental in developing Zambia’s new ‘domestically designed’ [economic] program was the new head of the Bank of Zambia, Canadian Jacques Boussières.”30

Paid by Ottawa, Boussières was the first foreign governor of the Bank of Zambia since independence.31 This was not well received by some. Africa Events described Boussières as “a White Canadian who came to de-Zambianise the bank post under controversial circumstances.”32

The Zambian public bitterly resisted layoffs and cuts to social programs spurred by neoliberal reforms and during the “Christmas riots” of 1988 security forces killed 30 protesters in a bid to suppress opposition.33 The violence in Zambia was representative of widespread resistance across the continent with dozens of “IMF riots” and hundreds of thousands protesting structural adjustment measures. In the late 1980s and early 1990s anti-IMF protests “led to the fall of more than a dozen African governments.”34

Anti-IMF/World Bank protests, taken up later by movements in the North, discredited SAPs. The IMF/World Bank responded by softening the harshest edges of its demands and a repackaging of its policies. Beginning in 1999 the IMF/World Bank shifted away from SAPs and towards Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). A gathering of social organizations in Kampala in 2001 concluded that these were “Structural Adjustment Programmes in disguise.”35

In exchange for debt relief Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) — 80% sub-Saharan African — had to agree to a PRSP. Edward Akuffo describes Ottawa’s support for PRSPs in Canadian Foreign-Policy in Africa: “Consistent with the apparent commitment to advance the neoliberal economic order with key allies in the G8, Canadian aid to African countries since the late 1990s has been anchored on the acceptance and preparation of in country directed PRSPs under the supervision of the Bretton Woods institutions [IMF/World Bank]. Unlike the SAPs that were imposed on African countries, the PRSPs are said to be a country led program that is built on local participation in the formulation of policies and strategies for broad-based growth and poverty reduction. The preparation of PRSPs involves the participation of domestic stakeholders such as civil society groups and external development partners including the IMF and the World Bank. CIDA’s Country Programming Framework for countries such as Burkina Faso, Ghana, Senegal, and Mozambique was based on the individual country’s IMF/World Bank approved PRSPs, which CIDA assisted these countries to produce.”36

Canada aligned its debt cancellation with the IMF-led HIPC initiative. In 2000 Ottawa said it would cancel 100% of HIPC debt owed to Export Development Corporation (EDC) and the Canadian Wheat Board. However, as noted by a Canadian Council for International Cooperation paper, this was “conditional on compliance by these countries with all the terms of their agreement with the IMF/World Bank Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC).”37

Between 2005 and 2015 Ottawa provided $200 million to the HIPC Trust Fund to help the World Bank and African Development Bank write off the debt for over a dozen HIPC-compliant African countries.38

Ottawa played a lead role promoting another neoliberal initiative in Africa. As host of the G8 summit in 2002 the Liberal government promoted the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which exchanged aid for policy reforms. To support NEPAD Canada set up a $500 million Canada Fund for Africa and committed to raising billions more from its G7 allies.39 Three months prior to the G8 Summit Prime Minister Jean Chrétien visited seven African countries partly to promote NEPAD. At an Organization of African Unity and Economic Commission for Africa summit to discuss NEPAD, Chrétien told the African leaders and press: “By establishing the conditions that are necessary to attract and retain private investment from Africa and abroad, we can shatter the perception all too deeply rooted that investing money in Africa does not pay, thereby securing capital flows that greatly exceed any foreseeable development assistance.”40

Though presented as altruistic, Ottawa promoted NEPAD to strengthen corporate power on the continent. Edward Akuffo writes: “Canada’s support for the NEPAD was driven by economic interest and the opportunity that NEPAD offered to ‘institutionalize’ the neoliberal ideology in African economies.”41 As a stark example of the corporate logic driving the Canada Fund for Africa, $100 million of it was devoted to the Canada Investment Fund for Africa (CIFA). Overseen by multibillion-dollar investment funds, Cordiant and Actis, CIFA’s stated objective was “to spur economic growth by providing risk capital for commercially successful private-sector businesses.”42 Among other projects, CIFA money was channelled to a telecommunications company, private banks and a half-dozen extractive sector projects (four operated by Canadian companies).43

Rather than supporting the International Jubilee debt cancellation campaign, NEPAD’s founding statement promotes initiatives to exchange debt relief for economic liberalization. It calls for the “support [of] existing poverty reduction initiatives at the multilateral level, such as the Comprehensive Development Framework of the World Bank and the Poverty Reduction Strategy approach linked to the Highly Indebted Poor Country debt relief initiative.”44

NEPAD also encourages the privatization of public infrastructure. The founding statement calls on African governments to “promote public-private partnerships (PPPs) as a promising vehicle for attracting private investors” and to “establish and nurture PPPs as well as grant concessions [to private companies] towards the construction, development and maintenance of ports, roads, railways and maritime transportation.”45

A host of African social movements, labour unions and women’s organizations rejected NEPAD, with the Council for Development and Social Research in Africa and Third World Network-Africa denouncing “the neo-liberal economic policy framework at the heart of the plan [NEPAD], which repeats the structural adjustment policy packages of the preceding two decades and overlooks the disastrous effects of those policies.”46 During an African Social Forum seminar on the subject Trevor Ngwane took this criticism further: “The reason Africa continues to suffer is because the advanced capitalist countries have the power to dictate to us what to do. Nowhere does NEPAD call for a change in the existing international power relations that compel Africa, for instance, to pay a debt whose legitimacy is highly questionable, or to succumb to an international economic system loaded against Africa.”47

Instead of pushing to reform an unfair international trade and investment regime, NEPAD reinforces structural imbalances that consign the continent to a position of economic subservience or “underdevelopment”.

Ottawa invested heavily in African neoliberalism with the Canada Fund for Africa providing some $30 million to promote “trade” agreements and neoliberal reforms. Another $8 million was put into the Program for Building African Capacity for Trade while $7 million went to the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Program for help with “implementation of WTO agreements, policy formation and market development.”48 Canada also gave $14.7 million to the African Trade Policy Centre, which helps build African governments’ capacity “to formulate and implement sound trade policies and participate more effectively in trade negotiations at the bilateral, regional and multilateral levels.”49

In another push to liberalize trade and investment regulations, Ottawa contributed $1.8 million to the WTO’s Global Trust Fund for Trade Related Assistance to Developing Countries and $2.5 million to the WTO’s Aid for Trade (AfT) program.50 Commenting on this move, Edward Akuffo notes: “To a large extent multilateral aid to Africa through the WTO became an instrument for free trade and liberalization that would in turn advance Canada’s economic interest in Africa.”51

In 2012 Ottawa put forward $15 million to establish the Africa Trade Fund (AfTra).52 Set up in collaboration with the African Development Bank, AfTra was designed “to promote Africa’s efforts to integrate into regional and global trading systems.”53

Canada funded efforts to further integrate African countries into neoliberal trade and investment regimes at the same time as it pushed to expand the WTO’s purview against the wishes of the continent’s negotiators. The Southern and Eastern African Trade, Information and Negotiations Institute reported on Canadian Trade Minister Ed Fast’s push to expand the scope of discussions during a ministerial meeting for the Doha Round of negotiations in January 2014. “One of the strongest statements at the TNC [Trade Negotiations Committee] was Canada’s reiteration of its position that new issues such as investment, competition, energy and environment should be added to the Doha agenda. Uganda’s trade minister, representing the negotiating group of least developed countries, rejected adding any new issues.”54 Canada also argued, alongside the US, European Union and Japan, to deepen cuts on industrial tariffs in the WTO’s Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) negotiations.55 The Group of 90, an alliance of the poorest and smallest developing countries, opposed significant tariff reductions out of fear that they would further undermine their already limited industrial bases.

Ottawa pushed African countries to liberalize their economies despite overwhelming evidence that poor countries which prosper, almost without fail, pursue auto-centered (inward looking) economic policies. In Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective prominent South Korean economist Ha-Joon Chang argues that all major developed countries pursued interventionist policies but once their industry got strong they tried to stop other countries from following the same path.

Alongside the liberalization of trade and investment regimes, most African countries’ manufacturing sectors stagnated or declined between 1990 and 2010. Between 2000 and 2008 manufacturing value added (MVA) as a percentage of African GDP fell from 12.8% to 10.5% while it increased from 22% to 35% in developing Asian countries.56

There are also other ways in which Ottawa promoted neoliberal capitalist policies in Africa. One avenue has been backing initiatives to promote the privatization of infrastructure and other traditionally public domains. Along with the African Development Bank, Canada set up the NEPAD Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility (IPPF), earmarking an initial $10 million to the IPPF partly to promote public-private partnerships in water and sanitation, transportation, energy etc.57 The stated goal is to “support [the] creation of an enabling environment for private participation in infrastructure.”58 It gained additional momentum in 2005 with Britain, Germany, Denmark and Spain joining the initiative.

Similar to the IPPF, the World Bank’s Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) was established in 1999 to address what it calls “a key constraint for improved service provision in many developing countries [which] is the lack of an enabling environment conducive to private investment.”59 Canada is one of a dozen donors to a facility largely established to convince sceptics of the benefits of corporations owning and operating infrastructure projects. Profiting From Poverty: Privatization Consultants, DFID and Public Services explains: “The PPIAF has also been engaged in the ongoing battle for hearts and minds in developing countries, running workshops, study tours and ‘public awareness campaigns’ in order to win over a sceptical public to the benefits of public service privatisation. One such project was the so-called ‘knowledge programme’ on water policy run for journalists from nine African countries in early 2000, which aimed to counter public scepticism over water privatisation in Africa by encouraging African journalists to provide more positive media coverage.”60

Stephen Harper’s Conservatives moved to lock-in neoliberal reforms in Africa. Since 2008 Canada has concluded and/or signed Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (FIPAs) with Tanzania, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Benin, Cameroon, Zambia, Madagascar, Mali and Senegal. At the time of publication Ottawa engaged in FIPA negotiations with Ghana, Tunisia, Kenya and plans were afoot to pursue bilateral investment treaties with other African countries. According to the government, “A FIPA is a treaty designed to promote and protect Canadian investment abroad through legally binding provisions and to promote foreign investment in Canada. By ensuring greater protection against discriminatory and arbitrary practices, and by enhancing the predictability of a market’s policy framework, a FIPA gives businesses greater confidence in investing.”61

FIPA treaties include an Investor State Dispute Settlement mechanism that gives corporations the right to sue governments — in private, investor-friendly tribunals — for pursuing policies that interfere with their profit making. As such, they undermine the public’s ability to democratically determine economic policy. In a 2014 Tanzanian Business Times article headlined “Rethinking the Role of Global Investment in Africa’s Development”, Ugandan Yash Tandon explains: “It is now widely acknowledged, even in government circles, that BITs [bilateral investment treaties] are an exercise in undermining the sovereignty of the capital-receiving countries. BITs invariably provide for extra-territorial rights for the owners of capital, including, typically, protection from expropriation; free transfer of exorbitant profits and royalties; and litigation under the jurisdiction of either the capital-exporting countries or international arbitration.”62

Since few African companies invest in Canada there is little chance that Ottawa will face a suit or feel domestic policy pressure as a result of a FIPA with an African country. Nonetheless, the Benin and Tanzania FIPAs (the two I read) were in Ottawa’s favour with Canada negotiating two to three times more industry exclusions (economic sectors protected from the constraints of the accord).

Incredibly, FIPAs are usually locked in for 16 years. One clause of the Canada-Benin accord reads: “The termination of this Agreement shall be effective one year after notice of termination has been received by the other Contracting Party.” The subsequent line, however, reads that the agreement will “remain in force for a period of 15 years in respect of investments or commitments to invest made prior to the date when the termination of this Agreement becomes effective.”63 In other words, future governments’ ability to shift direction could be restricted for over a decade and a half.

If neoliberal policies don’t lessen poverty in Africa and also harm democracy, why have Canadian governments pushed them? Part of the answer is provided in the next few chapters, in which we look at the specific Canadian interests that have benefited from neoliberalism.

9. A Mining Superpower

“Under neoliberal economic conditions, resource extraction in Africa by transnational mining and oil companies occurs in conditions reminiscent of early colonialism … In fact, over time, the more a country depends on natural resources, the lower its economic growth.”

– Kairos’1

It may not be part of the self-image of most people in this country, but Canada is a mining superpower. Canadian-based companies are to extracting minerals what the Swiss are to making expensive watches. With mines in at least 35 African countries, Canadian companies operate over 700 mineral projects across the continent.2

Canadian firms regularly exchange African mineral assets among themselves and a number of companies based and traded here have taken on African names. African Queen Mines, Tanzanian Royalty Exploration, Africa Oil, Lake Victoria Mining Company, African Aura Resources, Katanga Mining, Société d’Exploitation Minière d’Afrique de l’Ouest (SEMAFO), Uganda Gold Mining, East Africa Metals, Timbuktu Gold, Sahelian Goldfields, African Gold Group and International African Mining Gold (IAMGOLD) are all Canadian. With a mere half percent of the world’s population, Canada is home to half of all internationally listed mining companies operating in Africa.3

Since the late 1980s Canadian mining investment in Africa has grown nearly 150 fold. In 1989 Canadian mining companies had $233 million invested on the continent, which rose to $6 billion in 2005. By 2011 Canadian mining investments in Africa had surpassed $31 billion.4 Canada, not China, is the leading international resource investor in Africa.

Canadian mining companies have been the main beneficiaries of the World Bank’s push to promote capitalist mineral extraction in Africa. But in their quest for profits Canadian businesses have squeezed out domestic miners and solidified the colonial economic pattern whereby foreigners export the continent’s raw materials while African countries import value added products.

The International Council on Mining and Metals found that 16 African countries depended on minerals for more than 25% of their exports in 2010 (a number of other African countries were heavily reliant on energy exports). Of these 16 nations, eight relied on minerals for over half of their exports and three relied on minerals for more than three quarters of their exports.5 A 2015 African Development Bank study discovered even greater dependence. It concluded that 24 African countries relied on mineral products for three quarters of their export earnings.6

The dependence on resource extraction has grown across the continent. Between 2002 and 2012 more than two thirds of African export growth was in minerals, oil and gas.7 (Less dominant than their mining counterparts, more than a dozen Canadian oil and gas firms operate across the continent.)

In a 2014 speech at a World Bank forum on the Africa Mining Vision, Canada’s international development minister celebrated the continent’s dependence on raw resource exports. Christian Paradis lauded the continent for exporting $382 billion worth of minerals, oil and gas in 2011 and suggested that extracting and exporting minerals drove Canada’s development. “Canada owes much of its economic growth to extractive industries. Canada’s own history is an example of how natural resources can create jobs and drive government revenues that help build a diversified economy and strong society.”8

But, contrary to what Paradis and other officials say about mining’s role in Canadian economic development, focusing on raw mineral exports ensures “underdevelopment” not development. Or, as Digging to Development? A Historical Look at Mining and Economic Development explains: “The statistical evidence clearly undermines the proposition that investments in mining can set a nation on the path of sustained development.”9 The Oxfam America report challenges the World Bank (and Canadian government) promulgated notion that extracting minerals played a major part in the US, Australian or Canadian economic rise.

Between 1890 and 1914 metal and metal ore exports represented 3% of exports and 1% of GDP in Canada.10 This rose to an average of 9% of exports and 3% of GDP from 1918 to 1940. In more recent times, Canadian metal and metal ore exports barely represented one-twentieth the value of automotive exports.11 Simply put, Canada’s economy has never been remotely as reliant on mining as many African countries are today.

Equating Canadian mineral economics with African mineral dependence is even more absurd than the export percentages alone suggest. In Canada mineral extraction spurred significant technology and skills development as well as associated industries. But, aside from South Africa, few African countries are hubs of mineral technology development or provide the engineering, legal and financial services mining companies usually require and much of the refining work and profits leave the continent. And, while Canadian mining companies do employ tens of thousands of Africans, corporate mining is capital, not labour, intensive. Based on data acquired from US affiliate firms, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa found that manufacturing foreign investment was 17.5 times more labour intensive than mining foreign investment.12 Additionally, Canadian companies suppress a great deal of mining employment since they regularly displace labour-intensive (though often dangerous) artisanal mining and regularly take land from farmers.

A report titled “Blessing or Curse? The rise of mineral dependence among low- and middle-income countries” found that countries dependent on minerals generally have a lower GDP per capita and worse institutional governance.13 Another report, “Poverty Reduction or Poverty Exacerbation?”, confirms this analysis. It notes: “Countries highly dependent on oil and mineral exports tend to grow more slowly, face lower living standards, and suffer higher levels of corruption and violence than resource-poor countries. In addition, oil, gas and mining projects can have significant negative economic, social, and environmental impacts on directly affected communities and ecosystems.”14 The latter paper concludes that focusing on mineral exports does not simply fail to alleviate poverty it may make it worse. A longer-term study by the World Bank notes that “data on real per capita GDP show that developing countries with few natural resources grew 2-3 times faster between 1960 and 1990 than natural-resource-abundant countries.”15 Yet the World Bank and IMF have pressured African governments to expand their focus on extractives, enabling foreign companies to exploit them. In 1992 the World Bank published a “Strategy for African Mining” that declared “the main objective of donor intervention in African mining — whether through technical assistance or investment financing — should be to facilitate private investment and help reduce the country and project-related risk for the private investor.”16

The structural adjustment process forced more than thirty African governments to rewrite mining codes to facilitate foreign ownership and exploitation of their mineral resources.17 A World Bank promoted reform in Burkina Faso, for instance, reduced mining income taxes by twenty percent, dividend withholding taxes by fifty percent and capped the government’s share of mining ventures at ten percent.18 David Black and Malcolm Savage explain in Mainstreaming Investment: Foreign and Security Policy Implications of Canadian Extractive Industries in Africa: “Beginning in the 1980s with the imposition of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) on much of the continent, African countries were strongly encouraged to liberalize their mining codes to attract foreign investment. Canada has played an active role in advocating liberalization of Africa’s mining sector.”19

Ottawa championed these legislative reforms through both support for the IMF/World Bank and more direct avenues. Gwendolyn Schulman and Roberto Nieto write: “Canadian cash, technocrats and know-how have also been involved in rewriting mining codes in Malawi, Ghana, Mali and the Democratic Republic of Congo (with, in this last case, civil war as a backdrop).”20 The authors of Imperial Canada Inc., Alain Deneault and William Sacher, cite Botswana, Zimbabwe, Guinea and Zambia as other African countries where Canadian aid shaped mining legislation.21 In Violence as Civility: Race, Mining and Canadian Neocolonizers in African States, a PhD thesis based on interviews with Canadian mining executives operating across the continent, Paula Butler explains: “It became apparent from interviewees’ anecdotes that Canadian state and private actors have played significant direct roles in numerous African countries in reforming and rewriting their mining laws. While this is a postcolonial context in which formal power (vis-a-vis foreign investors and foreign states) is held and exercised by African governments, which do have some room to manoeuvre, the interview data indicates extensive access to information on the part of Canadian companies and Canadian diplomatic personnel about African host country law reform processes, as well as an unusual ability to directly or indirectly influence change. One interviewee stated that his private mining company had made an offer to a host African state to re-draft its mining legislation, and had paid for a Canadian lawyer to do so. Indeed, direct involvements by Canadians, and/or the use of Canadian mining law as a model, were reported for a number of countries.”22

Canadian aid enhanced the legislative environment for mining companies as well as their knowledge of Africa’s terrain.23 Ottawa provided funds to gather geological data in Tanzania, Angola, Cameroon, Niger, Uganda, Kenya and elsewhere.24 Long time West Africa-based freelance journalist, Joan Baxter, describes a chance encounter with Canadian geologists in her 2008 book Dust From Our Eyes: an Unblinkered Look at Africa: “Another CIDA employee I met one evening in Bamako [Mali] told me his work with CIDA had been a long-term project to map the mineral resources of Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo. When we spoke, he was on a two-year sabbatical from CIDA, working with Canadian mining companies that had taken out concessions in that country. In the 1980s in Burkina Faso, I had met a team of Canadians who were flying in an odd looking plane so full of antenna and wires that it resembled a flying catfish. When I asked the crew what kind of plane it was they told me it was for mapping the underground riches of Burkina Faso, whose gold is now being mined today by foreign — and several Canadian — companies.”25

As the biggest donor nation to African mining initiatives, Canada finances a multitude of projects facilitating resource extraction. Ottawa’s contributions are considerable. In the educational sphere, CIDA sponsored the Zimbabwe School of Mines, a mid-1990s government-industry collaboration, and financed a Senegalese school for geomatics (combining geography and information technology to map natural resources), which received an added $4.92 million in 2012.26 Two years later Canada put up $18.5 million for an extractives skills training centre in Mozambique and in 2015 Ottawa announced $12.5 million for the Project Strengthening Education for Mining in Ethiopia.27 The initiative was to work with Ethiopian universities “to develop more industry driven geology and mining engineering undergraduate programs.”28

Ottawa pledged $20 million in 2012 for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the Extractive Industries Technical Advisory Facility.29 Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair launched EITI in 2002 under the guise of improving standards for disclosing payments by resource companies to governments. The EITI, however, doesn’t publish what companies’ are required to pay, making it easy to overstate costs or understate revenues to reduce taxable income (see Chapter 15 for more detail). Prominent Nigerian author and activist Nnimmo Bassey criticized the EITI for “tend[ing] to portray the resource extracting companies as clean while the host governments are dirty and have to struggle to achieve the status of being EITI compliant.”30

The World Bank established the International Extractive Industries Technical Advisory Facility (EI-TAF) with the stated goal of improving governments’ capacity to negotiate and implement regulatory frameworks for managing natural resources. The World Bank argued that “the ultimate objective of the EI-TAF is to assist countries in the sustainable development of the extractives sector, to facilitate private investment that is positive for development and to ensure that countries — and ultimately their citizens — benefit from the exploitation of their natural resources.”31

The biggest donor to the EITAF, Ottawa is the reason the facility developed relations with the University of Calgary’s School of Public Policy. Established with a $4 million donation from James Palmer, one of Canada’s leading oil and gas lawyers, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice launched the initiative in 2009 at a $500-per-plate dinner.32

In another endeavour to help governments negotiate mining contracts, Canada’s international development minister announced $10 million in funding for the African Legal Support Facility at a 2014 World Economic Forum conference on Extractives and Sustainable Development. The African Legal Support Facility is the first initiative undertaken by the Extractives Cooperation for Enhanced Economic Development (EXCEED) initiative. The Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development budgeted up to $25 million per year for a program it described as “a new funding mechanism to expand Canada’s involvement in areas of high development impact in the extractive sector in Africa.”33

EXCEED partnered with the African Minerals Development Centre (AMDC) and Canadian International Institute for Extractive Industries and Development (CIIEID) with a mandate to advance “strategic partnership arrangements with leading international and Canadian institutions” to help “African countries to maximize the benefits of their own resource wealth.”34 Launched in December 2013, AMDC advises governments on the management of their mineral resources and implementation of the African Union’s Africa Mining Vision.35

The Africa Mining Vision grew out of the African Mining Partnership, which was set up to implement the mining chapter of the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The Canadian backed NEPAD calls for “[improving] the quality of mineral resource information” and “[creating] a regulatory framework conducive to the development of the mining sector.”36 But NEPAD’s mining chapter says little regarding the negative social and environmental impacts mining often has on local communities or the need for African governments/communities to maximize income from non-renewable resources.37

Secondary mining powerhouse Australia joined forces with Ottawa to fund AMDC. Canada, however, was the primary source of the centre’s funding and announced a $15.3 million contribution in 2014.38 In addition to the two governments, some mining companies publicly supported AMDC. A press release from a Brazilian-Canadian mining company noted: “Vale supports African Mineral Development Centre launch in Mozambique.”39

Ottawa promoted a partnership between the centre and the Canadian International Institute for Extractive Industries and Development as part of its effort to shape AMDC’s direction. In 2014 CIIEID signed a letter of intent “with the AMDC to cooperate in policy and regulatory frameworks, geological and mining mapping information systems, governance and participation and building human and institutional capacities.”40

The Stephen Harper government commissioned CIIEID, a University hosted think tank, to provide mining related services to developing countries. In 2012 Ottawa committed $25 million over five years to an institute jointly housed by the University of British Columbia, Simon Fraser University and Université de Montréal. A number of mining companies also pledged millions of dollars to support CIIEID programming.41

In June 2013 then International Development Minister Julian Fantino told a Mining Association of Canada meeting that CIIEID “will be your biggest and best ambassador.”42 Drawing from the minister’s statement, Mining Watch concluded: “CIIEID will promote extractive industry growth, not poverty reduction.”43

According to the government, its support for the African Minerals Development Centre, Canadian International Institute for Extractive Industries and Development, Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative and Extractive Industries Technical Advisory Facility was part of its Building the Canadian Advantage: Canada’s Corporate Social Responsibility Strategy for the Canadian International Extractive Sector. The government’s corporate social responsibility strategy also had the goal of increasing the public funds available for mining companies’ social responsibility initiatives. In 2012 CIDA declared that they designed their partnership with mining corporations to “improv[e] the competitive advantage of Canadian international extractive sector companies by enhancing their ability to manage social and environmental risks.”44

The Conservative government ploughed millions of dollars into mining companies’ corporate social responsibility projects. One example of the “aid” was a $4.5-million grant to Lundin for Africa, the philanthropic arm of mining giant Lundin Group of Companies, for its operations in Ghana, Mali and Senegal.45 In 2012 Ottawa also put up $5.6 million for a project between NGO Plan Canada and IAMGOLD near the company’s mine in Burkina Faso. (See Chapter 10 for more details.) But, the public paying for what should be mining companies’ social responsibility didn’t begin with the Harper Conservatives. In the early 2000s, for instance, CIDA put up $1.4 million for a Placer Dome program to aid hundreds of South Africans the Vancouver company laid off.46

The aid agency’s motivations extend beyond projects directly related to mining operations. Ottawa directed funds to countries hospitable to foreign mining firms and areas where Canadian companies sought resources. In an internal report titled “Reviewing CIDA’s Bilateral Engagement” the aid agency points to over a dozen countries where its work was partly motivated by Canadian mining companies.47 This 2013 report, for instance, acknowledged that the Congo is of “strategic interest” because Canadian extractive companies have billions of dollars invested there.48

While the Harper regime strengthened the linkage, governments have long delivered aid with mining interests in mind. In Player, Partner and Friend: Canada’s Africa Policy since 1945, Grant Dawson points out that an early motivation in dispensing aid was that “it would (hopefully) also dissuade their governments from nationalizing extractive industries (including, without compensation, Canadian firms), and make the states ‘trade and investment ready’. ”49

Tying development aid to mining interests is one of many ways Ottawa supported Canadian mining firms in Africa. Crown Corporation Export Development Canada (EDC) provided hundreds of millions of dollars in export finance and risk insurance for mining projects in Madagascar, Zambia, Ghana, Eritrea, Mauritania, Congo and beyond.50 EDC’s “Africa team” promoted the sector at South Africa’s Mining Indaba 2013 Conference and the Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada Convention.51 In 2015 Canada’s export credit agency opened an office in Johannesburg, its first on the continent, to facilitate market information work.

In 2014 the federal government announced the launch of branch offices of a professional society, the Canadian Institute of Mining, Metallurgy and Petroleum, in Senegal and Burkina Faso. A press release stated: “The opening of a second office [in West Africa] allows Canada to further share best practices with the region and will make the knowledge and experience of Canadian miners, geologists and managers more available to their African counterparts.”52 Supported by the Canadian Trade Commissioner Service, the Canadian Institute of Mining, Metallurgy and Petroleum sought to create the Institut Minier Ouest Africain.53

More than two dozen Canadian diplomatic and trade missions promote mining interests on the continent.54 According to Africa’s Blessing, Africa’s Curse: The Legacy of Resource Extraction in Africa, “Canadian diplomatic missions in Africa spend much of their time making sure that mining companies and host governments are brought together and the companies are much praised by Canadian officials.”55 In addition to arranging meetings between local politicians and Canadian businesses, Canadian missions organize conferences and lobby local governments for mining sector reform. A 2002 East Africa Standard article headlined “Relax Mining Laws, Urges Canadian Envoy” reported on a speech by Trade Commissioner Ronald Rose, who called for Kenyan mining sector reform.56

Top Canadian officials aggressively promoted mining under Stephen Harper’s leadership. As a Canadian Press journalist put it: “Harper ramps up a strategy to give Canadian business an edge in Africa’s lucrative and expanding resource industry.”57 A host of mining executives accompanied International Trade Minister Ed Fast during a series of visits to the continent and International Development Minister Christian Paradis attended various African mining forums. For his part, former foreign minister John Baird visited African countries partly based on where Canadian resource companies sought business.58 “Canada is keen to explore opportunities to realize the full economic potential of trade with Kenya and the East African Community, especially for Canadian natural resource companies, which are becoming leaders in the Kenyan mining and oil and gas industries,” a statement from Baird noted after he visited Nairobi in 2013.59

Harper was steadfast in his mission to support Canada’s corporate mining behemoth. When leaders from Tanzania, South Africa and Benin visited Ottawa in 2013 he used the opportunity to promote mining interests.60 During a trip to Senegal in 2012 he met seven Canadian business representatives, five of whom worked for resource firms or trade associations.61 On a visit to Tanzania in 2007 Harper gave audience to more than 10 Canadian resource firms. The prime minister described the meeting as an opportunity to discuss “the general business climate [and] what the government of Canada can do to assist in building our investments here.”62

Harper personally promoted Canadian mining companies and simultaneously blocked legislation to regulate an industry notorious for abuses in jurisdictions with weak legal structures. In early 2007 a pan-Canadian roundtable launched by the previous Liberal government crossed the country interviewing a wide array of social actors about Canadian mining. Upon conclusion it offered 27 recommendations to better address the human rights and environmental effects of Canadian companies operating abroad. The core suggestion was for government to withhold financial and political support from companies found responsible for significant social or ecological abuses.

Even though the Mining Association of Canada helped formulate the 27 recommendations — and tepidly agreed to them — other powerful forces opposed the plan. Barrick Gold, which operates some of the most controversial mines in the world, the Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce lobbied the Conservatives to reject the roundtable’s recommendations. They found a sympathetic ear.

When it became clear the Conservatives would not act on the roundtable’s recommendations, Liberal MP John McKay introduced An Act Respecting Corporate Accountability for the Activities of Mining, Oil or Gas Corporations in Developing Countries (Bill C300). Under Bill C300 companies that failed to adhere to (relatively lenient) standards of social responsibility would lose the support of Canadian embassy officials and taxpayer-funded agencies such as Export Development Canada.

Controversial private members bills are rarely adopted, however, this one made it to its third reading before the House of Commons. Once the mining industry realized Bill C300 had a chance of becoming law they launched a ferocious lobbying campaign.63

On October 27, 2010, the House of Commons voted 140 to 134 against Bill C300. The voting ran along party lines with almost every Conservative MP voting against it and the opposition parties voting in favour. But 13 Liberal MPs, four from the NDP and six Bloc members failed to show up for the vote (one independent opposed the bill and another abstained).

The Conservative government blocked efforts to withhold diplomatic and financial support from companies found responsible for significant abuses abroad and they also opposed legislation that would allow those victimized by Canadian companies to seek redress in Canadian courts. Canadian law makes it extremely difficult to bring criminal or civil suits against Canadian companies responsible for major environmental and/or human rights violations abroad, which suited Harper just fine. The government refused to support legislation, modeled on the US Alien Torts Claims Act, to allow lawsuits against Canadian companies for major human rights violations, infringements of labour rights, or ecological destruction abroad.

In their most significant support to Canadian mining corporations in Africa, the Harper Conservatives negotiated Foreign Investment Protection Agreements (FIPAs) with 15 African countries. As an indication of how these bilateral investment treaties were driven by mining interests, the government signed or announced a number of African FIPAs at mining conventions. During the 2014 Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada conference in Toronto a Globe and Mail article headlined “Trade Pacts to Spur Mining Investment” reported: “Canada is signing an investment protection agreement with Cameroon and launching negotiations with Kenya as it pushes to secure better rights for Canadian mining companies in Africa.”64

FIPAs give corporations the right to sue governments — in private, investor-friendly tribunals — for pursuing policies that interfere with profits. Under the Canada-Benin FIPA, for instance, a mining company could sue if Benin required a portion of the company’s products to be purchased domestically. It notes: “A Contracting Party may not condition the receipt or continued receipt of an advantage, in connection with an investment in its territory of an investor of a Contracting Party or of a non-Party, on compliance with the following requirements: (a) to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content; (b) to purchase, use or accord a preference to a good produced in its territory, or to purchase a good from a producer in its territory.”65 (In August 2013 Tanzania passed legislation requiring large mining companies to eventually procure 80 percent of their goods and services locally. Yet the Canada-Tanzania FIPA, which came into force four months later, effectively prohibits local procurement rules.)

The ability to sue — or threaten a suit — dissuades a national government from siding with a community opposed to a mine. As the Council of Canadians points out, “Canadian mining companies are using FIPAs with developing countries to claim damages from community opposition to unwanted mega-projects.”66

At a broader level the aim of a FIPA is to counter “resource nationalism”. Having benefited from two decades of privatizations and loosened restrictions on foreign investment, mining companies fear a reversal of these policies. These concerns can be somewhat alleviated by gaining rights to sue a government if it expropriates a concession, changes investment rules or requires value added production take place in the country. Writing in Canadian Dimension Paula Butler notes: “Canada appears keen to negotiate FIPAs with some of the most economically and politically vulnerable but resource rich African countries before they develop a taste for resource sovereignty.”67

The deputy head of Africa forecasting at political risk firm Exclusive Analysis, Robert Besseling, told the Toronto Star in 2013 that resource nationalism was Canadian miners’ top concern. The paper described “a trend toward what some call resource nationalism that’s seen a number of African governments — after opening doors to foreign investors — begin to reverse or revise regulations. Under pressure from civil society groups and labour unions, governments are driving a harder bargain or changing the rules of the game part way through.”68

Any government that increases resource royalty rates or nationalizes extractive industries is a threat to Canadian mining interests. Yet, large numbers of Africans believe natural resources should be publicly held, or at minimum, heavily taxed. Some simply want minerals to remain underground. Ottawa’s “goal” in signing FIPAs with African countries, note Paula Butler and Evans Rubara, “is to prevent control of mining policy throughout the continent from falling into the hands of nationalist, pro-African, pro-community political forces who will promote a vigorous ‘resource nationalism’ agenda.”69

Or, to put it even more bluntly, Ottawa’s goal is to make sure mining policy stays in the hands of mining corporations.

10. Mining Conflict

The previous chapter established the central role that support for corporate mining interests plays in Canadian policy towards Africa. This chapter details Canadian companies and public officials’ actions in specific locations and the reaction of local people.

What effects have Canadian mining companies had on ordinary Africans? When a mining company moves into a new area do the people living next door perceive it as a good neighbour, or their worst nightmare?

Many Canadian projects are bitterly resisted by local African communities. This shouldn’t be a surprise since around the world mining projects disrupt, and sometimes destroy, ecosystems and communities’ ways of life.

One reason why Canadian mining companies extract resources in Africa is they are able to operate in ways that would not be allowed in Canada. In a 2008 interview the president of one of Canada’s top mining corporations in Africa openly said a lack of regulations enticed the company. After boasting that First Quantum set up a mine in the Congo in less than a year, Clive Newall said: “We wouldn’t want to be in the U.S., for example, because the permitting requirements are so severe. It takes 10 to 20 years to take a mine into production. We just don’t operate like that.”1

In other words First Quantum and other Canadian companies often act like the sort of neighbour who doesn’t care about the people living next door. Their only concern is making as much profit as fast as possible. They do not intend to stay long and simply see the neighbourhood as a place to exploit.

The information that follows may be exhausting, but it is not exhaustive. It is meant to illustrate the scale of Canadian mining activity and its effects. The reader can judge if this behaviour is what they would like Africans to think is “typically Canadian”.

Burkina Faso

Canadian mining companies dominate this impoverished country’s main export industry. The first foreign miners in the country, in 2015 Canadian companies held nearly $2 billion in assets in the landlocked West African country.

In 2010 IAMGOLD opened a major open pit gold mine in northern Burkina Faso, which gobbles up the arid region’s water. To make way for the Toronto company’s Essakane project the government forced 13 villages to relocate.2 The government and IAMGOLD promised to provide new land, houses and jobs to the over 10,000 people displaced, a pledge that was only partially fulfilled.3 Before IAMGOLD began its operations most people in the area were small-scale miners who descended underground to hammer gold from rock. Miners had been living off of Essakane for over a quarter century, but when IAMGOLD is finished extracting gold sometime around 2025 the area is likely to become a ghost town.

Ottawa provided support for IAMGOLD’s operations in 2011. As part of its Corporate Social Responsibility Strategy for the Canadian International Extractive Sector, Ottawa financed “a job skills training project in 13 communities to meet labour market demands in a variety of sectors, including the mining sector and its sub-sectors.”4 The initiative was run by the Toronto company and Plan Canada. Ottawa put $5.6 million into the project while IAMGOLD invested $1 million and Plan Canada spent $900,000.5 The project was the signature initiative in a controversial effort to strengthen the bonds between mining companies and non-governmental organizations. The goal of the CIDA-funded project, the head of training programs at Burkina Faso’s education ministry told the Globe and Mail in 2012, was to “respond to the needs of the mining company.”6 Adama Traore added: “A number of graduates are expected to go directly into jobs at the mining company.”7

The Plan Canada-IAMGOLD training took place in a charged political context. To scare its workers, in May 2011 IAMGOLD closed the Essakane mine.8 The company’s CEO, Steve Letwin, warned the miners: “I have zero tolerance for strikes that are illegal. And, as they [the workers] will find out, will not tolerate anything that has a negative impact on our stakeholders.”9 In March 2012 Bloomberg reported that 100 people protesting the terms of their contract and a lack of local employment at the Essakane mine were scattered by police.10

These protests partially explain why the company saw the CIDA-funded job training as helpful. The day Bloomberg reported protests at the mine, the Globe and Mail quoted Letwin describing youth unemployment in the community as a major obstacle for the company, arguing that “over the course of time, they’re [youth] going to want more of a take”, which could mean “increased taxes and royalties” for IAMGOLD.11

The second largest mining company in Burkina Faso, SEMAFO is an outgrowth of Benoit La Salle’s work for Plan Canada, a subsidiary of Plan International, “one of the world’s largest development organizations.” La Salle told an interviewer that SEMAFO “was created in 1995 during my first visit to Burkina Faso as part of a mission with the NGO-Plan. I am the president of the administration council of Plan Canada and a director of Plan International. So, after the Plan organized visit to Burkina Faso provided me an opportunity to get close with national authorities, I decided to create SEMAFO to participate in the development of Burkina Faso’s mining industry.”12 As Plan Canada’s designated Francophone spokesperson La Salle got to know President Blaise Compaoré in the mid-1990s. “The president turned to me,” La Salle told another reporter, “and said that I should come back to his country with Canadian expertise to help his country develop its mining sector.”13

La Salle procured mining expertise while Compaoré granted the Canadian a massive stretch of land to prospect. “The land package we have is way beyond what you’d see anywhere else in the world,” La Salle boasted.14

While the president of the country backed Canadian mining companies they backed the Compaoré government. IAMGOLD CEO Steve Letvin, who’d previously been made Officer of the National Order of Burkina Faso, thanked the prime minister for expanding the company’s concession during a March 2014 visit.15 At a September 2014 Gold Forum in Australia SEMAFO lauded the government as “democratic and stable”. 16

A strong backer of the mining industry, Compaoré was ousted by popular protest in October 2014 after he attempted to amend the constitution to extend term limits. In 1987 Compaoré seized power by killing Thomas Ankara, “Africa’s Che Guevara”, who oversaw important social and political gains during four years in office. Two years after Ankara’s death, Compaoré, who was part of a triumvirate, claimed his co-rulers were plotting to overthrow the government and had them executed.17 He then won a largely uncontested presidential election in 1991.

After ending Compaoré’s 27-year rule community groups and mine workers launched a wave of protests against foreign-owned mining companies. Vancouver’s True Gold Mining shuttered its Karma gold project for five months after local residents damaged its equipment.18 Protesters also forced Ottawa’s Orezone Gold to close and targeted IAMGOLD’s Essakane mine.19 In a Bloomberg article titled “Revolt Rocks Burkina Faso’s Mines After President Flees”, SEMAFO’s director of corporate affairs Laurent Michel Dabire said, “the insurrection has really been a catalyst for serious social movements in the mining sector. … They think ‘if we can chase somebody who’s been in power for 27 years, we can chase the managing director’.”20 Dabire told Bloomberg that Québec’s leading miner was looking to fund a new police unit that would focus on protecting mining interests in the country.21

In the aftermath of Compaoré’s ouster Canadian companies relied on military and foreign influence to protect their mining licenses. A December 2014 Business Monitor Online analysis titled “Mining Audit Poses Little Risk to Established Players”, concluded: “Foreign pressure will also be brought to bear. Burkina Faso is heavily dependent on foreign aid, much of it from Canada, the home jurisdiction of most of the miners that would be hurt by significant review. The political influence of the military — which will likely continue under any future government — will prevent the introduction of aggressively populist legislation.”22

Four days after Compaoré was ousted Ottawa suspended development monies to the government until a “legitimate and accountable civil authority has been re-established.”23 But, three weeks later Ottawa restarted aid to Burkina Faso, which had been added to Canada’s list of priority aid recipients earlier that year. ‘‘We are satisfied that a legitimate and accountable civil authority is leading Burkina Faso toward what we hope will be peaceful and democratic elections in 2015,” said International Development Minister Christian Paradis when he announced the resumption of aid.24 Yet, the interim regime was little more than “a masked military junta”, according to Christopher Abbott, a junior research fellow at the NATO Council of Canada.25

Ottawa was little concerned with the constitution or democracy, but rather focused on the authorities’ mining policy. When the military killed at least 10 people protesting Compaoré just before he was overthrown, Foreign Minister John Baird called on “all sides to exercise restraint and avoid resorting to further violence” even though the violence was largely meted out by the Compaoré regime.26

Only four months before the popular revolt, Trade Minister Ed Fast visited Burkina Faso to open an office of the Canadian Institute of Mining, Metallurgy and Petroleum.27 During his visit Fast also concluded negotiations on a Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement.

To protect Canadian mining companies from popular discontent Ottawa negotiated a FIPA with the Compaoré regime. Harper’s Conservatives then signed the deal with the unelected transition administration that took over after Compaoré was ousted. The West African nation was represented at the April 2015 FIPA signing ceremony in Ottawa by Prime Minister Yacouba Isaac Zida, who was deputy commander of the presidential guard when Compaoré was ousted by popular protest. A US and Canadian trained Lieutenant Colonel, Zida was one of five military men in the cabinet overseeing the landlocked country’s transition towards elections after Compaoré’s 27 year rule.28

While the caretaker government was supposed to move aside after an election planned for the fall of 2015, the investment treaty will live on for at least 16 years. According to the FIPA, “the termination of this Agreement will be effective one year after notice of termination has been received by the other Party.” The subsequent line, however, reads that “in respect of investments or commitments to invest made prior to the date when the termination of this Agreement becomes effective, Articles 1 to 42 inclusive, as well as paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article, shall remain in force for a period of 15 years.” In other words, any elected government will be effectively bound by the accord, which gives Canadian corporations the right to sue Burkina Faso internationally, for another decade and a half.

Congo

A dozen Canadian mining companies have more than $4 billion invested in the Congo. They extract gold, copper, cobalt, tin, tantalum, niobium, and tungsten among other resources. As discussed in Chapters 12 and 15, during the wars from the mid-1990s to early 2000s Canadian companies stripped state mining company Gécamines of valuable assets and stoked a multi-country conflict in eastern Congo.

Illustrating corporate Canada’s proximity to violence in the Congo, Anvil Mining transported government troops who killed 100 people near its Dikulushi mine in the port town of Kilwa, Katanga, in October 2004.29 Most of the victims were unarmed civilians. Many more were tortured and beaten. A UN inquiry into the Kilwa Massacre found that Congo’s 62nd Brigade was ordered to “shoot anything that moved”.30

After a half-dozen members of the little-known Mouvement Revolutionnaire pour la Liberation du Katanga occupied the Canada-Australian company’s Kilwa concession, Anvil provided the trucks used to transport Congolese soldiers to the area and to dump the corpses of their victims into mass graves.31 A Congolese military commander told UN investigators that the military operation in Kilwa was “made possible thanks to the logistical efforts provided by Anvil mining.”32 “They requested assistance from Anvil for transportation,” admitted Bill Turner, head of the TSX-listed company, after Anvil’s involvement came to light. “We provided that transportation so that they could get their soldiers down to Kilwa.”33

Immediately after the massacre, an Anvil press release celebrated the return of law and order to its mining territory without reporting the use of Anvil planes and trucks to support the military intervention or the deaths near Kilwa.34 “Anvil began remobilizing personnel back to the mine yesterday (Oct. 17) via the airstrip at Kilwa and anticipates that operations will resume by tomorrow (Oct. 19). The company is in consultation with the government of the DRC to provide additional security for the mine so that, should such incidents occur again, the company would be able to continue operations.”35

A Congolese military judge recommended the prosecution of Pierre Mercier, the Canadian general manager of Anvil’s Congolese subsidiary, along with two other Anvil employees and nine military personnel. But they were cleared of all charges in a trial condemned by the UN.

The Canadian Association Against Impunity, representing survivors and families of victims, launched a legal challenge against Anvil, whose main shareholders were Vancouver’s First Quantum and the Canadian Pension Plan.36 Though the company was managed from Montréal, the Québec Court of Appeal refused to hear the case. The Supreme Court of Canada followed suit, arguing that the survivors had to pursue remedies in either the Congo or Australia.37

Canadian companies operated with virtual impunity in the Congo. Following the Kilwa Massacre, the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, with Canada as one of the administrators, awarded Anvil part of a $13.6 million US project in the country.38

In addition to its international backing, Anvil had powerful local allies. President Joseph Kabila’s assistant, Katumba Mwanke, sat on Anvil’s board. Mwanke received thousands of dollars in director’s fees. The company also paid him $50,000 a year to rent a compound he owned in Lubumbashi, Katanga’s capital.39

As part of the deal signed to acquire the Kilwa concession, Anvil was granted a two-decade-long tax holiday for its operations.40 A 2005 Congo parliamentary panel recommended the accord be renegotiated.41 A series of reports from the World Bank, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and Congolese Parliament have detailed the dismal return the people of Congo have received on their vast mineral wealth. Congo’s mining industry generated $41 billion between 2007 and 2012. Less than 3% of this sum flowed into the country’s budget.42

Côte d’Ivoire

A handful of Canadian miners operate in the country. In 2012 three villages near La Mancha Resources’ gold mine protested the TSX-listed company’s compensation for 300 hectares of plantations and forests it chopped down. The locals also wanted employment commitments from the company.43

In 2014 Côte d’Ivoire won an award for best improved mining code from Mines and Money, “Europe’s leading mining investment and capital raising conference and exhibition.”44 Sama Resources helped the government develop the new mining law.45 The Vancouver company’s well-connected director Benoit La Salle (formerly of SEMAFO and Plan Canada) met Côte d’Ivoire’s President Alassane Ouattara in 2013.46 Additionally, the International Finance Corporation, the World Bank’s private sector lending arm, invested in Sama, purchasing its first stake in the country’s minerals.

In late 2014 Ottawa signed a FIPA with Côte d’Ivoire. Earlier that year the Canadian ambassador inaugurated Vancouver-based Endeavor Mining’s project in the south of the country.47

Eritrea

This small coastal nation, which gained its independence from Ethiopia in 1993, has been a source of interest for several Canadian extraction companies. In 2011 Vancouver-based Nevsun Resources opened the first industrial mine in Eritrea. But Human Rights Watch and a UN Commission of Inquiry accused the company of failing to ensure that Nevsun’s state-owned partner didn’t conscript those who built its Bisha mine.48 Three Eritrean refugees in Canada sued Nevsun, alleging that they were forced to stay on the mine site and work under threat of torture. The three individuals said that the living and work conditions were miserable and they received a total of $30 US a month in compensation.

Canadian Business acquired 700 pages of government documents on Nevsun’s Eritrea operations through access to information legislation. Reporter Matthew McClearn wrote: “One internal DFAIT briefing about Nevsun noted that while the allegations [of forced labour] could not be substantiated … The low level of respect for human rights in Eritrea means that the allegations should not be dismissed lightly.” The files show that DFAIT officials kept in close email contact with the company and that dozens of federal government officials spent time coordinating Foreign Affairs’ response to the accusations. This caused the reporter to ask: “How is it, then, that when allegations arose that a Canadian mine may have been built with forced labour, the government’s response was largely confined to drawing up ‘media lines’ and ‘talking points?’”49

Ghana

Canadian companies dominate formal mining in the Gold Coast. With some $3 billion invested, about 20 Canadian mining companies operated in Ghana when this book went to print.50

Under World Bank and IMF pressure, the West African nation began to liberalize its mining policy and privatize state-owned mines in the mid-1980s. Years later the country was prodded to open its forest reserves to surface mining and a handful of Canadian companies led the way into Ghana’s ecologically sensitive forests.51 “Canadian mining companies are in the forefront of the destruction of some of Ghana’s rich forest reserves,” explained Abdulai Darimani in the 2005 report “Impacts of Activities of Canadian Mining Companies in Africa”.52

Canadian companies have been accused of various abuses in Ghana. In March 2004 Bonte Gold Mines closed without paying its 400 workers or the farmers affected by its operations in southern Ghana. The Toronto-based company also left an $18 million debt to state institutions and private companies and failed to reclaim the land it destroyed.53 An editorial in the country’s biggest private newspaper, the Ghanaian Chronicle, noted that “while the workers, farmers and the community at large lament over their future livelihood, the management of the company have long left for Canada.”54

In another part of the country Golden Star’s mine leaked toxins into the communities in which it operated. Ghana’s Centre for Environmental Impact Analysis concluded that arsenic, mercury and lead levels were above World Health Organization guidelines near the Toronto-based company’s mine in Prestea and Bogoso.55 Many of the two towns’ inhabitants were angry with Golden Star for polluting their community and refusing to compensate those affected by its operations. The company was accused of failing to fulfill commitments to relocate and house people that were a precondition for acquiring its concessions.56

In June 2005 the military opened fire on a 5,000-person demonstration in Prestea and seven mine opponents were hit by bullets.57 Backing a hardline approach to the local community, a Golden Star official called for greater repression to change the “mindset” of small-scale unlicensed miners, who are disparagingly referred to as “Galamsey”. “The main issue is … the mindset of those people — the Galamsey people — whatever the government has to do to change their mindsets ... unless that is really done, and like I said, there should be some radical way of doing it … Prestea people think they are unique, they are in a different state, and they can make their own constitution.”58

In northern Ghana Cardero Resource was accused of acquiring the Sheini Hills iron ore concession illicitly. Another company, Inland Mining Ghana, accused the Vancouver firm of having “pirated” its work to gain its license in 2012, prompting an investigation by the RCMP’s anti-corruption unit.59

At the behest of Cardero police arrested and detained a journalist in 2012. Ghanabusinessnews.com reporter Pascal Kudiabor set up an interview through the company’s public relations department and showed up to meet the managing director. While Kudiabor waited at Cardero’s office in Accra, the police were called. A policeman said Cardero complained that Kudiabor was “prying into their privacy”.60

While setting up its gold mine, the Vancouver company took over vast tracts of farmland in northern Ghana without adequately compensating the local owners. The company leaked chemicals into the community’s main drinking water stream and its noise scared away the area’s antelopes, grass cutters, monkeys and wild birds. Cardero’s vehicles also killed hundreds of domestic animals, including fowls, goats, dogs, sheep and cattle.61 Angry at the company’s disregard for the Sheini community and refusal to dialogue with the area’s chief, Obore Chamaya Poadi, local youth threatened to take up arms against Cardero in 2014.62

Guinea

A handful of Canadian mining companies operate in the small West African nation. Those living near SEMAFO’s Kiniero mine, reported Guinée News in 2014, felt “the Canadian company brought more misfortune than benefits.”63

In 2008 the military killed three in a bid to drive away small-scale miners from the mine in the southeast of the country. BBC Monitoring Africa reported that “the soldiers shot a woman at close range, burned a baby and in the panic another woman and her baby fell into a gold mining pit and a man fell fatally from his motor while running away from the rangers.” 64 Blaming the Montréal-based company for the killings, locals damaged its equipment.65

In September 2011 protests flared again over the company’s failure to hire local young people and the dissolution of a committee that spent community development monies. Demonstrators attacked SEMAFO’s facilities, causing hundreds of thousands of dollars in damage.66 Some also targeted a bus carrying company employees, prompting the authorities to evacuate all expatriate staff to Bamako in neighbouring Mali.67

In 2014 the Guinean government’s Comité Technique de Revue des Titres et Conventions Miniers concluded that the Montréal firm evaded $9.6 million in tax.68 The Comité Technique also found that the company failed “to produce detailed feasibility studies” and was not “in compliance with new measures in the 2011 mining code.”69 The Comité Technique recommended that SEMAFO be fined and stripped of its mining rights in the country.

Ottawa backed the mining sector by signing a Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement with Guinea in the spring of 2015.

Kenya

Tiomin Resources’ bid to extract titanium on the Kenyan coast sparked a major conflict at the start of the century, when the Toronto-based firm signed the country’s largest-ever mining deal.70 The company’s concession occupied an area of significant biodiversity, home to Kenya’s last remaining herds of Sable antelope as well as the only bands of Colobus monkeys on the East African coast.71 In addition to endangering wildlife, the mine and accompanying development also threatened Digo and Kamba farmers’ means of subsistence, notably coconut, cashew nut and mango groves.72 Environmental groups, farmers and even the Mombasa branch of the National Chamber of Commerce and Industry described Tiomin’s project as an environmental hazard.73

While the debate was still raging about the viability of the project, the Canadian International Development Agency gave Tiomin $391,000 for an environmental impact study on the planned mine.74 Tiomin set the terms of this study. They hired a South African consulting company to administer the assessment and submitted it to the National Environmental Management Authority.75 Researchers at Kenyatta University in Nairobi, as well as several Kenyan environmental groups, rejected the company-backed study. They criticized the assessment for underestimating the mine’s environmental impacts, notably the quantity of sulphur dioxide emissions and exposure to radioactive elements in the earth. The UN Environment Program also voiced criticism of the project.76

But Ottawa continued to throw its diplomatic weight behind the company. Canadian High Commissioner to Kenya Jim Wall called for the project’s approval and suggested that failing to proceed would send a negative message to international investors. The East African Standard reported that “the Government of Canada yesterday cautioned that delays in entering into contracts with international investors was likely to scare away potential investors to the country.”77 The paper continued, “speaking after paying a courtesy call on Environment Minister Dr Newton Kulundu, the [Canadian] envoy regretted that the Government had called Tiomin Inc, to re-negotiate an already sealed deal. He urged Dr Kulundu to meet his Cabinet colleagues and discuss what the Tiomin deal would mean to the reputation of Kenya internationally.”78

In 2014 High Commissioner David Angell announced that Canada was working with the County of Siaya’s mineral sector, which had already drawn several Canadian prospectors.79 While announcing negotiations for a Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, Angell said: “there is a lot of interest by Canadian investors in Kenya’s fast growing oil and mineral sector.”80

In fact, two Canadian oil companies clashed with the Kenyan government. In 2014, Toronto-based Africa Oil criticized the reintroduction of a capital gains tax on oil companies and announced it would push the Kenya Oil and Gas Association to lobby against the move. Concurrently, Vanoil sued Kenya for $150 million at the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes after the government refused to extend a seven-year-old exploration license.81 Arguing that Vanoil failed to carry out exploratory work or fulfill investment obligations, the Kenyan government refused to extend the Vancouver company’s exploration license. To prepare for an extended legal battle Vanoil all but transformed itself into a law firm. The company replaced its president with an individual experienced in investment disputes and slashed its operation costs by 75 per cent. Vanoil stated: “The board of directors has instructed management to conduct an immediate review of all company operations. The priority goal is to eliminate non-essential costs, dispose of non-productive assets and secure sufficient funding to enable Vanoil to aggressively pursue its legal arbitration against the Republic of Kenya.”82

Madagascar

Sherritt operates one of the world’s largest nickel and cobalt mines on the island nation 300 km off the coast from Mozambique. The Toronto-based company owns 40% of the $5.5 billion Ambatovy project in partnership with Japan’s Sumitomo, Korea Resources and SNC-Lavalin. Export Development Canada put up $400 million in risk insurance for the gigantic open pit mine.83

The Ambatovy project tore up 1,300 acres of biologically rich rain forest that was home to a thousand species of flowering plants, fourteen species of lemurs and a hundred types of frogs. The CEO of Sherritt acknowledged the sensitivity of the site. Ian Delaney told The Walrus that the Ambatovy mine “is smack in the middle of one of the most endangered rainforests in the world. There’s nothing I can do about that; it’s where nature put the nickel.”84 But Delaney, of course, justified any harm done to the area as contributing to Madagascar’s “development”. “There are 20 million people there, living on the edge. So what do you do? Develop or not develop?”85

But even among those who would be considered the primary Malagasy beneficiaries of Ambatovy there was discontent. Local employees complained that management mistreated them and failed to respect the country’s labour code. A 2013 hydrogen sulphide gas leak killed one and made two other employees seriously ill, while during the first five months of 2015 two more workers died in separate incidents.86 In response to mistreatment and safety concerns, workers downed their tools on two different occasions during the spring of 2015.87

Toxins from the mine also harm the health of those living nearby. Locals said a handful of sulphur dioxide leaks in 2012 left four dead and 50 others ill.88

The Canadian-led conglomerate was accused of making loads of money, but providing little to the treasury. In 2013 President Andry Rajoelina said: “Ambatovy pays only 1% royalty to the state. Now, Madagascar is the second largest exporter of nickel and cobalt in the world. In other countries such as Canada, Russia, South Africa, this fee is more than 10%. We can no longer accept being exploited in this way.”89

Rajoelina’s reservations towards a deal Sherritt signed with his predecessor shaped Canadian policy towards Madagascar. In 2013 Globe and Mail Africa correspondent Geoffrey York reported: “Diplomats from other countries have been fighting hard to restore democracy to the politically turbulent country, which was rocked by a coup in 2009. But for Canada, the battle for democracy has taken a back seat to the business interests of the Toronto-based mining company. In visits to Madagascar since the coup, Canada’s diplomats have spent much of their time lobbying the government to ensure that Sherritt secures an operating license for its mine. The post-coup government had hinted that it could reconsider its approval for the project, and the company wanted Ottawa’s help, which it got.”90

Sherritt had strong ties to Canadian diplomacy. Canada’s honorary consul in Madagascar, Yves Froumanoit, managed the Ambatovy mine during its initial stages.91

Mauritania

Canadian mining companies have been the lead foreign operators in the sparsely populated West African nation. In 2010 Kinross Gold acquired the Tasiast mine from Vancouver’s Red Back Mining for the princely sum of $7.1 billion.

That same year two Tasiast employees were arrested after dumping toxic waste in an inhabited area near a mine set to become the largest gold project in Africa and possibly the world.92 There was no independent environmental assessment of the mine and the Toronto-based company also failed to certify Tasiast under the International Cyanide Management Code, a voluntary code that allows companies to demonstrate their commitment to properly manage the poisonous substance.93

In a move destined to offend its Mauritanian staff, Kinross housed its ex-pat managers outside the country, in the Canary Islands.94 The local workforce was also angered by the company’s refusal to transfer seriously ill employees to the capital Nouakchott. In 2013 the mineworkers withdrew their labour in a bid to force Kinross to respect previous commitments to improve their pay and conditions.95

At the end of 2013 Kinross laid off 300 workers. The union claimed it was done in violation of the country’s labour law and that one of those dismissed was still receiving medical treatment for a workplace injury.96 Demanding government action, the laid-off workers protested outside the presidential palace in Nouakchott. After a multi-day sit-in the police raided their makeshift camp, arresting a dozen and injuring a similar number.97

As with many other Canadian mining companies in Africa, Kinross paid the country little and was accused of evading taxes.98 After President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz criticized the company’s meagre payments to the treasury, Kinross reportedly hired a couple of his cousins to important positions.99 An Africa Mining Intelligence article detailed the close familial and political ties between Kinross and Aziz, who came to power by overthrowing the country’s first elected president in 2008.100 (The brigadier general won an election the next year that most political parties boycotted.)

The company also received international backing. In 2011 US Ambassador Jo Ellen Powell visited the Tasiast gold mine and met the Americans working on site.101

First Quantum operated an open pit copper and gold mine near the Tasiast mine. Like Kinross, the Vancouver-based mining company was accused of mistreating its workers, including an incident where managers told a worker, Mohamed Ould Khatari, to take some painkillers after he was exposed to a powdered chemical and developed painful skin lesions.102 At the end of 2011 the workers at Guelb Moghrein went on strike, demanding the removal of three foreign managers and the reinstatement of a half-dozen colleagues. They also called on the company to “respect the labour legislation of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and the human values of its people.”103

During a follow-up strike in July 2012 the national guard raided a peaceful protest, killing Mohamed Ould Machdhoufi and wounding several others.104 A First Quantum release afterwards called the strike illegal, but failed to mention the death or injuries.105 In a subsequent protest, a regional director for the Confédération Nationale des Travailleurs de Mauritanie, Ethmane Ould Kreivit, was attacked and jailed for several days along with 30 others.106 On his release, the labour leader was dismissed from his job along with a number of others who were reportedly put on a company blacklist.107

The Aziz government employed state power to protect First Quantum from their workforce as well as from international media scrutiny. Al Jazeera, Radio France International and Reuters were all reported to have been denied permission to visit either Guelb Moghrein or the Kinross Tasiast mine.108

Residents near First Quantum’s mine accused the company of polluting their community. Those living close to the open pit mine were found to have elevated incidence of miscarriages, infant deaths and other illnesses.109 Additionally, a large number of their camels died from unknown diseases.110 Decrying First Quantum’s environmental and labour abuses, the local community launched a complaint with the CSR Counsellor set up by the Canadian government in 2009. Under pressure to restrict government support to companies found responsible for abuses abroad, the Harper Conservatives’ instead established an Extractive Sector Corporate Social Responsibility Counsellor to probe complaints of abuses committed by Canadian companies abroad. Touted as a way to provide remedy for those harmed by Canadian extractive operations, the Counsellor could not intervene — let alone take any remedial action — without agreement from the company accused of abuse.

In 2012 CSR Counsellor Marketa Evans dismissed the Guelb Moghrein complaint, claiming First Quantum had “site level community relations representatives currently engaging with the community” and that the company was “implementing a stakeholder engagement plan which includes newsletters and meetings and other outreach activities.”111 Evans called on the Mauritanian complainants to follow First Quantum’s local grievance mechanism.112

Mining Watch criticized the CSR Counsellor’s decision. It “found that no effective local mechanisms existed” for Mauritanians to hold First Quantum accountable. The mining watchdog group added: “fruitless participation in the CSR Counsellor’s process further harms the weakest parties … Not only do they waste their time and limited resources but expose themselves to further harm at home for sticking their necks out.”113

After failing to mediate any of the six cases brought before her, Evans quietly resigned her post as CSR Counsellor in 2013.114 A new CSR Counsellor was appointed in March 2015 but he had yet to announce any decisions when this book went to print.

Niger

A handful of Canadian mining companies have operated in the landlocked West African nation. In 2000 Montréal-based SEMAFO opened the first industrial scale gold mine in Niger. A 2007 Montréal Gazette business article headlined “Local Miner a Major Force in Niger: It’s not every day we receive a press release from a gold mining company that includes a warm personal message from the prime minister”, reported on the close ties between SEMAFO and Hama Amadou, then prime minister of Niger. “We work very closely with him,” said Benoit La Salle, SEMAFO chief executive and chairman. “We’re part of his budget every year.”115

La Salle described how the prime minister helped his company break a strike at the Samira Hill mine in the west of the country. “He gave us all the right direction to solve this legally,” La Salle said. ‘We went to court, we had the strike declared illegal and that allowed us to let go of some of the employees and rehire some of them based upon a new work contract. It allowed us to let go of some undesirable employees because they had been on strike a few times.”116

The bitter strike led to a parliamentary inquiry regarding environmental damage caused by the mine, lack of benefits for local communities and treatment of miners. Opposition politicians accused SEMAFO of paying “slave wages”.117 “The wages are very low,” explained Mohammed Bazoum, deputy chairman of Niger’s main opposition party in 2009. “The population is not benefiting at all from this gold.”118

SEMAFO was accused of failing to pay both taxes and dividends to the government. Despite owning a 20% share in the Samira Hill mine, the government received no direct payments from the Montréal-based majority owner between 2004 and 2010.119 In a report headlined “Scandal of Mineral Wealth: Niger cries with famine while Semafo celebrates its ‘millionth’ ounce of gold”, Ouestafnews contrasted the widespread impoverishment in that country with the millions of dollars Québec’s leading mining company made from its operations in West Africa. By 2010 SEMAFO had extracted 350,000 ounces of gold from Niger (and similar amounts from Burkina Faso and Guinea) worth about $350 million yet many in the country went hungry.120

In 2008 long time Canadian diplomat Robert Fowler, who was then the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy to Niger, and his aide, Foreign Affairs official Louis Guay, were abducted. They were kidnapped after visiting the Samira Hill mine. “Louis [Guay] called me and said he was going down there on a UN mission and that he heard the mine was a Canadian success and he wanted to report this back to Canada,” La Salle told the National Post.121

Why was a UN envoy, sent to a country to deal with a conflict largely over natural resources, visiting a Canadian-operated mine? Was the visit a message to Niger’s government? The rebels? The UN? Was Fowler in covert discussions with the mining company regarding the ongoing conflict between the Tuareg and the region’s mining companies?

In A Season in Hell: My 130 Days in the Sahara with Al Qaeda Fowler ignores these questions. He says the visit was simply an attempt to investigate a “Canadian success”, which still begs the question of whether it is common, or acceptable, for Canadian UN representatives to bestow diplomatic backing to corporate Canada?

Nigeria

Ottawa has sought to develop the nascent mineral sector in Africa’s most populous state. In 2013 Canada put $950,000 into a World Bank led initiative to identify mineral resource corridors, update Nigeria’s tax regime and design a strategy for the country’s small-scale miners.122

Canadian diplomats promoted a variety of other mining initiatives in the West African nation. In 2012 the Abuja Leadership reported: “The High Commissioner expressed his willingness to link the state with Mine Africa or any other interested Canadian mining interest for the development of solid Minerals and made reference to the existence of Mining Institutes in Canada that could help in capacity building.”123

In introducing Canadian companies to local officials Ottawa sought to shape Nigeria’s mining legislation. In 2011 ThisDay reported that “the regulatory frameworks, which were being operated in the nation’s mining industry were Canadian-based, adding that draft copies of the mining regulations were circulated to prospective mining investors at the last Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada, (PDAC) Forum in Canada. This is to enable them to get additional inputs in order to have regulatory frameworks that conform to international best practices.”124 The high commissioner in Abuja helped bring Nigerian officials to the annual PDAC conference in Toronto.125

Canadian officials helped the country develop its large bitumen belt. ThisDay reported in 2011 that the chairman of Nigeria’s Committee on Bitumen was “to liaise with the Canadian Embassy on the way forward for the exploration of the bitumen resources.”126

To protect Canadian companies operating in the country’s traditional oil sector and to prepare for an expansion in mining investment, Ottawa signed a FIPA with Nigeria in 2014.

Senegal

In 2015 Canadian mining assets in Senegal were worth more than half a billion dollars, with Teranga Gold operating the only industrial scale gold mine in the country.127 Taking its name from the Wolof word for “hospitality”, Teranga markets itself well. A search online generated a series of short videos and CSR reports detailing the Toronto company’s purported good deeds and local support. But reality is more complicated.

In 2010 a hundred soldiers were deployed to Teranga’s mine site to drive off long-standing artisanal miners whose digging helped the company determine where to prospect. One small-scale miner told Allo Dakar that “we prefer to die here rather than give the land to the company.”128 Despite the security presence, many continued to dig with the police periodically tear-gassing and arresting the artisanal miners.129

According to Amnesty International’s “Mining and Human Rights in Senegal: Closing the Gaps in Protection”, a half-dozen families were displaced to make way for a Teranga waste disposal pond. They were given new homes a few kilometres away but felt their situation had significantly deteriorated.130 Amnesty documented another small community unhappy with Teranga and worried they would also be displaced as the mine expanded.

The mayor of a larger town, Sabadola, claimed the company misled the community. “At first we thought that we’d benefit from many things: electricity, housing and infrastructure,” said Mamadou Cissokho. “But we received none of that.”131 Instead, Cissokho decried the pulmonary infections caused by dust from the mine and the company’s encroachment on their land. “Even our fields, they took them. We do not know where to go. Certainly, they do this to suffocate us and to clear us off.”132

In 2014 the director of Teranga’s Senegalese subsidiary, Macoumba Diop, was fired. His supporters told the press that Diop was let go because he protected Senegalese workers, largely confined to subordinate positions, from mistreatment by the foreign managers who were described as “colonialist”.133 After his dismissal Diop sued Teranga, but the case had yet to be heard when this book went to press.

The controversy surrounding Teranga failed to deter Canadian officials from backing the company. In early 2014 Canadian Ambassador Philippe Beaulne visited its mine with Senegalese president Macky Sall and Beaulne spoke during the public release of Teranga’s 2013 CSR policy.134 In 2012 Prime Minister Stephen Harper met Teranga CEO Alan R. Hill and some other Canadian mining officials in Dakar. During the part of the meeting open to reporters the prime minister suggested, reported Canada.com, that Canadian companies’ “ethical practices gave them an edge over the competition.”135 Harper also told the press that Senegal “really has the opportunity to become the hub for Canadian investment in this entire region of Africa.”136 To prepare for an expansion in Canadian mining, Ottawa signed a FIPA with Senegal in late 2014.

Sierra Leone

In the late 1990s diamonds fuelled a vicious civil war that left 50,000 dead and many more injured.137 During the conflict Canadian mining companies employed private military to grab the coastal state’s gems.

Rex Diamond Mining had links to both the Sierra Leone government and Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels. The Toronto company delivered $3.8 million US worth of military equipment to the government in 1998.138

Acting more like a military organization than a mining company, Amcan Minerals purchased a South African security firm and appointed a former Canadian soldier to lead its Sierra Leone operations. The Toronto company purchased ArmSec International while the individual responsible for its diamond properties in Sierra Leone was a 35-year veteran of the Canadian Armed Forces.139 Edwin D. Sanford, Amcan reported, “specialized in security at every level including the most top secret areas as an advisor to both the Canadian Armed Forces and the Government of Canada.”140

To help the government regain control of the country’s biggest mine DiamondWorks made a deal with notorious mercenary outfit Executive Outcomes, which was run by former members of apartheid South Africa’s top counterinsurgency units. One commentator described Executive Outcomes as an “advance guard for major business interests engaged in a latter-day scramble for the mineral wealth of Africa.”141 In 1996 infamous Vancouver miner Robert Friedland launched DiamondWorks, which became Canada’s biggest diamond miner. Two of the Vancouver-based company’s directors, Tony Buckingham, a former officer in Britain’s Special Air Service (SAS), and Michael Grunberg, were senior managers of the Executive Outcomes group of companies. In 1997 the Globe and Mail reported that “Canadian mining company DiamondWorks Ltd. has publicly acknowledged for the first time that its largest shareholder acts as an intermediary for a group of South African mercenaries that sell their services to troubled governments in Africa.”142 Two hundred Executive Outcomes troops helped take control of the valuable Koidu mines from the RUF rebels for DiamondWorks’ benefit. The mercenaries used helicopter gunships and airburst explosives, which destroy all life within a 1.6-kilometre radius.143

Canadian resource firms employed security forces across the continent. In fact, the large number of mining companies based in Toronto and Vancouver attracted Africa-focused security companies. A 1998 Vancouver Sun article headlined “Gunning for Business: Private armies, coups, bribery” reported on military contractors meeting the city’s mining financiers. Ian Mulgrew wrote, “a key organizer for Executive Outcomes was in Vancouver pitching another military operation to subdue rebel activity in Sierra Leone and so facilitate bauxite mining.”144

Mulgrew also interviewed Alan Bell, a 12-year veteran of the British Special Forces, who crossed the pond to establish Globe Risk Holdings in Toronto. Mulgrew reported that “Bell provides advice as well as military training for companies investing in the nations plagued by political instability but blessed with a treasure trove of natural resources.”145 As discussed in Chapter 14 Globe Risk Holdings supplied security support to businesses in more than a half-dozen African states. After a decade and a half overseeing a private military corporation, military planners viewed Bell as an expert on the question of security forces’ relations to natural resources. In 2013 Bell “shared his experiences working in the PMC industry” at a Canadian Special Operations Forces Command and US Joint Special Operations University symposium on “The Role of the Global SOF [Special Operations Forces] Network in a Resource Constrained Environment”.146

South Africa

As this book went to print about 15 Canadian mining companies extracted various resources in South Africa. In the years after apartheid ended they also upheld white supremacy in the racially fraught country. 

To redress the inequities left by the apartheid system the African National Congress promoted black economic empowerment policies in the country’s vast mining industry. At the end of the 1990s the ANC-led government proposed a “mining charter” that included a 40% quota for blacks in management, skills training for black employees and the privileging of “historically disadvantaged” suppliers of mining services and equipment.147 (The mining charter also included a 10% quota for women in management.) It gave companies seeking government exploration licenses five years to ensure that “historically disadvantaged South Africans” owned 15% of the equity or shares.148 After a decade that number would rise to 26%.149

Canadian companies and officials worked against this effort to rebalance relations that saw 85% of South Africa’s population legally excluded from economic opportunities. Or, in the words of Paula Butler, to transform South Africa from a “racist state to an anti-racist state.”150

In March 2001 the Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada (PDAC) produced a 25-page critique of the draft bill and followed that up by criticizing a second draft of the bill. In a bout of hyperbole, the PDAC claimed that Canadian companies would be “effectively barred by the proposed restrictions.”151 The PDAC commentary stated: “There is nothing in the Draft Bill that prevents the Minister from prohibiting all transfers except to historically disadvantaged persons, who might offer just a fraction of the value of the rights. Indeed, nothing prohibits the Minister from prohibiting all transfers in order to force the prospecting right to lapse so the Minister could subsequently grant the right to historically disadvantaged persons.”152

The Canadian High Commission delivered the PDAC submissions to the South African government and Canadian officials participated in an “international reference group” set up by the ANC to comment on the proposed legislation.153 South Africa’s Mining Weekly reported that “Canadian enterprises were probably the foreign mining companies most consulted by the South African government ...The South African government received a lot of input from the whole spectrum of the Canadian mining industry, from prospecting companies through mining houses all the way to analysts at the Toronto Stock Exchange.”154

Canadian companies threatened to sue South Africa. Placer Dome and SouthernEra, as well as a UK and Australian company, said they would take legal action if the new legislation infringed on their mineral rights. SouthernEra CEO Patrick Evans said: “The South African government could be faced with billions of dollars of potential liabilities. But we had to act. We cannot be seen to be contracting our shareholders out of our rights.”155

In response to pressure from international firms and white-owned local mines, the South African government softened its black economic empowerment policies in mining.156

In the final days of apartheid mining company executive Robert Friedland quietly began laying the groundwork for a massive platinum mine in the northeast of the country. At the start of 2015 the Globe and Mail’s Geoffrey York reported on Ivanhoe’s use of “court injunctions, ultimatums to government, and digging up dirt on opponents” during a two-decade long effort to establish its Platreef mine.157

The newspaper detailed how Friedland’s company coerced a villager into surrendering her farm and spent years wooing the chief of the Mokopane traditional council, which holds most of the area’s land in trust on behalf of the community. The company began making donations to the council in 2001 and in 2010 Ivanhoe signed an agreement with Chief Kekana for “all reasonable access” to test drill on the community’s land for a “monthly stipend” of 30,000 rand (about $4,000 US). The deal also included a laptop, use of a farm, an annual “gratuity” and a lump-sum payment to a “trust” of the chief’s choice as well as 3,000 rand monthly payments to the chief’s adviser and five village headmen. Ivanhoe also paid 10,000 to 30,000 rand a month, as well as computers and cell phones, to the “community mining committee” in a number of villages near its mine.158

At the national level Ivanhoe forged close ties to the former secretary general of the African National Congress, the ruling party. Cyril Ramaphosa resigned from the Ivanhoe board of directors to become South Africa’s deputy president in 2014, but for a decade he sat on the ANC’s national executive and Ivanhoe’s board. Ramaphosa owned about 1.2 million Ivanhoe common shares.159

The Vancouver company’s high-level political connections helped it secure permission for Platreef. It may also have protected local partners, reported the Daily Maverick. The South African news agency suggested that Ivanhoe’s support for the local Mogalakwena government led the provincial and national governments to turn a blind eye to their “serious corruption and mismanagement”.160

Many of those living nearby opposed the Platreef mine. A number of protests in 2011 and 2012 blocked or damaged Platreef drilling rigs and when the Department of Mineral Resources gave the company final approval in November 2014, protesters blocked a highway near the project with rocks and tires. The police fired rubber bullets at the demonstrators and arrested three protesters.161

Community members were angry at losing their ability to visit their ancestors’ gravesites, the mine’s preferential access to water and the company’s influence over local politics. A 72-year-old farmer told the Globe and Mail he spends an extra $100 a month on food due to the mine. “Platreef put their machines in our yards,” Daniel Nong said. “There were so many machines. They’ve killed our crops. We can’t grow anything now.”162

Tanzania

Canadian mining companies dominated the East African country’s resource sector with some $2 billion in assets in 2015. As the top gold producer in Tanzania, Barrick Gold (now Acacia Mining) led the way with four mines. At the start of the 21st century Barrick’s North Mara mine displaced thousands of artisanal miners and farmers. Then the company polluted the area with arsenic, according to a Norwegian University of Life Sciences report, which can cause a variety of cancers, skin problems and birth defects.163

In May 2009 a tailing dam at the mine spilled sulphuric acid into the Tigithe River, leaving the area’s water source toxic for human and animal consumption. The spill killed over 40 people and 1,000 livestock.164 “We have no problem with investors,” local villager Esther Mugusuhi told Tanzania’s ThisDay newspaper after the spill. “But the investors must respect and treat us like human beings. These Canadians are killing us.”165

The death wasn’t always accidental. Between 2005 and 2015 Barrick-paid security operatives killed dozens of villagers at, or in close proximity, to its North Mara mine.166 Hundreds more were severely injured by the security and police Barrick paid to patrol the perimeter of its mine and regularly called on site. Most of the victims were impoverished villagers who scratch rocks for tiny bits of gold.

With the help of London law firm Leigh Day, nine local villagers pursued African Barrick in the High Court of England for deaths and injuries they claim were a result of an excessive use of force by mine security and police. At the beginning of 2015 Acacia settled the case out of court without disclosing the terms of the agreement.167

The Barrick security forces also raped many women. After an international campaign Barrick agreed to compensate 14 women who were sexually assaulted by police and security guards at the mine. But the company forced the women to waive their right to bring forward “any other claim” or “assist other complainants” in potential suits against Barrick. Some saw this as a way to restrict the rape victims from acting as witnesses in civil litigation or criminal proceedings.168

Barrick operates another mine in Tanzania with an equally appalling human rights record. Between 2006 and 2014 at least five employees died on the job in three separate incidents at its Bulyanhulu mine near Lake Victoria in the north of the country.169

After a multi-year courtship process, in 1999 Barrick bought the Bulyanhulu mine from Vancouver-based Sutton Resources. The mine displaced tens of thousands — estimates range wildly from 20,000 to 400,000 — of small-scale miners.170 When the army carried out the evictions 52 miners were allegedly buried alive in the mine holes.171 An attorney with the Dar es Salaam-based Lawyers’ Environmental Action Team, Tundu Lissu, described the lead-up to the evictions: “In late July 1996, the government ordered the artisanal miners to vacate the area. The following day, paramilitary security forces of the government moved against the miners’ communities and commenced forcible evictions. A High Court ordered the government and the company to stop the removals, but even this did not save the artisanals from eviction and the destruction of their settlements.”172

Denied by the mining sector and Tanzania’s government, the deaths were reported by Amnesty International (annual reports from 1997 to 1999).173 A mission to Tanzania in 2001 by the Council of Canadians, Mining Watch Canada and Amnesty International found: “The intensity and seriousness in the telling of the stories of the alleged evictions, violence and brutality of the police and mining officials, the level of detail, as well as the willingness of the Bulyanhulu residents to take significant risks to their own personal safety to come and speak with us, impressed the members of the mission, as did the willingness of apparently 250 others who waited several hours for us to arrive in Bulyanhulu. The members thought that these factors lent weight to the credibility of the allegations.”174 Mission members called for an independent international investigation into the allegations of mass murder in the Bulyanhulu pit.

Through Access to Information laws Probe International obtained boxes of heavily censored correspondence from the Canadian High Commissioner in Tanzania concerning the evictions. The documents detail a Canadian diplomat actively pressuring Tanzanian officials to clear Sutton’s concession of small-scale miners. “Sutton [censored words] is ready to go to stock market [censored words] but cannot / not do so in absence of Tanz govt action to remove 7,000/10,000/ illegal miners” said a report to Foreign Affairs in December 1995.175

Later, the High Commission reported to Ottawa that Sutton had gone to court to secure an eviction order to remove small-scale miners from its concession and to obtain a permanent injunction to “restrain respondants from interfering with the mining operations in the area.” But the judge refused, concluding that a special three-judge panel needed to decide the case. “I found no provision made for compensation and/or resettlement of the indigenous people,” read the Tanzanian judge’s ruling.

Despite the court ruling, Canadian officials continued to press Sutton’s case. Incredibly, the Canadian high commissioner told Ottawa the Tanzanian government ought to disregard the judge’s decision. “High Court Judge ruled that issue cld [could] involve constitutional rights and should be heard by a panel of three High Court judges. … Sutton has appealed to High Court for panel hearing. We do not/not believe that judicial action on injunction need impede action by govt to resolve situ[ation].”176 (italics added)

For a time, the court ruling (as well as an upcoming election) stopped the Tanzanian government from removing the miners. But Canadian pressure grew as the estimated size of the Bulyanhulu mine’s deposits increased. The high commissioner discussed the issue directly with the Tanzanian prime minister and president. In a memo to the president of Tanzania, the high commissioner noted that the “Vancouver, Calgary and Toronto stock exchanges have become the leading sources of exploration capital in the resource sector. … It will be important, therefore, that outstanding problems relating to title and to illegal activities be quickly removed.”177 The “illegal activities” that concerned the high commissioner were, of course, the small-scale miners who lived in Bulyanhulu and had dug for gold since it was discovered in 1976.

To advance Sutton’s interests, the High Commission published a special supplement in the Tanzanian press and the high commissioner appeared in a half-hour TV interview.178 With this effort, the High Commission wrote to Ottawa, “the decision makers will be fully aware of how important this mining sector, Cdn participation, and rule of law is to their economy.”179 The high commissioner even dangled the possibility of resuming Canadian aid to encourage the government to drive the artisanal miners from Bulyanhulu. The high commissioner said that he “advised Pres Mwinyi that Tanzania has been reinstated as Cdn development assistance partner, and mentioned a few projects whose further development cld now be pursued, including perhaps, development of mining training centre in mining belt in conjunction with Sutton and other mining coys, assuming current problems cld be and wld be resolved?”180

After the artisanal miners were displaced the Canadian High Commission sought to muzzle an opposition political party and shape its report into the issue.181 The high commissioner arranged a private meeting with the Tanzanian Labour Party to encourage it to tell the “truth or at least moderation” in its investigation into the evictions at Bulyanhulu.182

For its part, the Tanzanian government harassed the Tanzania Labour Party and the Lawyers Environmental Action Team (LEAT). It charged Labour Party leader Augustine Mrema and LEAT representatives Rugemeleza Nshala and Tundu Lissu with sedition for publicizing allegations of abuses in Bulyanhulu.183

Later the Tanzanian government prevented two different international groups from inquiring into the alleged massacre. The authorities refused to let officials from the World Bank’s Compliance Adviser Ombudsman visit Bulyanhulu because they held “business visas”, which didn’t entitle them to investigate the matter.184

Since lobbying on behalf of Sutton, Canadian officials have repeatedly intervened to shape Tanzanian mining policy. Tanzanian activist Evans Rubara and Canadian academic Paula Butler describe the “aggressive role played by Canadian mining companies, Canadian lawyers and Canadian diplomats to establish the pro-foreign-investor content of Tanzanian mining codes since the mid-1990s.”185

In 1998 the High Commission lobbied the Tanzanian government and World Bank to invite Canadian companies to a forum on drafting new mining legislation.186 At the start of the century Canadian diplomats sought to influence the country’s tax policy. In a letter to the chairman of the Mineral Sector Regulatory System Review Committee, Tanzania’s Industry and Trade Minister Basil Mramba recounted how foreign diplomats — Canadian, South African, Norwegian and British — interfered in the country’s tax law reforms. Mramba stated that “during the preparations (for enacting the 2004 act) several foreign diplomats based in the country formed a committee to examine the proposals for the (Income) Tax Bill, which is rather unusual. Being the then Finance minister, I met twice with them to hear and respond to their objections — especially to the manner in which mines were to be made to pay income tax as had then been proposed by an expert from Oxford University in England. Eventually, the Cabinet decided to postpone the incorporation into the new law of the entire section of that Bill which dealt with minerals so that it would be re-examined when the time was right.”187

During a November 2007 visit to Tanzania Stephen Harper met representatives from nearly a dozen Canadian resource firms operating in the country.188 According to Harper, the meeting was to discuss “the general business climate [and] what the government of Canada can do to assist in building our investments here.”189

In the months after Harper’s visit, reported ThisDay, the High Commission launched an “intense” lobbying effort to convince Tanzania’s Parliament to reject the Mineral Sector Review Committee’s recommendation that a larger proportion of profits from higher mineral prices be retained by the government.190 In 2014 the two countries signed a FIPA.

Western Sahara

Saskatoon’s PotashCorp and Calgary’s Agrium partnered with Morocco’s state owned OCP to export phosphate mined in Africa’s last colony. The UN calls Western Sahara “occupied” by Morocco and international law prohibits an occupying power from exploiting the resources of territories they control unless it’s in the interest of, and according to, the wishes of the local population. In Western Sahara Moroccan tanks and troops protect phosphate shipments from Sahrawi independence forces.191

The world’s top exporter of the mineral, phosphate mining represents over a quarter of Morocco’s total exports and OCP is the country’s largest industrial company. King Mohammed VI oversees it.192

PotashCorp is the biggest customer of Western Sahara phosphates, buying 750,000 tonnes of rock annually.193 To deflect from its complicity in violating international law, the company said OCP’s operations benefit the Saharawi people. A 2014 PotashCorp statement claimed: “OCP has established a proactive affirmative action campaign to the benefit of the local people and, importantly, is making significant economic and social contributions to the entire region. As a result, we believe those who choose to make a political statement about OCP are effectively penalizing Saharawi workers, their families and communities.”194

For its part, the POLISARIO Front national liberation movement claims that PotashCorp and Agrium’s deals with OCP contravene international law and prop up Morocco’s control of the region.195 So does the African Union. A mid-2015 AU Summit resolution called on the UN Security Council to assume its responsibilities with regards to Morocco’s occupation of Western Sahara, specifically highlighting its “illegal exploitation of the Territory’s natural resources.”196 Agreeing with this view, several European pension funds and banks have divested all PotashCorp stock.197

Zambia

A half-dozen Canadian companies, with $6 billion invested, operate in the copper rich central African nation. The Canadian mining presence in Zambia dates to the late 1990s privatization of the Zambian Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM), which once produced 700,000 tonnes of copper per year. In a report on the sale, John Lungu and Alastair Fraser explain that “the division of ZCCM into several smaller companies and their sale to private investors between 1997 and 2000 marked the completion of one of the most comprehensive and rapid privatisation processes seen anywhere in the world.”198

The highly indebted country was under immense pressure to sell its copper and public mining company. Zambia’s former Finance Minister Edith Nawakwi said, “we were told by advisers, who included the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank that … for the next 20 years, Zambian copper would not make a profit. [But, if we privatised] we would be able to access debt relief, and this was a huge carrot in front of us — like waving medicine in front of a dying woman. We had no option” but to privatize.199

Ottawa played a part in the privatization push. A proponent of neoliberal reform in Zambia since the late 1980s, Canada was part of the World Bank led Consultative Group of donors that promoted the copper selloff. With the sale moving too slowly for the donors, a May 1998 Consultative Group meeting in Paris made $530 US million in balance of payments support dependent on privatizing the rest of ZCCM.200

But the hasty sale of the public behemoth was highly unfavourable to Zambians. The price of copper was at a historic low and the individual leading the negotiations, Francis Kaunda, was later jailed for defrauding the public company.201 “ZCCM’s privatization was carried out with a complete lack of transparency, no debate in parliament, and with one-sided contracts which few of us have ever seen,” said James Lungu, a professor at Zambia’s Copperbelt University.202

Taking advantage of the government’s weak bargaining position, First Quantum and other foreign companies picked up the valuable assets for rock bottom prices and left the government with ZCCM’s liabilities, including pensions.203 The foreign mining companies also negotiated ultralow royalty rates and the right to take the government to international arbitration if tax exemptions were withdrawn for 15 years or more.204 Many of the multinationals made their money back in a year or two and when the price of copper rose five fold in the mid-2000s they made bundles.

Having conceded tax exemptions and ultralow royalty rates, the government captured little from the surge in global copper prices. In 2006 Zambian royalties from copper represented about $24 million on $4 billion worth of copper extracted.205 The 0.6% royalty rate was thought to be the lowest in the world. The government take from taxing the mining companies wasn’t a whole lot better. Between 2000 and 2007 Zambia exported US $12.24 billion in copper but the government only collected $246 million in tax.206

Since 2008 Zambia has wrestled more from the companies, but they’ve had to overcome stiff corporate resistance. When the government suggested an increased royalty in 2005 First Quantum’s commercial manager Andrew Hickman complained that it “would probably make any new mining ventures in Zambia uneconomical” while three years later First Quantum said it would have “no choice” but to take legal action if a new tax regime breached the agreement it signed during the privatization process.207

First Quantum had good reason to campaign aggressively to maintain the country’s generous mining policy. It had become Zambia’s largest foreign investor, purchasing the Bwana Mkubwa copper mine in 1996 as well as the Kansanshi and Mopani Copper Mine (with Glencore) at the start of the 2000s.208 As discussed further in Chapter 15, Mopani Copper Mine (MCM), which is now only a sixth owned by First Quantum, cheated Zambia out of tens of millions of dollars. An audit found that between 2006 and 2008 MCM underreported cobalt extracts and manipulated internal prices to shift profits to First Quantum and Glencore subsidiaries in the British Virgin Islands and Bermuda, allowing it to evade millions of tax in Zambia.

In a bid to cut down on tax evasion and transfer pricing, the Zambian government sought to simplify the mining fee structure. In 2013 Lusaka proposed eliminating income tax on mining companies and substantially increasing royalty rates (up to 20% for open-pit mines and 8% on underground operations). In February 2015 Minister of Finance Alexander B. Chikwanda told Parliament: “The tax system was vulnerable to all forms of tax planning schemes such as transfer pricing, hedging and trading through ‘shell’ companies which are not directly linked to the core business. Sir, it has been a challenge for the revenue administration to detect and abate such practices. Further, provisions on capital allowances and carry forward of losses eliminated potential taxable profits. Mr Speaker, the tax structure was simply illusory as only two mining companies were paying Company Income Tax under the previous tax regime as most of them claimed that they were not in tax-paying positions.”209

First Quantum, Barrick Gold and a number of other foreign mining companies screamed murder and worked to derail the Zambian government. First Quantum government affairs manager John Gladston said “the new system doesn’t incentivise investment in new capital projects which in turn, will inevitably be translated into fewer new jobs and less opportunities for wealth creation for Zambians.”210 To spur a backlash in the job-hungry country, First Quantum laid off 350 workers at its Kansanshi mine. The government responded by saying First Quantum wasn’t adhering to the country’s labour laws. Government spokesperson Chishimba Kambwili told Xinhua that “all mining companies are aware of the standing order, which obliges them to consult the government through the Ministry of Labour before any decision to sack any worker becomes effective.”211

Barrick Gold also threatened to lay off workers if the government increased royalty rates. The Toronto company said it would shutter its Lumwana Mine, which prompted 2,000 workers, fearing for their jobs, to hold a one-day strike.212 The foreign-run Chamber of Mines of Zambia claimed 12,000 jobs would be lost if the royalty changes went through and the International Monetary Fund added its voice to those opposing the royalty hike. The mining corporations’ strong-arm tactics succeeded. After a six-month standoff, the government backed off.

First Quantum, Barrick and the other foreign mining companies exploited the immense power ZCCM’s privatization gave them over Zambian economic life. By shuttering their mines they could produce economic hardship for thousands of people. (With an 80% unemployment rate and most Zambians living on less than a dollar a day, each formally employed individual provides for many others.)213 Some suggested the foreign mining companies were even “powerful enough to manipulate the exchange rate” of the country.214

Despite working diligently to minimize their payments, First Quantum touted their tax contributions when it served to undercut social demands. In 2014 First Quantum Community Engagement Manager Garth Lappeman complained to Africa Report that there “is constant reference to what used to happen in the past, of what ZCCM used to do, and a complete misunderstanding because of low literacy levels. I think mainly, that the mining sector has been privatized and it’s a different context now. We pay tax.”215

In 2011 First Quantum initiated a mammoth project a few hours outside Zambia’s historic copperbelt. At its peak the $2 billion US Kalumbila Trident Project is expected to produce 300,000 tonnes of low grade copper a year. To reach this output level the firm will extract, process and separate 55 million tonnes of ore annually.216 The chemically intensive process demands massive tracts of land for storage, waste rock and tailing pipelines, which led the Vancouver firm to clear cut 5,000 hectares of woodlands.217 First Quantum acquired the right to mine 50,000 hectares (518 square km) of the Lunda people’s customary land in a controversial manner. It bypassed Zambia’s central government and signed a deal with the Musele Chiefdom, even though traditional leaders are only allowed to alienate 250 hectares by law.218 Chief Felex Muzeya later claimed the company deceived him and a ministerial task force found serious irregularities in the way First Quantum acquired the land.219

Despite not controlling surface rights to the land, First Quantum pushed forward with the project.220 First Quantum began cutting trees in one of Zambia’s last indigenous forests and the Vancouver firm dammed two rivers, undermining locals’ access to water and fish. In one instance, a woman frightened by company guard dogs fled into a river and drowned.221 Chief Chisele told University of the Western Cape researchers that “they are chasing people away from the dam where they fish; from the forest where they get mushrooms. The mine people said the river will be free to the people but they are chasing people away and using police dogs.  … They are cheats! Land for homes and land for fields belongs to the Chief in as far as he holds the land for the villagers. But this land was for the community because it was an inheritance from the ancestors.”222

Some direct beneficiaries of the Kalumbila mine also found themselves aggrieved. After the January 2015 death of mineworker Greyan Taimo 3,000 Kalumbila employees went on strike. They claimed the mine hospital failed to treat Taimo or send him for care in Solwezi and criticized the company’s failure to provide his family with a funeral grant. In response, First Quantum fired 11 individuals it claimed instigated the job action even though it told the government no one would be targeted for the work stoppage.223

In March 2015 another Kalumbila worker, Evans Lombe, died on the job.224

To the east of Kalumbila, First Quantum’s Bwana Mkubwa mine polluted the Mukulungwe River. Grist reported that “the stream has literally been turned into a tailings dam — all aquatic life-forms have perished, farm animals have been dying, and farmers cannot use the stream water for farming or for domestic use.”225 Yet a 2006 European Parliament development committee report published pictures of children bathing in the Mukulungwe River.226

In January 2008 Mopani Copper Mine discharged polluted water into a community drinking source in southern Zambia. The company then failed to purify the water, which led nearly 1,000 people to visit health clinics with abdominal pain, severe diarrhoea and vomiting. “The failure of the company’s underground pump to purify the acidic water should have been avoidable by simply ensuring there was a standby alternative at all times,” said Bob Sichinga, a former parliamentarian who once served on the parliamentary mining committee.227 “But even after it happened, the water utility should have been able to detect the impurities in the water — it didn’t have to take the people to complain for the two companies to realise the pumped water was polluted.”228 Sichinga described the pollution discharge as “an act of total disregard for the rights of the people and the law of the land; it seems to suggest that the rights of the people are dispensable, while investment is indispensable.”

Sulphur dioxide emissions at MCM were 70 times the limit set by the World Health Organization, causing respiratory problems, killing plant life and damaging houses.229 In August 2014 protests erupted at the mine after local residents said seven people were hospitalized due to sulphur dioxide emissions. The demonstrators broke through a security fence and tried to damage MCM facilities, but were eventually pushed back by company security and police tear gas.230

Canadian officials actively backed the mining companies in Zambia. At the 2013 Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada Convention Ottawa announced the start of negotiations on a FIPA with Zambia and the next year the head of office at the Canadian High Commission, Sharad Kumar Gupta said, “the Canadian government is trying to encourage the private sector to explore … opportunities in Zambia’s mining sector,” reported a Zambian news site.231

After the leftist Patriotic Front opposition party accused First Quantum of blocking workers from voting in a 2005 parliamentary by-election, the Canadian high commissioner defended the Vancouver company. John Deyell, who previously worked at Inco and Falconbridge in Sudbury, claimed First Quantum wasn’t responsible for day-to-day operations despite owning a sixth of MCM stock and controlling two seats on MCM’s executive board.232 In response the Patriotic Front sought to take their protest against MCM’s violation of workers’ rights to the Canadian High Commission, but the police denied them a permit.233

***

While not an exhaustive reckoning, this overview illustrates the breadth and depth of mineral extraction in Canadian foreign policy and how ordinary Africans experience Canada as a neighbour. Readers should make up their own minds as to whether or not Canadian mining corporations and the government that supports them have been a “force for good” in Africa.

11. The Spoils of Privatization

“We have spent a lot of time and work on privatization throughout Africa.”1

– Peter R. Kieran, President, CPCS Transcom

While the massive investments by Canadian-based mining companies go a long way to explain this country’s support for policies that give free rein to corporations, another important money making opportunity has accompanied the neoliberal war on government. And Canada has grabbed a significant share of the spoils.

As part of its “free” market push, Canada supported the World Bank/IMF’s African privatization drive. From rail lines and ports to water services to power utilities, thousands of state-owned enterprises were sold outright or concessioned (with the state retaining nominal ownership of some — or all — of the assets but the concessionaire taking control of the company). In most cases the World Bank or bilateral donor agencies financed or promoted the sales, often making their money to a government conditional on privatization.

To realize their ideological aims the World Bank and bilateral donors paid Western consultancy firms to advise African governments on the best ways to reform state companies. The consultants usually suggested transferring public assets to private hands and then provided advice on reorganizing a firm to attract suitors, ways to avoid labour unrest and how to get financial help.

The reason usually stated for pressing African governments to transfer public assets to private hands has been that state-owned enterprises were either poorly managed or drained the public treasury. There was often some truth to these claims and in some instances privatization brought short-to-medium term benefits to the government or company. But, even when state-owned enterprises generated steady income, operated efficiently or fulfilled an important function, the World Bank and IMF still sought privatization. The drive to privatize was based not on careful assessment of each company and the social and economic conditions in which they operated, but rather on the ideological belief that private corporations should determine economic affairs.

The privateers ignored the factors that motivated governments to establish businesses in the first place (or how greater community or worker participation in managing state enterprises could improve operations). State companies were often created to reverse the dependence left by colonialism, sometimes taking on social goals or endeavours that may not have interested profit-seeking businesses. Others were set up to develop internal capacities or to capture profits fleeing the country.

Criticized for enabling political patronage, state-owned companies simultaneously dampened inequality. The transfer of public assets to private hands partially explains the rise of a super-rich class of Africans. On the other hand, the dismembering of the state over the past quarter-century has done little to temper patronage or corruption. In fact, with improper oversight, privatization often has seen an entire asset — not just part of the operating budget — fall into the hands of well-connected individuals.

While insiders often benefit from selling state companies, it is the rural and urban poor who usually bear the cost. Prices for electricity, water and other services increase when subsidies are withdrawn along with public ownership. The hardest hit by the drive to privatize, however, have been public workers and their dependents. Tens, perhaps hundreds, of thousands have lost their jobs in economies with few employment opportunities.

A number of the corporations that promoted, facilitated or profited from the privatization drive had their roots in Canada. While some prominent public utilities took over or managed state owned companies, one relatively unknown Ottawa-based consulting firm led corporate Canada’s assault on Africa’s public sector.

With half its business on the continent, CPCS Transcom helped concession or privatize ports, railways and electricity companies in no less than a dozen sub-Saharan African countries. According to the Globe and Mail Report on Business, “CPCS is handling, or has completed, some of the toughest projects on the continent, including the privatization of the biggest Nigerian and Kenyan ports and an ambitious scheme to reform and privatize Nigeria’s crisis-ridden electricity system.”2

CPCS has worked in 35 African countries and the consulting firm has offices in Accra, Lagos, Abuja, Calabar, Nairobi, Kampala, Dar es Salaam and Harare.3 Since the 1990s, CPCS has participated in more than $22 billion US in public-private partnership transactions across the continent.4 To put this in perspective, the gross domestic product for 30 million Ugandans was $21.5 billion in 2013.5

A profile of the company’s long-time CEO explains: “Since 1990, Peter [Kieran] has been working with international financial institutions, as well numerous governments, to develop new approaches to structural reform and encouragement of private investment in power and other critical infrastructure. He has provided policy direction to national governments in over 25 countries on infrastructure. Peter has been responsible for leading large multi-disciplinary teams responsible for the successful private investment in railways and ports in Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mali, Senegal, Congo Brazzaville, Cameroon, Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania, Madagascar, Jordan and Armenia. His current major initiative is the privatization of the entire publicly owned power sector in Nigeria.”6

CPCS facilitated the privatization process in port services in a handful of African countries.7 In Nigeria alone, CPCS assisted in restructuring and/or privatizing cargo handling in more than 20 individual port terminals.8 Hired by USAID to review the continent’s biggest cargo port, CPCS proposed the sale of the facilities in Durban, but the South African government rejected the 2003 privatization paper after tens of thousands took to the streets in defence of public ownership.9

The most controversial port initiative involving CPCS took place in Kenya. Contracted by the World Bank to formulate a plan for the port of Mombasa, a team of 30 CPCS consultants developed a strategy to commercialize the Kenya Ports Authority.10 The East African reported that the Ottawa firm proposed the “complete transfer of responsibility for the port to private operators.”11 The government encountered fierce backlash after publicly endorsing CPCS’ roadmap in 2011. The Dock Workers Union spearheaded a fight that garnered widespread community support (or as one concerned pro-privatization commentator put it, “emotional vote-gathering appeal.”)12 During a trip to Mombasa in November 2014, every person I talked to about the issue, including a half dozen random individuals I met exploring the coastal city, expressed opposition to the privatization of East Africa’s largest port. Most believed foreigners or businessmen in Nairobi would benefit at the expense of the coastal community.

In a small second story office two kilometres north of the city centre two representatives of the Dock Workers Union told me that privatizing the profitable port would weaken a union that had won its 7,000 members good conditions, including medical benefits, education leave and a housing allowance. Union officials also feared it would lead to thousands of layoffs in a city with a dire need for formal employment. This, they said, would exacerbate insecurity and religious tensions in the city of 1.2 million.

Another sector affected by the privatization process that CPCS and other Canadian firms facilitated and profited from has been African state railways. At the beginning of the 1990s all 34 African railways were government-owned and operated. By 2014, half of them had been concessioned to foreign operators.13 In most cases the World Bank and G7 countries made their financial support to the rail sector and/or government conditional on private participation.

CPCS, a firm with roots as the consulting services arm of Canadian Pacific Railway, assisted in the concessioning of at least nine African railways.14 Unfortunately, this process generally led to a deterioration of already limited rail services.15 Basing their conclusion on World Bank data, the authors of Should the Zambian Government Invest in Railways? explained that “with a couple of exceptions, [rail] concessions have failed to perform as anticipated, sometimes because of unrealistic expectations, sometimes because of incompetent concessionaires selected through an inadequate concessioning process, and sometimes a combination of both.”16

In most cases, private operators laid off large numbers despite significant social costs. According to one estimate, each formally employed African railway worker supports an average of 30 others.17

Many of the newly privatized companies discontinued or starved passenger rail services, which was sometimes cheaper and usually emitted less carbon than bus travel. During a five-week trip through East Africa in 2014 I experienced firsthand the demise of passenger rail. While Lonely Planet lists a train line from Dar es Salaam to Mwanza on Lake Victoria it no longer operated and on the day I planned to travel, the thrice-weekly train from Nairobi to Mombasa was cancelled.

The most successful rail system on the continent is in South Africa. But it has invested billions of dollars into its publicly owned network. Without public investment, notes the African Development Bank, “[subsidized] road networks will make it impossible for rail to survive except to carry large-scale mineral traffic.”18 Herein lies an important consequence of rail privatization. Left to their own devices, private rail operators tend to reassert colonial patterns. There is little money to be made promoting intra-African trade or transport, so for-profit rail lines focus on delivering unprocessed resources to coastal ports. Thus, privatized rail systems act much like those built during the colonial era. According to one study, two thirds of the railways built during colonialism connected mines to a coastal harbour.19

At the end of the 1990s, CPCS oversaw the first rail privatization in a former British colony. Supported by the World Bank and USAID, the privatisation of Malawi Railways saw 40% of the workforce let go.20

In the mid-2000s, CPCS helped tender and evaluate bids to operate the Tanzania Railway Company (TRC). The concessioning was a fiasco. CPCS was accused of favouritism and the company it helped to select went on to short-change the government. Days before the final bid, CPCS excluded South Africa’s Comazar, leaving only India’s RITES to explain their submission to Tanzania’s Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission.21 Comazar was outraged that despite its thousand page technical bid, Tanzanian authorities only viewed a CPCS prepared evaluation note. The South African firm suggested that CPCS’ previous partnership with RITES influenced this work. Comazar asked the World Bank (which had put up most of the money for the sale) to investigate CPCS’ ties to RITES. Simultaneously it filed suit in a Tanzanian court “which granted it a suspension of the opening of the financial bids.”22

After taking over the public railway, RITES failed to pay Tanzania the $6 million it owed. In response the government cancelled the firm’s concession and TRC’s parent company refused to pay CPCS a success fee for its advisory services. (CPCS eventually won the money in court.)23

To the north, CPCS had a hand in the equally disastrous sale of the Kenyan and Ugandan railway systems. In 1998, the World Bank’s Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility hired CPCS to perform an “Options Study” on the best way forward for the Kenya Railways Corporation (KRC).24 Not surprisingly, CPCS suggested concessioning. Shortly after, CPCS “assisted a private company and potential operator of Uganda Railways to prepare a Business Plan and offer to the Government of Uganda for the private operation of URC under a concession structure.”25 CPCS’ work set the stage for a joint Kenyan/Ugandan rail privatization.

The World Bank hired Montréal-based Canarail as the main transaction advisor for both the Kenyan and Ugandan railway privatizations. The World Bank allocated $77 million to prepare the two East African railway companies for sale, devoting a third of the funds to layoff and compensate KRC employees.26 All but 30 of the 8,970 employees lost their jobs.27 The private operator rehired some staff, but Rift Valley Railways Consortium refused to recognize the Kenyan Railway Workers Union. Even after an intervention from Kenya’s Ministry of Labour, they held fast to this anti-labour position.28

Rift Valley failed to fulfill their contract. Their investment in infrastructure and safety fell below agreed benchmarks as did freight and passenger volumes. Rift Valley also neglected to pay their concession fees. The Africa Infrastructure Digest called the privatization of KRC “one of the biggest corporate scandals in the country’s history” while the managing editor for business and economic affairs at the Daily Nation penned a piece headlined “Privatising Kenya Railways was an Experiment Gone Bad”.29 Jaindi Kisero complained that “an institution that used to be among the biggest employers in the country, with a powerful workers union and owning colossal assets — mainly buildings and land in Nairobi, Kisumu, Mombasa and Nakuru — has been made to shrink almost into nothingness.”30

Under significant donor pressure, Mali and Senegal privatized a shared rail network in 2003. A few years earlier, CPCS had been hired to develop a program and procure a company that would improve the services and financial stability of the Dakar to Bamako rail line.31

A few years prior to assisting the Senegalese and Malian governments in the “privatisation of the international operations on the Dakar-Bamako railway,” CPCS was hired to oversee a multi-million dollar Canadian rail project in Senegal.32 In addition to financing CPCS’ work, CIDA actively shaped the privatization plan. A CIDA report on “Canada’s Railway Program in Mali” stated that “Canada has played a major part in the policy dialogue regarding discussions between Mali and Senegal surrounding the utilisation of the section of the line that runs from Bamako to Ségou.”33 Another aid agency report, “Investments in the Rail Sector in Senegal” noted that Canada’s position of “first turning the [rail] agency around then privatizing it … ultimately prevailed” over the World Bank’s plan.34 As part of these efforts, Ottawa pumped tens of millions of dollars into Senegal’s rail sector and millions more into Mali’s system.35

A Montréal-based company won a joint long-term lease to run the Senegalese-Malian railway. Canarail together with France’s Getma acquired 51% ownership of Transrail, which oversaw the rail line. Le Monde Diplomatique explained that “a Canadian fund obtained a 25-year investment in Transrail and with the help of the World Bank, the collusion of President Wade in Senegal and the passivity of President Amadou Toumani Touré in Mali robbed both countries of a railway network that is economically vital and a source of national pride.”36 Forty percent of the workforce was immediately laid off.37 This triggered strikes and protests, which security forces were quick to repress. More than 20 striking employees were fired or suspended, including Dakar union leader, Pierre Ndoye.38

Transrail focused on freight and broke its pledge to ensure passenger services. It closed 26 of 36 stations, delivering a blow to those who peddled wares at stops or operated the station buffets as well as those who relied on the train to get from place to place.39 A number of people died after they were unable to get to hospital.40 After Transrail slashed passenger service, Le Monde Diplomatique explained that “the company’s profitability is the result of a simple equation: monopoly + modest objectives + minimum investment + ‘modern’ labour policy = a slight profit.”41

In an assessment of its rail funding to Senegal, CIDA highlighted the “Benefits for Canada” of the $40 million it disbursed. It noted that Canadian companies “were able to establish or to consolidate their presence in these markets and to develop new markets on the African continent.”42 Canada’s International Development Minister Aileen Carroll described CIDA’s role in the Dakar-Bamako rail privatization as one of its successes in 2004.43

Unfortunately this is not the only example of Canadian “aid” aiding Canadian corporations while harming Africans.

Publicly owned Canadian power utilities facilitated the demise of their African counterparts. While Manitoba Hydro and Hydro-Québec often prioritize the public interest at home, they have operated to maximize profits abroad. At a 2001 conference of African labour leaders, a Guinean electricity worker complained to France’s L’Humanité that “foreign buyers come with a ready-made policy that they impose without distinction. Even in the case of public companies such as EDF [Electricité de France] or Hydro Québec, once outside their borders they all operate according to the logic of profit alone.”44

A shift to private operators usually resulted in layoffs, higher tariffs and minimal service improvements. A 2007 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report described “dramatic failures” in the privatisation of electricity and other public utilities in sub-Saharan Africa. It noted that “profit-maximising behaviour has led privatised companies to keep investments below the necessary levels, with the result that rural communities and the urban poor were further marginalised” in electric power access.45

Electricity penetration has stagnated over the past quarter-century. Only about a quarter of Sub-Saharan Africa’s population (and fewer than 1 in 10 people living in rural areas) has access to electricity. Yet electricity can spur socioeconomic development. In “Privatisation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Where do We Stand?”, the OECD explained that “access to electricity is a major determinant of household productivity. For instance, electric light extends the day, providing additional time to study or work. Efficient and affordable energy services may also dramatically improve the health of the poor. Refrigeration allows local clinics to keep medicines on hand; modern cook stoves may save women and children from daily exposure to noxious cooking fumes. The utilities sector thus plays a crucial role in poverty alleviation policies.”46

One role of government should be to ensure that (carbon free) electricity reaches those without it. This partly explains the creation of public utilities such as Manitoba Hydro and Hydro-Québec, which aimed to mobilize public resources to extend electricity to rural areas.

Despite this role at home, Hydro-Québec International (HQI) undermined public utilities in former French colonies. In 1995, HQI in partnership with France’s EDF and SAUR acquired a 10-year leasing contract for Guinea’s Société Nationale d’Electricité (SNE). The World Bank, US and EU funded initiative broke down seven years later.47

In 2001, HQI and France’s Elyo won a five-year renewable contract to manage La Compagnie Energie Electrique du Togo. Four years later the Togolese government terminated the contract due to “noncompliance with commitments” and “multiple dysfunctions in the execution of the concession agreement.”48 Le Syndicat des Travailleurs du Secteur de l’Electricité au Togo described the privatization as a “painful experience”.49

In response to World Bank/IMF pressure, Senegal granted HQI and Elyo control over the country’s electricity provider in 1999.50 The five-year management contract included a share purchase giving the foreign companies majority control of SENELEC’s board of directors.

Before taking control of SENELEC, Hydro-Québec announced it expected an 18% return on their investment and argued the contract would spur $200 million worth of business for Québec companies.51 Barely a year later, the accord collapsed. The Financial Times reported that the Franco-Canadian management angered many by replacing local staff with expatriates and local suppliers with foreign contractors.52 A year into its contract, SENELEC requested a rate increase 17% above the amount stipulated in its contract. This combined with its failure to invest in infrastructure upgrades, prompted a new Senegalese government to re-nationalize the company.53

(The Canadian government, through CIDA, financed Hydro-Québec to build a highly controversial dam project in Mali and Senegal. In the mid-1980s the public utility won part of a $46 million aid agency contract to build the Manantali dam and in the mid-1990s HQI benefited from smaller dam contracts.54 The dam on the Senegal River left over half a million West Africans without a means of subsistence. It also sparked the resurgence of diseases blamed for thousands of deaths annually and exacerbated tensions between Mauritania and Senegal, which culminated in armed conflict. “While the Manantali project has impoverished hundreds of thousands of people,” explained Probe International policy director Grainne Ryder, “Canadian companies have done very well by this disastrous scheme.”)55

Another Crown corporation, Manitoba Hydro International (MHI), weakened the public character of at least two African electricity providers. In 2006, MHI won a contract to manage the Kenya Power and Electricity Company after the “World Bank insisted that a management contract for KPLC had to be given to a private company” as a condition for $152 million US.56 Unhappy with MHI management, the Kenyan government failed to extend its contract for a third year and withheld $150,000 of a $450,000 executive performance bonus, which angered four MHI managers seeking a big payday.57

In an even larger endeavour than in Kenya, Manitoba Hydro and CPCS Transcom played a part in privatizing the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN), the main electricity provider for the nation of 160 million. In 2013 CPCS oversaw the selloff of 11 power distribution companies and four gas-fired generating plants as well as the long-term concessioning of two hydro plants. According to the firm: “CPCS worked hand-in-hand with the Federal Government as its transaction advisor in every aspect of this sale. CPCS carried out the due diligence review, developing detailed privatization plans for each of the successor companies. We also advised on and assisted in implementing various reform measures to the electricity sector of Nigeria to support the new commercial framework, including the drafting of Power Purchase Agreements, Transmission Agreements and Performance Agreements to allow the government to monitor the long-term performance of the private sector and ensure they maintain their investment commitments. CPCS was responsible for administering the entire privatisation transaction, including responding to thousands of investor inquiries, evaluating proposals received, leading the negotiations with preferred bidders, and assisting the government in completing the sale and handing over companies to the private investors.”58

It is important to note that this “administration” work is expensive. While CPCS is usually hired directly by the World Bank, USAID, CIDA etc. — or with money put up by the donors for Western consultants — the fees it charges are considerable. In a London-based biweekly Nigerian Watch article headlined “High Consultancy Fees and Spiraling Costs Threaten Railway Network Revamp” it was reported that “International rail transport consulting company CPCS Transcom, are among the leading firms currently providing Nigeria with different consultancy and feasibility services. However, their feasibility consultancy services come at a huge cost to the ministry despite the fact that such hefty bills do not themselves guarantee the completion of projects in the sector.”59 The article cites a feasibility study for which CPCS was paid $200,000. To put this sum in perspective, 70% of Nigerians live on less than two dollars a day and Nigeria’s monthly minimum wage is about $120.

The Nigerian government generated the tidy sum of $8 billion from the electricity sale. But, as CPCS explained, the privatized company’s “liabilities” were “stripped out and held by government” and “all staff” were “retrenched” with their “pension obligations” paid by the government.60 What’s more, the government had recently spent between $8 and $20 billion — depending on your source — building new power plants under the Nigerian National Integrated Power Project.61

One analyst dubbed the electricity selloff “the build-and-privatize model” while the Director General of the Bureau of Public Enterprises, Bolanle Onagoruwa, said “the privatisation of the power utilities is unique and different from previous privatisation programmes in the country in that it is driven by the need for efficiency and investment rather than optimisation of proceeds to the government.”62 This was music to the ears of the private interests who acquired the public infrastructure at a bargain, in some cases as the sole approved bidder.

The Financial Times reported that businessmen close to the government and former military leaders acquired most of the assets. “The sale of the plants attracted strong interest from some of Nigeria’s richest businessmen as well as retired military generals.”

Prior to the sale, Reuter’s correspondent Joe Brock wrote an article headlined “Murky Deals Cast Doubt over Nigeria’s Power Sell-off”. “Since power minister Barth Nnaji resigned in August over an alleged conflict of interest, doubts are gathering about the integrity of the process, as oligarchs with scant experience in running power firms line up for a slice of this lucrative pie. As with Russia in its 1992-1994 sell off of state assets, it is entrenched political and business elites who look set to win much of Nigeria’s power sector, even while Western aid agencies are backing the process with tens of millions of dollars.”

Power minister Barth Nnaji resigned in the middle of the privatization drive when attention focused on his interests in companies bidding for the publicly owned Afam Power Station and Enugu Distribution Company. Reuters reported that Britain’s Department for International Development “funded Nnaji’s office throughout even though it was public knowledge that he had a stake in a company bidding for one of the power plants.”

As a strong proponent of the electricity privatization, Nnaji found international backing. The Daily Trust called him someone “who investors and development partners said inspired confidence to invest” while Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan approvingly described Nnaji as a “product of the World Bank.”63

Canadian officials also backed Nnaji. Sunday Trust reported that “the award” of a “management contract to Manitoba [Hydro] was backed by the former Minister of Power, Barth Nnaji.”64 Canadian officials worked with the minister because he favoured privatization, a direction Canadian diplomats had long pressed for. In 2011, High Commissioner Chris Cooter prodded Nigerian authorities to proceed with the controversial electricity privatization. In an article headlined “Canada Joins Race for Nation’s Power Market”, the Daily Trust reported that Cooter visited minister Nnaji and told the press afterwards that “the air indicates that something is enveloping Nigeria’s capacity to lead the world, we are here to compliment these efforts to resolve your electricity challenges and galvanize your industrial leadership of Africa.”65

Two years earlier Nigeria’s media reported on a visit made by Canada’s trade commissioner to lobby for electricity reform and in 2005 Ottawa put up 82.5 million Naira (about $200,000 today) to train staff of the National Electric Power Authority (predecessor to the Power Holding Company of Nigeria).66 ThisDay reported that “through this initiative, a framework for the eventual privatisation of the authority [Canadian High Commissioner David] Angel said, has been established.”67

While Canadian officials promoted privatization, Nigerian activists denounced the 2013 sale of the country’s electricity network. In an article headlined “Power Firms Sold for N404 Billion After Gulping N3.2 Trillion” the president of the Civil Rights Congress of Nigeria, Shehu Sani, called the privatization “a criminal robbery of the people’s collective assets by a few bourgeoisie elites.”68

Others complained about rising costs. The Financial Times reported that the Nigerian government boosted electricity rates by 88% in 2012, “under reforms designed to revive the power sector and attract outside investors.” While this helped guarantee “profitability of investment”, the tariff hike further priced out the 70 per cent of Nigerians who live on less than $2 a day.

As part of the privatization process, CPCS procured Manitoba Hydro International to manage the Transmission Company of Nigeria (TCN), the only part of the Power Holding Company of Nigeria that was meant to remain government property.69 But MHI said it would use its three-year contract to reorganize TCN in the hopes of privatizing most of the country’s sole transmission provider. A Nigerian analyst pointed out the strangeness of a public utility facilitating a process that would be illegal in its home province (The Manitoba Hydro Act requires a provincial referendum for privatization). Policy Chair on Energy, Infrastructure and Technology at Nigeria’s NDi think tank, Tunji Ariyomo, wrote: “One finds it a bit ironical that while Manitoba [MHI] remains solely a government owned company in Canada with a legislative protection to prevent its privatization, the company has announced that one of its key objectives is to reorganize Transmission Company of Nigeria such that its function as a Transmission Service Provider (TSP) could be separated and for the TSP to become a private commercial company.”70

MHI’s plans were resisted by elements in the government as well as the workforce, and much of the population. The electricity workers union demanded all outstanding labour issues be resolved prior to MHI’s takeover of TCN. They blocked MHI managers and minister Nnaji from entering the corporate headquarters until their picket lines were broken up by dozens of armed military personnel. The Daily Independent reported that “the workers were beaten to a pulp.” But the workforce refused to back down, with the Daily Independent newspaper noting that they “proceeded to make the environment a living hell for the Canadian firm.”71

Manitoba Hydro’s $24 million contract to manage TCN created conflict within the government and power ministry. While minister Nnaji supported it, the Daily Trust reported that “some powerful interests in the Ministry of Power were reportedly unimpressed with the arrangement to transfer the management of the transmission plants to the Canadian firm.”72 Electricity analyst Tunji Ariyomo provided a window into their concerns. He questioned the impact MHI’s contract would have on job creation and knowledge transfer and expressed concern, arguing that “responsibility for the management of the entire national power transmission backbone covering the 910,768 sq. km of the nation’s land space is being outsourced to one single monopoly.” Ariyomo further explained that “rather than receiving payments from this contract, government of Nigeria would be paying the platform operator. This is awkward. It directly negates the entire narrative behind a private sector led electricity sub-sector while potentially leaving room for collusion and ultimately corruption.”73

A year after MHI took charge of Nigeria’s transmission company, the chairman of TCN’s supervisory board, Hamman Tukur, resigned in protest. He accused the Canadian provincial utility of a domineering style and denounced MHI for appointing a new director to the TCN board, a move that should have been the government’s prerogative. Tukur told an interviewer: “Can you imagine this! Somebody from Manitoba in far-away Canada appointing a managing director and chief executive officer of the Transition Company of Nigeria owned by the Federal Government of Nigeria.”74

An engineer by training, Tukur also criticized MHI’s selection to chair the TCN board. “This Mr [Mack] Kast, who was being appointed the new TCN CEO has a Bachelor’s degree in Commerce, not in Engineering, from the University of Toronto, Canada. Can you believe this? He is now the chief executive of the TCN, responsible for providing electricity to a country of over 150 million people. God! This is unbelievable.”75

Tukur, of course, was critical of the government for allowing MHI to usurp his authority. But, the Nigerian government was under significant pressure from the G7 and international business community to accelerate a privatization process that was promoted partly on the grounds that the transmission company would be reorganized. Additionally, Canadian officials actively promoted MHI.

Four months after taking control of TCN, Manitoba Hydro’s contract was cancelled by Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan. With the workforce protesting and many in the government opposed to MHI’s plans, Director General of the Bureau of Public Procurement Emeka Eze highlighted irregularities in the process that led to MHI’s selection. According to the This Day, Eze sent a memo to the president “pushing for its [MHI’s contract] cancellation on the premise that it did not pass through due process as provided under the Public Procurement Act.”76

Canadian officials were hostile to the cancellation of MHI’s contract. In an article headlined “How Canadian Govt Forced [President] Jonathan to Make U-Turn” the Abuja Leadership reported that Canadian High Commissioner Chris Cooter contacted the minister of finance, vice president and president, telling them “that the Canadian government was unhappy with the issue and may be reluctant in supporting Nigeria in other sectors due to the way Manitoba has been treated.”77 The high commissioner also made Canada’s displeasure known to the public. “Manitoba Hydro, a company with extensive international experience, was selected for a three-year contract through a very transparent process to transform TCN into a financially sustainable and self-sufficient company in the power sector,” Cooter said in an official release.78 In his intervention the high commissioner also implied that if the MHI contract was not restored it could impact Canadian investment. “The message I am conveying back to Canada is that Nigeria is open for business, and that the Manitoba Hydro contract proves it,” Cooter noted. “To that end, in January our trade minister will come to Nigeria with a delegation of Canadian business investors in many fields, together with educational institutions.”79

The Canadian lobby was successful. Less than a week after MHI’s contract was cancelled the Nigerian government again reversed course. Six months later, during a meeting in Ottawa for the signing of a Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, International Trade Minister Ed Fast personally thanked Nigerian Vice President Mohammed Namadi Sambo. This Day reported that “Fast expressed Canada’s gratitude over the manner issues surrounding Manitoba Hydro was [sic] resolved.”80

Four years prior to the Ottawa meeting, the trade commissioner at the Canadian High Commission in Abuja, Sophie Bibeau, accompanied three MHI representatives to the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission’s headquarters to discuss the power industry. Further advancing the Manitoba company’s interests in Nigeria, Ottawa put up 82.5 million Naira in 2005 for a MHI administered electricity sector staff training initiative.81

It’s hard to imagine that the people of Manitoba wouldn’t be interested in what their crown corporation is doing in Africa, but despite hundreds of articles in Nigerian and international business outlets, the Canadian media ignored Manitoba Hydro’s role in Nigeria. Aside from the Dominion and University of Winnipeg radio CKUW the only mention I found was a 250-word Winnipeg Sun article that failed to discuss the political context. The May 2013 piece simply quoted Manitoba Hydro’s spokesman, Glenn Schneider, calling the Nigerian contract a way “to make a little extra money on the international market. ... That money flows to Manitoba Hydro itself, which helps in a small way to keep everybody’s rates down.”82 But, in a discussion of the company’s international division five years earlier, Manitoba Hydro president Bob Brennan told the Globe and Mail Report on Business: “You’re not going to make [enough] to reduce rate increases in Manitoba, but you are going to make a bit of money.”83 Brennan said MHI’s operations were largely viewed as an opportunity for staff development and to provide work for retirees (managers no doubt).84

The lack of oversight or even interest by the media in covering what is happening in Africa makes it easy for Canada’s preeminent privatization consultants to aggressively campaign against public utilities and services. Driven by ideology and a desire to make more money, CPCS (and other consultants) promote the idea that the public cannot build, operate or manage services. They claim the way forward is through public-private partnerships (PPPs), which often go beyond a standard design and build construction contract to include private sector participation in service operation, financing and decision making. CPCS officials sing the praises of PPPs in their writings, speeches and the company’s PPP newsletter. The firm also sponsors various pro-privatization forums such as the annual Africa Public Private Partnership Conference & Showcase.85

In a striking example of CPCS’ role in shaping the overarching policy environment, the Ottawa firm was hired to revise the African Union/NEPAD African Action Plan (AAP). At the 2008 Tokyo meeting of the African Partnership Forum, which comprises the wealthy donor countries, some officials criticized an initial draft of the AAP. To mollify this opposition, the African Development Bank — on behalf of the NEPAD Secretariat, AU Commission and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa — hired CPCS with the “objective of producing a revised AAP with buy-in from all stakeholders.”86

In an impressive display of cognitive dissonance or pure cynicism, CPCS’ review notes “the first guiding principle of NEPAD is African ownership and leadership. Accordingly, the process of selecting programmes and projects for the revised AAP must ultimately be done by African institutions.”87 But, in the meantime the Ottawa firm would determine the African Action Plan, or more precisely, what it believed the non-African G7 donors wanted to see in the AAP.

While winning the AAP contract reflects its status in neoliberal donor circles, CPCS is not a household name in Canada. Despite that, the company says “our clients have included every level of government in Canada, foreign government departments and agencies, industry associations, the private sector and all major international financial institutions, including the World Bank.”88 The company is also well connected in Ottawa. CPCS’ Vice President for French Africa, Jean-Francois Arsenault, worked for the Canadian International Development Agency while another company vice president held “economic advisory positions in the Government of Canada.”89 CEO Peter Kieran sits on the Canadian Trade Commissioner Service’s Infrastructure Public-Private Advisory Board and is a director of the Commonwealth Business Council. 90 He’s also chairman of the Canada Nigeria Chamber of Commerce and former chair of the Canadian Council on Africa (CCAfrica) and currently sits on its board of directors. CCAfrica claims to “maintain very close relations with the Canadian government as well as African governments.”91 Reflective of his stature in Ottawa, Kieran promotes EDC’s services in the export agency’s promotional literature.

CPCS’s African operations also receive high-level backing. During Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s 2012 visit to the Francophonie Summit in the Congo a CPCS official, Joseph Jones, participated in a business round table with the PM while senior company consultant Peter James participated in a 2015 trade mission to Tanzania with the trade minister. In January 2013 International Trade Minister Ed Fast visited a CPCS light rail project in Nigeria. A congratulatory release from Fast’s office read: “CPCS has successfully completed over 40 projects in Nigeria … The company is a good example of Canadian expertise helping Nigerians develop their booming economy.”92

Ironically, part of the reason CPCS has gotten so big in the privatization business is the government support it receives. Beyond the high-level diplomatic backing, Canadian officials based on the continent aid the company. In the Congo, the company reports, “the Canadian Embassy has provided valuable assistance in introducing CPCS to the local business community.”93

More significantly, Ottawa provides about $1 billion annually to the World Bank and Canada’s influence within the institution helps this country’s businesses win Bank financed work. But the federal government also organizes various initiatives to ensure that Canadian businesses profit from World Bank contracts. In 2015 Devex.com reported that “Canada’s foreign aid chief was in Washington to listen, learn and leverage his political clout to advance Canadian business interests with the World Bank.”94 A representative of CPCS accompanied development minister Christian Paradis to the meeting.95 Similarly, in 2013 key Canadian privatization consultants, including CPCS CEO Peter Kieran, participated in a meeting with then International Development Minister Julian Fantino on the sidelines of a World Bank conference.96 A government release noted that “Minister Fantino hosted a roundtable to strengthen the partnership opportunities between the Canadian private sector and the World Bank.”97 At the meeting Ottawa announced a $20 million contribution to create a Canada-International Finance Corporation Partnership Fund.98 An arm of the World Bank, the IFC encourages private sector development in impoverished countries.

Despite the many existing forms of government support (EDC financing, aid, diplomatic representation, World Bank influence etc.) the free market proponent complained that Ottawa isn’t doing enough to support Canadian corporations in Africa. In 2013 Kieran told a business journal that Ottawa should act more like how he believes Beijing operates in Africa. “The Chinese government plays such a strong coordinating role that their companies are able to offer projects that go all the way from conceptual design through to financing, engineering and construction.”99

Democratic accountability is nearly impossible when the public is largely uninformed about how their government supports corporations in Africa. Lack of information also makes it easy for governments to “spin” what’s happened into a story that suits their interests. In the next chapter Rwanda further illustrates this point. 

12. Mythology and Reality

The primary aim of this book is to tell the truth about Canada’s historic and current relationship with Africa even if it may seem unfamiliar and challenge some Canadians’ sense of themselves as “good guys on the world stage”.

All too often power defines what is considered reality. Nowhere is this more obvious than Rwanda. Most Canadians have heard this story: Deep-seated ethnic enmity erupted in a 100-day genocidal rampage by Hutus killing Tutsis, only to be stopped by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). A noble Canadian general tried to end the bloodletting but a dysfunctional UN refused resources. Washington was caught off guard by the slaughter, but it has apologized for failing to intervene and has committed to never again avoid its responsibility to protect.

But this widely repeated account is ahistorical, counterintuitive and, in the words of Ed Herman and David Peterson, a “remarkable achievement of a propaganda system sustained by both public and private power.”1

While the official story of the Rwandan genocide begins April 6, 1994, any serious investigation must at least go back to the events of October 1, 1990. On that day, thousands of troops from Uganda’s army, mainly exiled Tutsi elite, invaded Rwanda. The Ugandan government accounted for these events with the explanation that 4,000 of its troops “deserted” to invade. These troops included Uganda’s former deputy defence minister, former head of intelligence and other important military officials.2 This unbelievable explanation has been accepted largely because Washington and London backed Uganda’s aggression, which according to the Nuremberg Principles is the “supreme international crime, differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.”3

Much of the Tutsi force that invaded Rwanda in 1990 fought alongside President Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) during its six-year quest to capture control of Uganda (the NRM was dominated by the Hima, close relatives of the Tutsi).4 The leader of the force that invaded Rwanda, Paul Kagame, had been head of intelligence for the Ugandan government. He was trained at the US military officer academy in Fort Leavenworth Kansas “where rising stars of the U.S. military and other places go to get training.”5

Applying US training techniques, Kagame’s RPF seized control of Rwanda through force of arms. More than 90% Tutsi, the RPF was unlikely to gain power democratically in a country where less than 15% of the population was Tutsi. In fact, some have speculated that fear of elections — set for the end of 1994 by the Arusha peace accords — may have provided motivation for the assassination of Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana.6

The assassination of Habyarimana sparked the mass slaughter of spring 1994. The RPF remains the prime suspect in the fatal shooting, but is nevertheless widely celebrated for ending the genocide. Both directly and indirectly, the RPF is implicated in a significant proportion of the bloodshed during the genocide. Christian Davenport and Allan Stam, US academics initially sponsored by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, found a strong correlation between RFP “surges” — advances in April 1994 — and local bloodbaths. In 2009 Davenport and Stam reported: “The killings in the zone controlled by the FAR [Armed Forces of Rwanda] seemed to escalate as the RPF moved into the country and acquired more territory. When the RPF advanced, large-scale killings escalated. When the RPF stopped, large-scale killings largely decreased.”7 Somewhere between several hundred thousand and a million Rwandans were killed over 100 days in mid-1994. The US academics concluded that the “majority of victims were likely Hutu and not Tutsi.”8

The Rwandan genocide was not a long planned attempt to exterminate all Tutsi. Instead, it was the outgrowth of a serious breakdown in social order that saw hundreds of thousands of Tutsi slaughtered by relatively disorganized local command. But the RPF also killed tens of thousands of Hutu and was likely responsible for shooting down the presidential plane that sparked the mass killing. This makes sense since in April 1994 the RPF was best placed to unleash violence. In The Politics of Genocide Herman and Peterson point out that “the RPF was the only well-organized killing force within Rwanda in 1994, and the only one that planned a major military offensive.”9

The rise of ethnic enmity and breakdown of social order was caused by many factors. The 1990 Uganda/RPF invasion displaced about one million Rwandans, nearly 15% of the population.10 Six months before the spring 1994 bloodletting, Burundi’s Tutsi-dominated army assassinated its first elected Hutu president. The political killings sparked significant violence and the flight of hundreds of thousands of mostly Hutu Burundians into Rwanda. This further destabilized the small country and elevated animosity towards Tutsis, who were accused of refusing to accept majority rule.

(Rwanda’s 1959-61 Hutu revolution saw the majority group gain political control while the Tutsi minority maintained control of Burundi after independence. Historically, the Tutsi, who speak the same language and practice the same religion as the Hutu, were distinguished based upon their proximity to the monarchy. In other words, the Tutsi/Hutu was a class/caste divide.)

The breakdown of social order was also tied to economic hardship brought on by the low price of coffee and foreign-imposed economic adjustments. No longer worried about the prospect of poor coffee producers turning towards the Soviet Union, the US withdrew its support for the International Coffee Agreement in 1989, an accord Ottawa was never enamoured with. The price of coffee tumbled, devastating Rwanda’s main cash crop. Largely because of the reduction in the price of coffee the government’s budget dropped by 40 percent.11 When Rwanda went in search of international support, the IMF used the country’s weakness to push economic reforms at the same time as donors demanded political reforms. The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire notes “political adjustments were pushed on Rwanda at the same time that Canada required Rwanda to adopt a structural adjustment approach to its economy.”12 As in so many other places, structural adjustment brought social instability.

In the years leading to the mass killings, Canada began tying its aid to a “democratization” process, despite the country being under assault from a foreign-supported guerrilla group, the RPF. Ostensibly, because of human rights violations, Ottawa cut millions in aid to Rwanda. Prime Minister Brian Mulroney wrote three letters in the early 1990s to Rwandan President Habyarimana, criticizing his human rights record and his slow pace on peace negotiations with the RPF.13 On December 6, 1991, Foreign Affairs wrote the head of its arm’s-length human rights organization Rights & Democracy, Ed Broadbent, telling him to visit Rwanda and to begin a program in that country.14 After a visit to Rwanda, in January 1993, Broadbent gave a press conference in Brussels claiming Habyarimana was directly responsible for a genocide (more than a year before the mass killings began).15 Rights & Democracy was quick to criticize Habyarimana’s rights record, though it failed to recognize the context: an invasion organized and armed by its much larger neighbour Uganda (with quiet support from Washington, London and Ottawa).16

The RPF benefited from the role Canada played in weakening the Habyarimana government. Ottawa also played a more direct part in Kagame’s rise to power. Taking direction from Washington, Canadian General (later Senator) Romeo Dallaire was the military commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), which was dispatched to oversee the Arusha Accords.

According to numerous accounts, including his civilian commander on the UN mission, Dallaire aided the RPF. Gilbert Ngijo, political assistant to the civilian commander of UNAMIR, summarizes the criticism: “He [Dallaire] let the RPF get arms. He allowed UNAMIR troops to train RPF soldiers. United Nations troops provided the logistics for the RPF. They even fed them.”17

In his book Le Patron de Dallaire Parle (The Boss of Dallaire Speaks), Jacques-Roger Booh Booh, a former Cameroon foreign minister and overall head of UNAMIR, claims Dallaire had little interest in the violence unleashed by the RPF despite reports of summary executions in areas controlled by them.18 RPF soldiers were regularly seen in Dallaire’s office, with the Canadian commander describing the Rwandan army’s position in Kigali. This prompted Booh Booh to wonder if Dallaire “also shared UNAMIR military secrets with the RPF when he invited them to work in his offices.”19 Finally, Booh Booh says Dallaire turned a blind eye to RPF weapons coming across the border from Uganda and he believes the UN forces may have even transported weapons directly to the RPF.20 Dallaire, Booh Booh concludes, “abandoned his role as head of the military to play a political role. He violated the neutrality principle of MINUAR by becoming an objective ally of one of the parties in the conflict.”21

Dallaire doesn’t deny his admiration for Kagame. In Shake Hands with the Devil, published several years after Kagame unleashed unprecedented terror in the Congo, Dallaire wrote: “My guys and the RPF soldiers had a good time together” at a small cantina.22 Dallaire then explained: “It had been amazing to see Kagame with his guard down for a couple of hours, to glimpse the passion that drove this extraordinary man.”23 Dallaire’s interaction with the RPF was not in the spirit of UN guidelines that called on staff to avoid close ties to individuals, organizations, parties or factions of a conflict.24

A witness at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) actually accused Dallaire of complicity in a massacre. A Rwandan national testifying under the pseudonym T04, reported Tanzania’s Arusha Times, “alleged that in April 1994, Gen. Dallaire allowed members of the rebel Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF, now in power in Kigali), to enter the national stadium and organize massacres of Hutus. Several people, including the witness, took refuge there following the assassination of Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana.”25

Criticisms of Dallaire’s actions in Rwanda have been almost entirely ignored by Canadian media. Le Patron de Dallaire Parle went largely unnoticed, or at least not commented upon. A Canadian news search found three mentions of the book (a National Post review headlined “Allegations called ‘ridiculous’: UN boss attacks general,” an Ottawa Citizen piece headlined “There are many sides to the Rwanda saga” and a letter by an associate of Dallaire). Other critical assessments of Dallaire’s actions in Rwanda have fared no better including Enduring Lies: The Rwandan Genocide in the Propaganda System, 20 Years Later in which the authors “suggest that Dallaire should be regarded as a war criminal for positively facilitating the actual mass killings of April-July, rather than taken as a hero for giving allegedly disregarded warnings that might have stopped them.”26

On the other hand, a Canadian news search of “Romeo Dallaire Rwanda” elicited over 6,000 articles that generally provide a positive portrayal of Dallaire. Similarly, a search for mention of Dallaire’s 2003 book Shake Hands with the Devil elicited 1,700 articles.

But Dallaire did not support the RPF on a personal whim. Evidence suggests Ottawa backed the US/British position in favour of Uganda/RPF. During the worst of the Rwandan conflict, Canadian military aircraft continued to fly into Rwanda from Uganda, the country that sponsored the RPF.27 In Tested Mettle: Canada’s Peacekeepers at War Scott Taylor and Brian Nolan write: “A sizable contingent of JTF2 [Canadian special forces Joint Task Force 2] had been deployed into Africa. To provide additional ‘security’ for the U.N. mission in Rwanda, MacLean and his team had set up an ‘advanced operational base’ in Uganda. From there they would launch long-range, covert intelligence patrols deep into Rwandan territory.”28

Some commentators have even suggested the UN military force, which was in charge of airport security in Kigali, may have helped the RPF shoot down the plane carrying both Rwandan Hutu President Juvénal Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira on April 6, 1994 as well as the chief of staff of the Rwandan Defence Forces, another official responsible for the “maison militaire” of the Rwandan president as well as the chief of the military cabinet of the Rwandan president and two Burundian ministers. That event triggered mass killing and an environment of deep instability that facilitated the RPF’s rise to power. (According to the official story, Hutu extremists waited until much of the Hutu-led Rwandan military command was physically eliminated and the Hutu were at their weakest point in three decades, before they began a long planned systematic extermination of Tutsi.)

Habyarimana’s assassination ignited a mass killing spree (but no planned genocide, according to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR]). Five days after Habyarimana’s death, an internal US memorandum warned of “hundreds of thousands of deaths”, but in Rwanda and the New Scramble for Africa Robin Philpot notes, “even though they knew that the massacres would occur and that millions would flee to other countries, the Americans devoted all their efforts to forcing the United Nations to withdraw its UNAMIR troops.”29 With RPF forces advancing on Kigali, UN troops would likely have blocked the RPF from capturing the capital. Canada went along with the US position.

Within 24 hours of Habyarimana’s assassination the RPF had doubled the size of the territory it controlled.30 Two weeks later the RPF controlled the north-eastern third of the country with the Rwandan military “running for their lives,” wrote Dallaire in his book.31 Six weeks later the RPF controlled half of Rwanda and a few weeks later they had two thirds of the country, including Kigali.32

Canadian Supreme Court Justice Louise Arbour, who left the bench to head the ICTR, wasn’t interested in evidence suggesting the RPF was responsible for Habyarimana’s assassination. According to French government investigators and the National Post, she refused to investigate evidence implicating the RPF in shooting down Habyarimana’s airplane.33 In 1996 former ICTR investigator Michael Hourigan compiled evidence based on the testimony of three RPF informants who claimed “direct involvement in the 1994 fatal rocket attack upon the President’s aircraft” and “specifically implicated the direct involvement of [Kagame]” and other RPF members.34 But, when Hourigan delivered the evidence to her in early 1997, Arbour was “aggressive” and “hostile,” according to Hourigan. Despite initially supporting the investigation surrounding who shot down the plane, the ICTR’s chief prosecutor now advised Hourigan that the “investigation was at an end because in her view it was not in our [the ICTR’s] mandate.”35

When the ICTR prosecutor who took over from Arbour, Carla del Ponte, began to investigate the RPF’s role in shooting down Habyarimana’s plane the British and Americans had her removed from her position. Del Ponte details her ordeal and the repression of the investigation in The Hunt: Me and the War Criminals.

A French magistrate, Jean-Louis Bruguière, who spent eight years investigating the death of the three French nationals operating the presidential jet, issued nine arrest warrants for high-ranking RPF officials (French law prohibits issuing an arrest warrant for a head of state, excluding Kagame from the investigation.) Bruguière concluded that Kagame rejected the August 1993 Arusha Accords and that he needed Habyarimana’s “physical elimination” for the RPF to take power.36 Bruguière’s detailed investigation on behalf of the French family members of the jet’s crew showed that “due to the numerical inferiority of the Tutsi electorate, the political balance of power did not allow [Kagame] to win elections on the basis of the political process set forth by the Arusha Agreements without the support of the opposition parties. … [I]n Paul Kagame’s mind, the physical elimination of President Habyarimana became imperative as early as October 1993 as the sole way of achieving his political aims.”37 In protest of the investigation, Kagame broke off diplomatic relations with France.38

Washington backed the Uganda/RPF takeover of Rwanda for a variety of reasons. US officials saw Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni as an up-and-coming strongman and bulwark of Anglo-Saxon power vis-à-vis Sudan and the Great Lakes region. Similarly, Washington viewed the RPF as a potential proxy force in a French-dominated region. A trio of authors explain in The Congo: Plunder and Resistance: “The plan expressed clearly by the White House at the time was to use the Rwandan army as an instrument of American interests. One American analyst explained how Rwanda could be as important to the USA in Africa as Israel has been in the Middle East.”39

Washington provided diplomatic cover for Uganda’s aggression in Rwanda as part of an effort to undermine French influence in the region. With the end of the Cold War and weakening of Russia’s influence on the continent, Washington decided it would no longer allow the French to dominate large parts of Africa. After a May 1995 Afro-American summit Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown explained: “America is going to be demanding of Africa’s traditional partners, starting with France. We are no longer going to leave Africa to the Europeans.”40 Similarly, on an October 1996 visit to Africa, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher noted: “The time is up when Africa could be divided into spheres of influence, when foreign powers could consider whole groups of countries to be reserved for them. Today Africa needs the support of all its friends rather than the exclusive patronage of a few.”41

Rwanda was viewed as an important staging ground for control over central Africa’s big prize, the Congo’s immense mineral resources (worth up to $24 trillion according to African Business).42 Famous for three decades of corruption and brutality, Zaire (now Congo) dictator Joseph Mobutu was allied with Habyarimana and close to Paris. Mobutu remained in office until May 1997 when a Rwandan/Ugandan invasion pushed him out.

Before the 1996 Rwanda/Uganda invasion of the Congo, officials from Congo pointed out the broader geopolitical dimension of the conflict. A top Mobutu official said Rwanda aimed to “establish the Anglo-American hegemony in the Great Lakes region at the expense of La Francophonie.”43

Rwanda justified its 1996 intervention into the Congo as an effort to protect the Banyamulenge (Congolese Tutsi) living in Eastern Congo from the Hutus who fled the country when the RPF took power. As many as two million, mostly Hutu, refugees fled the RPF takeover of Rwanda.

The US military increased its assistance to Rwanda in the months leading up to its October 1996 invasion of Zaire.44 In The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006 Filip Reyntjens explains: “The United States was aware of the intentions of Kagame to attack the refugee camps and probably assisted him in doing so. In addition, they deliberately lied about the number and fate of the refugees remaining in Zaire, in order to avoid the deployment of an international humanitarian force, which could have saved tens of thousands of human lives, but which was resented by Kigali and AFDL [L’Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo, a Rwandan backed rebel force led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila].”45

Ottawa played an important part in this sordid affair. In late 1996, Canada led a short-lived UN force into eastern Zaire, meant to bring food and protection to Hutu refugees. The official story is that Prime Minister Jean Chrétien organized a humanitarian mission into eastern Zaire after his wife saw images of exiled Rwandan refugees on CNN. In fact, Washington proposed that Ottawa, with many French speakers at its disposal, lead the UN mission. The US didn’t want pro-Mobutu France to gain control of the UN force.46

On November 9, 1996, the UN Security Council backed a French resolution to establish a multinational force in eastern Congo. Four days later, French Defence Minister Charles Millon urged Washington to stop stalling on the force. ‘‘Intervention is urgent and procrastination by some countries is intolerable,’’ Millon said in a radio interview. ‘‘The United States must not drag its feet any longer.’’47

Canada’s mission to the Congo was designed to dissipate French pressure and ensure it didn’t take command of a force that could impede Rwanda’s invasion of the eastern Congo. “The United States and Canada did not really intend to support an international force,” writes Reyntjens.48 “Operation Restore Silence” was how Oxfam’s emergencies director Nick Stockton sarcastically described the mission. He says the Anglosphere countries “managed the magical disappearance” of half a million refugees in eastern Zaire.49 In a bid to justify the non-deployment of the UN force, Canadian Defence Minister Doug Young claimed over 700,000 refugees had returned to Rwanda. A December 8 article in Québec City’s Le Soleil pointed out that this was “the highest estimated number of returnees since the October insurrection in Zaire.”50

The RPF dismantled infrastructure and massacred thousands of civilians in the Hutu refugee camps, prompting some 300,000 to flee westward on foot from refugee camp to refugee camp. Dying to Live by Pierre-Claver Ndacyayisenga describes a harrowing personal ordeal of being chased across the Congo by the RPF and its allies.

Ultimately, most of the Canadian-led UN force was not deployed since peacekeepers would have slowed down or prevented Rwanda and its allies from succeeding. But, the initial batch of Canadian soldiers deployed to the staging ground in Uganda left much of the equipment they brought along. In Le Canada dans les guerres en Afrique centrale: génocides et pillages des ressources minières du Congo par le Rwanda interposé Patrick Mbeko suggests the Ugandan Army put the equipment to use in the Congo.51

Prior to deploying the Canadian-led multinational force, Commander General Maurice Baril met with officials in Kigali as well as the director of the joint staff at the Pentagon.52 Hinting at who was in the driver’s seat, the New York Times reported that Baril “cancelled a meeting with United Nations officials and flew instead to Washington for talks.”53 In deference to the Rwandan-backed forces, Baril said he would only deploy UN troops with the rebels’ permission. ‘‘Anything that I do I will coordinate with the one who is tactically holding the ground,’’ Baril noted.54

Much to Mobutu’s dismay, Baril met rebel leader Laurent Kabila who was at that time shunned by most of the international community.55 The meeting took place in a ransacked mansion that had belonged to Zaire’s president and as part of the visit Kabila took Baril on a tour of the area surrounding Goma city.56 Baril justified the meeting, asserting: “I had to reassure the government of Canada that the situation had changed and we could go home.”57

The book Nous étions invincibles, the personal account of Canadian special forces commando Denis Morrisset, provides a harrowing account of the Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2) operation to bring Baril to meet Kabila. The convoy came under attack and was only bailed out when US Apache and Blackhawk helicopters retaliated. Some thirty Congolese were killed by a combination of helicopter and JTF2 fire.58 Official Ottawa was happy with Baril’s work, appointing him chief of the defence staff in September 1997.

A number of sources reported on US personnel operating in eastern Congo. The Wall Street Journal quoted “an American pilot flying for the rebels” while African Business reported that “European Intelligence sources also mention the pervasive presence in Goma, of former Pentagon officers acting as military advisers to the [rebel] Alliance.”59 US Ambassador in Kigali Robert E. Gribbin admits that he set up a meeting between Kabila and US officials during his initial incursion into Congo and after he took Kinshasa Gribbin referred to Kabila as someone “we had created”.60

Kabila maintained frequent contact with Richard Orth, former deputy of the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency for Africa. Appointed by Clinton, Orth became US military attaché to Kigali shortly before Kabila began his march across the DRC.61

A subsidiary of Halliburton reportedly built a training base for the Rwandan Army on the border.62 With former Secretary of State George Schultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger on its payroll, Bechtel provided the rebels with satellite maps and reconnaissance photos of Mobutu’s troops.63 According to the Wall Street Journal, Bechtel executive Robert Stewart provided Kabila with advice “to help him deal with ethnic uprisings.”64

Alongside tactical intelligence, Bechtel helped the rebels in other ways. The San Francisco-based company drew up a development plan and inventory of the country’s mineralogical and geographical data.65 This information was incredibly valuable to prospective mining firms.

Resources fuelled the Rwandan/Ugandan invasion. Prominent Belgian Great Lakes journalist Colette Brackman produced a map showing that the zigzag progression of Kabila’s rebels was based on the location of minerals.66 Multinationals signed billions of dollars in deals with Kabila before he took office.67 The Wall Street Journal explained: “At a time when rebel forces are threatening to topple dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, Zaire’s vast mineral resources are beckoning foreign companies, prompting a scramble that recalls the grab for wealth 120 years ago in this vast land, once known as the Congo. American, Canadian and South African mining companies are negotiating deals with the rebels controlling eastern Zaire. These companies hope to take advantage of the turmoil and win a piece of what is widely considered Africa’s richest geological prize — and one of the richest in the world.”68 During Mobutu’s reign, locally based Congolese powerbrokers controlled the distribution of resources on the government’s behalf, which limited the scale of mining deals. But, according to The Business of War in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Who Benefits?, after the AFDL invasion, foreign corporations were able to secure much larger mining concessions.69

A number of Canadian companies signed deals with Kabila before he took Kinshasa in May 1997. In a 2004 Canadian Geographic article Madeleine Drohan explains that “the main shareholder of [Toronto-listed] Adastra minerals, Jean-Raymond Boulle, decided to throw his support behind the rebel leader early on, providing a jet for Kabila’s use and arranging to buy diamonds from the rebel troops long before they reached the Congolese capital of Kinshasa.”70 Infamous Canadian mining executive Robert Friedland was Boulle’s partner in Adastra, which was later taken over by First Quantum Minerals.

Vancouver-based First Quantum signed nearly $1 billion worth of contracts with Kabila before he assumed power. Delphine Abadie explains in Canada and the Geopolitics of Mining Interests: a case study of the Democratic Republic of Congo: “One month before capturing Kinshasa, Kabila’s forces signed three contracts with First Quantum Minerals (FQM) for the Kansanshi and Lonshi mines in Katanga, worth $1 billion Can.”71 From 1997 to 2001 First Quantum’s stock value rose from almost nothing to $140 million.72

Partly to facilitate its move into the Congo, First Quantum hired former prime minister and long-time foreign minister Joe Clark. Soon after, reported Canadian Business, “[Clark] paid a couple of visits to Laurent Kabila, the rebel strongman-turned-president of the Democratic Republic of Congo.”73 Clark became part of what the Christian Science Monitor dubbed Kabila’s “circle of Canadian advisers.”74

With former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, US President George Bush Sr., Tennessee Senator Howard Baker and Bill Clinton’s advisor, Vernon Jordan, on its board, Toronto’s Barrick Gold signed a deal with Kabila for a gold concession in northeast Congo.75 Canadian NGO worker Carole Jerome claims “Barrick made a deal with Kabila in [the eastern Congolese city of] Lubumbashi in February, three months before Kabila came to power in Kinshasa.”76

After taking control of the Congo with their assistance, Kabila turned on his Rwandan and Ugandan allies, demanding they exit the country. This prompted a full-scale invasion by Rwanda in August 1998, which the US backed. In a book titled In the Aftermath of Genocide: The U.S. Role in Rwanda, former US Ambassador Robert E. Gribbin explained: “The United States accepted Rwanda’s national security rationale as legitimate. We also recognized that the RCD [rebels] was a proxy, directed in many respects from Kigali.”77

According to the UN, the Rwanda/Uganda occupation led to “mass scale looting” in eastern and south-eastern Congo.78 Rwanda used forced labour — generally indentured labourers from Rwandan prisons — to dig colton and other minerals.79 Despite producing no diamonds, Rwandan diamond exports increased from 166 carats in 1998 to 30,000 carats in 2000 while Ugandan colton exports grew from 0 to 69.5 tons.80 The illegally extracted resources paid for a large share of the Rwandan military’s budget and enriched a small group of regime supporters in Kigali.

When Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian troops looked set to take Kinshasa, Angola and Zimbabwe intervened on Kabila’s behalf. Eight nations would ultimately participate in a war that officially lasted five years (and continues to today in parts of eastern Congo). Millions died from the violence largely unleashed by Rwanda in the Congo. A January 2008 study by the International Rescue Committee blamed the conflict and its destabilizing impact for 5.4 million Congolese deaths over a decade.81 In October 2010, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights released a report on the Congo spanning 1993 to 2003 that charged Rwandan troops with engaging in mass killings “that might be classified as crimes of genocide.”82

Despite a trail that left millions dead in the Congo and an appalling domestic human rights record, Ottawa offered assistance and diplomatic support to the RPF. After Rwandan proxies once again displaced hundreds of thousands of people in eastern Congo in late 2008, Sweden and the Netherlands finally suspended some aid to Rwanda (a country dependent on donor support for more than half of its budget).83 Ottawa said and did little about the Rwandan-backed aggression in the Congo. During a flare up of violence in the eastern Congo’s Kivu provinces in November 2008, Foreign Affairs released two statements referencing the situation. Neither mentioned Rwanda or its proxy rebel leader Laurent Nkunda.

In April 2012, Rwanda reasserted its military hold over a large chunk of the Congo. Rwandan troops together with the M23 militia group captured Goma, a city of a million people in the mineral-rich east of the country. The Globe and Mail’s Geoffrey York reported, “a [new] layer of administrators, informers, police and other operatives [have been put in place] who will bolster M23’s economic power in the city — including their grip on the trade in ‘blood minerals’.”84 Ottawa remained decidedly ambivalent towards the Rwandan-sponsored violence. When violence resurged in eastern Congo between May and December 2012, Foreign Affairs published four press releases on the matter. Only one sentence mentioned Rwanda, despite UN reports that Rwandan troops were once again involved, with its defence minister commanding the entire operation.85 That sentence read: “We are extremely concerned by continuing allegations of Rwandan support of M23 and urge the immediate cessation of any form of assistance.”86

The four press releases contained more criticism of the relatively powerless Congolese government than of Rwanda. In fact, one release was little more than an attack against the government in Kinshasa. In a statement about “the increasing instability in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo,” Foreign Affairs urged “the Congo to ensure the protection of human rights is central in their daily deliberations.” With no mention of Rwanda or the M23, it goes on to state: “The rapidly rising number of displaced persons and refugees is a troubling trend and needs to be addressed immediately.”87

Between May and December 2012 Ottawa produced more statements and comments critical of Congolese president Joseph Kabila than the foreign sponsored M23. “Canada Concerned by Post-election Situation in Democratic Republic of Congo” and “Minister of State Valcourt Encourages Reforms in Democratic Republic of Congo,” announced two of the statements. During an October trip to the Francophonie summit in Kinshasa, Prime Minister Harper and his staff repeatedly complained about the Kabila government’s human rights record. After meeting representatives of the political opposition, Harper described the “complete unacceptability of failures in the electoral process and the abuse of human rights that are taking place in this country.”88

While major question marks surround the legitimacy of the December 2011 Congolese poll in which Kabila was re-elected, it was certainly as free and fair as the 2010 Rwandan election. After Kagame’s return to power in August 2010, Ottawa noted: “Canada commends the people of Rwanda on participating in their country’s presidential election.”89 The harshest criticism in the statement was that Canada was “concerned” by violence, “intimidation of political opposition” and “restrictions on the media.”90

The Rwandan government ruthlessly suppressed opposition. Political opponents rotted in jail while freedom of assembly and the press were nonexistent. Kagame’s regime is widely suspected of having murdered numerous former allies who fled the country after turning critical. “‘Whoever betrays the country will pay the price, I assure you,’ Rwandan President Paul Kagame told a rally soon after the country’s former intelligence chief, Patrick Karegeya, was found strangled in a South African hotel room last January,” reported Gwynne Dyer in 2014. “Karegeya had quit the government and become a leading opponent of the regime, which President Kagame would certainly see as a betrayal of the country.”91

In 2009, Ottawa supported Rwanda’s entry into the Commonwealth and the next year Canada donated a dozen patrol vehicles to the Rwanda National Police.92 Since 2004, Kagame has visited Canada at least three times. He spoke at the University of Western Ontario that year and received an honorary doctorate and peace medal from the University of Sherbrooke in 2006. At the time, Grands-Lacs Confidentiel criticized the Canadian government for inviting the “African Hitler” to Canada.93

Once again, in September 2013, the Rwandan strongman came to Canada for a public event. “We protest today the Canadian government’s permission for the visit,” Gally Gasana, a Rwandan expatriate told the CBC. “We protest today the war in Congo, the mass murder of hundreds and thousands of people.”94

Kagame often labels his opponents as génocidaires. In 2010, presidential candidate Victoire Ingabire, who was not in Rwanda during the war or when the alleged crimes took place, was prosecuted for genocide denial.95 Human Rights Watch Africa Director Daniel Bekele said “the prosecution of Ingabire for ‘genocide ideology’ and ‘divisionism’ illustrates the Rwandan government’s unwillingness to tolerate criticism and to accept the role of opposition parties in a democratic society.”96

Ottawa supported Kagame’s witch-hunt. In Rwanda and the Scramble for Africa Robin Philpot points to the example of a former Rwandan prime minister denied a Canadian visa: “The Prime Minister of the government that supposedly ended the genocide had now become a génocidaire. Canada had already received Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramngu with all honours in December 1994 when he was looking for funding to rebuild Rwanda under the RPF. Either Canada’s institutional memory is short and selective or, more likely, the country has a policy of supporting the RPF government at all costs.”97

Rwandans who’ve sought refuge in Canada have been harassed. After he criticizing the RPF, a human rights organization with close ties to the Rwandan government accused Victor Ndihokubwayo of leading a group of Tutsis seeking sanctuary to their deaths in 1994. In 2002, investigators from the war crimes branch of the Justice Department interviewed a dozen witnesses in Rwanda about Ndihokubwayo, who worked as a lawyer for the federal government. After compiling the testimonies, the investigators decided he would not face charges. Three years later the Canada Border Service tried to extradite Ndihokubwayo. Reflective of the politically motivated nature of the deportation, Canada Border Services officials only submitted the interviews that aided their case. The Globe and Mail reported: “At the hearing, summaries of only three interviews conducted in Rwanda were disclosed — those that helped the government’s case. Mr. Ndihokubwayo’s lawyer knew others had been interviewed, including the senator who’d been saved by Mr. Ndihokubwayo. But when he asked for full disclosure, the investigators said there was nothing more. The summaries that were disclosed were also misleading, having omitted details that would have cast doubt on the case.”98

Once the undisclosed interviews were released, the deportation case was dismissed and the judge denounced the government for “abuse of process”.99

After a 10-year legal battle Québec city-based Léon Mugesera, who left Rwanda in 1993, was extradited in 2012. He purportedly condemned Tutsis in a speech a year and a half before the spring 1994 killings. A 2014 La Presse article headlined “En prison au Rwanda: Léon Mugesera craint pour sa vie” reported accusations that a guard threatened to shoot the former University of Laval professor.100

The extradition of Mugesera and attempt to deport Ndihokubwayo assume that accused génocidaires can receive a fair trial in Rwanda. They can’t. That said, it might not be possible for the defendants to receive a proper trial in Canada, either.

The first individual ever arrested and convicted in Canada on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity was a Rwandan businessman. After a two-year, $4 million trial, Désiré Munyaneza was found guilty of several counts of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity in and around Rwanda’s second-largest city, Butare. The judge surmised: “The accused, an educated and privileged man, chose to kill, rape and pillage, vaunting the superiority of his ethnic group, reminding us again that every time a man claims to be part of a superior race, a chosen people, humanity is in danger.”101 In a highly politicized statement, the judge complained that Munyaneza produced several witnesses who questioned the official story of the Rwandan genocide. “We know that denying a genocide is to kill the victims a second time,” he wrote.102

While Rwanda’s dictatorship has been in Ottawa’s good books, Canadian officials turned critical of Congolese President Joseph Kabila (the son of Laurent Kabila who was assassinated in 2001). Kabila angered Western countries when he signed a $6 billion resource for infrastructure deal with China in 2008. In exchange for the right to extract 11 million tons of copper and 620,000 tons of cobalt from the Congo, China agreed to build 6,000 kilometres of roads and railway track as well as hundreds of schools, airports and clinics.103

More significantly, Ottawa opposed the Congolese government’s (modest) moves to regain some control over the country’s natural resources, including $3 billion in Canadian mining investment.104 In the face of civil society pressure, the government set up a Committee for the Review of Mining Contracts signed during the war.

Claiming Vancouver’s First Quantum Mining violated parts of its contract, in September 2009 the Congolese government withdrew the company’s rights to a copper mine in the eastern part of the country. Stephen Harper’s Conservatives staunchly defended First Quantum.

“Canada to press Congo mining dispute at G20 meeting,” read a headline in London’s Financial Times.105 During the G8/G20 in June 2010, the Conservatives pushed for a declaration in the final communiqué calling on the Congo to “extend urgently the rule of law” and “enhance governance and accountability in the extractive sector.”106 The Financial Post captured the mood: “G8 leaders scold Congo on governance.”107 A First Quantum spokesperson told the paper: “The company is encouraged by the G8’s statement regarding the governance issues challenging the resource sector in the [DRC].”108 But the Conservatives did not stop there. They took the issue to other international forums. The Financial Post reported: “Harper will raise the case of Vancouver-based First Quantum Minerals Ltd. with representatives from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other governments that do business in the DRC.”109

As part of this effort, Ottawa obstructed international efforts to reschedule the country’s foreign debt, which was mostly accrued during more than three decades of Joseph Mobuto’s dictatorship and the subsequent multi-country war. “The Canadian government wants to use the Paris Club [of debtor nations] in order to resolve a particular problem [with First Quantum]”, explained Congolese information minister Lambert Mende in November 2009. “This is unacceptable.”110

Ottawa refused to respond directly to allegations that it used Congo’s indebtedness to gain political concessions for Canadian mining companies. But, Conservative government spokesperson Me’shel Gulliver Bélanger told Reuters: “Some Canadian firms have been having significant issues in a challenging investment environment.”111

A Canadian Business article based on a number of access-to- information requests noted that First Quantum hired Daniel Brock, a lawyer who formerly worked in the Finance and Foreign Affairs departments. “Brock met twice with officials, including the international trade minister’s chief of staff, to discuss ‘Canadian foreign policy regarding debt forgiveness package for Democratic Republic of Congo.’”112

After winning concessions that pleased Canada’s many mining companies in the Congo, Ottawa relented on the debt rescheduling. Though largely ignored outside of Canada’s business press, the story received significant attention “in the Congo where newspaper editorial cartoons mocked Canada and First Quantum”, reported the Financial Post.113 Outside of Canadian Business and The Dominion magazine, the Canadian media ignored the circumstances under which First Quantum acquired its concession.

It is key to recall that First Quantum struck its deal with Laurent Kabila when he was fighting the national government in the mid-1990s. One reason First Quantum’s project was nationalized was because the company had rejected the Congolese government’s attempt to renegotiate mining licenses granted during the war. In an article headlined “Canada and the Geopolitics of Mining Interests: A Case Study of the Democratic Republic of Congo,” Delpni Abadie writes: “Among the last contracts examined in the 2009 report of the Committee for the Review of Mining Contracts in DRC (2009) was the Kingamyambo Musonoi Tailings (KMT) project. The Congolese government was pressured by the Canadian Ambassador in the DRC, Sigrid Anna Johnson, backed up by Hillary Clinton, to review its decision to cancel the contract involving Vancouver’s FQM [First Quantum]. The sovereign conclusion of the Review Committee was decisive on the outcome of this contract: cancellation.”114

In addition to the internal review committee, a 2002 report by the UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo accused First Quantum of violating OECD guidelines during the war. The report referred to the “collusion” between foreign mining companies and “highly placed government officials who provide mining licenses and export permits in return for private gain. … For example, in its attempts to buy the Kolwezi Tailings, First Quantum Minerals (FQM) of Canada offered a down payment to the State of $100 million, cash payments and shares held in trust for Government officials. According to documents in the possession of the Panel, the payments list included the National Security Minister, Mwenze Kongolo; the Director of the National Intelligence Agency rights, Didier Kazadi Nyembwe; the Director General of Gécamines, Yumba Monga; and the former Minister of the Presidency, Pierre-Victor Mpoyo. The FQM share offer to those officials was premised on a sharp rise in its share price once it was announced that it had secured some of the most valuable mineral concessions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”115

Eight Canadian companies were cited in the above-mentioned 2002 UN Security Council investigation on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and other Forms of Wealth in the Congo. Despite serious allegations levelled against Canadian companies, Ottawa refused to investigate the mining industry’s role in the Congo. In fact, Canada’s UN ambassador defended the companies, saying: “The alleged violations were not specified” and that “the OECD ethical principles are voluntary, not compulsory.”116 Worse still, Ottawa pushed to scrap the report. “Ottawa responded to the report by exercising ‘its clout in the U.N. on behalf of the Canadian companies cited for complicity in human rights violations in the Congo.’ ‘Canada has strong representation in the U.N.. They imposed on the Security Council to review [the 2002] report,’ he said.”117 Reportedly, First Quantum, with long-time Foreign Affairs Minister Joe Clark as special adviser for African affairs, lobbied Ottawa to demand a review of the UN report.118

Toronto-based Banro was also on the UN list of companies involved in the illegal exploitation of eastern Congo. As one of two international mining companies operating in the border provinces of North and South Kivu, Banro reportedly worked closely with the Rwandan government. Keith Harmon Snow claims that “Canadian Banro Corporation is one of the most secretive corporations operating in Congo, and they have established and maintained their control through very tight relations with the Kagame regime. Banro has taken over thousands of hectares of South Kivu province by manipulating the local mwamis (chiefs), by bribing officials and by infiltrating officials into power who are friendly to Banro and Kagame’s interests.”119

Upon expelling Rwandan troops from the Congo in 1998, Laurent Kabila revoked Banro’s concessions. With all of its business activity in eastern Congo, the company responded by filing a $1 billion “unlawful” expropriation claim at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes in Washington.120 In Digging Deeper: How the DR Congo’s Mining Policy is Failing the Country, Dominic Johnson and Aloys Tegera explain: “On 29 July 1998, just before war again started in Congo, President Laurent-Désiré Kabila annulled the Banro deal and gave ex-Sominki to a newly created Congolese state company called Somico (Société Minière du Congo) led by a Kivu traditional leader. Much of the subsequent fighting around Eastern Congo’s mining pitted Banro supporters, mostly supporting the [Rwandan backed] RCD rebels and backed by business interests, against Somico supporters, mostly consisting of Mai-Mai and supported by the Kabila government.”121 Alongside the regional peace accord that officially ended the eight-country war in the Congo, Joseph Kabila returned the concession to Banro in 2003.

All in all, Canada’s role in Rwanda and the Congo is best described as self-serving and certainly not motivated by altruism or human solidarity. Unfortunately this is not the only “case study” illustrating that Canada has not been “a force for good” in Africa.

13. A Sordid Tale

While the official story about Rwanda has been used by people in power to justify Western military intervention, Somalia is a place some powerful Canadians would prefer us to ignore. Taking place at the same time as Romeo Dallaire’s mission in Rwanda, events in Somalia became the most infamous example of bad behaviour by the Canadian Armed Forces.

Following the collapse of Siad Barre’s government in 1992 much of Somalia was gripped by civil war and famine. Ostensibly to alleviate the suffering, Canada deployed 900 military personnel as well as a naval vessel and transport aircraft as part of a US-led humanitarian intervention, which later came under UN command.

When Somalis failed to rejoice at the foreign intervention, it turned violent. On March 4, 1993, Canadian troops fired into a crowd of between 50 and 300 demonstrators, killing one of the protesters and disabling at least two.1 Later that day, Canadian soldiers lured two Somalis near a Canadian base and shot them in the back, one fatally. The survivor claimed “instantly my companion was shot and he fell to the ground on the spot and as I looked at him I was shot too. My companion managed to move before me. At that time an armed man, you know, from the Canadian forces came out of the camp. Luckily, I fell under a shallow cliff and he could not see me. … he followed the other man and shot him on that spot, the face. … I saw the shot clearly. Some other forces ran out of the camp after him, and when he started to come running after me, the other forces held him by the hand and stopped him.”2

The most disturbing incident of Canadian abuse in Somalia took place two weeks later. Sixteen-year-old Shidane Abukar Arone was tortured to death by a number of Canadian soldiers with dozens of other members of the Airborne Regiment in the know.3 As many as 80 soldiers heard Arone’s screams, which lasted for hours.4 In Dark Threats and White Knights, Sherene Razack writes: “What is evident more than anything else is how absolutely unremarkable the violence seemed to be to the men who enacted it, witnessed it, or simply heard that it was happening.”5

The Somali mission brought to light disturbing levels of overt racism within the military. Corporal Matt Mackay, a self-confessed neo-Nazi who declared he’d quit the white supremacist movement two years before going to Somalia, gleefully reported “we haven’t killed enough N– yet.”6 Another Canadian soldier was caught on camera saying the Somalia intervention was called, “Operation Snatch Nig-nog.” Yet another soldier explained how Somalis were not starving; “they never were, they’re lazy, they’re slobs, and they stink.”7

Canadian military leaders in Somalia believed the natives had to be kept in line, often through violence.8 The problem for the US and its allies was that many (if not most) Somalis did not see the UN intervention, which was sanctioned as a peace enforcement rather than peacekeeping mission, as a humanitarian endeavour.9 At the time of the intervention The Nation referred to Somalia as “one of the most strategically sensitive spots in the world today: astride the Horn of Africa, where oil, Islamic fundamentalism and Israeli, Iranian and Arab ambitions and arms are apt to crash and collide.”10

In 1993 Project Censored Canada found the prospects for extracting oil in Somalia the most under-reported Canadian news item that year.11 A 1991 World Bank/United Nations Development Program study pointed to significant hydrocarbons in the north and in January 1993 the Los Angeles Times reported that it had obtained documents revealing that Siad Barre had given four major US oil companies — Chevron, Amoco, Conoco, and Phillips — exploration rights over two-thirds of the country. “Far beneath the surface of the tragic drama of Somalia, four major U.S. oil companies are quietly sitting on a prospective fortune in exclusive concessions to explore and exploit tens of millions of acres of the Somali countryside. That land, in the opinion of geologists and industry sources, could yield significant amounts of oil and natural gas if the U.S.-led military mission can restore peace to the impoverished east African nation.”12

Somalia became a scandal for the Canadian military. Details of the cruel training rituals and racism within the force were widely derided, leading to the disbandment of the Airborne Regiment.

Yet few individuals in positions of authority were punished. The Canadian forces commander in Somalia, Serge Labbé, was found to have “failed as a commander” by a public inquiry into the mission.13 He claimed, without evidence, that the two victims shot in the back by Canadian troops were “trained saboteurs.” At the Somalia inquiry it was alleged “that he offered a case of champagne to the first soldier who killed a Somali.”14

Despite his actions in the Horn of Africa, Labbé’s career flourished. He went on to receive important NATO positions in the Balkans and Turkey and commanded Canada’s 15-officer Strategic Advisory Team in Kabul. General Rick Hillier’s last act as chief of defence staff in mid-2008 was to quietly promote Labbé to brigadier general, which was backdated seven years to top up his salary and pension.15

After their failed invasion in the early 1990s, US forces attacked Somalia once again in December 2006. When the Islamic Courts Union captured control of Mogadishu and the south of the country from an assortment of CIA-backed warlords, American forces launched air attacks and 50,000 Ethiopian troops invaded.

According to a cable released by WikiLeaks, US Undersecretary of State for Africa Jendayi Frazer pressed Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi to intervene.16 Washington-based Foreign Policy in Focus notes: “The cable suggests that Ethiopia had no intention of invading Somalia in 2006 but was encouraged/pressured to do so by the United States which pushed Ethiopia behind the scenes.”17

The US literally fuelled the invasion, providing gasoline, arms and strategic guidance for the Ethiopian assault.18 On December 4, 2006, CENTCOM Commander General John Abizaid made “a courtesy call” to meet Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in Addis Ababa to finalize plans for the invasion.19 Three weeks later, Ethiopian forces invaded. “The meeting was just the final handshake,” said a former intelligence officer familiar with the region.20

The fighting included some US ground forces. Stars and Stripes described a contingent of US forces who came under fire in the northeast of the country on June 1, 2007, and were then bailed out by a destroyer patrolling off the coast. The US naval vessel fired more than a dozen rounds from its 5-inch gun.21

Ottawa supported the US-Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in which about 6,000 civilians were killed and 335,000 fled the country.22 Amnesty International reported that Ethiopian soldiers were widely accused of “slaughtering” men, women and children “like goats” — slitting their throats.23 The US Air Force also killed numerous civilians. In one incident an AC 130 ground-attack aircraft, reported Oxfam, killed as many as 70 innocent Somali herders and their families.24

As Ethiopian troops occupied Somalia and the US launched periodic air strikes, Ottawa added its military presence. HMCS Calgary, HMCS Iroquois, HMCS Charlottetown, HMCS Protecteur, HMCS Toronto and HMCS Ville de Québec all patrolled off the coast of Somalia during this period and in the summer of 2008 Canada took command of NATO’s Task Force 150 that also worked in the region.25

The Canadian government’s public comments regarding Somalia broadly supported Ethiopian-US actions. Two months before the invasion, Canadian Public Safety Minister Stockwell Day said he was “concerned” the Islamic Courts Union could seize control of Mogadishu from the warlords. “We know that the ICU has made considerable gains, certainly in Mogadishu and the south. That’s a concern.”26

Ottawa made no criticism of the US bombings so when members of Toronto’s Somali community protested the Ethiopian invasion they called on Ottawa to “join the international community in denouncing this illegal aggression against Somalia.”27 After prominent Somali-Canadian journalist Ali Iman Sharmarke was assassinated in Mogadishu in August 2007, Foreign Affairs Minister Peter Mackay only condemned “the violence” in the country. He never mentioned that the assassins were pro-government militia members with ties to Ethiopian troops.

Ottawa publicly backed a February 2007 UN Security Council resolution that “authorized the establishment of an AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM).”28 According to the East African, Canadian officials immediately “pledged logistical support and some funding for the Uganda-led force” that was dispatched to Somalia.29 Official Canada also endorsed the Ethiopia-installed Somali government, which had operated in exile. A February 2007 Foreign Affairs release noted: “We welcome Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed’s announcement to urgently convene a national reconciliation congress involving all stakeholders, including political, clan and religious leaders, and representatives of civil society.”30 In April 2009 the Somali transitional government’s minister of diaspora affairs and ambassador to Kenya were feted in Ottawa.31

Supported by outsiders, the transitional government had little backing among Somalis. An Oxfam report explained: “The TFG [Transitional Federal Government] is not accepted as legitimate by much of the population. Unelected and widely perceived as externally imposed through a process that sidelined sub-national authorities and wider civil society, the transitional federal institutions face strong allegations of corruption and aid diversion.”32

Canadian officials saw little problem working with their Ethiopian counterparts on Somalia. A US government cable released by WikiLeaks suggests that Canada’s ambassador in Addis Ababa, Yves Boulanger, discussed the issue prior to the invasion.33 At the 2013 G8 meeting Prime Minister Harper discussed Somalia with his Ethiopian counterpart. The Ethiopia Reporter noted: “The two Prime Ministers exchanged views … on ways to consolidate the relative peace and stability in Somalia. Harper underlined Somalia’s need for a military training center to build up the capacity of its security forces and affirmed that Canada would support such an initiative.”34

In what was perhaps the strongest signal of Canadian support for the outside intervention, Ottawa didn’t make its aid to Ethiopia contingent on withdrawing from Somalia. Instead they increased assistance to this strategic US ally that borders Sudan and Somalia. In 2009 Ethiopia was selected as a “country of focus” for Canadian aid and this status was reaffirmed in 2014. Canada is the third biggest donor to Ethiopia, and gave over $150 million annually from 2008 to 2014.35

Providing aid to Ethiopia was a controversial move — and not only because of the invasion and occupation of its neighbour. An October 2010 Globe and Mail headline noted: “Ethiopia using Canadian aid as a political weapon, rights group says.” Human Rights Watch researcher Felix Horne claimed Ottawa contravened its Official Development Assistance Accountability Act by continuing to pump aid into Ethiopia despite its failure to meet international human-rights standards. In addition to arbitrary detentions, widespread torture and attacks on political opponents, the Ethiopian government systematically forced rural inhabitants off their land. This “villagization” program cut many off from food and health services.36

Canadian aid to Ethiopia faced another challenge. In February 2012 the family of a Somali-Canadian businessman sued Stephen Harper’s Conservatives to prevent them from sending aid to Ethiopia until Bashir Makhtal was released from prison. In January 2007 Makhtal was “rendered” illegally from Kenya to Ethiopia, imprisoned without access to a lawyer or consular official for 18 months and then given a life sentence.37 The lawsuit was a last ditch effort by the Makhtal family to force Ottawa’s hand.

The NDP claimed the government was indifferent to the plight of non-white Canadians imprisoned in foreign countries. While this may partly explain the Conservatives’ indifference towards Makhtal, they were also wary of conflict with Ethiopia, a strategic Western ally. Makhtal’s grandfather was co-founder of the Ogaden National Liberation Front, a rebel group that continues to fight for the independence of the south-eastern portion of the Somali Regional State that is currently part of Ethiopia. For the Ethiopian government, imprisoning Makhtal was a way to deliver a message to its opponents. In the eyes of the paranoid Ethiopian state, Makhtal’s departure from Somalia when the Islamic Courts Union collapsed proved he’d collaborated with Al Shabaab.

In early 2009 Ethiopian troops withdrew from Somalia. They reinvaded in late 2011 and in 2014 about 4,400 Ethiopian troops were integrated into the AMISOM mission.

As previously mentioned, Ottawa immediately backed the AU force deployed to Somalia. “Canada is an active observer in the (African Union) and provides both direct and indirect support to the [Somalia] mission,” explained a heavily censored June 2012 government briefing obtained by Canadian Press under the Access to Information Act. “Indirectly, Canada is engaged in training initiatives through (Directorate of Military Training and Co-operation) to enable (African Union) troop contributing nations through the provision of staff and peace support operations,” noted the above-mentioned internal briefing.38 Between 2011 and 2014 Ottawa gave over $20 million to AMISOM.39

The United States spent upwards of $1 billion on the mission to train and arm AMISOM.40 In July 2012 the Los Angeles Times reported: “The U.S. has been quietly equipping and training thousands of African soldiers to wage a widening proxy war against the Shabaab. … Officially, the troops are under the auspices of the African Union. But in truth … the 15,000-strong force pulled from five African countries is largely a creation of the State Department and Pentagon, trained and supplied by the U.S. government and guided by dozens of retired foreign military personnel hired through private contractors.”41

Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force trained Ugandan, Burundian and Sierra Leonean military for Somalia.42 In June 2012 US Army Africa Commander General David Hogg told Sierra Leone forces that “you will join the Kenyan forces in southern Somalia to continue to push al Shabaab and other miscreants from Somalia so it can be free of tyranny and terrorism and all the evil that comes with it.”43 Given its role in training and equipping African soldiers, the LA Times described the US as “the driving force behind the fighting in Somalia.”44

Over a hundred US special forces were also on the ground in Somalia. In July 2014 Reuters reported that “US military advisors have secretly operated in Somalia since around 2007 and Washington plans to deepen its security assistance to help the country fend off threats by Islamist militant group al Shabaab.”45

Since the late 2006 Ethiopia-US Invasion, al Shabaab has waged a violent campaign against the foreign forces in the country and Somalia’s transitional government. During this period, al Shabaab grew from the relatively small youth wing of the Islamic Courts Union to the leading oppositional force in the country. It also radicalized. Rob Wise, a researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, notes that Ethiopia’s occupation of Somalia transformed al Shabaab into “the most powerful and radical armed faction in the country.”46

Al Shabaab was conceived as a national organization, but with time it began forging increasing ties to Al Qaeda. (The upper echelon of Al Shabaab was connected to and inspired by global jihad while the bulk of the group’s foot soldiers were motivated by nationalism and local injustices.) They killed 74 people seated in a bar watching the 2010 World Cup final in Kampala and ended the lives of 67 shoppers at Nairobi’s Westgate Mall in 2013. In the spring of 2015 they killed 147 students at a university in northern Kenya. The group said these attacks were retaliation for Uganda and Kenya’s invasion and occupation of Somalia.

Canada’s support for foreign intervention in Somalia did not go unnoticed. In April 2014, Embassy reported that after the Westgate Mall assault, Canadian special forces in Kenya found it necessary to upgrade security at the High Commission.47 The story explained that Canada’s counter-terrorism strategy included a concern that al Shabaab “explicitly identified Canada as a legitimate target.” And in October 2008, when a group calling themselves Mujahedin of Somalia abducted a Canadian and Australian, they accused Canada and Australia of “taking part in the destruction of Somalia.”48

Washington and Ottawa portrayed their intervention in Somalia as a simple struggle against Islamic terrorism, but the mission was also driven by geopolitical and economic considerations. Somalia’s 1,600-kilometre coastline is “near two important oil choke points; Babel-Mandeb between Yemen and Djibouti, and the Strait of Hormuz between the most northern part of UAE and Iran,” notes Patrick Lennox, at Dalhousie’s Centre for Military and Strategic Studies. “This has made the Arabian Sea some of the most important maritime real-estate on the planet.”49 In addition to its strategic location, Somalia possesses oil. As noted, World Bank geologists found hydrocarbons at the beginning of the 1990s and more recent exploration suggests significant offshore oil deposits. A February 2012 UK Observer headline read: “Why defeat of Al Shabaab could mean an oil bonanza for western firms in Somalia.”50

After years of exploration, Vancouver-based Africa Oil commenced drilling in northern Somalia’s semi-autonomous Puntland region in 2012. As the first major oil operation in the region in two decades, the project was controversial. Control over the area’s resources is contested between regional authorities in Puntland and Somaliland as well as the government in Mogadishu. Threatening to revoke the licenses of Western oil companies, the federal government claimed “exclusive responsibility” over Somalia’s natural resources.51 The Somali Petroleum Ministry claimed resource agreements with regional governments were “destabilizing the country” and “adding fire to conflicts”.52

Echoing government concerns in Mogadishu, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, warned that competition over oil would undermine efforts to rebuild. In 2013, the UN Monitoring Group voiced fears about Africa Oil’s exploration licenses being in the same area as licenses Somaliland awarded to Norwegian firm DNO and that both regions and companies were building up security forces. “Potentially, it means that exploration operations in these blocks, conducted by both DNO and Africa Oil under the protection of regional security forces, its allied militia or private forces, could generate new conflict between Somaliland and Puntland,” the UN report stated.53 “It is alarming that regional security forces and armed groups may clash to protect and further Western-backed oil companies’ interests.”54

In 2012 Africa Oil CEO Keith Hill acknowledged that “security costs are significant” for their operations in Puntland but noted the rarity of a “billion-barrel oil field.”55 Since the mid-2000s, Africa Oil has employed private security in Puntland. In 2008 Garowe Online reported: “Africa Oil and its partners in the government of Puntland have established a private militia force to safeguard the Canadian company’s operations in Somalia.”56 But, in October 2008, members of its security team kidnapped company employees, prompting Africa Oil to bolster its force with heavily armed Australian and American soldiers.57

In mid-2011 the Vancouver company hired South African security firm Pathfinder to protect its interests in Puntland. In doing so, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea claimed it violated the arms embargo on the country. “Africa Oil, through its subsidiaries and affiliates, has engaged in a mutually beneficial relationship with a Somali security sector institution, namely the Puntland Exploration Security Unit (ESU). For this purpose, the company has contracted the services of a private security company, Pathfinder Corporation. … in the assessment of the Monitoring Group, the company’s ‘temporary issue’ of military equipment to the ESU, as well as Africa Oil’s payment of ESU salaries (through its subsidiary, Canmex) constitute violations of the general and complete arms embargo on Somalia imposed by Security Council resolution 733 (1992) and elaborated by subsequent resolutions.”58

In spring 2006 there were deadly clashes in an area where Africa Oil and its partners were collecting mineral samples. The Puntland government allowed the companies to explore the Sanaag region without approval of local inhabitants, the Warsangeli clan. Many people were killed and hundreds more were wounded.59

Though the details are murky, the former president of Puntland, General Mohamud Muse Hirsi, a Canadian citizen, signed a favourable agreement with Range Resources, Africa Oil’s Australian partner. Apparently, Hirsi and other members of his government owned shares in Range. After a company-sponsored tour of its operations Derek Brower wrote in Britain’s Prospect Magazine: “President Hirsi told me that Range had helped to draw up the laws governing its own operations there. Any company that wanted to explore in the region, he added, must speak to Range first.”60

Africa Oil was also accused of feeding instability in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa granted the Vancouver company rights to explore 50,000 km² of territory mainly in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, an area contested by Somali Ethiopians and the Somali government.61

The Ogaden National Liberation Front challenged the TSX listed company. A statement from the separatist group said “ONLF calls upon African Oil to desist from paying blood money to Ethiopia until a just settlement of the conflict is achieved and the people of the Ogaden are in a position to be masters of their wealth and interest.”62 In a follow-up December 2013 release the group stated: “The Ethiopian regime has ordered its army in Ogaden to displace the rural population from large tracts of the Ogaden grassland by burning traditional pasture rich areas in order to clear the land for oil exploration.”63 The ONLF statement went on to name a dozen towns it claimed were displaced.

Ethiopian authorities blocked international aid workers and media from entering the Ogaden during the struggle. Amnesty International expressed concerns about Addis Ababa obstructing NGOs from providing much needed humanitarian aid in the region and when two Swedish journalists crossed into the Ogaden from Somalia to investigate Africa Oil’s alleged complicity in human rights violations, they were arrested by Ethiopian authorities.64 (Africa Oil is also listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange and is part of the Swedish-Canadian Lundin Group of Companies.) Martin Schibbye and Johan Persson were imprisoned from July 2011 to September 2012 on “terrorism” charges and their detention was widely publicized in Sweden.65

Some criticisms of Africa Oil were virulent. One online article was headlined: “How Foreign Oil Companies annihilated the lives of ordinary African population in Ogaden Region” and another read “Africa Oil Bleeding Ethiopia.”66

Ethiopia’s regional competitor Sudan has long been in the crosshairs of Washington. At odds with the IMF and international creditors since it failed to pay debt obligations in the 1980s, Sudan has also been offside with US policy in the region. The Omar al-Bashir regime backed Iraq during its 1991 invasion of Kuwait and provided support for a variety of Islamic militant groups such as Hamas, Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah.67 Khartoum also has close ties to China.

Clashing geopolitical, business and security interests resulted in a schizophrenic Canadian policy. In the late 1990s Ottawa claimed the US had the right to bomb the “terrorist” enabling country and then defended a Canadian company under criticism for abuses in Sudan. Similarly, during much of the 2000s the federal government accused Khartoum of horrendous acts while asking it to detain a Canadian citizen.

Canadian officials even defended the illegal US bombing of the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical facility in August 1998. Washington claimed the plant produced the deadly nerve agent VX. It didn’t.

In a rare move CIA analyst Mary O’Neil McCarthy sent a letter to President Bill Clinton expressing doubts about the factory’s ties to chemical weapons production or Al Qaeda. “Eventually,” reported the New York Times, “Clinton administration officials conceded that the hardest evidence used to justify striking the plant was a single soil sample that seemed to indicate the presence of a chemical used in making VX gas.”68

One employee was killed and 11 were wounded when US cruise missiles blasted through the factory. The Al-Shifa plant produced half of Sudan’s medicines and most of the country’s supplies of chloroquine, the standard treatment for malaria. The resulting lack of medicines is believed to have led to tens of thousands of preventable deaths.69

Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy immediately defended the US bombing, an act later condemned by the Non-Aligned Movement, Arab League and Organization of African Unity.70 Echoing US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s statement that “we have a legal right to self-defense,” Axworthy said: “When you come into this very murky and very dangerous area of dealing with terrorism, nations have a right to defend themselves.”71

Arguing he was “not privy to the private information they have”, Chrétien insisted “the Americans had to do something. They decided to use cruise missiles to attack the people who are responsible for the terrorism.”72 The US strike in Sudan was purportedly a response to Al Qaeda’s bombing of the US Embassy in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam two weeks earlier.

Ottawa obstructed Sudan’s effort to have the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) condemn the US violation of its airspace during the bombing. Canadian officials refused to grant a Sudanese delegation visas to attend an ICAO General Assembly. As a result, their chargé d’affaires in Canada presented Sudan’s case at the Montréal-based ICAO.73

At the same time as it supported the US bombing of Sudan, Ottawa backed a Canadian company widely criticized for exacerbating southern Sudan’s civil war. To mollify growing protests against Calgary-based Talisman Oil’s operations in Sudan, Lloyd Axworthy sent a senior foreign policy advisor on Africa, John Harker, to investigate “the alleged link between oil development and human rights violations, particularly with respect to the forced removal of populations around oilfields and oil related development.”74

The October 1999 federal government-sponsored investigation found that “Talisman was clearly adding to the suffering of the Sudanese people.”75 The government report continued: “There has been and probably still is, major displacement of civilian populations related to oil extraction. Sudan is a place of extraordinary suffering and continuing human rights violations, even though some forward progress can be recorded, and the oil operations in which a Canadian company is involved add more suffering.”76

Talisman and other oil companies built an airstrip owned by the Sudanese government, which was used as a base for bombing raids on the southern Sudanese.77 Talisman also serviced broken military trucks, provided electricity lines to the army’s barracks and piped water to army camps. According to Madelaine Drohan, “Talisman provided expertise, China provided manpower, and Sudan provided army and loyal militias who not only protected the pipeline and facilities, but also aggressively cleansed the oil fields of people.”78 Beyond providing direct support to the Sudanese government’s military campaign, Talisman officials justified the army’s actions. After the government bombed a Norwegian relief agency in the south, the head of Talisman claimed “the SPLA [Southern guerrillas] puts its camps next to Norwegian hospitals.”79

As domestic pressure mounted on the Liberal government to take action against Talisman, the corporation played the nationalist card. The Calgary-based company argued that it offered important opportunities for Canadians to work in a major head office and that if Ottawa refused to support them, they would relocate.80 Axworthy buckled under corporate pressure. Even after the Harker report found Talisman guilty of supporting the Sudanese government’s brutal tactics, Axworthy described Talisman as “a positive force for change in Sudan.”81 Soon after, with prodding from Talisman, Canada opened an embassy in Khartoum.82

But, in 2003 Talisman finally pulled out of Sudan. The decision was sparked by mounting criticism from humanitarian groups as well as moves by the US Congress to block investments in Sudan and a US court case against Talisman for complicity with human rights abuses.83 In 2001 the Presbyterian Church of Sudan filed a $12-billion suit, alleging that Talisman assisted the Sudanese military in attacks against local populations as part of an effort to depopulate areas for oil exploration.

Despite Talisman’s questionable record in Sudan, Ottawa backed the company in its US court case. In June 2007 the Canadian government sent a letter to the US Federal District Court defending the company.84

In the mid-2000s Canadian officials repeatedly condemned Sudan’s human rights violations in the northeast province of Darfur. Since 2004 Canada has spent $250 million to train and equip African troops and police for the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which later morphed into the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).85 Canada co-chaired UNAMID with the US and on a couple of occasions Ottawa called on the AU to deploy more troops to Darfur.86

But, Ottawa was inconsistent in its engagement with Sudan. A blog titled “Canada, Sudan and the Stench of Hypocrisy” pointed out how Stephen Harper’s government applauded the International Criminal Court’s indictment of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir while simultaneously making “use of Sudan’s crappy human rights record to detain and torture a Canadian citizen, Abousfian Abdelrazik.”87

When Abdelrazik visited the country of his birth in 2003 the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) asked Sudanese authorities to arrest him.88 After torturing Abdelrazik and allowing CSIS officials to interrogate him, Sudan eventually let him go. Still, Ottawa refused to provide Abdelrazik with a passport to return home, leaving him stuck in Sudan for six years. He spent more than a year of this nightmare living in the Canadian embassy.

The Globe and Mail uncovered government documents revealing that Canadian intelligence officials warned Transport Canada that allowing Abdelrazik to return from Sudan could upset the George W. Bush administration. The memo stated, “senior government of Canada officials should be mindful of the potential reaction of our U.S. counterparts to Abdelrazik’s return to Canada as he is on the U.S. no-fly list.”89

14. Carrying a Big Stick

While the preferred means to keep Africa, its people and material resources available for exploitation is through “agreements” of various sorts, enforcing “free trade” has always required military might. While not as obvious as a hundred years ago, this remains true today.

Unlike the US or France, Canada is not a leading military force on the continent. But Ottawa exerts significant influence through its training, deployments and participation in regional security initiatives. Canadian companies have also militarized parts of the continent.

Since the start of the century Canadian Forces have trained hundreds of African soldiers through Canada’s Military Training Assistance Program (MTAP). Senior military personnel from Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Benin, Cameroon, Botswana, Benin, Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire trained at the Lester B. Pearson Centre in Nova Scotia and Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre in Kingston Ontario.

On the continent Canadian special forces trained a number of African militaries. Along with the US, Canadian troops trained counterterrorism units in Niger, Kenya and Mali and in 2014 Canadian Special Operations Forces Command spokesman Major Steve Hawken told Embassy that his force had recently trained 800 African military personnel.1 Regular Canadian forces directed or participated in a slew of training initiatives, running courses in Botswana, Kenya, Namibia, Mali among other places.2 In 2010 Canadian troops led a three-week Tactical Operations Staff Course in Nairobi for officers from a dozen different African countries and facilitated a multi-week course in Okahandja, Namibia, to prepare officers from 11 nations for the ranks of captain to lieutenant colonel.3 In 2006 Canada’s special operations liaison officer to NATO “develop[ed] a Military Assistance training program in order to enhance the Counter Insurgency (COIN) skill sets of the Cape Verde Coast Guard Marines.”4

Canadian officials generally tell the media the aim of training other militaries is to help fight terror or the illicit drug trade but a closer look at military doctrine suggests broader strategic and geopolitical motivations. An important objective is to strengthen foreign militaries’ capacity to operate in tandem with Canadian and/or NATO forces. According to MTAP, its “language training improves communication between NATO and other armed forces” and its “professional development and staff training enhances other countries compatibility with the CFs [Canadian Forces].”5 At a broader level MTAP states its training “serves to achieve influence in areas of strategic interest to Canada. ... Canadian diplomatic and military representatives find it considerably easier to gain access and exert influence in countries with a core group of Canadian-trained professional military leaders.”6

When Ottawa initiated post-independence training missions in Africa (see Chapters 6 and 7) a memo to cabinet ministers described the political value of training foreign military officers. It stated: “Military leaders in many developing countries, if they do not actually form the government, frequently wield much more power and influence domestically than is the case in the majority of western domestic nations … [it] would seem in Canada’s general interest on broad foreign policy grounds to keep open the possibility of exercising a constructive influence on the men who often will form the political elite in developing countries, by continuing to provide training places for officers in our military institutions where they receive not only technical military training but are also exposed to Canadian values and attitudes.”7

Canada is increasingly involved in “counterterrorist” training exercises in the Sahel region, which covers parts of Senegal, Gambia, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, South Sudan, Sudan and Eritrea. Through its Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program Ottawa ploughed tens of millions of dollars into training law enforcement, increasing border security and strengthening legal regimes in a half-dozen Sahel countries.8 As part of this effort Canadian special forces also trained militaries in the region.9

As an indication of Ottawa’s involvement in the region, Canada (with Algeria) co-chaired the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) Sahel working group, a consortium of nations organized by Washington in September 2011.10 The Global Counterterrorism Forum “provide[s] a unique platform for senior counterterrorism policymakers and experts from around the world to work together to identify urgent needs, devise solutions and mobilize resources for addressing key counterterrorism challenges.”11

Alongside this effort, the Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR) has participated in Exercise Flintlock since 2011. Fifty members of CSOR and the Special Operations Aviation Squadron traveled to Senegal and Mauritania for Exercise Flintlock in 2014.12 The New York Times Magazine reported: “For the past three weeks, Green Berets, along with British, French and Canadian special operators, had been training 139 elite troops from Niger, Nigeria and Chad” as part of Flintlock 2014.13

Sponsored by the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) and directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Flintlock takes place in a different Sahel region nation each year. In December 2011 the Toronto Star reported: “The training efforts are closely tied to the larger US special forces efforts across the [Sahel] region” of northern Africa.14 “Although Flintlock is considered an exercise, it is really an extension of ongoing training, engagement, and operations that help prepare our close Africa partners in the fight against extremism and the enemies that threaten peace, stability, and regional security,” said the commander of the US Joint Special Operations Task Force-Trans Sahel, Colonel Kenneth Sipperly, during Flintlock 2014.15

In March 2012 Flintlock was cancelled because Mali’s military, which was to host that year’s exercise, was fighting a rebellion by largely nomadic Tuaregs in the north of the country. The Ottawa Citizen’s David Pugliese explained: “There was a debate in US military circles on whether to proceed with the Flintlock exercise, as a show of force that western nations are committed to supporting governments in the region. But it was decided that since Malian troops were so heavily involved in combat, its military couldn’t spare the soldiers to be trained by Canadian and other special forces.”16

Exercise Flintlock is but one of the mechanisms under which special forces are deployed to the region. In 2014 the Globe and Mail reported that Canadian special forces were sent to hunt Boko Haram in Nigeria while the Ottawa Citizen reported that Canadian Special Operations Forces Command members trained troops in Niger, Kenya and Mali.17

Though their operations are “shrouded in secrecy” — complained a 2006 Senate Committee on National Security and Defence — it is clear Canada’s Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2) commandos have been deployed to the continent on numerous occasions since the unit’s establishment in 1993.18 Weak state structures in many African countries and Western media indifference make it possible to deploy special forces to the continent without push back.

Canadian special forces were dispatched to Mali in 2013 to “protect Canadian personnel who are already operating in the troubled African country”, reported Canadian Press.19 On February 28, 2011, CTV.ca reported “that Canadian special forces are also on the ground in Libya.”20 Apparently, JTF2 were dispatched to that country in contravention of international law and UN Security Council resolution 1973, which was adopted on March 17, 2011. Resolution 1973 authorized a no-fly zone over Libya but explicitly forbade “a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.”21

In 2009 JTF2 soldiers flew to Chad and/or Burkina Faso in a bid to secure the freedom of kidnapped Canadian diplomats Robert Fowler and Louis Guay.22 At the end of 1998 JTF2 descended on the Central African Republic as part of a UN force sent to secure key areas around Bangui, the capital.23 In Canada’s Secret Commandos David Pugliese points out that Ottawa announced the deployment of 300 Canadian peacekeepers to the Central African Republic but said nothing about the JTF2 operatives.24

Earlier in 1998, JTF2 commandos accompanied former general Romeo Dallaire to Arusha, Tanzania, for his testimony at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.25 In November 1996 JTF2 escorted the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa, Raymond Chrétien, to Kinshasa and General Maurice Baril into eastern Congo.26 Nous étions invincibles, a personal account by Canadian special forces commando Denis Morisset, provides a harrowing account of the JTF2 operation to bring Baril to meet Rwandan-backed rebel leader Laurent Kabila. The convoy came under fire upon which US Apache and Blackhawk helicopters launched a counterattack on the Congolese, rescuing their Canadian allies.27

JTF2’s first mission may have been to Somalia in 1993, according to Pugliese of the Ottawa Citizen: “The Defence Department still declines to discuss, or deny, whether the JTF2 was involved in the Somalia killing. But a review of military records points to intriguing links that suggests the March 4 incident [when Canadian soldiers killed a Somali civilian] could have been the counterterrorism unit’s first foray into missions affecting ‘the national interest.’”28

If decision-makers in Ottawa have their way Canadian special forces are likely to increase their operations on the continent. Since the mid-2000s Canada’s special forces have steadily expanded. In 2006 the military launched the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command to oversee JTF2, the Special Operations Aviation Squadron, Canadian Joint Incident Response Unit and Special Operations Regiment. Begun that year, CSOR’s 750 members receive similar training to JTF2 commandos, the most secretive and skilled unit of the Canadian Armed Forces. After having doubled from 300 to 600 men, JTF2 is set to move from Ottawa to a 400-acre compound near Trenton, Ontario, at a cost of $350 million.29 By 2014 Canada’s total special forces numbered just over 1,800 and had a $353 million yearly budget, a big increase from JTF2’s $25 million budget in 2005.30 The government supports special forces because these elite units have close ties to their US counterparts and the government is not required to divulge information about their operations. Ottawa can deploy these troops abroad and the public is none the wiser. “Deniability,” according to Major B. J. Brister, is why the federal government prefers special operation forces.31

It’s harder to deploy a naval frigate covertly. But what actually transpires at sea is generally only known to those aboard.

Over the past decade Canadian naval ships have maintained a patrol off the continent, particularly near the Horn of Africa. As part of what’s been dubbed Africa’s “encirclement by U.S. and NATO warships”, HMCS Athabaskan led Operation Steadfast Jaguar 06 in the Gulf of Guinea.32 A dozen warships and 7,000 troops participated in the exercise, the first ever carried out by NATO’s Rapid Response Force.33

The following year HMCS Toronto participated in a six-ship task group of the Standing Naval Maritime Group 1 of NATO that traveled 23,000 kilometres around the continent. The trip took five months and was the first NATO fleet to circumnavigate Africa. HMCS Toronto spent a year preparing for this trip, a journey costing Canadian taxpayers $8 million.34

Oil largely motivated operations off Nigeria’s coast. Nigeria’s Business Day described NATO’s presence as “a show of force and a demonstration that the world powers are closely monitoring the worsening security situation in the [oil-rich] Niger Delta.”35 A Canadian spokesperson gave credence to this interpretation of their activities in a region long dominated by Shell and other Western oil corporations. When the Standing Naval Maritime Group 1 warships patrolled the area Canadian Lieutenant Commander Angus Topshee told the CBC that “it’s a critical area of the world because Nigeria produces a large amount of the world’s light crude oil, and so when anything happens to that area that interrupts that flow of oil, it can have repercussions for the entire global economy.”36

More broadly, the objective of circumnavigating the continent was to develop situational knowledge of the various territorial waters, especially Nigeria and Somalia.37 How knowledge of countries’ coastlines was to be used was not made entirely clear, but it certainly wasn’t to strengthen their sovereignty. “During the voyage,” according to a story in Embassy, “the fleet sailed at a distance of 12 to 15 miles off the African coast, just beyond the limits of sovereign national waters. The NATO fleet did not inform African nations it would soon be on the horizon. This, Lt.-Cmdr. Topshee says, was an intentional move meant to ‘keep options open.’ ‘International law is built on precedent,’ he says. ‘So if NATO creates a precedent where we’re going to inform countries, we’re going to operate off their coastline, over time that precedent actually becomes a requirement’.”38 To help with the legal side of the operations a lawyer circumnavigated the continent with HMCS Toronto.39 Reportedly, the Nigerians did not appreciate NATO’s aggressive tactics. Topshee described the Nigerians as “downright irate” when the fleet approached. “There was real concern they might take action against us.”40

For HMCS Toronto’s Captain Stephen Virgin, the circumnavigation was largely about preparing NATO forces for a future invasion. “These are areas that the force might have to go back to some day and we need to operate over there to get an understanding of everything from shipping patterns to how our sensors work in those climates.”41

In early 2011, 15 days before the UN Security Council authorized a no-fly zone over Libya, HMCS Charlottetown left Halifax for the North African country.42 Two rotations of Canadian warships enforced a naval blockade of Libya for six months with about 250 soldiers aboard each vessel.

Later that year, on May 19, HMCS Charlottetown joined an operation that destroyed eight Libyan naval vessels.43 The ship also repelled a number of fast, small boats and escaped unscathed after a dozen missiles were fired towards it from the port city of Misrata.44 After the hostilities the head of Canada’s navy, Paul Maddison, told Ottawa defence contractors that HMCS Charlottetown “played a key role in keeping the Port of Misrata open as a critical enabler of the anti-Gaddafi forces.”45

On one occasion a Canadian warship, part of a 20-ship NATO flotilla purportedly enforcing the UN arms embargo on Libya, boarded a rebel vessel filled with ammunition. “There are loads of weapons and munitions, more than I thought,” a Canadian officer radioed HMCS Charlottetown commander Craig Skjerpen. “From small ammunition to 105 howitzer rounds and lots of explosives.”46 The commander’s response, reported the Ottawa Citizen, was to allow the rebel ship to sail through.47

Since 2008 the Canadian Navy has maintained a near constant patrol off Somalia’s coast. In the summer of that year Canada took command of NATO’s Task Force 150 that worked off the coast of Somalia. Between the start of 2013 and fall of 2015 Canadian warships participated in a 28-nation Combined Maritime Forces operation in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. HMCS Regina reported seizing 130 kilograms of heroin 160 km east of Tanzania in April 2014 while a few months earlier HMCS Toronto confiscated 539 kilograms 300 km from the Kenyan coast.48 At the start of 2015 twenty-six Canadian Armed Forces members participated in the multinational maritime security exercise Cutlass Express 2015.49 Sponsored by AFRICOM, it took place off the East African coast.

While Canadian naval vessels patrolled the coast, Canadian forces sought to expand their presence on land. In 2011 Ottawa negotiated to house equipment and soldiers in Tanzania, Senegal and Kenya (as well as four other non-African countries). Dubbed Operational Support Hub, the Canadian military was seeking “a permanent footprint on both sides of the African continent”, reported the Toronto Star.50 According to a military briefing note obtained by Postmedia, the bases are designed to improve the Canadian Forces’ “ability to project combat power/security assistance and Canadian influence rapidly and flexibly anywhere in the world.”51

Apparently, some African governments pushed back against the Canadian military request. According to documents unearthed by the Toronto Star, Canadian officials ran into difficulties upon asking an East African government — either Kenya or Tanzania — about hosting a military hub. “Local officials were suspicious and demanded to know Ottawa’s motivation for moving into the region,” noted the newspaper.52 When this book went to press it was not clear if the African “Support Hubs” had been launched.

Canada’s growing military interest in Africa coincided with Washington’s creation of the United States Africa Command. Initiated in 2000, AFRICOM was formally launched as a US Defense Department geographic combatant command in 2008.

As part of AFRICOM the Pentagon began establishing Cooperative Security Locations and Forward Operating Sites across the continent in 2004. By 2013, wrote author Nick Turse, US forces were “involved in Algeria and Angola, Benin and Botswana, Burkina Faso and Burundi, Cameroon and the Cape Verde Islands. And that’s just the ABCs of the situation. Skip to the end of the alphabet and the story remains the same: Senegal and the Seychelles, Togo and Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia. From north to south, east to west, the Horn of Africa to the Sahel, the heart of the continent to the islands off its coasts, the U.S. military is at work. Base construction, security cooperation engagements, training exercises, advisory deployments, special operations missions, and a growing logistics network.”53

In 2014 one AFRICOM official called the operation an “actual war-fighting combatant command”.54 Speaking to an audience of defence contractors, the chief of AFRICOM’s engineering division, Rick Cook, added that the US had been “at war” on the continent for two-and-half years.55

The Pentagon’s growing interest in the continent was partly motivated by competition with China, explains Pádraig Carmody, author of The New Scramble for Africa. The “creation of AFRICOM and other US military initiatives in Africa have to be seen also in the context of geoeconomic competition with China on the continent. This is acute in certain oil rich countries such as Sudan (where China is supportive of Al-Bashir, whereas the US is much closer to the Southern Sudanese government).”56

The competition with China was centered on Africa’s growing role as a commodity provider. In 2011 the chief of the analysis branch for the Strategic Reviews Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff Jeffrey N. Krulick, pointed out that “during the past decade, the increasing global competition for resources, access to energy, and terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa have spurred a renewed focus on U.S. policy toward Africa.”57

One of the ways in which AFRICOM expressed US power, added Krulick, was through relations with the African Union. “The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) was established to address U.S. strategic interests in Africa by building partnerships with African allies and the African Union.”58

Alongside AFRICOM’s efforts, Ottawa spent hundreds of millions of dollars building African Union military capacity. The bulk of the money supported AU missions in Sudan and Somalia but Ottawa also funnelled tens of millions of dollars into developing a regional military structure to police the continent.59 Delivering Results: Canada Fund for Africa explains: “The Canada Fund for Africa has enabled preparatory work towards the establishment of a continental early-warning system and the African Standby Force, the adoption of a draft framework on a common African Defense and Security Policy, the launching of an African Center for the Study and Research on Terrorism and the technical upgrading of the African Union’s Situation Room.”60

The centerpiece of the AU peace and security architecture is the African Standby Force (ASF). The ASF is supposed to eventually include regional brigades for East, West, North, South and Central Africa with each force expected to reach some 4,000, mostly soldiers, but also civilian and police units. Not a standing army, the ASF is a network of nationally based units integrated through common doctrine, shared training curriculum, joint exercises and regional planning.61

While a pan-African force has been a topic of discussion for a half-century, the ASF proposal dates to a 1997 African Chiefs of Defence Staff conference in Harare. But the initiative only gained traction when the G8 agreed to “The Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations.”62 At the summit in Kananaskis, Alberta, G-8 leaders committed “to work with African partners to deliver a joint plan, by 2003, for the development of African capability to undertake peace support operations, including at the regional level; to train African peace support forces, including through the development of regional centres of excellence for military and civilian aspects of conflict prevention and peace support, such as the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre; and, to better coordinate peacekeeping training initiatives.”63

Alongside the US and several European countries, Canada organized and financed initial workshops for the AU Peace Support Operations Division, which oversaw the ASF.64 In its 2005-06 report Canada’s Military Training Assistance Program noted that it “offers the training that African countries, and the African Union (AU), are seeking to build up their security forces and prepare them for peace support operations. For example, this fiscal year MTAP facilitated Canada’s co-sponsorship, with France, of one in the ongoing series of training workshops for the African Standby Force (ASF).”65

Canada has engaged from coast to coast. In 2005 Canadian officials assisted the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in producing a framework document for the operationalization of the West African Standby Force while on the other side of the continent Ottawa paid for “Exercise NJIWA” at the Eastern African Standby Force Brigade headquarters in Addis Ababa.66 A Canadian embassy official oversaw the introduction of the 2012 exercise attended by more than 100 participants.67

Further south, Canada joined Britain and the US in funding Kenya’s Amani Peace Operations Training Village.68 Located just outside of Nairobi, this facility supports a wide array of “scenario-based” training for both urban and rural settings, explained US Army Sergeant Luis R. Rivera, who managed phase four of the Amani Peace Support Operations Village.69

In aid of the ASF roadmap, Canada funded and staffed various military training centres across the continent.70 In the mid-2000s Ottawa donated more than $4 million to help open the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Ghana and the African Centre for Strategic Research and Studies in Nigeria as well as to expand the Ecole de Maintien de la Paix Alioune Blondin in Mali. Between 2012 and 2014 Canada put up another $10 million for these West African “peacekeeping” centres.

Alongside its commitment to developing the AU’s security architecture, Ottawa financed and armed African Union missions in Sudan and Somalia. Since 2004 Canada has spent $200 million to train and equip African troops and police for the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which later morphed into the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). As part of the effort, Ottawa also donated three-dozen armoured personnel carriers to Rwanda, Senegal, Uganda and Burkina Faso.71 Canadian forces went further with their assistance and helped deploy and train numerous African military units dispatched to Sudan.

Similarly, Ottawa funnelled over $20 million to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) between 2011 and 2014.72 Hailed as “the highlight of the new regional security architecture”, AMISOM included staff officers of the East Africa Standby Force.73

It is not a stretch to say that AMISOM and, to some extent, AMIS were instigated by Washington.74AMISOM emerged immediately after the US/Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, and as discussed in the previous chapter, largely depended on US weapons and money. In 2014, AFRICOM spokesperson Tom Davis admitted “the US has established a military coordination cell in Somalia to provide planning and advisory support to the African Union Mission in Somalia.”75

Washington paid close attention to the ASF. Both AFRICOM’s posture statement and the 2011 US National Military Strategy made strong commitments to developing ASF capacity.76 As part of this effort AFRICOM helped establish an AU Peace Support Operations Center “to assist the African Union with communications links to its new African Standby Force.”77 They also trained AU technicians and military personnel on Very Small Aperture Terminal (VAST) satellite systems and other communication technologies.78 It’s critical to note that by training and equipping AU forces, AFRICOM is well placed to eavesdrop on AU military operations.79

Through the Partnership for Integrated Logistics Operations and Tactics (PILOT) accord Ottawa formerly worked with AFRICOM to build ASF capacities. PILOT “aimed at building long-term operational logistics planning capacity with the African Standby Force while simultaneously promoting interoperability between the US military and ASF.”80

Along with the US and Canada, NATO was another force that developed the ASF. Since 2005 NATO has provided expert and training support for “the operationalisation of the African Standby Force” and in 2009 ASF staff officers began training at the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany. Despite its purported focus on the North Atlantic region, NATO also provided airlift support to the AU missions in Somalia and Sudan.81

In theory AU-sponsored military forces represent African unity at its finest. Just after independence Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah called for an African High Command and African legion.82 But Nkrumah wanted a force to repel the traditional powers from the continent.

The ASF is unlikely to develop into that force. The AU has not, or cannot, provide sufficient resources to the ASF, making it “reliant on foreign funding for any large-scale interventions or peace-keeping work”, notes Simon Allison in South Africa’s Daily Maverick.83 As things stand it’s hard to imagine the US, EU or Canada providing significant sums to an ASF mission viewed as contrary to their interests. The AU also lacks transport logistics support. The US is “capable” of providing this, wrote Jeffrey N. Krulick, chief of the analysis branch for the US Strategic Reviews Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff. “But the efforts to improve ASF operational reach must coincide with U.S. interests in Africa.”84

The combination of logistical and financial dependence on NATO countries make it unlikely for the regional brigades to be deployed when Washington and/or Paris oppose such a move. But AFRICOM’s interest in building up the ASF is not simply defensive.

Washington and NATO countries support the ASF in hope that it will do their bidding. AFRICOM’s civilian Deputy Ambassador Anthony Holmes, described official US thinking on this point: “By and large our approach is what we call ‘by, with and through’,” which involves “developing partnerships for extended periods of time” to develop African military capacity for dealing with “problems” so “we don’t have to do it.”85 Reframing this thinking in anti-imperialist terms, Stop NATO’s Rick Rozoff argued that Washington backed the ASF and its regional brigades to build “surrogate armies to control Africa region by region.” He further asserts that “by training, modernizing, arming and integrating the armed forces of the 54-nation African Union … the U.S. and its main NATO allies are developing regional proxy forces — most notably the African Standby Force — for armed interventions against nations whose governments are not to the West’s liking.”86

The federal government poured tens of millions of dollars into the ASF as part of a professed desire to promote “African solutions to African problems”.87 In 2008 then foreign minister Maxime Bernier reportedly described a $10 million grant to ASF training centres as a way for “African peacekeepers and civilian police to take on increased responsibility for their own continent” while Canada’s permanent representative to the AU, David Usher, launched an ASF training initiative in 2012 by saying “Africa has empowered itself with a unique and decisive capability to provide African answers to some of the most complex African security challenges.”88

When it serves their interests Ottawa, Washington and Paris happily promote “African solutions to African problems”. But when African solutions are not to their liking the NATO powers simply ignore AU proposals, as was the case with the conflict that arose in eastern Libya in early 2011. Days into the uprising the AU Peace and Security Council discussed the crisis and announced it would send a mission to study the situation. But the “advanced assessment” AU military team dispatched to Cairo, Egypt, was unable to gain security assurances from the Transitional National Council in control of Benghazi. The fact-finding mission never reached Libyan territory.89

A week before NATO began bombing Libya, the AU outlined a way to resolve the conflict. On March 10 the AU Peace and Security Council, which is responsible for the ASF, put forward a five-point plan demanding: “A cease-fire; the protection of civilians; the provision of humanitarian aid for Libyans and foreign workers in the country; dialogue between the two sides, i.e. the Gaddafi regime and the National Transitional Council (NTC); leading to an ‘inclusive transitional period’ and political reforms which ‘meet the aspirations of the Libyan people.’”90

Three weeks into the bombing the AU High Level Ad Hoc Committee on Libya, including four heads of state and Uganda’s foreign minister, visited Libya to pursue a ceasefire.91 Gaddafi agreed to the first phase of the proposal but it was rejected by NATO-backed NTC. The AU roadmap called for “(i) immediate cessation of all hostilities; (ii) cooperation of the concerned Libyan authorities to facilitate the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance to needy populations; (iii) protection of foreign nationals, including the African migrant workers living in Libya; and (iv) dialogue between the Libyan parties and establishment of a consensual and inclusive transitional government.”92
In May 2011 the entire AU assembly convened in an extraordinary session to “review the situation in Libya”.93 They called for an immediate end to all attacks against civilians, a ceasefire and a transitional period that would allow for elections.94

In flagrant disregard of the emerging African security regime they claimed to support, the US, Canada, France and Britain ignored AU mediation efforts. AU officials protested vociferously. Ten days into the NATO assault the AU boycotted an international conference on Libya held in London.95 Four months later Jean Ping, the chairperson of the AU Commission, expressed his concern about being sidelined during a BBC program, explaining that “nobody talked to us, nobody has consulted us.”96 At a meeting with the UN Security Council three months into NATO’s war the AU High Level Ad Hoc Committee on Libya criticized the war. Delivering the AU position, Ruhakana Rugunda, Uganda’s permanent representative to the UN, said: “there has been no need for these war activities, ever since Gaddafi accepted dialogue when the AU Mediation Committee visited Tripoli on April 10. Any war activities after that have been provocation for Africa. It is an unnecessary war. It must stop.”97

(This book doesn’t cover it thoroughly but Canada played a significant role in the 2011 NATO attack. A Canadian general led the bombing campaign, seven CF-18 fighter jets participated and two Canadian naval vessels patrolled the Libyan coast. See my The Ugly Canadian: Stephen Harper’s Foreign Policy for more detail.)

In Slouching Towards Sirte: NATO’s War on Libya and Africa, Concordia University professor Maximilian Forte argues the invasion of Libya was designed to eliminate an important supporter of African unity and critic of Western militarism on the continent. Gaddafi spearheaded opposition to AFRICOM, successfully undermining Washington’s ability to gain “broad African support for basing the AFRICOM headquarters on the continent.”98 A 2009 cable from the US Embassy in Tripoli called “the presence of non-African military elements in Libya or elsewhere on the continent” almost a “neuralgic issue” for Gaddafi.99

Eliminating Gaddafi delivered a blow to the AU and those who rejected AFRICOM. Dan Glazebrook writes: “In taking out Muammar Gaddafi, AFRICOM had actually eliminated the project’s fiercest adversary … Gaddafi ended his political life as a dedicated pan Africanist and, whatever one thought of the man, it is clear that his vision for Africa was very different from that of the subordinate supplier of cheap labour and raw materials that AFRICOM was created to maintain.”100

Corporate Canada also militarized African life. With few regulations constraining their international operations, a number of Canadian security companies operate on the continent. Unlike the US and South Africa, “Canada does not have legislation designed to regulate either the services provided by Canadian PMSCs [private military security companies] operating outside of Canada or the conduct of Canadian citizens working for foreign PMSCs.”101 Furthermore, Ottawa has not signed the international convention against the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries and has been little involved with the human rights councils working group on the use of mercenaries.102

Muskoka-based Executive Security Services International offers bodyguard services on the continent while Vancouver-based CKR Global helped Canadian businesses assess security risks in a number of African countries. CKR generally dispatches former soldiers on staff to help clients work with local police and private security firms.103

Run by former Torontonian Abdiweli Ali Taar, Somali-Canadian Coast Guard (SomCan) commanded 400 marines and operated a half-dozen patrol ships.104 In 2002 the private security firm was contracted to provide coast guard services in Puntland, a semiautonomous region in northern Somalia. In 2005 SomCan was removed after some of its men ended up in a “spectacular gun battle” with Puntland’s police and army and three of its employees hijacked a Thai fishing vessel for ransom.105 After SomCan smoothed over relations with Puntland authorities, a 2009 Macleans article noted that Abdiweli Ali Taar met “United Nations officials and foreign diplomats, including Canada’s ambassador to Kenya” to seek funds to restart its anti-pirate coast guard services.106

Run by retired Canadian Brigadier General Ian Douglas, Black Bear Consulting operated in Sierra Leone, Angola, Uganda, Rwanda and the Congo.107 In his 2000 book Fortune’s Warriors former Canadian Airborne Regiment commando Jim Davis writes that Douglas offered to introduce him to officials of the notorious mercenary outfit Executive Outcomes if he sought employment.108

Davis instead went to work for Globe Risk Holdings. The Toronto company supplied security support to businesses in Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Algeria, Ivory Coast, Sudan, Angola and both Congos. Set up by Alan Bell, a 12-year veteran of the British Special Forces, Globe Risk tried to open a branch in Sierra Leone in 1999. At the time the National Post reported: “Next month, Alan Bell and Jim Davis, two former soldiers, are travelling to Sierra Leone, a country few would dare visit, to open a branch of their private security company. For the two enterprising Canadians, the explosive mix of diamonds, road blocks, feuding rebel groups and child soldiers represents an irresistible business opportunity.”109 Globe Risk planned to train the president’s bodyguards and build a local security force capable of guarding airports and seaways.110 Driving the initiative forward was a plan to open a large bauxite mine in the country.111

Individuals such as Jim Davis and other publicly trained elite Canadian soldiers were highly sought after by private military firms. In 2006 the Ottawa Citizen reported: “Records previously released under the access to information law have shown that Joint Task Force Two officers are concerned the unit is losing personnel to private military firms. Former JTF2 have found work as guns-for-hire with companies in Africa and Iraq.”112

Home to former Canadian special forces, Canada’s leading private security corporation opened field offices in Nigeria, Algeria, Somalia and Libya. The “largest privately owned security company in the world”, Montréal-based GardaWorld has about 50,000 employees.

Garda established its Nigerian operations in 2013. “As part of our logistical support offering in Lagos, we have a secure operational villa in a gated community with waterfront access, popular with international oil & gas companies,” noted the company’s website.113 Oil operations in Nigeria are fraught with insecurity and a number of international energy firms have turned to former soldiers from the US, UK and South Africa to deter political and criminal attacks.

Similarly, in 2013 GardaWorld rented a villa in Mogadishu, Somalia. The Montréal company said it was capable of lodging energy contractors and international development workers as well as accompanying them around the country.114 A 2014 report from the UN Working Group on the use of mercenaries questioned the growing role of Western security companies in the country. “As Somalia rebuilds its security institutions, the Government should ensure that private security forces are properly regulated and do not become a substitute for competent and accountable police. All Somalis have the right to security, not just those who can afford to pay for it,” said Faiza Patel, chairperson of the UN Working Group.115

But it’s not simply a matter of equal justice. In a country where control of armed men has long been the main source of power, private security companies can easily strengthen the hand of a political faction or prolong conflict.

Libya was Garda’s most successful foray onto the continent. Sometime in the “summer of 2011”, according to its website, Garda began operating in the country.116 After Libya’s National Transition Council captured Tripoli (six weeks before Muammar Gaddafi was killed in Sirte on October 20, 2011) the rebels requested Garda’s assistance in bringing their forces “besieging the pro-Qaddafi stronghold of Sirte to hospitals in Misrata”, reported Bloomberg.117 Garda’s involvement in Libya may have contravened that country’s laws as well as UN resolutions 1970 and 1973, which the Security Council passed amidst the uprising against Gaddafi’s four-decade rule. Resolution 1970 called for an arms embargo, mandating all UN member states “to prevent the provision of armed mercenary personnel” into Libya. Resolution 1973 reinforced the arms embargo, mentioning “armed mercenary personnel” in three different contexts. In an article titled “Mercenaries in Libya: Ramifications of the Treatment of ‘Armed Mercenary Personnel’ under the Arms Embargo for Private Military Company Contractors”, Hin-Yan Liu points out that the Security Council’s “explicit use of the broader term ‘armed mercenary personnel’ is likely to include a significant category of contractors working for Private Military Companies (PMCs).”118

Canadian officials probably introduced the rebels to Garda. In fact, Ottawa may have paid Garda to help the rebels. Reportedly, the federal government used some of the $2.2 billion it froze in Libyan assets in Canada to pay Waterloo-based Aeryon Scout Micro to equip and train the rebels with a three-pound, backpack-sized Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.119

Contravening international law can be good for business. As the first Western security company officially operating in Libya, Garda’s website described it as the “market leader in Libya” with “over 3,500 staff providing protection, training and crisis response.”120 Garda’s small army of former British special forces and other elite soldiers won a slew of lucrative contracts in Libya. The company’s Protective Security Detail provided “security for a number of international oil companies and their service providers” as well as NATO soldiers training the Libyan Army (the first time NATO contracted out the protection of a training program).121

The company also protected a hundred European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) personnel who trained and equipped Libyan border and coast guards in a bid to curtail African migrants from crossing the Mediterranean. Garda’s four-year EUBAM contract garnered attention in early 2014 when 19 cases of arms and ammunition destined for the company disappeared at the Tripoli airport. But Garda didn’t let this loss of weapons deter it from performing its duties. According to Intelligence Online, company officials asked “to borrow British weapons to ensure the safety of EU personnel.”122

The request found favour since Garda already protected British interests in Libya, including Ambassador Dominic Asquith. In Under Fire: The Untold Story of the Attack in Benghazi, Fred Burton and Samuel M. Katz describe the ambassador’s protection detail: “Some members of Sir Dominic Asquith’s security detail were undoubtedly veterans of 22 Special Air Service, or SAS, Great Britain’s legendary commandos, whose motto is ‘Who Dares Wins.’ Others were members of the Royal Marines Special Boat Service, or SBS.”123

In June 2012 a rebel group attacked Asquith’s convoy in Benghazi with a rocket-propelled grenade. “The RPG-7 warhead fell short of the ambassador’s vehicle”, notes Under Fire. Two Garda operatives “were seriously hurt by fragmentation when the blast and rocket punched out the windshield of the lead vehicle; their blood splattered throughout the vehicle’s interior and then onto the street.”124

One wonders how many Libyans have fallen prey to “Canada’s Blackwater”? Or how many such military engagements Canadians will participate in as the scramble for African resources grows?

15. Whose Corruption?

“Traditionally, the corruption indices, such as from the World Bank and Transparency International always end up pointing the finger at African countries, but, with the recent arrival of measures such as the Financial Secrecy Index, we are beginning to see the finger pointed back at the handlers, the facilitators of illicit financial flows: western banks and tax havens.”

– Nicholas Shaxson, Treasure Islands

The story so far has been the use of military and economic force by powerful interests to get what they want from Africa. But, some may argue, the continent is corrupt and cannot be trusted so we must do what we do simply to make things work.

But, while bribery and theft of public resources are no doubt a problem on the African continent, Canadian commentators tend to exaggerate their role in impoverishment. These commentators also define “corruption” narrowly and downplay the role of Western capitalists therein.

Canada is quick to denounce African corruption, but lags behind the rest of the G7 countries in criminalizing foreign bribery. For example, into the early 1990s, Canadian companies were at liberty to deduct bribes paid to foreign officials from their taxes, affording them an “advantage over the Americans”, according to Bernard Lamarre former head of Montréal engineering firm Lavalin (now SNC Lavalin).1

In 1977, the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act outlawed bribes to foreign officials. Ottawa failed to follow suit until the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) launched its anti-bribery convention in 1997. The OECD convention obliged signatories to pass laws against bribing public officials abroad and two years later Canada complied, passing the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (CFPOA). Still, for the next decade Canadian officials did little to enforce the law. The RCMP waited until 2008 to create an International Anti-Corruption Unit and didn’t secure a significant conviction under the CFPOA until 2011.2

Anticorruption watchdogs have repeatedly criticized Ottawa’s lax approach. A March 2011 report from the OECD Working Group on Bribery criticized Canada’s framework for combating foreign corruption with Ottawa repeatedly faring poorly in Transparency International’s (TI) rankings. In 2013 TI complained that between 2005 and 2011, Canada exercised “little to no enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.”3 The group ranked Canada the worst performer among G7 countries on this front for eight of the last 10 years.4

Canada’s laidback pursuit of corruption is compounded by poor legislation. As a purely criminal statute, the CFPOA requires higher standards of proof than the mix of criminal and civil provisions that allow US authorities to lay civil charges when a firm “cooks its books” to disguise illicit payments.5

While the evidence is clear that this country has repeatedly failed to seriously combat corruption, most Canadians would likely be surprised at the extent to which our governments and corporations have engaged in what (in any sane world) should be illegal practices.

What follows is a list of just some of the publicly reported incidents of Canadian governments and corporations alleged to have bribed African officials or engaged in corruption:

Between 1985 and 1989 the federal government provided almost $140 million in assistance to Zaire during Mobutu Sese Seko’s rule. In 1990 alone, reported an Ottawa Citizen editorial, “Canadian taxpayers contributed $52.95 million to Zaire: almost $16 million went direct to Mobuto’s corrupt regime.”6

A June 2014 Wall Street Journal exposé headlined “Barrick Gold Unit is Accused of Bribery in Africa” detailed payments the company made to Tanzanian officials. “As part of a process to buy land near the mine starting last year, African Barrick paid more than $400,000 in cash mostly to Tanzanian government officials and consultants responsible for valuing the land, according to company invoices and copies of checks reviewed.”7 Barrick paid expenses, honorariums and “night out allowances” to members of the task force overseeing its land valuation. The payments were made in cash. A Barrick spokesperson said they paid hard currency due to inadequate banking services. This may be true of far-flung regions, but in the half dozen cities this author visited on a recent journey to Tanzania, the widespread presence of ATMs and phone-based “mobile money” stands was apparent. While media outlets across the globe picked up the Wall Street Journal story, the Canadian media essentially ignored Barrick’s dubious tax payments. More significant, there’s no indication that the RCMP’s International Anti-Corruption Unit investigated actions that likely contravened the CFPOA.

A second incident involving Barrick Gold took place in 2007, when it signed a sweetheart concession for its Buzwagi mine with Tanzania’s Energy and Minerals minister Nazir Karamagi.8 The transaction took place thousands of kilometres from Dar-es-Salaam, in London, England.9 Ordinarily, Tanzania’s Parliament was supposed to review mining contracts, but this deal was signed without its oversight. Upon obtaining a leaked copy of the accord, ThisDay reported that the Canadian firm was granted reprieve from tax payments, duty and fees associated with the East African Customs Management Act.10 The contract also committed the parties to arbitrate disputes in British, rather than Tanzanian, courts. A joint 2008 report from the National Council of Muslims in Tanzania, the Christian Council of Tanzania, and the Tanzania Episcopal Conference, criticized the manner in which the deal was concluded and its low benefit to Tanzanians.

A third incident involving Barrick took place in Canada. In 2011 Barrick Gold transferred $122,000 to a bank account set up by Zambia’s high commissioner in Canada, Nevers Mumba.11 When Mumba was accused (and later charged) with raising funds illicitly he claimed the money was for a Zambian cultural ensemble’s tour of Canada. Formerly vice president, Mumba ran for president in 2015 as head of the main opposition party. During the campaign he called for a reduction in mining royalty rates. “The moment you raise it [royalties] to those levels without engaging those in that field you paralyze your efforts to build an economy,” Mumba told Bloomberg. “I’ve already made a passionate appeal to Barrick Gold. I’ve told them to hold their fire [on shuttering their Lumwana mine] and see what happens” after the presidential election.12 While the Zambian media focused on Mumba’s alleged corruption, it’s hard to imagine that the Toronto miner would put up $122,000 without expecting something (beyond a logo placement) in return.

In 2003, Acres International, which had benefited from $100 million in CIDA contracts, was convicted of paying an official in Lesotho a minimum of $300,000 US to win a contract for a major water project. The Oakville-based company deposited the money into a Swiss bank account belonging to Masupha Ephraim Sole, a Canadian-trained engineer at the helm of the project.13 Prior to the ruling, Foreign Affairs spokesperson Richard Chappell dismissed the matter, saying it was “not treating this issue at all.”14 This apparent disinterest was odd given that Acres’ representative in Lesotho had been Canada’s honorary consul in the country.15 To make matters worse, Canadian officials lobbied the World Bank to avoid suspending Acres from bidding on its contracts and the company continued to receive CIDA contracts.16

TSX-listed Addax Petroleum became the leading independent oil producer in Nigeria after its former country representative, Richard Granier-Defferre, paid the country’s oil minister $10 million for drilling rights during the years spanning 1993 to 1998.17 Addax executive and founder Granier-Defferre also helped open bank accounts in Europe for the oil minister, Dan Etete. The oil minister served in the government of dictator Sani Abacha, a president infamous for looting huge sums of the country’s wealth. Etete was convicted in France of money laundering in 2007, part of a probe into kickbacks paid by oil companies for contracts. Granier-Defferre, Addax’s representative in Nigeria until 2000, was tried as an accessory. In 2006 Addax and its well-connected Nigerian partner, Emeka Offor, acquired additional Nigerian concessions. Forbes reported: “When the deal was announced, the Nigerian media exploded with allegations of corruption.”18

Bombardier quietly paid $35 million in “success fees” to a controversial arms dealer and middleman, Youssef Zarrouk, who helped the Montréal-based company win a multibillion-dollar South African railway contract in 2010.19 As part of this sum, CBC News discovered “that a secret deal was brokered by Bombardier to pay $5 million to a South African middleman, Peter-Paul Ngwenya, who described himself as an ‘influential individual in political circles.’”20 At press time South Africa’s anti-corruption agency announced an investigation into Bombardier’s payments. Canada’s anticorruption unit, however, ignored the questionable dealings.21

UN reports, media and NGOs have criticized numerous Canadian mining companies for their deals in the Congo. A 2002 report by the UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo accused Vancouver-based First Quantum of bribery. The report referred to the “collusion” between foreign mining companies and “highly placed government officials who provide mining licenses and export permits in return for private gain. … For example, in its attempts to buy rights to the Kolwezi Tailings, First Quantum Minerals (FQM) of Canada offered a down payment to the State of $100 million, cash payments and shares held in trust for Government officials. According to documents in the possession of the Panel, the payments list included the National Security Minister, Mwenze Kongolo; the Director of the National Intelligence Agency, Didier Kazadi Nyembwe; the Director General of Gécamines, Yumba Monga; and the former Minister of the Presidency, Pierre-Victor Mpoyo. The FQM share offer to those officials was premised on a sharp rise in its share price once it was announced that it had secured some of the most valuable mineral concessions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”22

Amidst the Second Congo War in the early 2000s, Kinross Gold negotiated a generous deal with the state’s mining company, Gécamines, for pieces of its infrastructure as well as valuable copper and cobalt leases. Shortly following this, the Vancouver-based company entered a partnership on their new Katanga concession with a company owned by George Forrest, a former chairman of Gécamines.23 Rights and Accountability in Development (RAID), a London-based organization, found that representatives of Kinross negotiated the deal while Forrest was still Chairman of Gécamines. The transaction faced major scrutiny. A Congolese parliamentary commission questioned Kinross’ deal with Gécamines and international groups called on the World Bank to investigate the company’s activities. In 2006 Paul Fortin, a Canadian who was then chief executive of Gécamines, said he wasn’t interested in investigating deals signed during the multi country war that stripped the public company’s assets. “I am not here as Sherlock Holmes,” he told Corporate Knights magazine.24

Over the past half-decade, Canada’s biggest engineering company, SNC Lavalin is alleged to have greased palms in Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Angola, Nigeria, Mozambique, Ghana, Malawi, Uganda and Zambia. A joint CBC/Globe and Mail investigation of a small Oakville based division of SNC uncovered suspicious payments to government officials in connection with 13 international development projects. In each case between five and 10 per cent of costs were recorded as “‘project consultancy cost,’ sometimes ‘project commercial cost,’ but [the] real fact is the intention is [a] bribe,” a former SNC engineer, Mohammad Ismail, told the CBC.25

In Libya, the RCMP accused SNC of paying $50 million to Saadi Gadhafi, son of the late Libyan dictator, in exchange for a series of contracts.26 The company is also alleged to have defrauded $130 million from Libyan public agencies.27 In a less high profile incident, the RCMP accused SNC of paying $6-million to the son-in-law of former Tunisian dictator Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in exchange for assistance securing contracts.28

In Angola, SNC allegedly paid millions of dollars to government officials in exchange for a hydro dam contract. Former SNC employee Joseph Salim sued the company for wrongful dismissal, claiming he was terminated after he blew the whistle on the illegal payments. Salim alleged that SNC’s former CEO, Jacques Lamarre, agreed to pay a ten percent “agent fee” but company officials were unwilling to declare more than five percent on the books, which necessitated artificially increasing the price of the dam.29

In northern Nigeria, SNC officials allegedly paid 1.2 million naira in cash — nearly five times the annual average Nigerian salary — to a government official responsible for a World Bank-funded water and sewer project.30 One company spreadsheet noted that money was “paid to Musa Tete [the Nigerian bureaucrat overseeing the World Bank-financed project] through Yaroson”, SNC’s Nigerian partner.31

Another company spreadsheet cited by CBC revealed SNC distributed 7.5 per cent of its project budget in “project consultancy cost” to a number of employees for an African Development Bank financed road project in Mozambique.32

In yet another questionable dealing, SNC employee Ramesh Shah requested Verona Parkinson, then managing director of the Mozambican consulting company AGEMA, to invoice $50,000 US for a nonexistent “geophysical survey”.33 The money was channelled into the accounts of Parkinson’s daughter and ex-husband and then wired to Ramesh Shah’s personal bank account. As allegations of SNC bribery seeped out, the Montréal company continued to win billions of dollars in Canadian government contracts, maintained the backing of the Canadian Commercial Corporation and garnered support from Canadian diplomats abroad.

Calgary-based Griffiths Energy International gave $2-million US and discounted stock to Nouracham Niam, the wife of Chad’s ambassador to the US and Canada, Mahamoud Bechir, in return for her help in securing an oil concession in Chad for the energy company.34 After the death of the company’s CEO, Brad Griffiths, new management alerted Canadian authorities to the payments in 2011. Griffiths Energy was charged under the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act and agreed to pay a $10.35-million fine. No one was jailed and the company maintained its concession in Chad. The concession, the company’s most valuable asset, was the main reason it was later purchased by Glencore Xstrata for $1.35 billion.35 At the end of the day, the cost of a $2 million bribe and $10 million fine were good business for the Calgary-based company. Prime Minister Jean Chrétien helped Griffiths Energy win its concession in Chad. In late 2008 he arranged an introductory meeting between Brad Griffiths, Chadian President Idriss Déby, ambassador Bechir and himself.36 He set up a second meeting a year later that also included Chad’s oil minister.37 A Globe and Mail summary of a 2013 interview with former ambassador Bechir, noted that Chrétien “helped Griffiths’ senior management gain access to key officials in the Chadian government. The ex-ambassador said his wife, Nouracham Niam, wrote a formal letter to the embassy proposing the meeting, which he approved ‘because this is Jean Chrétien. … He has the priority because he was the former Prime Minister of Canada’.”38

Just a few bad apples or symptoms of a structural problem? The fact that Canadian politicians can look forward to a corporate gravy train once they are out of office suggests that these examples represent a bigger problem.

Canadian corporations regularly employ former politicians to advance their interests on the continent. Almost every prime minister since Pierre Trudeau (Joe Clark, Brian Mulroney, Paul Martin, Jean Chrétien) left office and lobbied on behalf of Canadian corporate interests in Africa. A number of provincial premiers and foreign ministers have done so as well.

Companies generally appoint politicians to their board of directors or contract their services through a law firm. The hope is that they can open doors. The smaller, poorer and more aid-dependent a nation, the more likely this is so. When asked why he appointed Brian Mulroney to his board, Peter Munk, chairman and founder of Barrick Gold, told Peter C. Newman: “He has great contacts. He knows every dictator in the world on a first name basis.”39

A month after leaving office in December 2003, Chrétien joined the law firm Heenan Blaikie and over the next 13 months traveled to Niger, Nigeria, Gambia, Angola and the Congo to advance the interests of its clients.40 According to the Globe and Mail, Calgary-based TG World Energy hired Chrétien to help it “get out of a pickle in the impoverished African nation of Niger.”41 TG’s rights to explore 18 million acres of Niger’s wilderness for oil and gas were revoked by the government, which argued that TG failed to fulfill its investment targets. Niger then awarded the concession to a subsidiary of the China National Petroleum Corp. The Calgary company sued Niger’s government and went to arbitration with the Chinese firm. “It also asked Mr. Chrétien to intervene”, reported the Globe and Mail.42 “The former prime minister spoke with officials of China National Petroleum during a trip to Beijing and then in March of 2004, he flew into Niamey, the Niger capital. In normal circumstances, the best TG World could have hoped to get on its own was a meeting with the energy minister. But Mr. Chrétien managed to snag a meeting with the president.”43 Chrétien’s lobbying led to a new agreement between TG World, Niger and the Chinese corporation, which saw the company’s stock increase from eight cents to more than a dollar within a year.

Chrétien used his reputation to advance Canadian corporate interests in Gambia as well. In 2004 he visited Gambian dictator Yahya Jammen to discuss offshore petroleum concessions for Calgary’s Buried Hill Energy. After the meeting, Chrétien said: “I met the President, when I was the Prime Minister of Canada. … We have been negotiating with the government of The Gambia to find out if there is oil off-shore here. And it is a very complicated trial and we’ve made a lot of progress and we hope we can build the company if we negotiate.”44

In 2014, the firm that employed Chrétien disintegrated. A Financial Post article headlined “How Heenan Blaikie’s Stunning Collapse Started with a Rogue African Arms Deal”, discusses how Chrétien and colleague Jacques Bouchard Jr.’s efforts to drum up African business sparked a rift within the law firm.45 But Chrétien’s services remained highly prized. Soon after Heenan Blaikie’s demise, Dentons Canada made Chrétien a partner and appointed him vice president of the law firm’s board of directors.46

Not unlike the role Chrétien played at TG World, Toronto-based Teranga Gold employed the services of former Québec Premier Jean Charest to lobby Senegalese officials. The mining company claimed the royalties mandated by Senegal were above the agreed upon rate and commissioned Charest to help navigate the issue with this active member of la Francophonie. “With his credibility and contacts, he was the right person to get the attention of the government and a fair deal for both sides,” Teranga CEO Richard Young told La Presse in 2014.47

Working on behalf of Bay Street law firm McCarthy Tétrault, Charest aggressively promoted Canadian mining on the continent. “The Africa question is certainly on the minds of a lot of Canadian mining companies,” said Charest at the 2014 Mining Indaba conference in South Africa.48

Former prime minister and long-time foreign affairs minister Joe Clark worked for several companies operating in various African countries. Clark helped a small Calgary-based company secure exploration rights for oil and gas in Tanzania and Mozambique. The company, Suprex Energy Corporation, sent out a 1997 press release announcing they acquired these exploration rights “with the assistance of the Right Honourable Joe Clark and the Honourable Harvie Andre [another former Mulroney cabinet minister].”49

First Quantum appointed Clark its special adviser for African affairs to lobby on its behalf in the Congo. He reportedly facilitated a 1998 meeting between Canadian officials and Congo’s Minister of Mines Frédéric Kibassa Maliba, and later pressured Canadian diplomats to demand a review of a 2002 UN report criticizing the manner in which First Quantum acquired its concession.50 Alongside his corporate work in the Congo, Clark engaged in diplomatic work and led the Carter Center’s delegation of election observers that gave Congo’s controversial 2007 presidential election its stamp of approval.

In Ghana, Clark used his name recognition as former chair of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa to assist Triton Logging secure the world’s largest underwater logging license. BC Business magazine reported: “Confronted by a former Canadian Prime Minister, the Ghanaians in the room are spellbound. Clark, who is a director of the Canadian Council of Africa, might as well be Canada’s sitting prime minister.”51

Clark secured an agreement for Triton that had the potential to generate multiple billions of dollars, which also allotted the Vancouver-based company 80% of all profits. Ghanaian Chronicle publisher Kofi Coomson criticized the generous deal and called on Clark to “do the right thing”. In an interview with BC Business, Coomson said: “Ghana’s interests should come first, and Mr. Clark’s personal interests come second.”52

Clark remains influential on the continent partially because he continues to engage in African politics. His diplomatic roles have included leading international election observation teams in Cameroon, Congo and Nigeria.

While corruption is widely identified with bribing or looting by public officials, Africa loses much more from corporate tax evasion. According to a 2015 UN Economic Commission for Africa/African Union panel, companies and government officials are illegally moving up to $60 billion US a year out of the continent.53 Chair of the UN/AU panel, former South African President Thabo Mbeki told the press: “Large commercial corporations are by far the biggest culprits of illicit outflows, followed by organized crime.”54

The Washington DC-based Global Financial Integrity Forum found that between 1970 and 2008 “total illicit financial outflows from Africa, conservatively estimated, were approximately $854 billion. Total illicit outflows may be as high as $1.8 trillion.”55 Three percent of this total was thought to be bribes to government officials or theft of public funds. Fifteen percent of all illicit outbound transfers were found to be money derived from drug smuggling, counterfeit goods, racketeering and other common criminal activities. The vast majority of the illicit funds, up to two thirds of the total, were cross-border commercial transactions designed to reduce or eliminate taxes.56 Most of this money consisted of corporations shifting goods and profits between jurisdictions to reduce or eliminate their tax bill.

Often called “transfer pricing” or “trade misinvoicing”, multinational corporations artificially adjust the price of goods sold between their subsidiaries or partner companies in order for profits to end up in low (or no) tax jurisdictions while costs appear in high tax countries where they’re deducted from a company’s tax bill. Alain Deneault describes transfer pricing thusly: “First, the corporation creates one or more subsidiaries in a tax haven. Then, it maintains business relations with the subsidiary as if it were an independent party. Transactions are always designed to benefit the subsidiary, because money earned by the offshore entity will not be taxed. In other words, the goal is to establish bogus operations with the subsidiary in order to record a large proportion of the company’s earnings in offshore accounts, removing them from taxation in countries where the corporation has real and substantial activities.”57

US Senator Carl Levin described transfer pricing as “the corporate equivalent of the secret offshore accounts of individual tax dodgers.”58 The director of Global Financial Integrity, Raymond Baker, employs even stronger language. Baker calls the offshore financial system “the ugliest chapter in global economic affairs since slavery.”59

“Transfer pricing” and falsified invoicing between seemingly unrelated companies deprives African governments of the tax revenues required to build schools, hospitals and other vital infrastructure. In most African countries government expenditures represent a small percentage of GDP, which exacerbates impoverishment.

Canada has helped build the global offshore financial system. Alain Deneault details the work of Canadian politicians, businessmen and Bank of Canada officials in developing taxation and banking policies in a number of Caribbean financial havens in his book Canada: A New Tax Haven: How the Country That Shaped Caribbean Tax Havens Is Becoming One Itself.

The offshore system relies on the financial infrastructure of the leading capitalist countries. CBC reported that Canadian “banks play a role” by “setting up accounts for offshore companies, or providing essential assistance to do so.”60 In a 2013 story, the public broadcaster pointed out that Canada’s big banks had 75 subsidiaries in locales considered offshore havens. Additionally, Canadian banks were cited when the Consortium of Investigative Journalists released a cache of leaked files concerning secret tax havens that year. Scotia Bank, CIBC and the Royal Bank of Canada were named a combined 5,000 times in the leaked documents.61

The CIBC is apparently popular with wealthy, well-placed Africans. Economist Thierry Godefroy and legal expert Pierre Lascoumes write that the “Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce is known as the bank of many African dignitaries” while French Africa specialist François-Xavier Verschave called it “the nefarious CIBC, favourite bank of African oil dictators.”62 In 1997, for instance, the Toronto-based financial institution was the conduit of a $22 million transfer from Geneva to the British Virgin Islands for Kourtas, which was owned by Gabonese dictator Omar Bongo.63

Ottawa has signed tax treaties and Tax Information Exchange Agreements with a number of Caribbean tax havens. Due to a 2011 Tax Information Exchange Agreement, Deneault writes, “subsidiaries of Canadian companies that record their profits in the Caymans can now transfer them to Canada without paying any taxes — a clear incentive to practise transfer pricing.”64 Co-founded by Calgary lawyer Jim Macdonald, who greatly influenced the Cayman Islands banking legislation, Maples Fund Services explains to its clients: “With no income, corporate or capital gains tax, no estate duty, inheritance tax or gift tax and no withholding tax, the Cayman Islands is well situated to be used in structuring investments for Canadian corporations.”65
While they’ve proliferated in recent years, the first double taxation treaty Canada signed with a Caribbean tax haven dates to Wayne Gretzky’s inaugural season in the NHL. In 1980, Joe Clark’s short-lived Conservative government signed a double taxation treaty with Barbados.66 This allowed Canadians to park their international profits in Barbados, which taxes companies at between 0.25% and 2.5%, and transfer them here without paying tax in Canada.67

In 2015, Barbados was the No. 2 destination for Canadian foreign investment after the US. With thousands of mailbox head offices Canadians invested $71 billion in the tiny island, equal to the sum Canadian companies invested in Germany, China, Brazil and Mexico altogether.68

At $36 billion, the Cayman Islands was the fourth biggest destination for Canadian investors in 2015. (Britain was the third biggest recipient of Canadian investment.) In fact, Canadian capitalists have some $200 billion ‘invested’ in the ten leading tax havens.

Ottawa actively defends the Caribbean financial system. In response to a push for greater regulation of the offshore world, in 2009 Minister of Finance Jim Flaherty told the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund (where Canada represents most members of the Commonwealth Caribbean as well as Ireland): “Some of our Caribbean countries have significant financial sector activities. There is a risk that changes to financial sector regulation in advanced countries could have negative unintended consequences on these activities. In particular, there is a risk that measures taken against non-cooperative jurisdictions, including tax havens, could have unintended negative impacts on well-regulated, transparent, financial centres. I believe that this should be avoided. Countries that comply with international standards should be protected from such measures.”69 Staying true to this position, Canadian officials were rumoured to have undermined efforts to tackle “the scourge of tax evasion” at the 2010 and 2013 G8 summits. In private, officials from the French Ministry of Finance reportedly blamed Canada for undermining international cooperation to combat tax evasion.70

Mining companies are some of the leading culprits in misinvoicing. With commodity prices constantly in flux and their products entirely for export, resource companies are well placed to abuse countries’ limited means of investigating false invoices and transfer pricing. A number of Canadian companies operating on the African continent have been accused of evading their taxes:

Mopani Copper Mines (MCM), a sixth of which is owned by Vancouver’s First Quantum, cheated Zambia out of millions of dollars. At the request of the Zambia Revenue Agency, Grant Thornton audited MCM, which “resisted the pilot audit at every stage.”71 The global accountancy firm found an “unexplainable” increase in MCM’s costs between 2006 and 2008, which allowed the company to significantly reduce its stated profits and tax bill.72 Leaked to the public, the audit also suggested that MCM underreported cobalt extracts and manipulated internal prices to shift profits to First Quantum and Glencore subsidiaries in the British Virgin Islands and Bermuda, allowing it to evade tax in Zambia. “Based on the Grant Thornton analysis, we estimate that the company’s practices potentially cost the Zambian government up to £76m a year in lost corporation tax,” said Anna Thomas, head of tax policy at ActionAid.73 In 2011, half a dozen international NGOs filed a complaint against majority owner Glencore and First Quantum before the Swiss and Canadian National Contact Points for violating OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.74

To the east, a series of reports suggest that Barrick Gold short-changed Tanzanians. A 2003 Alex Stewart Assayers audit concluded that mining companies overstated their losses by $502 million US between 1999 and 2003, which cost the Tanzanian government $132.5 million US.75 The audit also suggested that $25 million US in royalties went unpaid.76 Another report found that between 2003 and 2008, foreign mining companies exported $2.5 billion in gold from Tanzania with only $110 million reaching the government in royalties and direct taxes.77 In 2014, Global Financial Integrity calculated that transfer pricing by Tanzanian mining companies cost the government a quarter billion dollars a year in tax revenue.78 As Tanzania’s top gold producer during this period, Barrick consistently declared losses in order to pay minimal corporation tax. With many subsidiaries, including in the Cayman Islands and Barbados, Africa Barrick Gold (now called Acacia) made it difficult for Tanzanian tax collectors to trace exactly what the country was owed.79

Tenke Fungurume mine (a quarter of which is owned by Toronto-based Lundin Mining) was accused of overstating its investment in eastern Congo in a bid to reduce its tax bill. In 2013, a half-dozen NGOs claimed the company short-changed the government and violated Congolese law by holding its financial statements outside the country.80 Lundin Mining’s Tenke holdings are officially held by a subsidiary based in Bermuda.81

Tax authorities in Mali concluded that IAMGOLD owed the country over $15 million in taxes.82 In the mid-2000s, the Toronto-based miner engaged in a multiyear legal wrangle to avoid paying the bill.83

The Ghana Revenue Authority sought $6.6 million Gh ($2 million) from Prestea Sankofa Gold.84 The Vancouver-based company was accused of failing to pay royalties on $130 million Gh in exports from 2012 to 2013.85

To the south, Senegalese tax authorities accused Teranga Gold of diverting funds to an offshore bank. In 2011 they claimed the Toronto-based company skipped out on $24 million in payments and then again failed to pay $2 million more in 2015.86

Next-door, Semafo was accused of failing to pay both taxes and dividends to the government of Niger. Despite owning a 20% share in the Samira Hill mine, the government received nothing from the Montréal-based majority owner between 2004 and 2010. “Since this company started its activities, Niger has not seen a single franc despite its being a shareholder,” noted Abdoulkarim Mossi, head of a government committee set up to tackle economic and financial irregularities in the country.87 The committee found a discrepancy between the quantity of gold mined and the royalties paid. Between 2004 and 2010 SEMAFO extracted 350,000 ounces of gold from Niger worth about $350 million.88

Starving governments of much-needed income, Canadian companies evade their African taxes through various morally and legally questionable means. Some corporations also pay public officials to advance their interests. Ottawa has enabled the tax evasion and largely turned a blind eye to the bribery.

Some might blame Africa for a culture of bribery. Others might point to the ideology of extreme capitalism, which decries government spending and regulation, argues “greed is good” and that the world is made better by people only caring about their own interests.

16. Our Shared Environment

Anthropogenic global warming poses a particularly profound threat to Africa. Although hardest hit by climate change, the terrible irony is that Africa among all continents is least responsible for the problem.

As Nigerian ecologist Nnimmo Bassey has put it: “There is a climate debt that must be recognized and paid. The payment is not all about finance but principally about decolonizing the atmospheric space and redistributing the meagre space left. Developed countries already occupy 80% of the space.”1

During the twentieth century average temperatures rose 0.7 Celsius across the continent.2 With the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere having risen from 280 parts per million prior to the Industrial Revolution to 400 ppm today, climate models predict growing deviation from “normal” temperatures across the continent. If nothing is done to curtail greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) average temperatures may rise 7°C in southern Africa and 8°C in the north by century’s end.3 Reaching nearly twice the global average, this would greatly destabilize human life on the continent. In 2012 the Climate Vulnerability Monitor concluded that climate disturbances were responsible for 400,000 deaths per year, mostly in Africa.4 Bassey has dubbed growing carbon emissions a “death sentence for Africa” while Naomi Klein reports that “African delegates at UN climate summits have begun using words like ‘genocide’ to describe the collective failure to lower emissions.”5

Africa is the region of the world most vulnerable to climate change. A 2011 African Development Bank assessment concluded that “the majority of both bottom up and top down (‘integrated assessment’) studies suggest that damages from climate change, relative to population and GDP, will be higher in Africa than in any other region in the world.” The report continued, arguing that “climate damages in Africa, as a percentage of GDP, may be 10% higher than the next most exposed region (India) and more than twice as high as in the US, Russia, Eurasia and Latin America. Breaking these impacts into specific sectors or components further illustrates these vulnerabilities, with recent studies into health, agriculture and water all demonstrating that Africa is often more vulnerable to climate change along these dimensions than any other region.”6

Various ecological, economic and social factors explain the continent’s vulnerability. Most Africans are directly dependent on resource sectors — fisheries, forestry and agriculture — that are particularly vulnerable to climate conditions. Between half and two thirds of the continent’s people are subsistence farmers who largely rely on natural rainfall, rather than irrigation, to water their crops. Additionally, large swaths of the continent are arid and a third of Africa’s productive area is already classified as dry land.7 As such, subsistence farmers’ crop yields and incomes are easily damaged by reduced or intermittent rainfall.

A rise in temperatures of 1.5°-2°C would severely compromise food security. This increase is expected to result in a 40-80 percent drop in available cropland for maize, millet and sorghum, important staples in many areas.8 According to Tanzanian Minister of State for the Environment Binilith Mahenge, “global warming of 2˚C would put over 50 per cent of the African continent’s population at risk of undernourishment.”9

CO2 induced food shortages are not in some far off dystopian future. British climate scientists suggest global warming sparked a major famine in Somalia in 2011. Somalia’s short rains failed in late 2010 from the natural effects of the La Nina weather pattern, according to Britain’s Met Office weather service. But, as explained by Peter Stott, head of the Climate Monitoring and Attribution team at the Met Office, the dearth of long rains in early 2011 resulted from “systematic warming due to influence on greenhouse gas concentrations.”10 Over 50,000 Somalis died as a result of the famine.11

While water shortages represent a threat to many, an excess of this life-sustaining liquid poses a hazard elsewhere. The African island states of the Seychelles, Cape Verde and Mauritius may disappear as a result of rising sea levels caused by climate change. Similarly, a quarter of Africa’s population lives within 100 km of the continent’s 38,000-km coastline.12 Without significant investments to mitigate risks to major metropolises, such as Dar es Salaam, Mombasa and Lagos, the threat of flooding looms.

Climate change may also deepen the scourge of Africa’s biggest killer, malaria. An increase in temperature allows the spread of both the vector of the disease and the causal agent to higher altitudes. An increase in temperatures also affects areas where malaria is already established by reducing the interval between the mosquito’s blood meals and shortening the incubation period of the parasite in the mosquito. Reversing recent successes in combating the disease, climate change may expose tens of millions more Africans to malaria. Time Magazine environmental reporter Bryan Walsh notes: “Malaria, like many infectious diseases, is first and foremost a problem of development and poverty — and when those are addressed, infections fall. But by expanding the range of malaria, climate change will make a tough challenge all the more difficult. It’s just one more way carbon can kill.”13

Carbon can also trigger the taking up of arms. A University of California Berkeley study found a statistical link between the hotter temperatures generated by climate change and the risk of armed conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. The researchers forecast a 54 per cent rise in civil conflict on the continent due to climate change by 2030, causing 393,000 more combat deaths.14

Climate change spurred violent cattle raids in north-western Kenya and triggered the 2012 Tuareg rebellion in Mali. The mid-2000s violence in Sudan’s Darfur region was dubbed the world’s “first climate change war.” A persistent reduction in rainfall in the area exacerbated ethnic tensions that left hundreds of thousands dead. “The Darfur conflict began as an ecological crisis, arising at least in part from climate change,” wrote UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, in a 2007 Washington Post op-ed. “It is no accident that the violence in Darfur erupted during the drought.”15

Increasing the strain on governance structures, climate change has already exacerbated inequities and ethnic divisions in parts of the continent. Climate change may well propel large areas of Africa into a downward cycle, further undermining the capacity of communities and governments to cope.

It is alarming that certain solutions proposed from the west as a means to combat anthropogenic global warming also threaten many Africans. A proposal to dampen temperature increases by injecting sulphur into the stratosphere to reflect sunlight away from the earth could cause a staggering drop in plant productivity in the Sahel.16 Several computer-modeling studies indicate that a sulphate based solar radiation management (SRM) intervention from a northern hemisphere point of origin would decrease plant productivity by 60-100% in six Sahel countries. Part of the Integrated Assessment of Geo-engineering Proposals project, Leeds University professor Piers Forster told BBC News that “the most striking example of a downside would be the complete drying-out of the Sahel region of Africa — that would be very difficult to adapt to for those substantial populations — and that happens across all the scenarios.”17

An SRM intervention from a southern hemisphere point of origin would probably lead to a better outcome for Africans. But it would likely increase hurricane frequency in the US and Canada. In This Changes Everything Naomi Klein writes: “Does anyone actually believe that geo-engineering will be used to help Africa if that help could come only by putting North America at greater risk of extreme weather?”18

While engineering a mammoth sulphuric volcano to counteract anthropogenic global warming may sound like the basis of a sci-fi thriller, SRM initiatives have found backing from the likes of Bill Gates, Richard Branson and the American Enterprise Institute.19 And while one would like to believe that no government would proceed with a climate engineering initiative likely to harm large swaths of Africa, isn’t that precisely what Canada and the other big carbon emitters are already doing?

Most African governments can contribute little to curtail runaway global warming because their countries’ carbon footprints are negligible compared to the biggest capitalist economies. Per capita emissions in most African countries amount to barely one percent of Canada’s rate. In Uganda, Congo, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Rwanda and Mozambique, per capita emissions comprise less than 1/150th of Canada’s average.20 In Tanzania, Madagascar, Comoros, The Gambia, Liberia and Zambia per capita emissions are less than 1/80th Canada’s average.21

Even more startling is the historical imbalance among nations in global greenhouse gas emissions. According to a September 2009 Guardian comparison, Canada released 23,669 million metric tons of carbon dioxide between 1900 and 2004.22 Canada’s contribution to global warming over this period was more than the combined total of every sub-Saharan African country.23 While the historical data is troubling, forward-looking comparisons are equally bleak. If tar sands expansion proceeds as planned, by 2030 Alberta’s project will emit as much carbon as most of sub-Saharan Africa combined.24

Canadian officialdom has done little to regulate tar sands emissions and has, in fact, subsidized its extraction. Fearing policies that might impact sales of Alberta bitumen, Canadian officials have campaigned aggressively against any international effort to reduce carbon emissions from fuel sources. Canadian diplomats worked with feverish determination to undermine the European Union’s Fuel Quality Directive, a modest bid that would force suppliers to privilege lower-emission fuels. Illustrating the extent of the lobbying efforts, Friends of the Earth Europe determined that Canadian officials met British and European representatives 110 times between September 2009 and July 2011 in attempts to derail the Fuel Quality Directive and ensure what the Canadian government refers to as “non-discriminatory market access” for tar sands exports.25

Through its US Oil Sands Advocacy Strategy, the Canadian government also lobbied against any US legislation that might curtail tar sands expansion. Canadian officials targeted California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard as well as Section 526 of the US Energy Security and Independence Act, which effectively forbids government agencies, including the oil-guzzling US military, from buying oil with a high carbon footprint. (See The Ugly Canadian: Stephen Harper’s Foreign Policy for more detail.)

The Canadian government’s priority in the US was to counter the massive social and environmental campaign that, as of August 2015, had blocked Calgary-based TransCanada’s plan to build the $7 billion Keystone XL pipeline from Alberta to US refineries on the Gulf of Mexico. In January 2013, foreign minister John Baird announced that the top issue on his US agenda was the approval of the Keystone XL. The Canadian government (as well as those of Alberta and Saskatchewan) spent tens of millions of dollars pushing Keystone XL in a campaign that did everything from hiring lobbying firms and purchasing advertising to wining and dining members of the press.26

Despite the pleas of the scientific community, Canadian officials have gone to town promoting the tar sands. In 2011, the head of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies, James Hansen, wrote that proceeding with planned tar sands expansion would be “game over for the climate” while a Nature analysis of international fossil-fuel deposits concluded that 85% of viable reserves and 99% of all Canadian bitumen had to be kept in the ground if humanity is to limit global warming to 2°C (the uppermost threshold at which uncontrollable positive feedback cycles — warming leading to more warming — will be triggered).

Indifferent to science, Canadian officials have also ignored pleas from the African continent. At the end of 2011, several prominent South Africans, including anti-apartheid hero Archbishop Desmond Tutu, criticized Alberta’s dirty oil in a full-page Globe and Mail advertisement. “For us in Africa, climate change is a life and death issue. By dramatically increasing Canada’s global warming pollution, tar sands mining and drilling makes the problem worse, and exposes millions of Africans to more devastating drought and famine today and in the years to come.”27

Despite the rising toll of climate change in Africa, the Canadian government pushed to grow the global “carbon bomb” in international forums. At every turn, Stephen Harper’s Conservatives blocked progress on setting minimally serious targets for reducing CO2 emissions. On at least six occasions between 2006 and 2014 Canada received the Colossal Fossil given out by hundreds of environmental groups to the country that did the most to undermine international climate negotiations meetings.28

Under Conservative government leadership, Canada became the first country to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol, an international agreement committing leading industrial economies to reducing GHG emissions below 1990 levels by 2012. (Instead of attaining its 6% reduction target, Canada’s emissions increased 18 per cent.) A number of African officials criticized Canada for withdrawing from the Kyoto protocol.29 The Rwandan environment minister Stanislas Kamanzi told the New Times “it’s a pity that one of the highest emitters has decided to withdraw from the Protocol. Canada’s withdrawal will not only affect Africa but the world at large.”30

In 2013, Ottawa applauded a move by Australia’s new government to eliminate its carbon tax. A Guardian headline read: “Canada reveals climate stance with praise for Australian carbon tax repeal: Canada discourages other industrialized nations from following through on their own climate change commitments.”31

In addition to undermining international climate negotiations and the efforts of other nations to reduce GHGs, the Harper government made a mockery of its own commitments. As part of the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, Ottawa pledged to reduce carbon emissions 17 per cent by 2020 (from the levels in 2005). Five years later, however, Environment Canada admitted this target would not be reached. In fact, Environment Canada suggested emissions would rise 20% by 2020 and even higher afterwards.

In a sign of Ottawa’s near total indifference to the impact of global warming in Africa, Canada pulled out of an international accord to study the consequences of desertification, a process ravaging parts of the African continent. (The Sahara desert is expanding southward by 48 kilometers a year and nearly half of Africa’s landmass is affected by desertification processes.)32 In 2013, Canada withdrew from the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Seriously Affected by Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa.

Adopted in 1994, this international convention collects and shares scientific information about drought and ways to curb its spread. By becoming the sole nation outside the convention, Canada saved itself a paltry $150,000 a year.33 While the savings barely registered in the federal government’s $260 billion budget, the message was clear.

Conclusion

The story outlined in the previous chapters is one long (mostly) unbroken line of exploitation by Canadians of African people and resources. What’s been offered in “aid” has largely been designed to enhance the profitability of foreign-owned enterprises. Colonialism has disappeared, but it’s been replaced by neo-colonialism.

For over a century (with a break of about 20 years in some countries right after independence) Africans have been forced to accept the dictates of economic liberalism and neoliberalism. Canadians have participated in prying the continent open to a capitalist world order in which Africans produce basic commodities that are manufactured elsewhere and shipped back as finished goods. While some African capitalists have become wealthy, the profits have largely flowed out of the continent.

None of the leading capitalist countries followed the liberal or neoliberal route to build their own economies. Capitalism has only succeeded in significantly raising living standards when governments have protected and nourished industries (and where popular movements demanded decent labour standards and social entitlements). This has certainly been the case for most of Canadian history and to a large extent remains so. But, taking advantage of their political and economic weakness, Ottawa and its allies insist that Africans follow a model that almost guarantees failure.

Since economic relations began, the divide between Africans and Europeans has steadily increased. Before the beginning of the transatlantic slave trade in the 1500s African incomes were thought to be a shade below the global average and about 60% of the European rate.1 Since then, however, the gap has widened significantly.

The slave trade destabilized African economies. It also exacerbated ethnic fragmentation and undermined pre-colonial state formation, which has had long-term economic impacts.2 Coordinator of the Exploring Long Term Changes in African Living Standards in Global Perspective Project, Ewout Frankema describes the “negative correlation between slave export intensity and current levels of GDP per capita in African countries.”3 Conversely, the enormous profits made from the slave trade and plantations were used to industrialize large swaths of Europe and the US, even benefiting many capitalists in what is now Canada.

During the colonial period African politics and economics were directly organized in the interests of European powers. The objective was usually to gain control of the colony’s natural resources and to open its market to value added exports. In Africa’s Choices, Michael Barratt Brown explains that colonies were “developed as suppliers of primary produce; the later stages of production — refining, processing and manufacture — were to be carried out in the homelands of the colonial powers.”4

Despite gaining political independence, the system continues to be loaded against the continent. As evidence, the most capital-starved continent is a net creditor to the rest of the world. In Africa’s Odious Debt Léonce Ndikumana and James Boyce explain: “The magnitude of African capital flight is staggering both in absolute monetary values and relative to GDP. For the thirty-three sub-Saharan African countries for which we have data, we find that more than $700 billion fled the continent between 1970 and 2008. If this capital was invested abroad and earned interest at the going market rates, the accumulated capital loss for these countries over the thirty-nine years was $944 billion. By comparison, total GDP for all of sub-Saharan Africa in 2008 stood at $997 billion.”5 The outward flow of capital may be accelerating, according to “Honest Accounts? The True Story of Africa’s Billion Dollar Losses”. The 2014 report by a large coalition of groups found that the continent loses $58 billion annually — $134 billion flows into the continent through a combination of loans, foreign investment, remittances and development aid but $192 billion flows out through tax evasion, debt payments, profits made by multinationals as well as the costs of adapting to climate change. Honest Accounts? concludes that “Africa is being drained of resources by the rest of the world.”6

Over the past half-century there’s been growth in internationalism and a decline in racism, as well as substantial technological changes, that have broadened interest and knowledge of African affairs. But, most Canadians are still unaware, indifferent or too confused by the dominant ideology to exert any pressure on decision-makers.

But this author believes that through activism it is possible to convince Canadians of the importance of paying attention to what the government is doing in their name in Africa and other parts of the world. Anthropogenic global warming and technological change has made it more important than ever to see ourselves as part of a collective humanity.

We must call on a sense of collective solidarity and understand that acting on it is in our self-interest. We must work towards making this understanding the basis of our foreign-policy in Africa and elsewhere.

Notes

Introduction

1 Rohinton Medhora and Yiagadeesen Samy, Canada-Africa Relations: Looking Back, Looking Ahead, Canada Among Nations 2013, 2

2 Ibid, 118

3 Ibid, 25-28

4 Allan Gotlieb, Romanticism and realism in Canada’s foreign policy, Policy Options, Feb 2005 (http://policyoptions.irpp.org/issues/canada-in-the-world/romanticism-and-realism-in-canadas-foreign-policy/); Jennifer M. Welsh, Wake-up call for a dozy Canada, The Globe and Mail, May 10 2003 (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/arts/wake-up-call-for-a-dozy-canada/article750501/?page=all)

5 Chukwudi Pettson Onwumere, At Arm’s Length: Canada’s relations with Commonwealth west Africa 1957-1977, McMaster University thesis, 1978, 16

6 Ibid, 21

7 Kevin Spooner, Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64, 221

Chapter One

1 Natasha L. Henry, Emancipation Day: Celebrating Freedom in Canada, 18

2 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slavery_in_Canada)

3 A Past, Denied: The Invisible History of Slavery in Canada (http://apastdenied.ca/)

4 Robin W. Winks, Blacks in Canada: A History, 6

5 Afua Cooper, The Hanging of Angelique: The Untold Story of Canadian Slavery and the Burning of Old Montreal, 81

6 Harvey Amani Whitfield, Blacks on the Border: The Black Refugees in British North America, 1815-1860, 15

7 Winks, Blacks in Canada, 24

8 Ibid, 35; Daniel Tseghay, A forgotten history of slavery in Canada, Ricochet, Feb 16 2015 (https://ricochet.media/en/331/a-forgotten-history-of-slavery-in-canada)

9 Cooper, The Hanging of Angelique, 103

10 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haitian_Revolution#cite_note-10)

11 Dan Conlin, A Private War in the Caribbean: Nova Scotia Privateering, 1793-1805 (www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern_mariner/vol06/tnm_6_4_29-46.pdf); Julian Gwyn, Frigates and Foremasts: The North American Squadron in Nova Scotia Waters 1745-1815, 102

12 Ibid

13 Nathan Tidridge, Prince Edward, Duke of Kent: Father of the Canadian Crown, 130

14 Ibid, 136

15 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prince_Edward,_Duke_of_Kent_and_Strathearn)

16 Charles de Salaberry, U.S. National Park Service (http://www.nps.gov/people/charles-de-salaberry.htm)

17 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gordon_Drummond)

18 Richard Gott, Britain’s empire: resistance, repression and revolt, 117

19 Dan Conlin, A Private War in the Caribbean: Nova Scotia Privateering, 1793-1805 (www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern_mariner/vol06/tnm_6_4_29-46.pdf)

20 Ibid

21 Ibid

22 Henry, Emancipation Day, 41

23 Mark Kurlansky, Cod: Biography Of The Fish That Changed The World, 83

24 Ibid, 80

25 Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, 59

26 Kurlansky, Cod, 81

27 Harold Adams Innis, The Cod Fisheries: The History of an International Economy, 265

28 Ibid, 200

29 Ibid, 206

30 Ibid, 296

31 James K. Hiller, The 1904 Anglo-French Newfoundland Fisheries Convention: Another Look, Journal of the History of the Atlantic Region, Vol. XXV, No. 1, Autumn 1995

32 Kurlansky, Cod, 102

33 Victor Ross and Arthur St. L. Trigge, A history of the Canadian Bank of Commerce: with an account of the other banks which now form part of its organization, Vol 1, 83

34 Stephen Kimber and Thomas H Raddall, Halifax: Warden of the North, 168

35 Innis, The cod fisheries, 200; Whitfield, Blacks on the Border, 15

36 Kimber and Raddall, Halifax: Warden of the North, 36

37 Winks, The Blacks in Canada, 27; Kenneth Joseph Donovan, Slaves in Ile Royale, 1713-1758, French Colonial History, Vol. 5, 2004

38 John Bartlet Brebner, The neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia: a marginal colony during the revolutionary years, 197

39 Roma Senn, The Haligonians: 100 Fascinating Lives from the Halifax Region - 2005, 92

40 CIBC celebrates 185 years in downtown Halifax today, Canada NewsWire Sept 1 2010 (http://www.newswire.ca/en/story/564351/cibc-celebrates-185-years-in-downtown-halifax-today)

41 Alice Jones, A Privateer’s Fortune, 10

42 Ibid; Collins, Enos (http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/collins_enos_10E.html)

43 Harper Government Commemorates Enos Collins for His Role in the War of 1812, Feb 22 2013 (http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=721999)

44 Dictionary of Canadian Biography (http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/cunard_samuel_9E.html)

45 R. T. Naylor, History of Canadian Business, 223

46 Ross and Trigge, A History of the Canadian Bank of commerce, Vol 1, 94

47 Eric W. Sager, Maritime Capital: The Shipping Industry in Atlantic Canada, 1820-1914, 27

48 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atlantic_slave_trade)

49 Quick guide: The slave trade, BBC, Mar 15 2007 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6445941.stm)

50 Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, 97

51 R.T. Naylor, Canada in the European Age, 1453-1919, 63

52 Nathan Nunn, The Long-Term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 123(1)

53 C. M. Kusimba, Archaeology of Slavery, 236

54 Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, 79

55 Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, 82

Chapter Two

1 Adrian Hastings, The church in Africa, 1450 – 1950, 432

2 Norman Penlington, Canada’s entry into the Boer war, 59

3 Winfried Baumgart, Imperialism: The Ideal and the Reality of British and French Colonial Expansion, 1880-1914, 16

4 Christopher Wise, The Desert Shore: Literatures of the Sahel, Vol 3, 8

5 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scramble_for_Africa)

6 Andrew B Godefroy, Canadian Soldiers in West African Conflicts, 1885–1905, Canadian Military History, Vol 17, Issue 1

7 William Heneker and Andrew B Godefroy, Bush Warfare – The Early Writings of General Sir William C.G. Heneker, KCMG, DSO, XIII

8 Richard Arthur Preston, Canada’s RMC: A history of the Royal Military College, 170

9 R. Guy C. Smith, As You Were!: Ex-cadets Remember, 1876-1918, Vol I, 15

10 Heneker and Godefroy, Bush Warfare, 127

11 Godefroy, Canadian Soldiers in West African Conflicts

12 Roy MacLaren, Canadians on the Nile, 1882–1898: Being the adventures of the voyageurs on the Khartoum Relief Expedition and other exploits, 21

13 Ibid, 16

14 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Tel_el-Kebir)

15 Brien Brothman, Surveying imperialism: the english-canadian press and British imperial conduct in Africa: 1880-1885, 268

16 Canadian Voyagers in the Sudan 1884-1885 (http://www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca/assets/ARMY_Internet/docs/en/canadian-army-journal/volume-14/CAJ_Vol14.2_12_e.pdf)

17 Ibid, 7

18 Carl Benn, Mohawks on the Nile: Natives Among the Canadian Voyageurs in Egypt, 1884-1885, 125

19 Ibid

20 Brothman, Surveying Imperialism, 304

21 Benn, Mohawks on the Nile, 24

22 Peter Pigott, Canada in Sudan: War Without Borders, 75

23 Douglas Anglin, Towards a Canadian Policy on Africa, International Journal, Vol 15, No. 4, Autumn 1960

24 MacLaren, Canadians on the Nile, 91

25 Preston, Canada’s RMC, 100; Pigott, Canada in Sudan, 75

26 Ibid, 61

27 MGen JF Wilson 1852-1911 (http://www.rcamuseum.com/English/Great%20Gunners/wilson.htm)

28 MacLaren, Canadians on the Nile, 60

29 Pigott, Canada in Sudan, 66

30 Awards to Canadians in the Royal Navy before World War I (http://www.rcnvr.com/1800%20-%20CANADIANS%20in%20RN.php)

31 MacLaren, Canadians on the Nile, 115

32 Lord Halliburton, 48

33 Ibid, 219

34 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Racism_in_the_work_of_Charles_Dickens)

35 Lord Halliburton, 218

36 MacLaren, Canadians on the Nile, 107

37 Ibid, 94

38 Victoria, Encyclopedia of World Biography, 2004 (http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Victoria_%28England%29.aspx)

39 Proceedings of the Royal Military College Club of Canada number 15, 1898, 10

40 Byron Farwell, Queen Victoria’s Little wars, 334

41 MacLaren, Canadians on the Nile, 153

42 Smith, As You Were, 105/261; MacLaren, Canadians on the Nile, 154; Duane Duff and Desmond Morton, The Forces and the Faces, 237; Fergus Nicoll, The Mahdi of Sudan and the death of General Gordon, 6

43 Nicoll, The Mahdi of Sudan and the death of General Gordon, 8

44 David Shonfield, Battle of Omdurman, History Today, Vol 48, Issue 9, Sept 1998 (http://www.historytoday.com/david-shonfield/battle-omdurman)

45 Winston Churchill and Martin Gilbert, Churchill: The Power of Words: His Remarkable Life Recounted Through His writings and speeches, 23

46 Smith, As You Were, 16

47 Proceedings of the Royal military college club of Canada, No 16 1899, 89

48 Smith, As You Were, 178

49 John M. Mwaruvie, “Kenya’s ‘Forgotten’ Engineer and Colonial Proconsul: Sir Percy Girouard and Departmental Railway Construction in Africa, 1896 – 1912,” Canadian Journal of History, Vol 41, No 1, 2006

50 A. H. M. Kirk-Greene “Canada in Africa: Sir Percy Girouard. Neglected Colonial Governor,” African Affairs, Vol 83, 1984 (http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/83/331/207.full.pdf+html)

51 Edward Paice, Lost lion of empire: the life of Cape-to-Cairo Grogan, 147

52 William Robert Ochieng’ and Robert M. Maxon, An Economic History of Kenya, 112

53 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philip_Geoffrey_Twining)

54 Smith, As You Were!, 249

55 William G. Stairs and Roy D. MacLaren, African Exploits: The Diaries of William Stairs, 1887-1892, 32

56 Ibid, 60

57 Proceedings Of the Royal Military College of Canada, 1891, 13

58 Kevin Patience, The Witu Expeditions: 1890 and 1893 (http://home.comcast.net/~kenyaregiment/WituExpeditions.html); Proceedings of the Royal military college of Canada, 1893, 58

59 Witu 1890, A punitive expedition on the East African coast, The Soldier’s Burden (http://www.kaiserscross.com/188001/218001.html)

60 Ibid

61 Lotte Hughes, Moving the Maasai: A Colonial Misadventure, 25-26

62 James Fox, White Mischief: The Murder of Lord Erroll, 12

63 M. P. K. Sorrenson, Origins of European settlement in Kenya, 67

64 John M. MacKenzie, The Empire of nature: hunting, conservation and British imperialism, 153

65 Sorrenson, Origins of European settlement in Kenya, 71/115

66 Paice, Lost lion of Empire, 424

67 Ibid, 164; Anthony Clayton and Donald Cockfield Savage, Government and labour in Kenya, 1895 – 1963, 21

68 (http://www.1879zuluwar.com/t920-ralph-b-leslie-civil-surgeon-doctor)

69 James Douglas Frost, Merchant princes: Halifax’s first family of finance, ships, and steel, 36

70 Daniel Liebowitz, The Last Expedition: Stanley’s Mad Journey through the Congo, 18

71 Ibid, 293

72 Stairs and MacLaren, African Exploits, 21

73 Ian McKay and Jamie Swift, Warrior Nation: Rebranding Canada in an Age of Anxiety, 36; Liebowitz, The Last Expedition, 3/33

74 Conny Steenman-Marcusse and Aritha van Herk, Building Liberty: Canada and World Peace, 1945-2005, 217

75 Stairs and MacLaren, African Exploits, 110

76 Ibid, 114

77 Ibid, 144

78 Liebowitz, The Last Expedition, 160/151

79 William G. Stairs and J. M. Konczacki, Victorian Explorer: the African diaries of Captain William G. Stairs, 1887-1892, 160

80 Liebowitz, The Last Expedition, 274

81 Ibid, 274

82 Stairs and MacLaren, African Exploits, 86

83 Ibid, 100

84 Ibid, 208

85 Liebowitz, The Last Expedition, 312

86 Ibid, 311

87 Tim Jeal, Stanley: The Impossible Life of Africa’s Greatest Explorer, 411; Liebowitz, The Last Expedition, 321

88 Stairs and MacLaren, African Exploits, 114

89 Stairs and Konczacki, Victorian Explorer, 27

90 Ibid, 28/211-213

91 Ibid, 39

92 Stairs and MacLaren, African Exploits, 332

93 Stairs and MacLaren, African Exploits, 312

94 Stairs and Konczacki, Victorian Explorer, 193

95 Ibid, 209

96 Stairs and Konczacki, Victorian Explorer, 42

97 Stairs and MacLaren, African Exploits, 399

98 Ibid, 386

99 Ibid, 410

100 Stairs and Konczacki, Victorian Explorer, 241/187

101 Ibid, 199

102 Stairs and MacLaren, African Exploits, 305

103 Preston, Canada’s RMC, 119

104 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Grant_Stairs)

105 Stairs and MacLaren, African Exploits, 394

106 Stairs and Konczacki, Victorian Explorer, 278

107 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congo_Free_State#Humanitarian_disaster)

108 Michiko Kakutani King Leopold’s Ghost’: Genocide With Spin Control Sep 1, 1998 (http://www.nytimes.com/books/98/08/30/daily/leopold-book-review.html)

109 Godefroy, Canadian Soldiers in West African Conflicts 1885-1905

110 Stairs and MacLaren, African Exploits, 60

111 C. J. Chivers, The Gun, 85

112 Brandon D Newton, Punishment, Revenge, and Retribution: A Historical Analysis of Punitive Operations, School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (https://timedotcom.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/a436111.pdf)

113 Arthur Abraham, Mende Government and Politics under Colonial Rule: A Historical Study of Political Change in Sierra Leone 1890-1937, 93

114 Godefroy, Canadian Soldiers in West African Conflicts 1885-1905

115 Smith, As You Were!, 90

116 Godefroy, Canadian Soldiers in West African Conflicts 1885-1905

117 Ibid

118 Preston, Canada’s RMC, 109

119 Proceedings of the Royal military College Club of Canada, 1895, 46

120 Walter Rodney, How Europe underdeveloped Africa, 187

121 The church in Africa, 1450 – 1950, 403

122 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hut_Tax_War_of_1898)

123 Arthur Abraham, Bai Bureh, The British, and the Hut Tax War, The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol 7, No 1, 1974

124 Godefroy, Canadian Soldiers in West African Conflicts 1885-1905

125 Heneker and Godefroy, Bush Warfare

126 Rodney, How Europe underdeveloped Africa, 186

127 Heneker and Godefroy, Bush Warfare, 133 - 136

128 Ibid, 133

129 Godefroy, Canadian Soldiers in West African Conflicts 1885-1905

130 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archibald_Hayes_Macdonell)

131 Godefroy, Canadian Soldiers in West African Conflicts 1885-1905

132 MacLaren, Canadians on the Nile, 16

133 Ibid

134 Chivers, The Gun, 78; Robert B. Edgerton, The Fall of the Asante Empire: The Hundred-Year War For Africa’s Gold Coast, 145

135 Edgerton, The Fall of the Asante Empire, 110

136 Ibid, 167

137 A. B. Ellis, A History of the Gold Coast of West Africa, 344

138 Edgerton, The Fall of the Asante Empire, 170

139 Smith, As You Were!, 61

140 Godefroy, Canadian Soldiers in West African Conflicts 1885-1905

141 Smith, As You Were!, 158

142 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duncan_Sayre_MacInnes)

143 Jeanne Cannizzo, Into the Heart of Africa, Royal Ontario Museum, Jan 1, 1989

144 Carol Tator, Frances Henry, Winston Mattis, Challenging Racism in the Arts: Case Studies of Controversy and Conflict, 46

145 Heneker and Godefroy, Bush Warfare, 134

146 Gold Coast Diaries: Chronicles of Political Officers in West Africa, 391

147 Edgerton, The Fall of the Asante Empire, 187

148 (http://generations.regionofwaterloo.ca/getperson.php?personID=I91914&tree=generations)

149 Ronald E. Wraith, Guggisberg, 42

150 Godefroy, Canadian Soldiers in West African Conflicts 1885-1905

151 Proceedings of the Royal military College Club of Canada, 1895/96, 43/27

152 Preston, Canada’s RMC, 105; Bush Warfare, 134

153 Preston, Canada’s RMC, 183

154 Toyin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, A History of Nigeria, 114; Godefroy, Canadian Soldiers in West African Conflicts 1885-1905

155 Ibid

156 Portrait of Sir Frederick Gordon Guggisberg, circa 1920 (http://janus.lib.cam.ac.uk/db/node.xsp?id=EAD%2FGBR%2F0115%2FY30448E;sib0=537)

157 Ibid

158 Falola and Heaton, A History of Nigeria, 107

159 Bruce Vandervort, Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830-1914, 193

160 Ibid, 194

161 J.R. Campbell. The Capture of Brohemie, Niger Coast Protectorate, West Africa, Royal Military College Club of Canada Review, 1896, 66

162 Richard Brooks, The long arm of empire: naval brigades from the Crimea to the Boxer Rebellion, 205

163 Obaro Ikime, Merchant Prince of the Niger Delta: The Rise and Fall of Nana Olomu, Last Governor of the Benin River, 105

164 J.R. Campbell. The Capture of Brohemie, Niger Coast Protectorate, West Africa, Royal Military College Club of Canada Review, 1896, 67

165 Ian Hernon, The Savage Empire: Forgotten Wars of the 19th Century, 156

166 Ikime, Merchant prince of the Niger Delta, 78

167 Godefroy, Canadian Soldiers in West African Conflicts 1885-1905; and Canada’s RMC, 119

168 Preston, Canada’s RMC, 119; J.R. Campbell. The Capture of Brohemie, Niger Coast Protectorate, West Africa, Royal Military College Club of Canada Review, 1896, 67

169 Philip Aigbona Igbafe, Benin under British administration: the impact of colonial rule on an African kingdom, 1897-1938, 92

170 Ibid, 103

171 Ibid, 99

172 Correspondence Relating to the Benin Territories Expedition, 1899 No. 1. Commissioner and Consul-General Sir R. Moor to Mr. Chamberlain. (Received June 29, 1899.)

173 Igbafe, Benin under British administration, 73

174 Ibid, 73/92

175 Heneker and Godefroy, Bush Warfare, 131

176 Ibid, 18

177 Godefroy, Canadian Soldiers in West African Conflicts 1885-1905

178 Ibid

179 Aro Confederacy (http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Aro_Confederacy)

180 Heneker and Godefroy, Bush Warfare, 135

181 Ibid

182 Godefroy, Canadian Soldiers in West African Conflicts 1885-1905

183 Ibid

184 S. O Onwukwe, Rise and fall of the Arochukwu Empire, 1400-1902: Perspective for the 21st century, 18

185 Ibid, 28

186 Godefroy, Canadian Soldiers in West African Conflicts 1885-1905

187 Heneker and Godefroy, Bush Warfare, 130

188 Godefroy, Canadian Soldiers in West African Conflicts 1885-1905

189 Heneker and Godefroy, Bush Warfare, 104

190 Jim Wallace, No Colours No Drums: Canadians in the South African Constabulary, 61

191 J. B. Atlay, Lord Haliburton: A Memoir of His Public Service, 51

192 (http://www.nam.ac.uk/exhibitions/online-exhibitions/zulu-war-1879)

193 Rory Carroll, Rorke’s Drift battle was war crime scene, Guardian, Apr 29 2003 (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/29/schools.southafrica)

194 Farwell, Queen Victoria’s Little wars, 224

195 Lawrence James, The savage wars: British campaigns in Africa, 1870-1920, 38

196 Smith, As You Were!, 15

197 Christopher M. Paulin, White Men’s Dreams, Black Men’s Blood: African Labor and British expansionism in southern Africa, 1877-1895, 137

198 Wallace, No Colours No Drums, 2

199 Ibid, 1

200 Carman Miller, Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War, 1899-1902, 12

201 Robert J.D. Page, Canada and the Imperial Idea in the Boer War Years, Journal of Canadian Studies, Feb 1970

202 Miller, Painting the Map Red, 111

203 (http://www.waymarking.com/waymarks/WM7A79_Captain_Edmund_Barker_Van_Koughnet_Aston)

204 Smith, As You Were!, 16

205 Empire to Umpire, 23

206 The Boer War and Canadian Imperialism, 15

207 Another Kind of Justice, 31

208 Miller, Painting the Map Red, 263

209 Ibid, 232

210 Ibid, 232

211 Ibid, 448

212 Byron Farwell, The Great War in Africa, 1914-1918, 76

213 James, The savage wars, 69

214 M. Morris, 10 Evil Crimes Of The British Empire, Feb 4 2014 (http://listverse.com/2014/02/04/10-evil-crimes-of-the-british-empire/)

215 Miller, Painting the Map Red, 389

216 John Hatch, The History of Britain in Africa: from the 15th Century to the Present, 215

217 Wallace, No Colours No Drums, forward

218 Ibid, 279

219 Ibid, 273

220 Ibid

221 Ibid

222 O. Mary Hill and Institute of Public Administration of Canada, Canada’s Salesman to the World: The Department of Trade and Commerce, 1892-1939, 63

223 Wallace, No Colours No Drums, 277

224 (Http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duncan_Sayre_MacInnes)

225 Smith, As You Were!, 333

226 Kevin Grant, A Civilised Savagery: Britain and the New Slaveries in Africa, 1884-1926 , 9; Wallace, No Colours No Drums, 251

227 Ibid, 278

228 Ibid

229 Sydney F. Wise, Canadian airmen and the first world war, 139

230 Ibid, 630

231 Preston, Canada’s RMC, 200

232 Heneker and Godefroy, Bush Warfare, 134; Douglas Dodds, The conquest of the Cameroons, August 1914 to February 1916, Queen’s University 1981; Charles Dobell, The Campaign in the Cameroons, Royal United Services Institution Journal, Vol 67, Issue 468, 1922

233 Priest, Canada’s share in world tasks, 130

234 Lovett Elango, The Anglo-French “Condominium” in Cameroon, 1914-1916: The Myth and the Reality, The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 18, No. 4 (1985)

235 Ibid

236 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Macpherson_Dobell)

237 Bernd Horn, The Canadian Way of War: Serving the National Interest, 169

238 Robert Craig Brown and Ramsay Cook, Canada: 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed, 212

239 Brian Douglas Tennyson, Canada and the Commonwealth Caribbean, 222

240 Ibid, 233

241 Peter McFarlane, Northern shadows: Canadians and Central America, 20

242 Walter Stewart, Towers of gold, feet of clay: the Canadian banks, 188

Chapter Threee

1 Shelley Butler, Contested Representations: Revisiting Into the Heart of Africa, 66

2 Jean-Guy Pelletier, Les relations entre le Quebec et I’Afrique 1880-1905, Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol 15, No 1, 1981

3 Colleen Mayo-Pankhurst, The Impact of Membership in the Commonwealth on Canadian Policy Towards Rhodesia, 1964-1966, Carleton University Dissertation, 1991, 51

4 Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Stig Forster, Bismarck, Europe, and Africa: The Berlin Africa Conference 1884-1885 and the Onset of Partition

5 Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, 252

6 Jonathan Derrick, Africa’s Agitators: Militant Anti-colonialism in Africa and the West, 1918-1939, 32

7 Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Stig Forster, Bismarck, Europe, and Africa: The Berlin Africa Conference 1884-1885 and the Onset of Partition

8 Brad Faught, Missionaries, Indirect Rule and the Changing Mandate of Mission in Colonial Northern Nigeria: the Case of Rowland Victor Bingham and the Sudan Interior Mission (http://historicalpapers.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/historicalpapers/article/viewFile/39452/35775)

9 Chanoine Lionel Groulx, Le Canada Francais Missionnaire: Une Autre Grande Aventure, 263

10 Ibid

11 Yusufu Turaki, An introduction to the history of SIM/ECWA in Nigeria, 1893-1993, 42

12 K. V. Ram, Survey of Canadian Protestant Missionary Archives Relating to Africa, History in Africa, Vol 7, 1980

13 Pelletier, Les relations entre le Québec et l’Afrique 1880-1905

14 Groulx, Le Canada Francais Missionnaire, 274

15 Roy MacLaren, Canadians on the Nile, 1882–1898, 59

16 Jean-Guy Pelletier, Les relations entre le Québec et l’Afrique 1880-1905, Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol 15, No 1, 1981

17 Groulx, Le Canada Francais Missionnaire, 289; Francis C. Barr, Archbishop Aston Chichester 1879 – 1962: a memoir, 7

18 Assa Okoth, A History of Africa: African societies and the establishment of colonial rule, 1800-1915, 95

19 Anthony J. Dachs, W. F. Rea, The Catholic Church and Zimbabwe 1879 – 1979, 28

20 J. M. Zvobgo, A History of Christian Missions in Zimbabwe 1890-1939, 5

21 Ian Linden, The Catholic Church and the struggle for Zimbabwe, 13

22 Philip Mason, The Birth of a Dilemma: the Conquest and Settlement of Rhodesia, 219

23 Ibid, 220

24 Ruth M Slade, English-speaking missions in the Congo Independent State, 1878-1908, 116

25 Robert Rotberg, Plymouth Brethren and the Occupation of Katanga, 1886-1907, Journal of African History, Vol 2, 1964

26 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada%E2%80%93Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo_relations#History)

27 Alfred R Stonelake, Congo: past and Present, 63

28 Slade, English-speaking missions in the Congo independent state, 154

29 Ibid, 251

30 Ibid, 243

31 Kevin Grant, A Civilised Savagery: Britain and the New Slaveries in Africa, 1884-1926, 51

32 Ibid, 47

33 Ibid, 49

34 Bryan Mealer, All Things Must Fight to Live: Stories of War and Deliverance in Congo, 165

35 Grant, A civilized savagery, 76

36 Aylward Shorter, Cross and flag in Africa: The White Fathers During the Colonial Scramble, 1892-1914, 19

37 Groulx, Le Canada Francais Missionnaire, 303

38 J. Auclair, Vie de Mgr John Forbes: le premier Père Blanc canadien, 225

39 Ibid, 127

40 Ibid

41 Raynald Pelletier and Jean-Claude Ceillier, Bishop John Forbes (1864-1926): Coadjutor Vicar Apostolic of Uganda: the First Canadian White Father

42 Auclair, Vie de Mgr John Forbes, 245

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid, 244

45 Pelletier and Ceillier, Bishop John Forbes; Auclair, Vie de Mgr John Forbes, 245

46 Ibid, 246

47 Pelletier and Ceillier, Bishop John Forbes

48 Bishop Joseph Georges Edouard Michaud, M. Afr. (http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/bishop/bmicha.html)

49 Auclair, Vie de Mgr John Forbes, 221; Shorter, Cross and flag in Africa, 19

50 Canada - Ghana Relations (http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/ghana/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/canada_ghana.aspx?menu_id=7&lang=eng)

51 Shorter, Cross and flag in Africa, 19/44

52 Bishop Oscar Morin, M. Afr.

(http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/bishop/bmorino.html)

53 Ian Linden and Jane Linden, Catholics, Peasants and Chewa Resistance in Nyasaland, 1889-1939, 109; Aylward Shorter, African recruits and missionary conscripts: The White Fathers and the Great War (1914-1922), 12

54 Linden and Linden, Catholics, Peasants and Chewa Resistance in Nyasaland, 109

55 Hector Livingston Duff, African Small Chop, 58

56 Andrew Jarboe, Empires in World War I: Shifting Frontiers and Imperial Dynamics in a Global Conflict, 264

57 Linden and Linden, Catholics, Peasants and Chewa Resistance in Nyasaland, 109

58 Ibid

59 Ibid, 119

60 Ibid, 127

61 Ibid, 125

62 Groulx, Le Canada Francais Missionnaire, 284

63 Ibid

64 Jean Criaud, La geste des spiritains: histoire de l’église au Cameroun, 1916-1990, 112

65 Accession 491: Papers of Thomas Westgate University of Birmingham (http://calmview.bham.ac.uk/Record.aspx?src=Catalog&id=XCMSACC%2F491)

66 R. I. Wilfred Westgate, T.B.R. Westgate: A Canadian Missionary on Three Continents, 46

67 Ibid, 44-46

68 Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan, The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective, 161

69 The University of Western Ontario Honorary Degrees Awarded, 1881 - present (http://www.uwo.ca/univsec/pdf/senate/honorary/honorary_degrees_by_year.pdf)

70 Dan Sheffield and Herbert E. Randall: A Canadian Holiness Missionary in Egypt and his Quest for More of the Holy Spirit, Canadian Journal of Pentecostal-Charismatic Christianity, 2, 2011.

71 Ibid

72 Gloria Grace Kulbeck, What God Hath Wrought: A History of the Pentecostal Assemblies of Canada, 1958, 231-233

73 Michael Wilkinson and Peter Althouse, Winds from the North: Canadian Contributions to the Pentecostal Movement

74 K. V. Ram, Survey of Canadian Protestant Missionary Archives Relating to Africa, History in Africa, Vol. 7, 1980

75 Kemp Pendleton Burpeau, God’s Showman: A Historical Study of John G. Lake and South African/American Pentecostalism, 84

76 Ibid, 99

77 Ibid, 107

78 Peter Mageto, Victim Theology: A Critical Look at the Church’s Response to AIDS, 7

79 Keller, Marion and Otto 1889 to 1953 and 1888 to 1942 Pentecostal Tanzania / Kenya (http://www.dacb.org/stories/tanzania/keller_marion,otto.html)

80 Kulbeck, What God Hath Wrought, 347

81 Ibid, 300

82 James Clare Fuller, We trust God will own his word: A Holiness-Mennonite Mission in Nigeria 1905-1978, McMaster University Thesis, 2003, 157

83 Turaki, An introduction to the history of SIM/ECWA in Nigeria, 202

84 Alexander Woods Banfield, Life Among the Nupe tribe in West Africa, 1905, 8

85 Ibid, 68

86 Thomas Dow, A. W. Banfield: Missionary Pioneer in Nigeria, Reflections, Spring 1994 (http://www.bethelcollege.edu/assets/content/mcarchives/pdfs/v2n1p12_15.pdf)

87 Fuller, We trust God will own his word, 55

88 Clare Fuller, Banfield, Nupe and the UMCA

89 (http://hisgraceassembly.org/about-us/history/)

90 James Hogg Hunter, A Flame of Fire: The Life and Work of R. V. Bingham, 55

91 Janet Benge and Geoff Benge, Rowland Bingham: into Africa’s interior, 87

92 E. Adeleye Ijagbemi, Christian Missionary Activity in Colonial Nigeria: the work of the Sudan Interior Mission among the Yoruba, 1908-1967, 30

93 Ibid, 32

94 Faught, Missionaries, Indirect Rule and the Changing Mandate of Mission in Colonial Northern Nigeria

95 Hunter, A Flame of Fire, 131/159

96 Rowland V. Bingham, Seven Sevens of Years and a Jubilee: The story of the Sudan Interior Mission, 109

97 Douglas C. Percy, Doctor to Africa: The Story of Stirrett of the Sudan, 25

98 Ibid, 20

99 Ibid, 70

100 Ibid, 70

101 Sophie De La Haye, Tread Upon the Lion the Story of Tommie Titcombe, 48

102 Ibid, 64

103 Ijagbemi, Christian Missionary Activity in Colonial Nigeria, 26

104 Hunter, A Flame of Fire, 152

105 Ibid, 116/124

106 Ibid, 204/308

107 Percy, Doctor to Africa, 29

108 Ijagbemi, Christian Missionary Activity in Colonial Nigeria, 81

109 Ibid, 81

110 Ibid, 99

111 John S. Hall, From Cannibalism to Christ: A Story of the Transforming Power of the Gospel in Darkest Africa, 17

112 Yusufu Turaki, Introduction to the history of SIM/ECWA, 74

113 Ibid, 138

114 Barbara M. Cooper, Evangelical Christians in the Muslim Sahel, 18

115 John C Butcher, Canadian missionaries and the Ovimbundu of Angola, 1885 – 1915, Dalhousie University Thesis, 1975, 20; Paul C Byam, New wine in a very old bottle: Canadian Protestant missionaries as facilitators of development in central Angola, 1886-1961, University of Ottawa Thesis, 1997, 66

116 John T. Tucker, Currie of Chissamba (Herald of the Dawn), v

117 Tim Barringer and Tom Flynn, Colonialism and the Object: Empire, Material Culture and the Museum, 153

118 Byam, New wine in a very old bottle, 67

119 Butcher, Canadian missionaries and the Ovimbundu of Angola, 100/167

120 Ibid, 64

121 Ibid, 110

122 Susan Pearce, On Collecting: An Investigation Into Collecting in the European Tradition, 340

123 Terrence L. Craig, The Missionary Lives: A Study in Canadian Missionary Biography and Autobiography, 46

124 Pearce, On collecting, 341

125 Butcher, Canadian missionaries and the Ovimbundu of Angola, 123

126 Byam, New wine in a very old bottle, 14

127 Ibid

128 Butcher, Canadian missionaries and the Ovimbundu of Angola, 87

129 Tucker, Currie of Chissamba, 78

130 Jeremy Ball, The ‘Three Crosses’ of Mission Work: Fifty Years of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) in Angola, 1880-1930, Journal of Religion in Africa, Vol 40, Issue 3, 2010

131 Byam, New wine in a very old bottle, 68

132 Ibid, 4

133 Ibid, 3

134 Ijagbemi, Christian Missionary Activity in Colonial Nigeria, 26

135 Tucker, Currie of Chissamba, 74

136 H. C. Priest, Canada’s share in world tasks, 129

137 Craig, The Missionary Lives, 118

138 Ibid, 53

139 Ibid, 76

140 Ibid, 19

Chapter Four

1 Crawford Young, The African colonial state in comparative perspective, 116

2 A. H. M. Kirk-Greene “Canada in Africa: Sir Percy Girouard. Neglected Colonial Governor,” African Affairs, Vol 83, 1984 (http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/83/331/207.full.pdf+html)

3 Ibid

4 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Percy_Girouard)

5 Northern Nigeria: the country which a Canadian will rule,” The Toronto Globe, Mar 2 1907

6 Michael Smith, Sir Percy Girouard: French Canadian proconsul in Africa, 1906-1912, McGill University, 1989, 38

7 Ibid, 54

8 Ibid, 26

9 Sir Percy Girouard, Canada’s Governor of Northern Nigeria, 1907-1909 (http://web.ncf.ca/fm122/percy-girouard/)

10 Ibid

11 Ibid

12 Ibid

13 Ibid

14 Michael Mason, Working on the Railway: Forced Labor in Northern Nigeria, 1907-1912, 57

15 Ibid, 60

16 Ibid, 69

17 Ibid

18 Professional public service, 1960

19 Elspeth Huxley, White Man’s Country: Lord Delamere and the Making of Kenya

20 East African, Kenya: Book Serialisation - Moving the Masaai, July 10 2006 (http://allafrica.com/stories/200607100261.html)

21 Lotte Hughes, Moving the Maasai: A Colonial Misadventure, 40; Robert M. Maxon, Judgment on a Colonial Governor: Sir Percy Girouard in Kenya, Trans-African Journal of History, 1989

22 M. P. K. Sorrenson, Origins of European settlement in Kenya, 118-119

23 Ibid, 186

24 Hughes, Moving the Maasai, 67

25 Ibid, 68

26 Robert M. Maxon, Judgment on a Colonial Governor: Sir Percy Girouard in Kenya, Trans-African Journal of History, 1989

27 Sorrenson, Origins of European Settlement in Kenya, 200

28 (http://www.globalsojourns.com/imagedump/Web_Articles/Articles_E.Africa/The_Maasai.pdf)

29 Hughes, Moving the Maasai, 5

30 Ibid, 50/61

31 Hughes, Moving the Maasai, 41

32 A. H. M. Kirk-Greene “Canada in Africa: Sir Percy Girouard. Neglected Colonial Governor,” African Affairs Vol 83, 1984 (http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/83/331/207.full.pdf+html)

33 Lotte Hughes, Moving the Maasai (http://www.palgrave.com/page/detail/moving-the-maasai-lotte-hughes/?isb=9781403996619)

34 Gordon Hudson Mungeam, British rule in Kenya 1895 – 1912: The Establishment of Administration in the East Africa Protectorate, 218

35 Sorrenson, Origins of European Settlement in Kenya, 249

36 Mungeam, British rule in Kenya, 249

37 A. H. M. Kirk-Greene “Canada in Africa: Sir Percy Girouard. Neglected Colonial Governor,” African Affairs, Vol 83, 1984 (http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/83/331/207.full.pdf+html)

38 Ibid

39 (http://www.davidsullivan.ca/oldstandrews/scrapbook/winterport/winterport6.html)

40 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Percy_Girouard)

41 Richard Arthur Preston, Canada’s RMC: A history of the Royal Military College, 248

42 Nick Auf Der Maur, Maybe Africa needs another Percy Girouard, Montréal Gazette July 15 1985

43 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gordon_Guggisberg)

44 Ronald E. Wraith, Guggisberg, 162

45 Ibid, 105

46 Frederick Gordon Guggisberg and Alexander Gordon Fraser, The Future of the Negro: Some Chapters in the Development of a Race, 63

47 Wraith, Guggisberg, 175

48 Ibid

49 David Kimble, A Political History of Ghana, 1850–1928, 439

50 Christian E Tsey, Gold Coast Railways: the making of a colonial economy, 1879-1929, University of Glasgow thesis 1986, 226

51 Ibid, 222

52 Ibid

53 Ibid

54 Ibid

55 H. B. Goodall, Beloved Imperialist: Sir Gordon Guggisberg governor of the Gold Coast, 62

56 Francis Agbodeka, Sir Gordon Guggisberg’s contribution to the development of the Gold Coast, 1919-27, Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana, Vol. 13, No. 1, June 1972

57 Nate Plageman, Colonial Ambition, Common Sense Thinking, and the Making of Takoradi Harbor, Gold Coast, History in Africa, Vol 40, Issue 1, Oct 2013

58 Goodall, Beloved imperialist, 94

59 Christian E Tsey, Gold Coast Railways: the making of a colonial economy, 1879-1929, University of Glasgow thesis 1986, 162

60 Nate Plageman, Colonial Ambition, Common Sense Thinking, and the Making of Takoradi Harbor, Gold Coast, History in Africa, Vol 40, Issue 01, Oct 2013

61 Goodall, Beloved Imperialist, 163

62 Kimble, A political history of Ghana, 395

63 George Padmore, The Gold Coast Revolution: The Struggle of an African People from Slavery to Freedom (http://archive.org/stream/goldcoastrevolut005687mbp/goldcoastrevolut005687mbp_djvu.txt)

64 Wraith, Guggisberg, 290

65 Sir Percy Girouard, Canada’s Governor of Northern Nigeria, 1907-1909 (http://web.ncf.ca/fm122/percy-girouard/)

66 Gillespie, W. H., The Gold Coast police 1844 – 1938, 80

67 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Godfrey_D._Rhodes)

68 Ibid

69 Duane Duff and Desmond Morton, The Forces & the Faces, 240; Sir Percy Girouard, Canada’s Governor of Northern Nigeria, 1907-1909 (http://web.ncf.ca/fm122/percy-girouard/)

70 Ralph Dolignon Furse, Aucuparius: Recollections of a Recruiting Officer, 103

71 Anthony H. M. Kirk-Greene, Taking Canada into Partnership in ‘The White Man’s Burden’: The British Colonial Service and the Dominion Selection Scheme of 1923, Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1981

72 Walter Bazley, Bunyoro: Tropical Paradox, 1

73 Anthony Kirk-Greene, On Crown Service: A History of HM Colonial and Overseas Civil Services, 1837-1997, 29

74 Anthony Kirk-Greene, Symbol of Authority: The British District Officer in Africa, 9

75 Kirk-Greene, Taking Canada into Partnership in ‘The White Man’s Burden’

76 Ibid

77 Kirk-Greene, On Crown Service, 29

78 Ibid

79 It Was a Great Privilege, 278

80 Vernon-Jackson, Date de décès: 2001-04-09 (http://www.federationgenealogie.qc.ca/avisdeces/avis/pdf?id=72261)

81 Bazley, Bunyoro

82 A. J. Barker, Rape of Ethiopia: 1936, 159

83 Nicholas Tracy, Two-Edged Sword: The Navy as an Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy, 57; Peyton V. Lyon and Tareq Y. Ismael, Canada and the Third World, 63

84 Leo Friman Kristjanson, Some reactions to Canadian government policy during the Italo Ethiopian crisis, University of Manitoba, 1959, 22

85 Ibid, 47

86 Ibid, 49

87 Ibid, 30

88 Philip Stigger, A Study in Confusion: Canadian Diplomatic Staffing Practices in Africa and the Middle East Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1971

89 Jonathan F. Vance, Maple Leaf Empire Canada: Britain, and Two World Wars, 29

90 Brereton Greenhous and W.A.B. Douglas, Out of the Shadows: Canada in the Second World War, 35

91 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Naval_College_of_Canada)

92 Tracy, Two-Edged Sword, 48

93 James A. Wood, Militia Myths: Ideas of the Canadian Citizen Soldier, 1896-1921, 147

94 Bernd Horn, The Canadian Way of War: Serving the National Interest, 169

95 Brian Douglas Tennyson, How Canada Helped Save the British Empire and Became a North American Nation, 8

96 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Lyon_Mackenzie_King)

97 J. L. Granatstein and Desmond Morton, Canada and the Two World Wars, 177

98 The Hamilton Spectator June 7 1943 (http://www.warmuseum.ca/cwm/exhibitions/newspapers/operations/northafrican_e.shtml)

99 Douglas G. Anglin, Towards a Canadian Policy on Africa, International Journal, Vol. 15, No. 4, Autumn 1960

100 Harry Boyle’s Tango over Takoradi (http://www.vintagewings.ca/VintageNews/Stories/tabid/116/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/413/Harry-Boyles-Tango-over-Takoradi.aspx)

101 Robin S. Gendron, Towards a Francophone Community: Canada’s Relations with France and French Africa, 1945-1968, 7

102 Ibid, 8

103 Ibid, 11

104 Brien Brothman, Surveying imperialism: the english-canadian press and British imperial conduct in Africa: 1880-1885, 29

105 O. Mary Hill and Institute of Public Administration of Canada, Canada’s Salesman to the World: The Department of Trade and Commerce, 1892-1939, 53

106 Ibid

107 Ibid, 86

108 Ibid, 87

109 Henry Rivington Poussette fonds (http://www.archivescanada.ca/english/search/ItemDisplay.asp?sessionKey=1126738539034_206_191_57_196&l=-1&lvl=1&v=0&coll=1&itm=263078&rt=1&bill=1)

110 Hill and Institute of Public Administration of Canada, Canada’s Salesman to the World, 63

111 Ibid, 166

112 Ibid, 297

113 Goodall, Beloved Imperialist, 64

114 Hill and Institute of Public Administration of Canada, Canada’s Salesman to the World, 297

115 West Africa and its opportunities for Canadian Trade, 7

116 Kevin A Spooner, Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64, 15

117 Hill and Institute of Public Administration of Canada, Canada’s Salesman to the World, 310

118 Ibid, 510

119 Ibid

120 Frederic H. Soward and Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Canada in World Affairs, 1959–1961, 218; Rohinton Medhora and Yiagadeesen Samy, Canada Among Nations 2013: Canada-Africa Relations; Looking Back, Looking Ahead, 25 – 28

121 Colleen Mayo-Pankhurst, The impact of membership in the Commonwealth on Canadian policy towards Rhodesia, 1964–1966, Carleton University Dissertation, 1991, 50

122 Douglas G. Anglin, Towards a Canadian Policy on Africa, International Journal, Vol 15, No 4, Autumn 1960

123 Ibid

124 Patrick Mbeko, Le Canada dans les guerres en Afrique centrale: génocides et pillages des ressources minières du Congo par le Rwanda interposé, 66

125 René Brion, De la Mine a Mars: le genèse d’Umicore, 282

126 Mbeko, Le Canada dans les guerres en Afrique centrale, 64

127 Libbie Park and Frank Park, Anatomy of Big Business, 156-158

128 Ibid, 156

129 Ibid, 156-158

130 James L. Darroch, Canadian Banks and Global Competitiveness, 43

131 Ibid, 128/90

132 Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, 162

133 Darroch, Canadian Banks and Global Competitiveness, 260

134 Thomas J Bata, Bata: shoemaker to the world, 81/202/206/212; Shoemaker with a Mission: The Bata Shoe Organization under the Leadership of Thomas J. Bata, 1914 – 2008 (shoemaker_with_a_mission.pdf)

135 Ibid

136 Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda: Kampala agreement on redressing trade imbalance: International Legal Materials, American Society of International Law, Vol 3, No 6, Nov 1964

137 Steven Langdon, Canadians too, can act like Economic imperialists, Saturday Night, Jan 1974

138 Ibid

139 Robert O. Matthews, Canada’s Relations with Africa, International Journal, Vol. 30, No. 3, Summer 1975

140 Chris Maina Peter, Foreign Private Investments in Tanzania: A Study of the Legal Framework, 21

141 James H. Mittelman, Underdevelopment and Nationalisation: Banking in Tanzania, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol 16, No 4, Dec 1978

142 Thomas J Bata, Bata: shoemaker to the world, 208

143 Douglas G. Anglin, Towards a Canadian Policy on Africa, International Journal, Vol 15, No 4, Autumn 1960

144 Ibid

145 Gendron, Towards a Francophone Community, 63

146 Davis, H. David. 1962. The economic development of Uganda, 268 (http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1962/01/1561286/economic-development-uganda); Marios Obwona, Isaac Shinyekwa, Julius Kiiza, and Eria Hisali, The evolution of industry in Uganda, WIDER Working Paper 2014 (file:///C:/Users/n_hausf/Downloads/wp2014-021.pdf); The Uganda Journal – 1957 vol. 21 – 23, 147

147 John Deverell and Latin American Working Group, Falconbridge: portrait of a Canadian mining multinational, 151

148 Ibid

149 Ibid, 177

150 Lake George as a Sink for Contaminants Derived from the Kilembe Copper Mining Area, Western Uganda

151 Mark Curtis, The rise of Idi Amin in Uganda, 1971-72, Feb 13 2007 (https://markcurtis.wordpress.com/2007/02/13/the-rise-of-idi-amin-in-uganda-1971-72/)

152 Ibid

153 “Uganda – Inquiry as to granting of diplomatic recognition to new regime” Hansard, Feb 3, 1971

154 Leo Louis Jacques, African Pearls and Poisons: Idi Amin’s Uganda; Kenya; Zaire’s Pygmies, 6

155 (https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973KAMPAL02120_b.html)

156 Ibid

157 Africa Research Bulletin, 1977, 4479

158 Douglas G. Anglin, Towards a Canadian Policy on Africa, International Journal, Vol 15, No 4, Autumn 1960

159 Duncan C. Campbell, Global Mission: The Story of Alcan, Vol 1, 1371; Duncan C. Campbell, Global Mission: The Story of Alcan, Vol 2, 303

160 Campbell, Global Mission, Vol 1, 1373

161 Campbell, Global Mission Vol 2, 366

162 Ibid, 287

163 Ibid, 290

164 Bonnie K. Campbell, Negotiating the Bauxite/Aluminium Sector under Narrowing Constraints, Review of African Political Economy, The Struggle for Resources in Africa, No. 51, July 1991

165 Pierre Legoux and André Marelle, Les Mines et la recherche minière en Afrique occidentale française: Histoire et témoignages, 266

166 Campbell, Global Mission Vol 2, 298; Mamadou Kalifa Diallo, Les relations de la Guinee avec le Canada: de 1960 a 1980, 212

167 Campbell, Global Mission Vol 2, 306

168 Gendron, Towards a Francophone Community, 67

169 Campbell, Global Mission Vol 2, 307

170 Ibid, 312

171 Campbell, Negotiating the Bauxite/Aluminium Sector under Narrowing Constraints

172 Campbell, Global Mission Vol 2, 330

Chapter Five

1 Caroline Elkins, Britain’s Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya

2 Elizabeth Schmidt, Foreign intervention in Africa: from the Cold War to the war on terror, 18; Sébastien Chartrand and John Philpot, Justice belied: The Unbalanced Scales of International Criminal Justice, 20

3 Christopher R. Kilford, The Other Cold War: Canada’s Military Assistance to the Developing World 1945-1975, 49

4 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algerian_War#Death_toll)

5 Hansard Dec 8, 1952, 422

6 Hansard Feb 12 1953, 1865

7 Hansard Jan 14 1957, 175

8 Douglas G Anglin, Towards a Canadian Policy on Africa, International Journal, Vol 15, No 4, Autumn 1960

9 Robin S. Gendron, Towards a Francophone Community: Canada’s Relations with France and French Africa, 1945-1968, 66

10 Robert Mills Clark, Canadian issues; essays in honor of Henry F. Angus, 89

11 Douglas G Anglin, Towards a Canadian Policy on Africa, International Journal, Vol 15, No 4, Autumn 1960

12 Asa McKercher, The Centre Cannot Hold: Canada, Colonialism and the ‘Afro-Asian Bloc’ at the United Nations, 1960–62, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol 42, Issue 2, 2014

13 Ibid

14 Douglas G Anglin, Towards a Canadian Policy on Africa, International Journal, Vol 15, No 4, Autumn 1960

15 Onwumere, Chukwudi Pettson, At Arm’s Length: Canada’s Relations with Commonwealth West Africa, McMaster University Thesis 1978, 19

16 Robin S Gendron, International Journal, Vol 56, No 1, Winter 2001; Sean Maloney, A Watchful eye: Canada and Soviet Influence Activities in Cold War Africa 1960–1963, Canadian Army Journal, 2010; Nigerian Labour Party, The NATO conspiracy in Africa: a glaring exposure of the military & political designs of the NATO powers against the African continent, 26

17 Douglas G Anglin, Towards a Canadian Policy on Africa, International Journal, Vol 15, No 4, Autumn 1960

18 John Gellner, Canada in NATO, 21

19 Kilford, The Other Cold War, 69

20 Ronald S Ritchie, NATO: the economics of the alliance, 92

21 Bernd Horn, The Canadian way of war: serving the national interest, 241

22 Kilford, The Other Cold War, 70

23 The Rotarian, Apr 1954, 22; Brereton Greenhous and Hugh Alan Halliday, Canada’s Air Force 1914 – 1999, 134

24 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Commonwealth_Air_Training_Plan#Canada)

25 George Monbiot, Deny the British empire’s crimes? No, we ignore them, Apr 23 2012 (http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/apr/23/british-empire-crimes-ignore-atrocities)

26 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mau_Mau_Uprising#Deaths)

27 Mau Mau Uprising (http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Mau_Mau_Uprising)

28 Mark Curtis, The Mau Mau war in Kenya, 1952-60 (https://markcurtis.wordpress.com/2007/02/12/the-mau-mau-war-in-kenya-1952-60/)

29 Hansard Feb 7 1956, 942

30 James George Eayrs, In defense of Canada: growing up allied, 230

31 Charles Philippe David and Jacques Lévesque, The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia, and European Security, 141; The Rotarian, Apr 1954, 22

32 Charles Hornsby, Kenya: A History Since Independence, 45

33 Fabian Klose, Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence: The Wars of Independence in Kenya and Algeria, 75

34 Randall Wakelam, Cold War Fighters: Canadian Aircraft Procurement, 1945-54, 90

35 Terror Shadows Kenya Beat, Ottawa Citizen, July 27, 1954

36 Mark Kennedy, Mountie in charge of Harper’s personal security detail to be appointed Canada’s ambassador to Jordan, Apr 17 2013 (http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-politics/bruno-saccomani-to-be-appointed-canadas-ambassador-to-jordan)

37 Mark Curtis, The Mau Mau war in Kenya, 1952-60 (https://markcurtis.wordpress.com/2007/02/12/the-mau-mau-war-in-kenya-1952-60/)

38 Terror Shadows Kenya Beat, Ottawa Citizen, July 27 1954

39 Bethwell A. Ogot and Toyin Falola, The challenges of history and leadership in Africa: the essays of Bethwell Allan Ogot, 134

40 Caroline Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya, 84

41 George Monbiot, Deny the British empire’s crimes? No, we ignore them, Apr 23 2012 (http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/apr/23/british-empire-crimes-ignore-atrocities)

42 Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, 193

43 John Hilliker and Donald Barry, Canada’s Department of External Affairs, Vol 2: Coming of Age, 1946-1968, 101

44 Eric Morse, Jordan appointment another ‘slap to the pinstripes’, Ottawa Citizen, Apr 27 2013

45 Kevin A. Spooner, Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64, 18

46 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belgian_Congo#Resistance)

47 Spooner, Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 20

48 Ian McKay and Jamie Swift, Warrior Nation: Rebranding Canada in an Age of Anxiety, 162

49 Gendron, Towards a Francophone Community, 80

50 J.P.R. Beauregard, UN operations in the Congo 1960 – 1964, Canadian Defense Quarterly, Aug 1989

51 Carole J.L. Collins, The cold war comes to Africa: Cordier and the 1960 Congo crisis, Journal of International Affairs, Vol 47, Issue 1, Summer 1993

52 Douglas G Anglin, Towards a Canadian Policy on Africa, International Journal, Vol 15, No 4, Autumn 1960

53 Nigel Thomas, NATO Armies Today, 12

54 Sean M. Maloney, Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945-1970, 105

55 La Force Aérienne Belge et l’opération Simba (http://www.avionslegendaires.net/dossier/recits/force-aerienne-belge-loperation-simba/)

56 CF-100 Canuck, General (http://www.349sqn.be/index.php/history/aircraft/cf-100)

57 4 Juillet 1959 - Opération Simba (Http://www.sergebonfond.be/index.php/en/appendices/82-1959-4-juillet-cf100-operation-simba)

58 Gendron, Towards a Francophone Community, 23

59 Ibid, 35

60 Ibid, 36

61 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Torture_during_the_Algerian_War)

62 Gendron, Towards a Francophone Community, 17

63 Hansard Mar 28 1949, 2099

64 Gendron, Towards a Francophone Community, 32

65 Ibid, 53

66 Ibid, 51

67 Ibid, 41

68 Ibid, 57

69 Ibid, 38

70 Shifting priorities: The evolution of Canada’s relations with French Africa, 1945-1968; Gendron, Towards a Francophone Community, 38

71 Gendron, Towards a Francophone community, 67

72 Ibid, 68

73 Kilford, The Other Cold War, 49

74 Gendron, Towards a Francophone community, 72

75 Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa, Words & Deeds: Canada, Portugal, and Africa, 77

76 Kilford, The Other Cold War,

77 Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa, Words and Deeds, 8

78 Ibid, 12

79 Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa, Words & Deeds, 31

80 External Affairs file 20 - 13 - 3 – Portugal - 15

81 External Affairs file 20 - 13 - 3 - Portugal - 19 - RG 25 volume 9318

82 External Affairs file 20 - 13 - 3 – Portugal - 25

83 Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa, Words and Deeds, 8

84 Peyton V. Lyon and Tareq Y. Ismael, Canada and the Third World, 75; Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa, Words & Deeds, 33

85 Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa, Words and Deeds, 28

86 Ibid, 35

87 Ibid, 80

88 Ibid, 79

89 Ibid, 85

90 John Saul, Canada and Mozambique, 75

91 Ibid

92 Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa, Words & Deeds, 38

93 Ibid, 59

94 Ibid, 68

95 Kilford, The Other Cold War, 179

96 Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa, Words & Deeds, 62

97 Ibid

98 Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa, Words & Deeds, 6

99 Robert Wright, Three Nights in Havana: Pierre Trudeau, Fidel Castro, and the Cold War World, 193

100 Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976, 346

101 Ibid

102 Ibid

103 Ibid

104 Wright, Three Nights in Havana, 242

105 Sontwa Sinkala, Canadian Development Assistance to Zambia: With Special Emphasis on the Agricultural Sector, University of Manitoba, 1991, 92

106 Andrew B Godefroy, The Canadian Armed Forces advisory and training team Tanzania 1965 – 1970 Canadian Military History, 11, Summer 2002

107 Kilford, The Other Cold War, 150

108 Land redistribution is not robbery, but a necessity, Guardian, Apr 19 2000 (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/apr/19/zimbabwe/print)

109 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rhodesia%27s_Unilateral_Declaration_of_Independence)

110 Colleen Mayo-Pankhurst, The impact of membership in the Commonwealth on Canadian policy towards Rhodesia, Carleton University Dissertation, 1991, 64

111 Ibid, 66

112 Ibid, 65; Africa research bulletin, June 1964

113 Colleen Mayo-Pankhurst, The impact of membership in the Commonwealth on Canadian policy towards Rhodesia, Carleton University Dissertation, 1991, 72

114 Asa McKercher, The Centre Cannot Hold: Canada, Colonialism and the ‘Afro-Asian Bloc’ at the United Nations, 1960–62 The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol 42, Issue 2, 2014

115 Ibid

116 Linda Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion: Canada and South Africa in the Trudeau and

Mulroney years, 32

117 The Situation in Southern Rhodesia: Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations, The American Journal of International Law, Vol 60, No 4, Oct 1966

118 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rhodesia%27s_Unilateral_Declaration_of_Independence)

119 Colleen Mayo-Pankhurst, The impact of membership in the Commonwealth on Canadian policy towards Rhodesia, Carleton University Dissertation, 1991, 73

120 Freeman, Ambiguous Champion, 34

121 Ibid, 33

122 Lyon and Ismael, Canada and the Third World, 114

123 Sinkala, Canadian Development Assistance to Zambia, 103

124 Freeman, Ambiguous Champion, 32

125 Ibid

126 Sinkala, Canadian Development Assistance to Zambia, 219

127 Steve Moore and Debi Wells Moore, Imperialism and the National Question in Canada, 86

128 Freeman, Ambiguous Champion, 34

129 John S. Saul, The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa: Essays, 127

130 Ibid

131 John Deverell and Latin American Working Group, Falconbridge: portrait of a Canadian mining multinational, 154

132 Robert Mills Clark, Canadian issues: essays in honor of Henry F. Angus, 83

133 Ibid, 84

134 Taskforce on The Churches and Corporate Responsibility, Canada and Namibian Uranium, Africa Today, Vol 30, No 1/2, 1983

135 Adam Mohammed Mutawakil, Canada’s Foreign Policy in Southern Africa Under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney 1984-1988, Carleton University Dissertation, 1988, 135

136 Freeman, Ambiguous Champion, 63

137 Deverell and Latin American Working Group, Falconbridge, 159

138 Clarence Redekop, Commerce over Conscience: The Trudeau Government and South Africa: 1968-84, Journal of Canadian Studies, Vol 19, No 4, Winter 1984- 85; Freeman, Ambiguous Champion, 64

139 Linda Freeman, The Effect of the World Crisis on Canada’s Involvement in Africa, Studies in Political Economy 17, summer 1985

140 Clarence Redekop, Commerce over Conscience: The Trudeau Government and South Africa: 1968-84, Journal of Canadian Studies, Vol 19, No 4, Winter 1984- 85

141 Freeman, Ambiguous Champion, 65; Jorge Niosi, Canadian Multinationals, 111

142 Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes, 116

143 Brian Douglas Tennyson, Canadian Relations with South Africa: A Diplomatic History, 181

144 Freeman, Ambiguous Champion, 67

145 Taskforce on The Churches and Corporate Responsibility, Canada and Namibian Uranium, Africa Today, Vol 30, No 1/2, 1983

146 Freeman, Ambiguous Champion, 66

147 The new swanla system, Last Post magazine, Vol 1, 1969, 78

148 Africa research bulletin, Feb 1983, 6729

149 Taskforce on The Churches and Corporate Responsibility, Canada and Namibian Uranium, Africa Today, Vol 30, No 1/2, 1983

150 Freeman, Ambiguous Champion, 84

151 Robert Miller, Aid as Peacemaker: Canadian Development Assistance and Third World Conflict, 44

152 Grant Dawson, Contact Africa: Canadian Foreign Policy, the Contact Group, and Southern Africa, International Journal, 64

153 Chris Tapscott, Land Reform in Namibia: Why Not?, Southern Africa Report SAR, Vol 9, No 3, Jan 1994

154 Namibia: Landless In The Land Of The Brave, New African, Feb 2013

155 Ibid

156 Ibid

157 Ibid

158 Bill Schiller, Canada helped lead international fight against Apartheid, Toronto Star, Dec 6 2013; Adam Daifallah, Canada’s stance against apartheid helped bring freedom to South Africa, National Post, Dec 6 2013

159 South Africa Country/Area: South Africa (http://search.beaconforfreedom.org/about_database/south%20africa.html)

160 http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/southafrica-afriquedusud/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/canada_sa-as.aspx?menu_id=7&lang=eng

161 Clarence Redekop, Commerce over Conscience: The Trudeau Government and South Africa: 1968-84, Journal of Canadian Studies, Vol 19, No 4, Winter 1984- 85

162 Peter Henshaw, Canada and the “South African Disputes” at the United Nations, 1946-1961 Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol 33, No 1, 1999

163 Freeman, Ambiguous Champion, 27

164 Canadian Relations to South Africa, 170

165 Freeman, Ambiguous Champion, 67

166 Ibid, 52

167 Ibid, 97

168 Ibid, 110; Linda Freeman, The Effect of the World Crisis on Canada’s Involvement in Africa, Studies in Political Economy 17, summer 1985

169 Ibid

170 Freeman, Ambiguous Champion, 88

171 Robert O Mathews and Cranford Pratt, Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy, 175

172 Freeman, Ambiguous Champion, 89

173 Ibid, 122

174 Ibid, 117

175 Ibid, 119

176 Dick Fidler, Canada: Accomplice in apartheid: Canadian government and corporate involvement in southern Africa, 8

177 Freeman, Ambiguous Champion, 104

178 Linda Freeman, The Effect of the World Crisis on Canada’s Involvement in Africa, Studies in Political Economy 17, summer 1985

179 Freeman, Ambiguous Champion, 41

180 Roger Young, Canadian development assistance to Tanzania: an independent study, 41

181 Freeman, Ambiguous Champion, 194

182 Ibid

183 Ibid

184 Ibid, 261

185 Ibid, 265

186 David J. Hornsbya & Oscar van Heerdenan, South Africa–Canada relations: a case of middle power (non)cooperation?, Canada Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, Vol 51, Issue 2, 2013

187 Freeman, Ambiguous Champion, 125

188 Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, Democratizing Southern Africa: Challenges for Canadian Policy, 34

189 Freeman, Ambiguous Champion, 202

190 Ibid

191 David R. Black and Clement E. Adibe, The Clinton Administration and Africa: A View from Ottawa, A Journal of Opinion, Vol 26, No 2, 1998

192 Freeman, Ambiguous Champion, 186

193 Robert Miller, Aid as Peacemaker: Canadian Development Assistance and Third World Conflict, 127

194 Cranford Pratt, Canadian International Development Assistance Policies: An Appraisal, 101

Chapter Six

1 Robin S. Gendron, Towards a Francophone Community: Canada’s Relations with France and French Africa, 1945-1968, 66

2 Robert Carty and Virginia Smith, Perpetuating Poverty: the political economy of Canadian foreign aid, 56

3 Ehidiame-John Inegbedion, Motivations and Canadian foreign aid policy to Africa, University of Alberta Thesis, 1986, 118-119

4 Carty and Smith, Perpetuating Poverty, 57

5 David Webster, Fire and Full Moon: Canada and Indonesia in a Decolonizing World, 52

6 Robert O. Matthews, Africa in Canadian Affairs, International Journal, Vol 26, Winter 1970-71

7 Robert O. Matthews, Canada’s Relations with Africa, International Journal, Vol 30, Summer 1975

8 Sean M. Maloney, Who Has Seen The Wind? An Historical Overview of Canadian Special Operations, Canadian Military Journal, 2003 (http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo5/no3/special-03-eng.asp)

9 Carty and Smith, Perpetuating Poverty, 57

10 Africa research bulletin, Apr 1969, 1394

11 Fred Gaffen, In the Eye of the Storm: a history of Canadian peacekeeping, 243

12 Chester A. Crocker External Military Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa, Africa Today, Vol. 15, No. 2, Apr 1968; Chris Madsen, Another Kind of Justice: Canadian Military Law from Confederation to Somalia, 119

13 Andrew B Godefroy, The Canadian Armed Forces advisory and training team Tanzania 1965 – 1970, Canadian Military History, 11, Summer 2002

14 Christopher Richard Kilford, The Other Cold War: Canadian Military Assistance in the Developing World, Queen’s University thesis, 2009, 120

15 Ibid

16 Andrew B Godefroy, The Canadian Armed Forces advisory and training team Tanzania 1965 – 1970, Canadian Military History, 11, Summer 2002

17 Kilford, The Other Cold War, 287

18 Ibid, 251

19 Grant Dawson, Player, Partner and Friend: Canada’s Africa policy since 1945, International Politics, 50, May 2013

20 Andrew B Godefroy, The Canadian Armed Forces advisory and training team Tanzania 1965 – 1970, Canadian Military History, 11, Summer 2002

21 Robin S. Gendron, Educational Aid for French Africa: And the Canada-Quebec Dispute over Foreign Policy in the 1960s, International Journal Vol 56, No 1, Winter 2000/2001

22 David R. Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance, 78

23 Africa research bulletin Sept 1965; Africa research bulletin Mar 1970; Michel Houndjahoué, A propos de la cooperation dominante et marginale: la France et le Canada en Afrique francophone, Revue canadienne d’études Vol 4, no 1, 1983

24 Réal P. Lavergne and Edward Philip English, Canadian Development Assistance to Senegal: An Independent Study, 49

25 Yukio Tsuda, The Hegemony of English and Strategies for Linguistic Pluralism: Proposing the Ecology of Language Paradigm (http://miresperanto.com/en/english_as_intern/hegemony_of_english.htm)

26 Patrick Manning, Francophone sub-Saharan Africa: 1880 – 1995, 189

27 Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide, 67

28 Suzane Lelande, SNC: Engineering Beyond Frontiers, 152

29 Robin S. Gendron, Educational Aid for French Africa and the Canada-Quebec Dispute over Foreign Policy in the 1960s, International Journal, Vol 56

30 Michel Houndjahouea and Paul-Normand Dussault, La coopération bilatérale entre le Canada et les pays francophones de l’Afrique de l’Ouest: une évaluation de l’offre entre 1961 et 1975, Canadian Journal of African Studies Vol 15, 1981

31 Manning, Francophone sub-Saharan Africa, 187

32 Kilford, The Other Cold War, 152

Chapter Seven

1 Karen Dubinsky, New World Coming: The Sixties and the Shaping of Global Consciousness, 230

2 Ibid

3 (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patrice Lumumba)

4 Robin S. Gendron, Towards a Francophone community: Canada’s Relations with France and French Africa 1945-1968, 80

5 Sean M. Maloney, Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945-1970, 109

6 Jacana Media, Who killed Hammarskjold, 33

7 Ludo de Witte, Ann Wright, The Assassination of Lumumba, 15

8 Kevin A. Spooner, Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping: 1960-64, 73

9 Ibid

10 Alastair MacDonald Taylor, David Cox, J. L. Granatstein, Peacekeeping: international challenge and Canadian response, 158

11 Daniel Galvin, A role for Canada in an African crisis: perceptions of the Congo crisis and motivations for Canadian participation, University of Guelph Dissertation, 2004, 91

12 Ibid, 88

13 Thomas F. Keating, Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy, 98

14 Spooner, Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 75

15 J P R Beauregard, UN operations in the Congo 1960 – 1964, Canadian Defense Quarterly, Aug 1989

16 David Bercuson and J. L. Granatstein, War and Peacekeeping: From South Africa to the Gulf - Canada’s Limited Wars, 219

17 Gaffen, In the eye of the storm, 227; Maloney, Canada and UN Peacekeeping, 122

18 Daniel Galvin, A role for Canada in an African crisis: perceptions of the Congo crisis and motivations for Canadian participation, University of Guelph Dissertation, 2004, 86

19 Spooner, Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 88

20 Daniel Galvin, A role for Canada in an African crisis: perceptions of the Congo crisis and motivations for Canadian participation, University of Guelph Dissertation, 2004, 43

21 Spooner, Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 87-88

22 Alastair MacDonald Taylor, David Cox, J. L. Granatstein, Peacekeeping: international challenge and Canadian response, 161

23 Spooner, Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 59

24 Ibid, 76

25 Ibid

26 Alastair MacDonald Taylor, David Cox, J. L. Granatstein, Peacekeeping: international challenge and Canadian response, 161

27 Kevin Spooner, Just West of Neutral: Canadian Objectivity and Peacekeeping during the Congo Crisis, 1960-61, Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol 43, Issue 2, 2009

28 Issaka K. Souare, Africa in the United Nations System: 1945-2005, 97

29 Ibid

30 Frank R. Villafana, Cold War in the Congo: The Confrontation of Cuban Military Forces, 1960-1967, 25

31 William Blum, Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II, 158

32 William J. Durch, The Evolution of UN peacekeeping: case studies and comparative analysis, 321

33 Lori Lyn Bogle, The Cold War: Hot wars of the Cold War, 176

34 Lise Namikas, Battleground Africa: Cold War in the Congo, 1960–1965, 89

35 Ludo de Witte and Ann Wright, The Assassination of Lumumba, 17

36 Daniel Galvin, A role for Canada in an African crisis: perceptions of the Congo crisis and motivations for Canadian participation, University of Guelph Dissertation, 2004, 83

37 Peter J. Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change, 55

38 Spooner, Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 71; Namikas, Battleground Africa, 88

39 Spooner, Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 130

40 Ibid, 89

41 Ibid, 109

42 Ibid, 116

43 Ibid

44 Blum, Killing Hope, 160

45 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antoine_Gizenga)

46 Blum, Killing Hope, 159

47 David C. Reece, Special Trust and Confidence: Envoy Essays in Canadian Diplomacy, 111

48 Fred Gaffen, In the eye of the storm: a history of Canadian peacekeeping, 227

49 Ludo de Witte and Ann Wright, The Assassination of Lumumba, 149

50 Paul Lee, Documents Expose U.S. Role in Nkrumah Overthrow, Seeingblack.com, 2001 (http://www.seeingblack.com/x060702/nkrumah.shtml)

51 John P. Schlegel, The Deceptive Ash: Bilingualism and Canadian Policy in Africa: 1957-1971, 64

52 Hansard, Mar 17 1966, 2808

53 Christopher R. Kilford, The Other Cold War: Canada’s Military Assistance to the Developing World 1945-1975, 154

54 Canadian Institute for International Affairs Vol V, No 3

55 Howell, Ghana and Nkrumah, 129/143

56 Howell, Ghana and Nkrumah, 149

57 Schlegel, The Deceptive Ash, 64

58 Kilford, The Other Cold War, 155

59 Howell, Ghana and Nkrumah, 175

60 Schlegel, The Deceptive Ash, 63

61 Gary Hunt, Recollections of the Canadian Armed Forces Training Team in Ghana, 1961- 1968, Canadian Defence Quarterly 18, spring 1989

62 Kilford, The Other Cold War, 155

63 Ibid, 142

64 Ibid, 143

65 Ibid, 160

66 Schlegel, The Deceptive Ash, 63

67 Kilford, The Other Cold War, 149

68 Ibid

69 Ibid, 151

Chapter Eight

1 Joan Baxter, Dust from our eyes: An unblinkered look at Africa, 146

2 Carolyn Mary Bassett, The Use of Canadian Aid to Support Structural Adjustment in Africa, Carleton University Dissertation, 1991, 68

3 Ibid, 55

4 Noam Chomsky, Jubilee 2000, Znet, May 15 1998 (http://www.chomsky.info/articles/19980515.htm)

5 Tim Murithi, Handbook of Africa’s International Relations, 254

6 Patrick McGroarty, Africa Loses $60 Billion a Year Illegally, Report Says, Wall Street Journal Feb 1 2015

7 Population living with less than Five Dollars a day - By Country (https://www.quandl.com/collections/society/population-living-with-less-than-five-dollars-a-day-worldbank-by-country)

8 Nigeria’s Ventures magazine lists 55 billionaires, BBC, Oct 7 2013 (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24433996)

9 James K. Boyce and Léonce Ndikumana, Elites Loot Africa While Foreign Debt Mounts: International banking laws help African elites borrow big, then shift funds to personal accounts, YaleGlobal, 27 Feb 2012 (http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/elites-loot-africa-while-foreign-debt-mounts)

10 Emma Glanfield, Wealthy Africans spending almost £4million on London property every week as they snap up some of the most exclusive investments in the capital, Daily Mail Oct 27 2014 (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2808556/Wealthy-Africans-spending-4million-London-property-WEEK-snap-exclusive-investments-capital.html)

11 David R. Black and Clement E. Adibe, The Clinton Administration and Africa: A View from Ottawa, A Journal of Opinion, Vol 26, No 2, 1998

12 David R. Black, Canada and Africa in the New Millennium: The Politics of Consistent Inconsistency, 109

13 Roy Culpeper, First to forgive, Policy Options, Sept 1987

14 Simard Hughes, Une étude des politiques canadiennes en matière d’aide au développement à l’égard des pays francophones d’Afrique de l’Ouest dans les années 1980, Université Laval, 1998, 58

15 Carolyn Mary Bassett, The Use of Canadian Aid to Support Structural Adjustment in Africa, Carleton University Dissertation, 1991, 63

16 Ibid, 44

17 Ibid, 68 Pierre Beaudet, Qui aide qui?, 123

18 Cranford Pratt, Canadian International Development Assistance Policies: An Appraisal, 219

19 Robert Matthews and Cranford Pratt, Human rights in Canadian foreign policy, 182

20 David R. Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance, 260

21 Frances Stewart, Adjustment and poverty: options and choices, 131

22 Eboe Hutchful, Ghana’s Adjustment Experience: The Paradox of Reform, 125

23 Ibid, 91

24 Ian Gary, Confrontation, Co-operation or Co-optation: NGOs and the Ghanaian State During Structural Adjustment, Review of African Political Economy vol 23, no 68, June 1996

25  A.S.Z. Kiondo, The Politics of Economic Reforms in Tanzania, 1977-1988, University of Toronto dissertation, 1989

26 Carolyn Mary Bassett, The Use of Canadian Aid to Support Structural Adjustment in Africa, Carleton University Dissertation, 1991, 129

27 David Reece, A Rich Broth: memoirs of a Canadian diplomat, 185

28 Carolyn Mary Bassett, The Use of Canadian Aid to Support Structural Adjustment in Africa, Carleton University Dissertation, 1991, 132

29 Jamie Swift and Brian Tomlinson, Conflicts of Interest: Canada and the Third World, 15

30 Carolyn Mary Bassett, The Use of Canadian Aid to Support Structural Adjustment in Africa, Carleton University Dissertation, 1991, 131

31 Reece, A Rich Broth, 186

32 Africa Events Dar es Salaam Limited, 1990 - Vol 6 - 39

33 Swift and Brian Tomlinson, Conflicts of Interest, 14

34 Patrick Bond and George Dor, Neoliberalism and Poverty Reduction Strategies in Africa. Discussion paper at the Regional Network for Equity in Health in Southern Africa, 2003

35 Ibid

36 Edward Akuffo, Canadian foreign-policy in Africa: Regional Approaches to Peace, Security, and Development, 66

37 Canadian Economic Relations with sub-Saharan Africa, Recent Trends (http://www.ccic.ca/resources/archives_acf_2002_05_can_econ_relations_africa_e.php)

38 Budget 2005 Delivers on Canada’s Commitment to Africa (http://www.fin.gc.ca/n05/05-015-eng.asp)

39 Canada: Support to NEPAD (period 2001- 2003) (http://www.un.org/esa/africa/support/Canada.htm)

40 Addis Tribune 12 April 2002 Canada Set Aside $500 million in Support of the G8 Africa Action Plan

41 Akuffo, Canadian foreign-policy in Africa, 97

42 Canada Investment Fund For Africa (http://www.cifafund.ca/en/)

43 Canadian International Development Agency, Canada Fund for Africa: Delivering Results, 13; Bruno Charbonneau and Wayne Cox, Locating Global Order: American Power and Canadian Security after 9/11, 245

44 The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 2001 (https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/nepad.html)

45 Ibid

46 Patrick Bond, Looting Africa: The Economics of Exploitation, 127

47 Trevor Ngwane, African NGOs critique of NEPAD: Should African social movements be part of the “New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), African Social Forum’s African Seminar at the World Social Forum, Porto Alegre, Brazil, Feb 2 2002 (http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/content/african-ngos-critique-nepad)

48 AID-FOR-TRADE CASE STORY: CANADA (http://www.oecd.org/aidfortrade/46827452.pdf);

New Canadian Initiatives in Africa: Backgrounder (http://ahibo.com/G8/en/caninitaf.htm)

49 The African Trade Policy Centre (ATPC) (http://www.aidfortrade.ecowas.int/programmes/the-african-trade-policy-centreatpc)

50 Akuffo, Canadian foreign-policy in Africa, 99

51 Ibid

52 Africa Trade Fund: Strategic Business Plan 2012-2015 - Enhancing Trade Capacity in Africa http://www.trademarksa.org/publications/africa-trade-fund-strategic-business-plan-2012-2015-enhancing-trade-capacity-africa

53 ADB Trade Facilitation Instruments - World Trade Organization

54 In Davos, WTO Ministers Set Stage for Debate on Post-Bali Agenda, Southern and Eastern African Trade, Information and Negotiations Institute, Feb 5 2014 (http://www.seatiniuganda.org/davos-wto-ministers-set-stage-debate-post-bali-agenda/)

55 Tariffs and Non-Tariff Measures (http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/goods-produits/nama.aspx?lang=eng)

56 Rick Rowden, The Myth of Africa’s Rise, Foreign Policy, Jan 4 2013 (http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/04/the-myth-of-africas-rise/)

57 Harper Government supports regional economic development in Africa, Apr 30 2013 (http://www.international.gc.ca/media/dev/news-communiques/2013/04/30a.aspx?lang=eng)

58 NEPAD Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility, Nov 7 2007 (http://www.docstoc.com/docs/33510962/NEPAD-WATER-SECTOR-PROGRAMMING---PowerPoint)

59 PPIAF Brochure (www.ppiaf.org/.../PPIAF%20Brochure%202011.12.06%20(English) pdf)

60 Profiting from Poverty: Privatisation consultants, DFID and public services (http://www.waterjustice.org/uploads/attachments/pdf67.pdf)

61 Harper Government Concludes Investment Agreement with Albania, Nov 27 2013 (http://www.international.gc.ca/media/comm/news-communiques/2013/11/27b.aspx?lang=eng)

62 Yash Tandon, Rethinking the Role of Global Investment in Africa’s Development, Business Times July 11 2014 (http://www.businesstimes.co.tz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3630:rethinking-the-role-of-global-investment-in-africas-development&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=57)

63 Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Benin for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/benin-text.aspx?lang=eng)

Chapter Nine

1 Joan Baxter, Dust from Our Eyes: An Unblinkered Look at Africa, 143

2 Edward Akuffo, Canadian Foreign Policy in Africa: Regional Approaches to Peace, Security and development, 210

3 Travis Lupick, How Canada Dominates African Mining Africa, Think Africa Press, Apr 18 2013

(http://allafrica.com/stories/201304181336.html)

4 Denis Tougas, Canada in Africa: The mining superpower, Issue 407, Nov 20 2008

(http://www.pambazuka.net/en/category/features/52095)

5 The role of mining in national economies: Mining’s contribution to sustainable development, International Council on Mining and Metals, Oct 2012 (www.icmm.com/document/4440)

6 Gavin du Venage, Africa sets its sights beyond commodities, The National, Mar 15 2015 (http://www.thenational.ae/business/economy/africa-sets-its-sights-beyond-commodities)

7 African countries advised to boycott European trade partner, CEO Magazine, Nov 2014

8 Address by Minister Paradis: The World Bank Event on the Africa Mining Vision and the African Minerals Development Centre, Feb 3 2014 (http://www.international.gc.ca/media/dev/speeches-discours/2014/02/03b.aspx?lang=eng)

9 Thomas Michael Power, Digging to Development? A Historical Look at Mining and Economic Development, Oxfam America, Sept 2002

10 Ibid

11 Ibid

12 Minerals and Africa’s Development: the International Study Group Report on Africa’s Mineral Regimes United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2011 (http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/mineral_africa_development_report_eng.pdf)

13 Dan Haglund, Blessing or curse? The rise of mineral dependence among low- and middle-income countries, Oxford Policy Management, Dec 2011 (http://www.eisourcebook.org/submissions/1325523556OPMBlessingorcursereport2011.pdf)

14 Scott Pegg, Poverty Reduction or Poverty Exacerbation?: World Bank Group Support for Extractive Industries in Africa (http://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/oa3/files/poverty-reduction-or-poverty-exacerbation.pdf)

15 Ray Bush, Poverty and neoliberalism: persistence and reproduction in the global south, 131

16 Letter to WB President on Ghana Re: Mining permits, July 7 2003 (http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/fr/node/564)

17 The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD): A Commentary, Africa-Canada Forum Canadian Council for International Co-operation Apr 2002 (http://www.ccic.ca/_files/en/archives/003_acf_new_initiatives_for_africa_a_canadian_response_to_nepad.pdf)

18 Scott Pegg, Poverty Reduction or Poverty Exacerbation?: World Bank Group Support for Extractive Industries in Africa (http://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/oa3/files/poverty-reduction-or-poverty-exacerbation.pdf)

19 Bruno Charbonneau and Wayne Cox, Locating Global Order: American Power and Canadian Security after 9/11, 242

20 Gwendolyn Schulman and Roberto Nieto, Foreign Aid to Mining Firms Dec 19 2011 (http://www.dominionpaper.ca/articles/4300)

21 Alain Deneault, William Sacher, Patrick Ducharme, Imperial Canada Inc.: Legal Haven of Choice for the World’s Mining Industries, 39; Alain Deneault, Mathieu Denis, William Sacher, Paradis sous terre: comment le Canada est devenu la plaque tournante de l’industrie minière mondiale, 127

22 Paula Joan Butler, Violence as Civility: Race, Mining and Canadian Neocolonizers in African States University of Toronto, 2006

23 Samia Kazi Aoul and Bonnie Campbell, Towards a Spiral of Violence? The Dangers of Privatising Risk Management of Investments in Africa: Mining Activities and the Use of Private Security Companies, 2000 (http://www.ieim.uqam.ca/IMG/pdf/spiral_en.pdf)

24 Delphine Abadie, Canada and the geopolitics of mining interests: a case study of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Review of African Political Economy Vol 38, Issue 128, 2011; Africa research bulletin, economic financial and technical series, July 15, 1975, 3600; Africa research bulletin June 15, 1965, 328; Africa research bulletin, Mar 15, 276

25 Baxter, Dust from Our Eyes, 270

26 Vocational training to support Senegal’s economic growth, Oct 11 2012 (http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2012/10/11/vocational-training-support-senegals-economic-growth)

27 Ethiopia: Canada is ready to support technologies of mining sector development, Sept 22 2014 (Http://www.geeskaafrika.com/ethiopia-canada-is-ready-to-support-technologies-of-mining-sector-development/5684/#sthash.SvfP2H1N.dpuf)

28 Mackenzie Scrimshaw, Feds to award $12M contract to consultant for mining education project, Ipolitics May 7 2015 (http://ipolitics.ca/2015/05/07/feds-to-award-12m-contract-to-consultant-for-mining-education-project/)

29 Extractive Industries, Oct 14 2012 (http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2012/10/14/extractive-industries)

30 Nnimmo Bassey, To Cook a Continent: Destructive Extraction and the Climate Crisis in Africa, 35

31 The World Bank Group in the Extractives Industries 2013: annual review

(http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/0a42ce004260bfa3a848ac0dc33b630b/WBG+EI+Annual+Report+2013_Final.pdf?MOD=AJPERES)

32 Donald Gutstein, Follow the Money, Part 3: Big Oil and Calgary’s School of Public Policy Apr 8 2014

(http://rabble.ca/blogs/bloggers/donald-gutstein/2014/04/follow-money-part-3-big-oil-and-calgarys-school-public-policy)

33 New Canadian Initiatives in Africa, Feb 3 2014 (http://www.international.gc.ca/media/dev/news-communiques/2014/02/bg3a.aspx?lang=eng)

34 Ibid

35 African Minerals Development Centre, a new project to improve sustainability on the continent (http://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/african-minerals-development-centre-new-project-improve-sustainability-continent)

36 Africa-Canada Forum, The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD): A Commentary (Part I of II), Canadian Council for International Co-operation (http://www.africafiles.org/printableversion.asp?id=926)

37 Abdulai Darimani, Impacts of Activities of Canadian Mining Companies in Africa, Third World Network - Africa Secretariat, Oct 31 2005 (http://www.miningwatch.ca/sites/www.miningwatch.ca/files/Africa_case_study_0.pdf)

38 Inside U.S. Trade 02/07/2014

39 Vale supports African Mineral Development Centre launch in Mozambique, Jan 16 2014 (http://www.vale.com/canada/EN/aboutvale/news/Pages/vale-apoia-lancamento-do-centro-de-desenvolvimento-mineral-em-mocambique.aspx)

40 Africa: Canadian Institute Signals Intent to Support the Africa Mining Development Centre, Feb 2014 (http://cirdi.ca/africa-canadian-institute-signals-intent-to-support-the-africa-mining/)

41 (http://stoptheinstitute.ca/)

42 Kim Mackrael, Huge opportunities’ for Canadian mining industry to work in developing countries, The Globe and Mail June 19, 2013

43 Brief: The Canadian International Institute for Extractive Industries and Development (CIIEID) MiningWatch Canada, Mar 2014 (www.miningwatch.ca/files/ciieid_overview_march2014_.pdf)

44 Geoffrey York, In West Africa, a Canadian mining company pioneers ‘the new humanitarianism’, The Globe and Mail, Mar 20 2012

45 Daniel Leblanc, CIDA funds seen to be subsidizing mining firms, The Globe and Mail Jan 29 2012

46 Frederick Bird, Project CARE: Placer Dome’s Efforts to Help Laid-off South African Miners Find Remunerative Work, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol 89, Issue 2, Nov 2009

47 Kim Mackrael, Commercial motives driving Canada’s foreign aid, documents reveal, The Globe and Mail, Jan 8 2014

48 Ibid

49 Grant Dawson, Player, partner and friend: Canada’s Africa policy since 1945, International Politics, Mar 2013

50 Samia Kazi Aoul and Bonnie Campbell, Towards a Spiral of Violence? The Dangers of Privatising Risk Management of Investments in Africa: Mining Activities and the Use of Private Security Companies, 2000 (http://www.ieim.uqam.ca/IMG/pdf/spiral_en.pdf); Deneault, Sacher, Ducharme, Imperial Canada Inc, 42

51 Export Development Canada Supporting Business in Africa May 2013 (http://www.mineafrica.com/documents/8%20-%20EDC1.pdf)

52 Minister Fast Attends Opening of CIM Office in Burkina Faso, June 19 2014 (http://www.international.gc.ca/media/comm/photos/2014/06/19b.aspx?lang=eng)

53 L’Institut canadien des mines, de la métallurgie et du pétrole (ICM) à une table ronde privée avec le Premier Ministre du Canada à Dakar, Oct 12 2012 (http://www.newswire.ca/en/story/1051479/l-institut-canadien-des-mines-de-la-metallurgie-et-du-petrole-icm-a-une-table-ronde-privee-avec-le-premier-ministre-du-canada-a-dakar)

54 Abdulai Darimani, Impacts of Activities of Canadian Mining Companies in Africa, Third World Network - Africa Secretariat Oct 31 2005 (http://www.miningwatch.ca/sites/www.miningwatch.ca/files/Africa_case_study_0.pdf)

55 Paula Butler and Third World Network -Africa Secretariat, Africa’s Blessing, Africa’s Curse: The Legacy of Resource Extraction, Canadian Ecumenical Justice Initiatives

56 Relax Mining Laws, Urges Canadian Envoy, East Africa Standard Mar 27, 2002 (http://allafrica.com/stories/200203270418.html)

57 Mike Blanchfield, Mali turmoil bad for Canadian mining ambitions in West Africa: analysts, The Canadian Press Feb 8 2013 (http://www.canadianbusiness.com/business-news/mali-turmoil-bad-for-canadian-mining-ambitions-in-west-africa-analysts/)

58 Geoffrey York, In Africa, Canada’s ‘economic diplomacy’ is nothing new, The Globe and Mail, Nov 27 2013

59 Baird Furthers Canada’s Interests and Values in Kenya, May 14, 2013 (http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiques/2013/05/14a.aspx?lang=eng)

60 Mike Blanchfield, Mali turmoil bad for Canadian mining ambitions in West Africa: analysts, The Canadian Press Feb 8 2013 (http://www.canadianbusiness.com/business-news/mali-turmoil-bad-for-canadian-mining-ambitions-in-west-africa-analysts/)

61 Correy Baldwin, In the driver’s seat: CIM leads Canadian mining industry development in West Africa, Dec 2012 (https://magazine.cim.org/en/Dec-2012-Jan-2013/CIM-community/In-the-drivers-seat.aspx)

62 Mike Blanchfield, Canada to invest $105M in health care for African children, CanWest News Service, Nov 26 2007 (http://www.nationalpost.com/news/world/story.html?id=124607)

63 Carl Meyer, Opposition MPs who skipped C-300 vote were targeted by industry lobby, Embassy, Nov 3 2010 (http://www.embassynews.ca/news/2010/11/03/opposition-mps-who-skipped-c-300-vote-were-targeted-by-industry-lobby/39577)

64 Barrie McKenna, Trade Pacts to Spur Mining Investment, Globe and Mail, Mar 3 2014

65 Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Benin for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/benin-text.aspx?lang=eng)

66 Daniel Tencer, 7 Things Harper Doesn’t Want You To Know About The China Trade Treaty (And A Few He Does), The Huffington Post Canada, Sept 17 2014 (http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2014/09/17/canada-china-fipa-facts_n_5836348.html)

67 Paula Butler, Canadian Mining and “Resource Nationalism”, Canadian Dimension, Sept 2014

68 Canadian miners wading into Africa, Toronto Star, Feb 18 2013 (http://www.thestar.com/business/economy/2013/02/18/fiminingafrica.html)

69 Paula Butler and Evans Rubara, Popularizing new neo-colonial governance processes for African minerals?, Issue 634, June 11 2013 (http://www.pambazuka.net/en/category.php/features/87799/print)

Chapter Ten

1 Peter Koven, Africa Rush; From political risk to corruption, obstacles to mining in Africa are many, but for those who persevere, the rewards can be huge, Financial Post, Mar 1 2008

2 Geneviève Lavoie-Mathieu, Burkina Faso: Gold, a Double-Edged Sword?, Alternatives International Journal, Apr 1 2013 (http://www.alterinter.org/spip.php?article3990)

3 Ibid

4 Minister Oda announces initiatives to increase the benefits of natural resource management for people in Africa and South America, Sept 29 2011 (http://www.international.gc.ca/media/dev/news-communiques/2011/09/29a.aspx?lang=eng)

5 Marco Chown Oved, After the gold rush, Toronto Star, Dec 12 2014 (http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2014/12/01/burkina_faso_after_the_gold_rush.html)

6 Geoffrey York, In West Africa, a Canadian mining company pioneers ‘the new humanitarianism’, The Globe and Mail, Mar 20 2012

7 Ibid

8 Liezel Hill, “Iamgold faces labour dispute in Burkina Faso,” Mining Weekly, May 12 2011 (http://www.miningweekly.com/article/iamgold-faces-labour-dispute-in-burkina-faso-2011-05-12)

9 Ibid

10 Simon Gongo, Burkina Faso Residents Protest Iamgold’s Essakane Mine, Bloomberg, Mar 21 2012 (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-03-21/burkina-faso-residents-protest-iamgold-s-essakane-mine-jobs-1-); Exploitation miniere à Essakane - Les jeunes bloquent l’acces de Dori aux véhicules de IAMGOLD, mars 22 2012 (http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201203221192.html)

11 Geoffrey York, In West Africa, a Canadian mining company pioneers ‘the new humanitarianism,’ The Globe and Mail, Mar 20 2012 (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/in-west-africa-a-canadian-mining-company-pioneers-the-new-humanitarianism/article535009/)

12 Daouda Emile Ouedraogo, Benoît La Salle, PDG de la SEMAFO: “Le secteur minier sera un des moteurs du développement du Burkina Faso” May 28 2007 (http://www.lefaso.net/spip.php?article21052)

13 Yan Barcelo, Midas Touch: A CA discovers an El Dorado in West Africa, CA magazine, Aug 2010 (file:///C:/Users/n_hausf/Downloads/CAmagazine-August-2010.pdf)

14 Peter Koven, The benefactor turns a profit; SEMAFO grew out of a charitable visit to Africa, National Post, July 29 2010

15 Gérard Coulibaly Wanlé, Exploitation minière: Essakane remercie le gouvernement burkinabè, Ouaga.com, Mar 27, 2014 (http://news.aouaga.com/h/23390.html)

16 Burkina Faso coup highlights African investment risks, The West Australian, Nov 2014

17 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blaise_Compaor%C3%A9)

18 Henry Lazenby, True Gold’s Karma project construction back on track, June 17 2015 (http://www.miningweekly.com/article/true-golds-karma-project-construction-back-on-track-2015-06-17)

19 Update on Bombore and Burkina Faso, Nov 3 2014 (http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/orezone-update-on-bombore-and-burkina-faso-tsx-ore-1963735.htm)

20 Pauline Bax and Simon Gongo, Revolt Rocks Burkina Faso’s Mines After President Flees, Bloomberg, Apr 7 2015 (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-08/revolt-rocks-burkina-faso-s-mines-after-president-compaore-flees)

21 Ibid

22 Business Monitor Online, Mining Audit Poses Little Risk To Established Players, Dec 1 2014 (http://www.bmiresearch.com/news-and-views/mining-audit-poses-little-risk-to-established-players)

23 Burkina Faso talks agree one-year transition until polls in Nov 2015, Reuters, Nov 6 2014 (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/burkinafaso/11212477/Burkina-Faso-talks-agree-one-year-transition-until-polls-in-Nov-2015.html)

24 Minister Paradis lifts suspension of aid to Burkina Faso, Nov 26 2014 (http://www.international.gc.ca/media/dev/news-communiques/2014/11/26a.aspx?lang=eng)

25 Christopher Abbott, A Masked Military Junta: Examining Burkina Faso’s Transitional Government, Nov 28 2014 (http://natocouncil.ca/a-masked-military-junta-examining-burkina-fasos-transitional-government/)

26 Baird Calls for End to Violence in Burkina Faso, Oct 30 2014 (http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiques/2014/10/30c.aspx?lang=eng)

27 Minister Fast Concludes Successful Visit to Burkina Faso, June 19 2014 (http://www.international.gc.ca/media/comm/news-communiques/2014/06/19d.aspx?lang=eng)

28 La Voix de l’Amérique, L’armée, maître du jeu au Burkina, s’arroge cinq portefeuilles ministériels, Nov 24 2011 (http://www.voaafrique.com/content/larmee-maitre-du-jeu-au-burkina-s-arrose-cinq-portefeuilles-ministeriels/2531838.html)

29 Peter Gonnella, Congo: Anvil Mining Hammered Over Military Assistance, MineWeb June 8 2005 (http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=12361)

30 Tom Burgis, The Looting Machine: Warlords, Oligarchs, Corporations, Smugglers, and the Theft of Africa’s Wealth, 39

31 Ibid, 38

32 Sally Neighbour, The Kilwa Incident Transcript report, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Four Corners, June 6 2005 (http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2005/s1386467.htm)

33 Ibid

34 Tom Sandborn, Canadian Mining Firm Accused of Complicity in Congo Killings, Nov 26 2010 (http://thetyee.ca/News/2010/11/26/CongoKillings/)

35 Ibid

36 Anvil Mining and the Kilwa Massacre, D.R. Congo: Canadian Company Implicated?, June 16 2005 (http://www.miningwatch.ca/anvil-mining-and-kilwa-massacre-dr-congo-canadian-company-implicated)

37 Supreme Court won’t hear appeal in Congo massacre case, The Canadian Press, Nov 1 2012

(http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/supreme-court-won-t-hear-appeal-in-congo-massacre-case-1.1297191)

38 Canada and the geopolitics of mining interests: a case study of the Democratic Republic of Congo

39 Burgis, The Looting Machine, 39

40 Ibid, 38; Alain Deneault, Offshore: paradis fiscaux et souveraineté criminelle, 165

41 Parliamentary Panel Slams Katanga Operations, Africa Mining Intelligence, Mar 1, 2006

42 Burgis, The Looting Machine, 52

43 La Mancha under pressure, Africa Mining Intelligence, Feb 22 2012

44 La Côte d’Ivoire distinguée pour ses réformes dans le secteur minier, Dec 24, 2014 (http://news.abidjan.net/h/519024.html)

45 Geoffrey York, Canadian companies go their own way in Africa, Feb 10 2015 (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/international-business/canadian-mining-companies-find-niches-in-smaller-african-countries/article22904732/)

46 Le Président du Groupe minier canadien Sama ressources, le Secrétaire Exécutif du Conseil de l’Entente et des Hommes d’Affaires japonais reçus par le Chef de l’Etat 3 Dec 2013 (http://news.abidjan.net/h/481316.html)

47 Côte d’Ivoire: inauguration d’une quatrième mine d’or pour augmenter la production aurifère de 20% Jan 28 2014 (http://news.abidjan.net/h/485711.html)

48 Hear No Evil Forced Labor and Corporate Responsibility in Eritrea’s Mining Sector, Jan 15 2013 (https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/01/15/hear-no-evil/forced-labor-and-corporate-responsibility-eritreas-mining-sector) ; Canadian Mine Among Sites of Gross Human Rights Violations in Eritrea – UN Report, June 9 2015 (http://www.miningwatch.ca/blog/canadian-mine-among-sites-gross-human-rights-violations-eritrea-un-report)

49 Matthew McClearn, The slaves of Eritrea, May 9 2014 (http://www.canadianbusiness.com/global-report/the-slaves-of-eritrea/)

50 Canada Trade Mission to Nigeria and Ghana, Jan 27 2013 (http://www.international.gc.ca/commerce/visit-visite/africa-2013-afrique.aspx?lang=eng)

51 Abdulai Darimani, Impacts of Activities of Canadian Mining Companies in Africa, Third World Network - Africa Secretariat Oct 31, 2005 (http://www.miningwatch.ca/sites/www.miningwatch.ca/files/Africa_case_study_0.pdf)

52 Ibid

53 Ibid

54 Ghanaian Chronicle, Ghana: Mining Companies Should Do More, July 23 2004

55 George Nyavor, Researchers disagree on study linking mining in Prestea to increased cancer cases, Myjoyonline.com Sept 24 2014 (http://www.myjoyonline.com/news/2014/september-24th/researchers-disagree-on-study-linking-mining-in-prestea-to-increased-cancer-cases.php#sthash.9J2QmHoP.dpuf)

56 Gavin Hilson and Natalia Yakovleva, Strained relations: A critical analysis of the mining conflict in Prestea, Ghana, The Centre For Business Relationships, Accountability, Sustainability and Society, Working paper series No 34

57 Police/Army open fire at Prestea, Ghanaian Chronicle, June 16 2005 (http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Police-Army-open-fire-at-Prestea-83763)

58 Gavin Hilson and Natalia Yakovleva, Strained relations: A critical analysis of the mining conflict in Prestea, Ghana, The Centre For Business Relationships, Accountability, Sustainability and Society, Working paper series No 34

59 Canadian Police investigate acquisition of Sheini Hills Iron Ore concessions, citifmonline, June 26 2012 (http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Canadian-Police-investigate-acquisition-of-Sheini-Hills-Iron-Ore-concessions-243071)

60 Lee Adoboe, Police question journalist for investigating a mining firm, Aug 19 2012 (Http://edition.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201207/90544.php)

61 Edmond Gyebi, Sheini Indigenes Threaten To Attack Mining Coy, Jan 8 2014 (http://thechronicle.com.gh/sheini-indigenes-threaten-to-attack-mining-coy/)

62 Ibid

63 Alpha Condé suspend le secrétaire général du ministère des mines pour la vente « illicite » des mines d’or de Kiniero, June 5 2014 (http://guineenews.org/alpha-conde-suspend-le-secretaire-general-du-ministere-des-mines-pour-la-vente-illicite-des-mines-dor-de-kiniero/)

64 Three said killed in army crackdown on small scale miners in central east Guinea, BBC Monitoring Africa –BBC Worldwide Monitoring, June 6 2008

65 Ibid

66 Peter Koven, Protests in guinea won’t hurt semafo, National Post Sept 21 2011

67 Woes for Canada’s Semafo at Kiniero; Gold, Africa Mining Intelligence, Sept 28 2011

68 Semafo caught out by Mazars law, Africa Mining Intelligence, Mar 24 2015

69 Ibid

70 Kwale Dispatch: Investigating Tiomin Resources’ Criminal Activities In Kenya Aug 7 2007 (http://www.miningwatch.ca/kwale-dispatch-investigating-tiomin-resources-criminal-activities-kenya)

71 Gemma Richardson, Tiomin Given Final Approval for Kwale Titanium Mine, Feb 9 2005 (http://www.dominionpaper.ca/canadian_news/2005/02/09/tiomin_giv.html)

72 Profiles of some Canadian mining companies operating in Africa, Groupe de recherche sur les activités minières en Afrique, Spring 2001

73 Ngeta Kabiri, The Coast Mining Rights Forum: An Anti-Tiomin or Anti-Titanium Mining Coalition in Kenya?, Southeastern Regional Seminar in African Studies (SERSAS), Fall Meeting, Oct 13 2001 (http://www.ecu.edu/african/sersas/Papers/KabiriNgetaFall01.htm)

74 Profiles of some Canadian mining companies operating in Africa, Groupe de recherche sur les activités minières en Afrique, Spring 2001

75 Ibid

76 Tiomin at Grips with Farmers, Africa Mining Intelligence, May 16 2001

77 New Negotiations Over Tiomin Deal, East African Standard, Sept 19 2003 (http://allafrica.com/stories/200309190479.html)

78 Ibid

79 Frank Otieno, Canadians seek minerals in Siaya, The Standard, Feb 23 2015 (http://ices.or.ke/canadians-seek-minerals-in-siaya/)

80 Kenya and Canada to sign investment protection deal, Xinhua, Apr 16 2014 (http://www.coastweek.com/3716-itn-03.htm)

81 Immaculate Karambu, Vanoil to use its British and Swiss links to press for Sh13bn payment, Oct 4 2014 (http://mobile.nation.co.ke/business/Vanoil-Compensation-Case-United-Kingdom-Switzerland/-/1950106/2475342/-/format/xhtml/-/fgxhexz/-/index.html)

82 Vanoil Announces Corporate Restructuring, Oct 31 2014 (http://www.vanoil.ca/s/NewsReleases.asp?ReportID=681440&_Type=News-Releases&_Title=Vanoil-Announces-Corporate-Restructuring)

83 Alain Deneault, William Sacher, Patrick Ducharme, Imperial Canada Inc.: Legal Haven of Choice for the World’s Mining Industries, 42

84 Rachel Pulfer, Castro’s Favourite Capitalist, Dec 2009 (http://thewalrus.ca/castros-favourite-capitalist/)

85 Ibid

86 Sherritt Reports Fatality at the Ambatovy Joint Venture, Press release, May 18 2015 (http://www.sherritt.com/press-releases/sherritt-reports-fatality-at-the-ambatovy-joint-venture-tsx-s-11g041990-001)

87 Sherritt Confirms Strike Action at Its Ambatovy Plant, Marketwired, Apr 15 2015 (http://www.sherritt.com/press-releases/sherritt-confirms-strike-action-at-its-ambatovy-plant-tsx-s-11g038542-001)

88 Another Mining Horror Story?: Sherritt International Corporation’s Ambatovy Project in Madagascar, Apr 10 2012 (http://www.miningwatch.ca/article/another-mining-horror-story-sherritt-international-corporation-s-ambatovy-project-madagascar)

89 Madagascar: les compagnies minières critiquées par Rajoelina, Xinhua, Jan 22 2013 (http://www.afriquinfos.com/articles/2013/1/21/madagascar-compagnies-minieres-critiquees-rajoelina-216460.asp)

90 Geoffrey York, In Africa, Canada’s ‘economic diplomacy’ is nothing new Globe and Mail Nov 27 2013

91 Canadian embassies abroad (http://www.sources.com/SSR/Docs/PNN28-8-CanadianEmbassies.pdf)

92 Pollution minière : des employés d’une filiale canadienne arrêtés en Mauritanie, La Presse, Apr 14 2010 (http://www.lapresse.ca/environnement/201004/14/01-4270417-pollution-miniere-des-employes-dune-filiale-canadienne-arretes-en-mauritanie.php)

93 Katelyn Spidle, A decade of safer gold extraction: Industry celebrates 10 years with the cyanide code, CIM Magazine, May 2015 (https://magazine.cim.org/en/2015/May/news/A-decade-of-safer-gold-extraction.aspx#sthash.k1IsQyrf.dpuf); Deaglan McManus, Drew Garvie and Padraic O’Brien, Feeding corporate responsibility, The Ontarion, Sept 13 2013 (http://www.theontarion.com/2013/09/feeding-corporate-responsibility/ Feeding corporate responsibility )

94 Christophe Le Bec, La Mauritanie a encore des filons à creuser, Jeune Afrique, Jan 29 2013 (http://economie.jeuneafrique.com/regions/afrique-subsaharienne/15308-la-mauritanie-a-encore-des-filons-a-creuser.html)

95 Mauritania: Solidarity with Workers on Strike at Tasiast Gold Mine, Aug 16 2013 (http://www.ituc-csi.org/mauritania-solidarity-with-workers)

96 Geoffrey York, Kinross defends Tasiast mine layoffs, The Globe and Mail, Jan 15 2014 (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/kinross-defends-tasiast-mine-layoffs/article16353908/)

97 Ibid

98 Christophe Le Bec, La Mauritanie a encore des filons à creuser, Jeune Afrique, Jan 29 2013 (http://economie.jeuneafrique.com/regions/afrique-subsaharienne/15308-la-mauritanie-a-encore-des-filons-a-creuser.html)

99 Kinross-Tasiast: L’or est de silence. Apr 19 2012 (http://www.rmibiladi.com/fr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1909:kinross-tasiast-lor-est-de-silence&catid=1:actualites&Itemid=2)

100 Oulad Bou Sbaas, Deep into mining, Africa Mining Intelligence, Apr 2 2013

101 Ambassador Powell Visits Tasiast Gold Mine, Nov 17 2011 (http://mauritania.usembassy.gov/mobile//tasiast.html)

102 Mauritania’s MCM: Digging for minerals, burying the truth (https://lissnup.wordpress.com/2012/10/08/mauritanias-mcm-digging-for-minerals-burying-the-truth/)

103 Plate Forme revendicative des travailleurs de MCM Akjoujt, Dec 21 2011 (http://www.cgtm.org/spip.php?article888)

104 Mauritanie-MCM : Un mort et 6 blessés lors d’une grève des employés, Al Akhbar, July 15 2012 (http://www.kassataya.com/societe/10469-mauritanie-mcm-un-mort-et-6-blesses-lors-dune-greve-des-employes)

105 Mauritania’s MCM: Digging for minerals, burying the truth (https://lissnup.wordpress.com/2012/10/08/mauritanias-mcm-digging-for-minerals-burying-the-truth/)

106 Ibid

107 Les délégués des travailleurs de la MCM demandent à ce que le groupe licencié recouvre ses droits, Sahara Médias, Nov 4 2012 (http://fr.saharamedias.net/Les-delegues-des-travailleurs-de-la-MCM-demandent-a-ce-que-le-groupe-licencie-recouvre-ses-droits_a3629.html)

108 Ibid

109 Ibid

110 Ibid

111 Second Case Before Canada’s CSR Counsellor is Closed, Recommending Existing On-The-Ground Dispute Resolution, Corporate Social Responsibility Bulletin, Apr 9 2012 (http://www.fasken.com/en/second-case-before-canada-csr-counsellor-closed/)

112 Ibid

113 The Federal CSR Counsellor Has Left the Building: Can we now have an effective ombudsman mechanism for the extractive sector?, Nov 1 2013 (http://www.miningwatch.ca/blog/federal-csr-counsellor-has-left-building-can-we-now-have-effective-ombudsman-mechanism-extracti)

114 Ibid

115 Don MacDonald, Local Miner a Major Force in Niger, Montreal Gazette, April 16 2007

116 Ibid

117 Geoffrey York, Niger: Digging in: uranium’s next frontier, The Globe and Mail, Feb 9 2009

118 Ibid

119 Lawrence Williams, Semafo Facing an African Gold Take-Away?, Sept 1, 2010 (http://www.mining.com/semafo-facing-an-african-gold-take-away/)

120 Scandale des richesses minières : le Niger crie famine, la Semafo célèbre son « millionième » once d’or, Ouestafnews, Mars 22 2010 (http://www.ouestaf.com/Scandale-des-richesses-minieres-le-Niger-crie-famine-la-Semafo-celebre-son-millionieme-once-d-or_a2857.html)

121 Steven Edwards, Diplomat visited Niger mine before vanishing Canwest News Service Dec 18 2008 (http://www.canada.com/diplomat+visited+niger+mine+before+vanishing/1091337/story.html)

122 Canada and Australia back drive in favour of Nigerian mining, Africa Mining Intelligence, July 9 2013

123 Abu Nmodu, Nigeria: Niger to Collaborate With Canadian Firm On Solid Minerals Exploration, Aug 3 2012 (http://allafrica.com/stories/201208030316.htmL)

124 Patrick Ugeh, Canada Seeks to Invest in Nigeria’s Mining Sector, Nov 8 2011 (http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/canada-seeks-to-invest-in-nigeria-s-mining-sector/102297/)

125 Teddy Nwanunobi, Canada Seeks Mining Business in Country, Abuja Leadership, Feb 26 2008

126 Patrick Ugeh, Canada Seeks to Invest in Nigeria’s Mining Sector, Nov 8 2011 (http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/canada-seeks-to-invest-in-nigeria-s-mining-sector/102297/)

127 Daniel Proussalidis, Senegal a possible ‘hub’ for Canadian investment in Africa: Harper, Oct 12, 2012 (http://www.torontosun.com/2012/10/12/senegal-a-possible-hub-for-canadian-investment-in-africa-harper)

128 Wade-Mamour Cissé, Les PIQUES de L’AS de ce Mercredi, Allo Dakar May 21 2014 (http://allodakar.com/?p=9862&lang=fr)

129 Elhadj Boubacar, Kedougou : Des orpailleurs dont 1 guinéen arrêtés à Sabodala, Mar 13 2015 (http://www.guinee360.com/13/03/2015/kedougou-des-orpailleurs-dont-1-guineen-arretes-a-sabodala/)

130 Mining and Human Rights in Senegal: closing the gaps in protection, Amnesty International, 2014 (http://www.amnesty.ca/sites/default/files/p4350_senegal_mining_report_-_web_en.pdf)

131 Tapa Tounkara, Sabadola : « la cohabitation est très difficile avec Teranga Gold Operation », Nov 22 2014 (http://www.gfm.sn/sabadola-la-cohabitation-est-tres-difficile-avec-teranga-gold-operation-populations/)

132 Ibid

133 Aly Fall, Licenciement abusif : L’ex-Dg Macoumba Diop et Sgo à la barre, May 12 2015 (http://www.lequotidien.sn/index.php/sports/licenciement-abusif-l-ex-dg-macoumba-diop-et-sgo-a-la-barre)

134 Aly Sagne, Teranga Gold va-t-elle se donner les moyens d’évaluer sa performance RSE?, Apr 1 2014 (https://alysagne.wordpress.com/2014/03/01/teranga-gold-va-t-elle-se-donner-les-moyens-devaluer-sa-performance-rse/)

135 Mike De Souza, Stephen Harper offers food security and jobs training in Senegal, Oct 11 2012 (http://o.canada.com/news/national/stephen-harper-offers-food-security-and-jobs-training-in-senegal)

136 Daniel Proussalidis, Senegal a possible ‘hub’ for Canadian investment in Africa: Harper, Oct 12 2012 (http://www.torontosun.com/2012/10/12/senegal-a-possible-hub-for-canadian-investment-in-africa-harper)

137 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sierra_Leone_Civil_War)

138 Ian Smillie, Lansana Gberie, Ralph Hazleton, The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds & Human Security, 51

139 Alain Deneault, Delphine Abadie et William Sacher, Noir Canada: Pillage, corruption et criminalité en Afrique, 185

140 Ian Smillie, Lansana Gberie, Ralph Hazleton, The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds & Human Security, 52

141 Lansana Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa: the RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone, 94; Herbert M. Howe, Private Security Forces and African Stability: The Case of Executive Outcomes, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol 36, No 2, June 1998

142 Madelaine Drohan, Miner linked to mercenaries DiamondWorks’ shareholder acts as agent for security firm, The Globe and Mail Feb 21 1997

143 Pratap Chatterjee, Mercenary Armies and Mineral Wealth, Covert Action Quarterly, Fall 1997

144 Ian Mulgrew, Gunning for Business: Private armies, coups, bribery, Vancouver Sun, Jan 31 1998

145 Ibid

146 Chuck Ricks, The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment, JSOU Report, Nov 2013 (http://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/Global%20SOF%20Network%20Resource%20Constrained%20Environment_FINAL.pdf)

147 Paula Joan Butler, Violence as Civility: Race, Mining and Canadian Neocolonizers in African States, University of Toronto, 2006, 329

148 Ibid

149 Ibid, 330

150 Ibid, 318

151 Ibid, 316

152 Ibid

153 Ibid

154 Ibid, 331

155 Foreign miners warn they may sue government (http://www.l2b.co.za/News/News/DisplayArticle?ID=061b30b6-deb3-4bca-a134-e0788bbbdb46)

156 Ibid, 318

157 Geoffrey York, Robert Friedland’s mining showdown in South Africa, The Globe and Mail, Jan 9 2015

158 Ibid

159 Ibid

160 Rebecca Davis, Ivanhoe’s Platreef mine: Doing business in a complicated country, Daily Maverick, Jan 13 2015 (http://allafrica.com/stories/201501130512.html)

161 Teresa Matich, Police Disperse Protesters Near Ivanhoe’s Platreef Project Resource, Investing News, Nov 26 2014 (http://platinuminvestingnews.com/9551-ivanhoe-mines-ivn-platreef-project-south-africa-protest-police-rubber-bullets.html)

162 Geoffrey York, Robert Friedland’s mining showdown in South Africa, The Globe and Mail Jan 9 2015

163 Dangerous Levels of Arsenic Found Near Tanzania Mine, Nov 17 2009 (http://www.miningwatch.ca/es/node/6356)

164 Ibid

165 The human cost of gold: And a deadly price to pay, This Day, June 30 2009 (http://corpwatch.org/article.php?id=15402)

166 Geoffrey York, Barrick hopes to score with new measures in Tanzania, Globe and Mail, Feb 5 2014

167 John Vidal, British gold mining firm agrees settlement over deaths of Tanzanian villagers, Guardian Feb 10 2015

168 African Barrick’s Confidential Compensation Agreements Questioned at Troubled Tanzania Mine Dec 17 2013 (http://www.miningwatch.ca/news/african-barrick-s-confidential-compensation-agreements-questioned-troubled-tanzania-mine)

169 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulyanhulu_Gold_Mine); African Barrick Gold reports fatality at Bulyanhulu, Mar 26 2014 (https://ca.finance.yahoo.com/news/african-barrick-gold-reports-fatality-084100250.html)

170 Paula Joan Butler, Violence as Civility: Race, Mining and Canadian Neocolonizers in African States, University of Toronto, 2006, 306

171 Report of the International NGO Fact-finding Mission to Tanzania Apr 16 2002 (http://www.miningwatch.ca/report-international-ngo-fact-finding-mission-tanzania)

172 Tundu A.M. Lissu, Tanzania: Human Rights Advocacy and the Bulyanhulu Gold Mine (http://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/docs/advocacytoolscasestudies/casestudy.tanzania.final.pdf)

173 Finnigan wa Simbeye, Barrick and Tanzania Government Muzzling Evidence on Bulyanhulu Murders, The Perspective, May 7 2002 (http://www.theperspective.org/bulyanhulu.html)

174 What Really Happened at the Barrick Gold Mine in Tanzania? April 16 2002 (http://www.miningwatch.ca/what-really-happened-barrick-gold-mine-tanzania)

175 Paula Joan Butler, Violence as Civility: Race, Mining and Canadian Neocolonizers in African States, University of Toronto, 2006, 310

176 Ibid, 303

177 Kelly Holloway and Stephen Kerr, What was the Canadian Government’s Role? University of Toronto Varsity, Apr 15 2002 (http://thevarsity.ca/2002/04/15/what-was-the-canadian-governments-role/)

178 Ibid, 304

179 Ibid, 309

180 Ibid, 302

181 Ibid, 304

182 Ibid

183 Human Rights Advocate Jailed in Tanzania — Please Write Letters!, Jan 3 2003 (http://www.miningwatch.ca/human-rights-advocate-jailed-tanzania-please-write-letters)

184 Government Thwarts Inquiry into Bulyanhulu, Africa Mining Intelligence, April 3 2002

185 Paula Butler and Evans Rubara, Popularizing new neo-colonial governance processes for African minerals? Issue 634, June 11 2013 (http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/87799)

186 Paula Joan Butler, Violence as Civility: Race, Mining and Canadian Neocolonizers in African States, University of Toronto, 2006, 305

187 Death & taxes: the true toll of tax dodging, Christian Aid, May 12 2008 (http://www.christianaid.org.uk/images/deathandtaxes.pdf)

188 Mike Blanchfield, Harper’s Tanzania visit highlights school children and Canadian business, CanWest News Service Nov 26 2007 

189 Ibid

190 Linda McQuaig, Canada mines African discontent, Toronto Star, Jun 6 2011

191 Phosphate: Morocco’s White Gold, Bloomberg, Nov 4 2010 (http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/magazine/content/10_46/b4203080895976.htm)

192 Ibid

193 Armina Ligaya, Desert Storm: Why Canadian fertilizer firms’ phosphate from Western Sahara is causing controversy, Feb 11, 2014 (http://business.financialpost.com/financial-post-magazine/desert-storm-why-canadian-fertilizer-firms-phosphate-from-western-sahara-is-causing-controversy)

194 Phosphate Rock from Western Sahara, PotashCorp, Aug 2014 (www.potashcorp.com/media/POT_Western_Sahara_08_2014.pdf)

195 Tom Stevenson, Occupied and Exploited - Taking Western Sahara’s Resources, Think Africa Press, Oct 25 2013 (http://allafrica.com/stories/201310251511.html)

196 Malainin Lakhal, AU asks UN to set referendum date in Western Sahara, June 19 2015, Issue 731 (http://www.pambazuka.net/en/issue.php/current/)

197 Kristen Chick, In remote Western Sahara, prized phosphate drives controversial investments, Jan 24 2013 (http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2013/0124/In-remote-Western-Sahara-prized-phosphate-drives-controversial-investments)

198 Alastair Fraser and John Lungu, For Whom the Windfalls?: Winners & losers in the privatisation of Zambia’s copper mines, Civil Society Trade Network of Zambia (http://www.banktrack.org/manage/ems_files/download/for_whom_the_windfalls_/report_for_whom_the_wind_falls.pdf)

199 Khadija Sharife, Conned for her copper: Zambia pays the price for aid, The Ecologist, Sept 29 2009 (http://www.theecologist.org/investigations/politics_and_economics/328797/conned_for_her_copper_zambia_pays_the_price_for_aid.html)

200 Lise Rakner, Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia: 1991-2001, 205

201 Court jails Former ZCCM boss- Francis Kaunda, Lusaka Times, Aug 15 2008 (http://www.lusakatimes.com/2008/08/15/court-jails-former-zccm-boss-francis-kaunda/)

202 Jean-Christophe Servant, Mined out in Zambia, Monde Diplomatique, May 2009 (http://mondediplo.com/2009/05/09zambia)

203 David Manley, Caught in a Trap: Zambia’s Mineral Tax Reforms, ICTD Working Paper 5 (http://www.ictd.ac/en/publications/caught-trap-zambia%E2%80%99s-mineral-tax-reforms)

204 Alastair Fraser and John Lungu, For Whom the Windfalls?: Winners & losers in the privatisation of Zambia’s copper mines, Civil Society Trade Network of Zambia (http://www.banktrack.org/manage/ems_files/download/for_whom_the_windfalls_/report_for_whom_the_wind_falls.pdf)

205 Nick Mathiason, Zambia’s new bid to cash in on copper, The Observer Oct 28 2007

206 David Manley, Caught in a Trap: Zambia’s Mineral Tax Reforms, ICTD Working Paper 5 (http://www.ictd.ac/en/publications/caught-trap-zambia%E2%80%99s-mineral-tax-reforms)

207 Jeff Kapembwa, Zambia’s Foreign Miners Cry Foul, Business in Africa, July 5 2005 (http://allafrica.com/stories/200507070560.html); Mining firms threaten to sue Zambia, Morning Star, Feb 14 2008

208 History, First Quantum (http://www.first-quantum.com/Our-Company/history/default.aspx)

209 Only two Mining companies were paying Tax under the previous tax regime-Chikwanda, Lusaka Times, Feb 26 2015 (http://www.lusakatimes.com/2015/02/26/two-mining-companies-paying-tax-previous-tax-regime-chikwanda/)

210 James Kunda, New Mine Taxes Harmful, Times of Zambia, Oct 15 2014

211 Zambia warns mining company over worker dismissal, Xinhua, Apr 3 2015 (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-04/03/c_134123665.htm)

212 Lumwana Mine, which prompted 2,000 workers, fearing for their jobs, to hold a one-day strike, Reuters Feb 23 2015 (http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/business/over-2000-workers-strike-at-barrick-golds-zambia-copper-mine/articleshow/46341413.cms)

213 Watch the documentary on how the Swiss get rich at Zambia’s expense, May 13 2014 (http://www.zambianwatchdog.com/watch-the-documentary-on-how-the-swiss-get-rich-at-zambias-expense/)

214 The Mopani saga and Zambia’s windfall tax: an alternative reading, Oct 22 2014 (https://martinhearson.wordpress.com/tag/glencore/)

215 Paul Carlucci, Zambia’s legacy of nationalisation in Kalumbila, Feb 17 2014 (http://www.theafricareport.com/Southern-Africa/zambias-legacy-of-nationalisation.html)

216 Zambia – conflict between copper mining companies and communities, Think Africa Press, Oct 22 2013 (http://africajournalismtheworld.com/2013/10/22/zambia-conflict-between-copper-mining-companies-and-communities/)

217 Corruption and exploitation: the war of NGOs against companies, Lusaka Voice, Nov 12 2013 (http://lusakavoice.com/2013/11/12/corruption-exploitation-war-ngos-companies/)

218 Huge land acquisition must be approved by President – Luo, Lusaka Times, Feb 16 2013 (http://www.lusakatimes.com/2013/02/16/huge-land-acquisition-must-be-approved-by-president-luo/)

219 The Copper Land Mine, Feb 22 2014 (http://joshuajerebusiness.blogspot.ca/2014/02/in-middle-of-massive-green-miombo.html)

220 Zambia: conflict between copper mining companies and communities, Think Africa Press, Oct 22 2013 (http://africajournalismtheworld.com/2013/10/22/zambia-conflict-between-copper-mining-companies-and-communities/)

221 Darlene Miller, Dimuna Phiri, Caesar Katebe, Gillian Kerchhoff , Mahongo Mazeze, Genevieve Musongole, Zambian villagers ‘hindering development’ by resisting Canadian mining company? Apr 25 2014 (http://www.plaas.org.za/blog/zambian-villagers-%E2%80%98hindering-development%E2%80%99-resisting-canadian-mining-company#sthash.hAfM3nnS.FKyIO9VW.dpuf)

222 Ibid

223 Peter Adamu, FQM Fires Striking Miners, Zambia Reports, Jan 30 2015 (http://zambiareports.com/2015/01/30/fqm-fires-striking-miners/)

224 Davies M.M Chanda, Miner dies at Kalumbila Mar 10 2015 (http://www.times.co.zm/?p=52510

225 Grist Staff, Peter Sinkamba, Citizens for a Better Environment, Apr 2 2002 (http://grist.org/article/sinkamba-cbe/1/)

226 EIB Loans Under Fire, Africa Mining Intelligence, Mar 1 2006

227 ZAMBIA: Mining companies accused of environmental negligence, Jan 8 2008 (http://www.irinnews.org/report/76144/zambia-mining-companies-accused-of-environmental-negligence)

228 Ibid

229 Brittany Crocker, Environmental and health issues in the Zambian copper belt, Nov 22 2013 (http://globaljournalist.org/2013/11/456/)

230 Rob Davies, Glencore hit by rioters at Zambian copper plant over sulphur dioxide pollution, Daily Mail, Aug 26 2014 (http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/markets/article-2735182/Glencore-hit-rioters-Zambian-copper-plant.html#ixzz3dFzrTBfX)

231 Canada to continue investing in Zambia’s mining sector, Apr 10 2014 (http://news.hot877.com/cgi-sys/suspendedpage.cgi?p=11345)

232 Zambia Lays Out Welcome Mat To SAMSSA Members, Sudbury Mining Solutions Journal, Feb 2005 (http://samssa.ca/2005/02/zambia/)

233 Larry Moonze, Zambia: PF is Free to Meet Me, Says Deyell, Zambia Post, Mar 10 2005 (http://allafrica.com/stories/200503100697.html)

Chapter Eleven

1 Rodney D. Sieh, Canadian Firm Submits Plan to Privatize Liberia Electricity Corporation, Fix Freeport, Apr 2 2007 (https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/theliberiancommunityusa/conversations/messages/1222)

2 Geoffrey York, CPCS Transcom helps tame traffic chaos in Lagos, The Globe and Mail, Apr 27 2011

3 Mary Gooderham, Opportunity in Africa: ‘Every single sector is growing’ May 16 2014 (https://globalconnections.hsbc.com/canada/en/articles/opportunity-africa-every-single-sector-growing)

4 Canada Africa Power Alliance, CPCS (http://www.canadaafricapoweralliance.com/#!cpcs/c1jlp)

5 Nancy Lynn, Out of... and into... Africa (http://www.ccafrica.ca/cpcs---out-of-and-into-africa.html); Geoffrey York, CPCS Transcom helps tame traffic chaos in Lagos, The Globe and Mail, Apr 27 2011

6 Peter Kieran, CPCS (http://www.cpcstrans.com/en/consultant-profiles/peter-james2/)

7 Ibid

8 Energy, Transport CPCS Transaction Advisory Services (www.cpcs.ca/download_file/view/793/139/149)

9 Durban: port in a storm, Jan 1 2003 (http://www.rra.co.za/?p=2021)

10 Kenya Port Authority Private Sector Participation Strategy, CPCS (http://www.cpcs.ca/fr/projets/kenya-port-authority-private-sector-participation-strategy/)

11 Jaindi Kisero, Can Kimunya force Mombasa port sale through?, The East African, Mar 7 2011 (http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Can+Kimunya+force+Mombasa+port+sale+through/-/2558/1119918/-/7hwohoz/-/index.html)

12 Kenya: Port Modernisation Unlikely Before 2013, May 10 2011 (http://www.ratio-magazine.com/201105103930/Kenya/Kenya-Port-Modernisation-Unlikely-Before-2013.html)

13 Marc-Andre Roy and Peter Kieran, Privatisation Rolls Across The Continent, International Railway Journal, Mar 1 2006 (http://www.cpcstrans.com/files/6813/9836/9073/Rail_Privatisation_Rolls_Across_the_Continent_IRJ_03-2006.pdf)

14 Ibid

15 Vivien Foster and Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia, Africa’s infrastructure: a time for transformation, 239

16 Gaël Raballand and Alan Whitworth, Should the Zambian Government Invest in Railways? Sept 11 2012 (http://www.zambianwatchdog.com/should-the-zambian-government-invest-in-railways/)

17 Brendan Martin, The World Bank, railways privatisation and trades unions, International Trade Union Cooperation, Briefing Papers, N° 4 2007

18 Widespread concessioning of railways has generally improved service and boosted revenues but concessioning alone probably cannot provide sufficient financing to rehabilitate Africa’s railways (http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/key-msg/sector/widespread-concessioning-railways-has-generally-improved-service-and-boosted-revenues)

19 Collins Magalasi, The Effects of Privatization on the Public Sectpr and the Role of the State in Malawi, Dec 2006 (http://collinsmagalasi.blogspot.ca/2008/08/effects-of-privatisation-in-malawi.html)

20 John Hilary, Profiting from Poverty - Water Justice, Sept 2004 (www.waterjustice.org/uploads/attachments/pdf67.pdf)

21 Dirty tricks against Comazar, June 11 2005 (http://www.africaintelligence.com/ION/business-intelligence/2005/06/11/dirty-tricks-against-comazar,14044375-ART)

22 Ibid

23 Mike Mande, Tanzania to redraw railway concession, East African, Aug 17 2009 (http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/-/2558/640202/-/r0mwwtz/-/index.html);

Faustine Kapama, CHC asked to pay 1.3 billion to Canadian firm, ENP Newswire, Aug 13 2009

24 Brendan Martin, The World Bank, railways privatisation and trades unions, International Trade Union Cooperation, Briefing Papers, N° 4 2007

25 Business plan for the private operation of Uganda railways corporation, 1997 (www.cpcs.ca/download_file/view/1559/425/)

26 Luke Mulunda, World Bank to Pump Sh6b in Railways Privatisation, The Kenya Standard, Nov 20 2004

27 Lucas Barasa, Railways to Send 8,970 Home, Africa News Service, Aug 17 2005 (http://business.highbeam.com/3548/article-1G1-135192787/railways-send-8970-home); PPP Project Case Studies, Nigeria Public-Private Partnerships Manual, Sept 2012 (http://ppptoolkit.icrc.gov.ng/ppp-project-case-studies/)

28 Brendan Martin, The World Bank, railways privatisation and trades unions, International Trade Union Cooperation, Briefing Papers, N° 4 2007

29 Is the RVR concession a raw deal to rail-bound cargo?, Africa Infrastructure Digest (http://www.africainfrastructuredigest.com/rail/is-the-rvr-concession-a-raw-deal-to-rail-bound-cargo/)

30 Jaindi Kisero, Privatising Kenya Railways was an Experiment Gone Bad, Daily Nation July 16 2008

31 Alain Deneault, Delphine Abadie et William Sacher, Noir Canada: Pillage, corruption et criminalité en Afrique, 223

32 CPCS Transcom Special Report, Apr 2000 (https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/37744147/sr-0004pdf-cpcs-transcom-ltd)

33 CIDA, Canada’s Railway Program in Mali (http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUImages/Performancereview3/$file/Mali_english.pdf)

34 CIDA, Investments in the Rail Sector in Senegal (http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/inet/images.nsf/vLUImages/Performancereview4/$file/SenegalEXECUTIVSum.pdf)

35 CIDA, Canada’s Railway Program in Mali (http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUImages/Performancereview3/$file/Mali_english.pdf); CIDA, Investments in the Rail Sector in Senegal (http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/inet/images.nsf/vLUImages/Performancereview4/$file/SenegalEXECUTIVSum.pdf)

36 Vincent Munié, On the slow train through Senegal, Le Monde Diplomatique, Mar 2007

37 Deneault, Abadie et Sacher, Noir Canada, 223

38 Vincent Munié, On the slow train through Senegal, Le Monde Diplomatique, Mar 2007

39 Ibid

40 Deneault, Abadie et Sacher, Noir Canada, 224

41 Ibid

42 http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/inet/images.nsf/vLUImages/Performancereview4/$file/SenegalEXECUTIVSum.pdf

43 Deneault, Abadie et Sacher, Noir Canada, 226

44 Jean Chatain, La formation, passage obligé du développement bamako, Nov 24 2001 (http://www.humanite.fr/node/255965)

45 Lucia Wegner, Privatisation: A Challenge for Sub-Saharan Africa, Policy Insights No 14, OECD (www.oecd.org/dev/35848653.pdf)

46 Jean-Claude Berthélemy Céline Kauffmann, Marie-Anne Valfort, Lucia Wegner Privatisation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Where do We Stand?, OECD, Paris 2003

47 Ibid, 62

48 Lomé résilie le contrat au groupe Elyo-Hydro Quebec International, Feb 23 2006 (http://www.ufctogo.com/+Lome-resilie-le-contrat-au-groupe+.html)

49 Les syndicats des travailleurs de la CEET se déclarent peu favorables à une privatisation, Xinhua News Agency, May 17 2006

50 Nilgün Gökgür, Privatization of Senegal electricity, One of Eight Papers from a Project Entitled: Assessing the Impact of Privatization in Africa, Oct 2006 (http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTNTFPSI/Resources/SenegalElectricity.pdf)

51 Miville Tremblay, Hydro prévoit des retombées de 200 millions au Sénégal, La Presse, Mar 3 1999

52 Grainne Ryder, Reckless Lending: How Canada’s Export Development Corporation Puts People and Environment at Risk, May 15 2001 (http://journal.probeinternational.org/2001/05/15/reckless-lending-how-canadas-export-development-corporation-puts-people-and-environment-risk/)

53 Ibid

54 Ibid

55 Ibid

56 David Hall, Energy privatisation and reform in East Africa, Public Services International Research Unit, Jan 12 2007

57 Africa Energy Intelligence, no. 448, State-Owned Enterprise, Sep 26, 2007, KPLC Dispute over Executives’ Bonus

58 Nigeria Power Sector Transactions, CPCS (http://www.cpcstrans.com/en/news/news/nigeria-power-sector-transactions/)

59 High consultancy fees and spiralling costs threaten railway network revamp, Nigerian Watch, Aug 13 2013 (http://www.nigerianwatch.com/news/2177-high-consultancy-fees-and-spiralling-costs-threaten-railway-network-revamp)

60 Peter Kieran, Review of the Reform and Privatization of the Power Sector in Nigeria, Dar es Salaam, Jan 31 2014, (http://www.energynet.co.uk/webfm_send/427)

61 Joe Brock, Nigeria lays out plans to privatise 10 power plants, Reuters, Jun 3, 2013 (http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/03/nigeria-electricity-privatisation-idUSL5N0EF27H20130603)

62 Nigeria advances privatization of NIPP gas-fired power plants (www.hoganlovells.com/.../Nigeria_advances_privatization_of_NIPP_gas); Clara Nwachukwu, FG woos investors to power sector, Jan 18 2011 (http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/01/fg-woos-investors-to-power-sector/#sthash.mHoaW0uc.dpuf)

63 Finally, Jonathan Speaks on Bart Nnaji’s Resignation, Aug 31, 2012 (http://www.nigeriaintel.com/2012/08/31/finally-jonathan-speaks-on-bart-nnajis-resignation/); Yunus Abdulhamid, TCN Contract Cancellation, Yet Another Setback?, Nov 15 2012 (http://allafrica.com/stories/201211150778.html)

64 Dramatic twists in Manitoba deal, Sunday Trust, Nov 18 2012

65 Judd-Leonard Okafor, Canada Joins Race for Nation’s Power Market, Daily Trust, Oct 26 2011 (http://allafrica.com/stories/201110270357.html)

66 Hamisu Muhammad, Nerc Assures Canadian Investors of Incentives, Daily Trust, Feb 26 2009

67 Iyefu Adoba, Canada Trains Nepa Staff With N82.5m, This Day, Mar 17 2005

68 Isiaka Wakili, Simon Sunday, Kayode Ekundayo, Mohammed Shosanya and Christiana Alabi, Power Firms Sold for N404 Billion After Gulping N3.2 Trillion, Daily Trust, Oct 1 2013 (http://allafrica.com/stories/201310010479.html)

69 The Africa Energy Yearbook Interview, 2013, Peter Kieran, President, CPCS (www.energynet.co.uk/webfm_send/202)

70 Tunji Ariyomo, Power Sector Reform - TCN, Manitoba and Suggestions for the New Power Minister, Feb 7 2013 (http://www.premiumtimesng.com/opinion/119166-power-sector-reform-tcn-manitoba-and-suggestions-for-the-new-power-minister-by-tunji-ariyomo.html)

71 PHCN workers’ attempted stop of Manitoba’s N3.72b TCN management takeover, Aug 5 2012 (http://dailyindependentnig.com/2012/08/phcn-workers-attempted-stop-of-manitobas-n3-72b-tcn-management-takeover/)

72 Ata Udo, Updated: Jonathan cancels PHCN management contract awarded by Barth Nnaji, Premium Times, Nov 14 2012 (http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/107052-updated-jonathan-cancels-phcn-management-contract-awarded-by-barth-nnaji.html)

73 Tunji Ariyomo, Power Sector Reform - TCN, Manitoba and Suggestions for the New Power Minister, Feb 7 2013 (http://www.premiumtimesng.com/opinion/119166-power-sector-reform-tcn-manitoba-and-suggestions-for-the-new-power-minister-by-tunji-ariyomo.html)

74 Temitayo Odunlami, Nigeria: Why I Quit TCN Job - Hamman Tukur, Daily Trust, Jan 5 2014

75 Nuruddeen M. Abdallah, Power sector: Manitoba usurping Jonathan’s power - Hamman Tukur, Daily Trust, Jan 5 2014

76 Chineme Okafor, Manitoba Contract: BPE Challenges Mis-procurement Charge by BPP, Nov 15 2012

77 How Canadian Govt Forced Jonathan to Make U-Turn Abuja Leadership, Abuja Leadership, Nov 20 2012

78 Raliat Ahmed-Yusuf, Nigeria: Manitoba Won Fair, Square - Canadian Envoy, Abuja Leadership, Nov 23 2012

79 Ibid

80 Muhammad Bello, Nigeria, Canada Sign Pact to Boost Investment, This Day, May 3 2013 (http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/nigeria-canada-sign-pact-to-boost-investment/146626/)

81 Iyefu Adoba, Canada Trains Nepa Staff With N82.5m, This Day Mar 17 2005

82 David Larkins, Nigeria deal a boost for Manitoba Hydro International, Winnipeg Sun, May 11 2013

83 Geoffrey York, Why Manitoba Hydro sticks it out in the hot spots, Globe and Mail, Feb 4 2008

84 Ibid

85 Promoting Development through Public & Private Partnerships, 3rd Annual Africa Public Private Partnership Conference & Showcase 1st-2nd December 2011, InterContinental Hotel Nairobi, Kenya (http://africappp.com/html/documents/amePPPApre3ndforwebV2.pdf)

86 Review of the AU/NEPAD African Action Plan (www.nepad.org/system/files/AAP%20Rev%20-%20Final%20Report.pdf)

87 Review of the AU/NEPAD African Action Plan

88 North America (http://www.cpcstrans.com/en/about-us/regions/north-america/)

89 Management Team (http://www.cpcstrans.com/en/about-us/management-team/)

90 Global Business Opportunities Bureau: ACEC – Annual General Meeting, June 24, 2010 St. Andrews-by-the-Sea, New Brunswick (http://www.acec.ca/assets/pdf/events/summit/2010/3-ACECPRESENTATION-JUNE2010PeterMacArthur.pdf)

91 Bruno Charbonneau and Wayne S. Cox, Locating global order: American Power and Canadian Security after 9/11, 245; Canada Fund for Africa: Summative Evaluation Executive Report

92 Minister Fast Visits CPCS Light Rail Project in Nigeria, Jan 29 2013 (http://www.international.gc.ca/media_commerce/release_photo_distribution/2013/01/29c.aspx?lang=en)

93 CPCS Principal Joe Jones meets with Canadian PM Stephen Harper at Francophonie Conference in Kinshasa, DRC (http://www.cpcstrans.com/en/news/news/cpcs-principal-joe-jones-meets-canadian-pm-stephen-harper-francophonie-conference-kinshasa-drc/)

94 Rolf Rosenkranz and Eliza Villarino, Christian Paradis to World Bank: Buy Canadian, Devex, Mar 2 2015 (https://www.devex.com/news/christian-paradis-to-world-bank-buy-canadian-85604)

95 Ibid

96 Minister Fantino promotes private sector partnerships at World Bank Group and International Monetary Fund spring meetings, Apr 19 2013 (http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/acdi-cida.nsf/eng/CAR-419165836-SLP)

97 Ibid

98 Ibid

99 Travis Lupick, Canada-Africa: The mines and the money, Africa Report, Nov 25 2013 (http://www.theafricareport.com/Southern-Africa/canada-africa-the-mines-and-the-money.html)

Chapter Twelve

1 Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, Enduring Lies: The Rwandan Genocide in the Propaganda System, 20 Years Later, 7

2 Mahmood Mamdani, From Conquest to Consent as the Basis of State Formation: Reflections on Rwanda, New Left Review, No. 216, Mar 1996

3 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_of_aggression)

4 Mahmood Mamdani, From Conquest to Consent as the Basis of State Formation: Reflections on Rwanda, New Left Review, No. 216, Mar 1996

5 Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, Peter Erlinder Jailed by One of the Major Genocidaires of Our Era, Mrzine (http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2010/hp290510.html)

6 Herman and Peterson, Enduring Lies, 28

7 Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, The Politics of Genocide, 58

8 Ibid

9 Ibid

10 Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics, 137

11 Bruce D. Jones, Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure, 27

12 Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire, 189

13 Ibid, 191

14 Ibid, 192

15 Ibid, 195

16 Ibid

17 Robin Philpot, Rwanda and the New Scramble for Africa: From Tragedy to Useful Imperial Fiction , 97

18 Jacques-Roger Booh, Le patron de Dallaire parle: Révélations sur les dérives d’un général de l’ONU au Rwanda, 70

19 Ibid, 161

20 Ibid, 71/95

21 Charles Onana, Les secrets de la justice internationale: enquêtes truquées sur le génocide rwandais, 127

22 Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands With the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, 327

23 Ibid, 156

24 Ibid, 164

25 Canadian General Romeo Dallaire accused of bias, Hirondelle News Agency, Feb 27 2006

26 Herman and Peterson, Enduring Lies, 63

27 Scott Taylor, Tested mettle: Canada’s peacekeepers at war, 186

28 Ibid, 196; David Pugliese, Canada’s secret commandos: The unauthorized story of Joint Task Force Two, 213

29 Philpot, Rwanda and the New Scramble for Africa, 121

30 Herman and Peterson, Enduring Lies, 23

31 Ibid

32 Ibid

33 Carol Off, The Lion, the Fox and the Eagle, 357

34 Herman and Peterson, The Politics of Genocide, 59

35 Ibid

36 Herman and Peterson, Enduring Lies, 28

37 Ibid

38 Rwanda cuts relations with France, BBC, Nov 24 2006 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6179436.stm)

39 Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila: A People’s History, 179

40 Rwanda 1994: Colonialism dies hard, Chapter 15: Watch out for Africa! Closing in on the Congo (http://www.taylor-report.com/Rwanda_1994/index.php?id=ch15)

41 Ibid

42 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mining_industry_of_the_Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo)

43 Filip Reyntjens, The great African war: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006, 46

44 Ibid, 73

45 Ibid, 78

46 Yvan Conoir, Gérard Verna, L’Action humanitaire du Canada: histoire, concepts, politiques et pratiques, 293; Christiane Amanpour, Initial aid teams reach towns in eastern Zaire: Security problems delay full-scale relief, CNN, Nov 11, 1996 (http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9611/11/zaire/)

47 Barbara Crossette, Canada Proposes Zaire Air Force, New York Times, Nov 13 1996

48 Reyntjens, The great African war, 83

49 Ibid, 87

50 Zaïre: Plus question d’intervenir, Le Soleil, Dec 8, 1996

51 Patrick Mbeko, Le Canada dans les guerres en Afrique centrale: génocides et pillages des ressources minières du Congo par le Rwanda interposé, 253

52 Rwanda 1994: Colonialism dies hard, Chapter 15: Watch out for Africa! Closing in on the Congo (http://www.taylor-report.com/Rwanda_1994/index.php?id=ch15); Peacemaking in Rwanda, 27

53 Barbara Crossette, Canada Proposes Zaire Air Force, New York Times, Nov 13 1996

54 James C. McKinley, Jr., Zaire Rebel Approves Food Drop But Rejects Western Military Role, New York Times, Nov 29 1996

55 Allan Thompson, Baril treks to rebel held Zaire, Toronto Star, Nov 28 1996

56 Pugliese, Canada’s secret commandos, 64

57 Ibid, 65

58 Denis Morisset and Claude Coulombe, Nous étions invincibles, 158; Wayne Madsen, Genocide and Covert Operations in Africa: 1993-1999, 215

59 Robert Block, Zaire’s Rebels May Win, But Can They Govern?, Dow Jones News Service May 5 1997 (http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB862673567964044000); Francois Misser, Zaire: Kabila’s Desirable Deals, African Business, June 1997

60 Robert Gribbin, In the Aftermath of Genocide: The U.S. Role in Rwanda, 194/273

61 Dena Montague and Frida Berrigan, The Business of War in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Who Benefits? Dollars and Sense, July 2001

62 Steven Hiatt, A Game As Old As Empire: The Secret World of Economic Hit Men and the Web of Global Corruption, 99

63 Ibid

64 Robert Block, US Companies Seek Deals As African Conflicts Worsen, The Wall Street Journal, Oct 14 1997

65 Dena Montague and Frida Berrigan, The Business of War in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Who Benefits? Dollars and Sense, July 2001 (http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/news/dollarsandsense.html)

66 Alain Deneault, Delphine Abadie et William Sacher, Noir Canada: Pillage, corruption et criminalité en Afrique, 61

67 Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo, 181

68 Robert Block, As Zaire’s War Wages, Foreign Businesses Scramble for Inroads, Wall Street Journal, Apr 14 1997

69 Dena Montague and Frida Berrigan, The Business of War in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Who Benefits?, Dollars and Sense, July 2001

70 Madelaine Drohan, Tango in Congo, Canadian Geographic, Nov 2004

71 Delphine Abadie, Canada and the geopolitics of mining interests: a case study of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Review of African Political Economy, Vol 38, Issue 128, 2011

72 Ibid

73 Sean Silcoff, Out of Africa, Canadian Business, Sept 25 1998

74 Kate Dunn, The Loaded Continent: Africa’s Big Share of World Minerals’, Christian Science Monitor, Mar 25 1998

75 Madsen, Genocide and Covert Operations in Africa, 301

76 Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo, 179

77 Reyntjens, The great African war, 195

78 The Coltan Wars Pt. 1: Economics and the Seeds of Conflict (http://globalinvestmentwatch.com/the-coltan-wars-pt-1/)

79 Reyntjens, The great African war, 228

80 Hiatt, A Game As Old As Empire, 95

81 Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An ongoing crisis, report from International Rescue Committee, Jan 22 2008 (http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/mortality-democratic-republic-congo-ongoing-crisis)

82 Glen Ford, A Second Wave of Genocide Looms in Congo, with Susan Rice on Point, Black Agenda Report, Nov 28 2012 (http://blackagendareport.com/content/second-wave-genocide-looms-congo-susan-rice-point)

83 Sweden suspends aid to Rwanda, Afrol News, Dec 18 2008 (http://www.afrol.com/articles/32047)

84 Geoffrey York, Inside the clash for Congo’s mineral wealth, The Globe and Mail, Nov 30 2012

85 David Smith, Rwandan minister is leader of Congo rebels, UN says, The Guardian, Oct 17 2012 (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/17/rwanda-minister-leader-congo-rebels-kabarebe)

86 Canada Deeply Concerned by Grave Human Rights Violations in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, Sept 14 2012 (http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiques/2012/09/14c.aspx?lang=eng)

87 Canada Concerned by Violence in Democratic Republic of Congo, May 4 2012 (http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiques/2012/05/4a.aspx?lang=eng)

88 Mike De Souza, Harper ‘glad’ he promoted human rights in Congo, Canada.com, Oct 14 2012 (http://o.canada.com/news/national/stephen-harper-is-glad-he-promoted-human-rights-in-congo)

89 Canada Concerned by Post-Election Situation in Rwanda, Aug 12 2010 (http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?m=/index&nid=552959)

90 Ibid

91 Gwynne Dyer, The dilemma over Rwandan president Paul Kagame, Georgia Straight, Sept 2 2014 (http://www.straight.com/news/718641/gwynne-dyer-dilemma-over-rwandan-president-paul-kagame)

92 James Karuhanga, Canada donates vehicles to Rwanda’s peacekeeping mission, New Times, Feb 22 2010 (http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/Printer/2010-02-22/16931/); Edmund Kagire, Rwanda: Canada Backs Country’s Commonwealth Bid, New Times, Nov 24 2009 (http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2009-11-24/13856/)

93 Paul Kagame, le plus grand criminel vivant visitera le Canada, Mar 26 2006 

(http://kitundu.blogspot.ca/2006/03/monde-paul-kagame-prsident-du-rwanda.html)

94 Joshua Errett, Toronto visit by Rwanda’s Paul Kagame divides expats Sep 28, 2013 CBC News

95 Sebastien Chartrand and John Philpot, Justice belied: The Unbalanced Scales of International Criminal Justice, 26

96 Rwanda jails opposition leader for ‘treason’, Aljazeera, Oct 30 2012 (http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/10/20121030231718261322.html)

97 Robin Philpot, Rwanda and the Scramble for Africa

98 Unnati Gandhi, Rwandan finds injustice in ‘land of hope’, The Globe and Mail Oct 9 2007

99 Ibid

100 Jean-Thomas Léveillé, En prison au Rwanda: Léon Mugesera craint pour sa vie, La Presse, Aug 18 2014

101 Luis Millán, Rwandan war criminal sentenced to life in prison, Law in Quebec.com, Nov 20 2009 (http://lawinquebec.com/rwandan-war-criminal-sentenced-to-life-in-prison/)

102 Munyaneza gets life in Rwandan war-crimes case, Oct 29 2009 (http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/munyaneza-gets-life-in-jail-for-rwandan-war-crimes-1.830579)

103 Peter Lee, China has a Congo copper headache, Asia Times, Mar 11 2010 (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/LC11Cb02.html)

104 Canada - Democratic Republic of Congo Relations (http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/congo/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/canada_drc-rdc.aspx?menu_id=7&lang=eng)

105 William Wallis, Canada to press Congo mining dispute at G20 meeting, Financial Times Jun 25 2010 (http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2010/06/25/canada-to-press-congo-mining-dispute-at-g20-meeting/)

106 G8 Muskoka Declaration Recovery and New Beginnings, Muskoka, Canada, June 26 2010 (http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2010/06/26/g8-muskoka-declaration-recovery-and-new-beginnings#sthash.EeoOKkEt.dpuf)

107 Peter Koven, G8 leaders scold Congo on governance, National Post, Jun 27 2010

108 Ibid

109 John Ivison, Harper to take up Quantum case at G20, National Post, Jun 21 2010

110 Joe Bavier and Anna Willard, Canada ready to finance DR Congo despite hitch Nov 25 2009 (http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/25/ozatp-congo-democratic-debt-idAFJOE5AO00220091125)

111 Joe Bavier and Anna Willard, DR Congo says Canada mining hitch holds up debt deal, Nov 24 2009 (http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/24/congo-democratic-debt-idUSGEE5AN2Q020091124)

112 Matthew McClearn, How First Quantum settled with ENRC for compensation, Canadian Business, June 5 2012 (http://www.canadianbusiness.com/business-strategy/how-first-quantum-settled-with-enrc-for-compensation-over-congolese-mine/)

113 Peter Koven, B.C. firm shafted in the Congo?, National Post, 18 June 2010

114 Delphine Abadie, Canada and the geopolitics of mining interests: a case study of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Review of African Political Economy, Vol 38, Issue 128, 2011

115 Macho Philipovich, Why is Canada Blocking Congo Debt Forgiveness?, Dominion Paper, Aug 11 2010 (http://www.dominionpaper.ca/articles/3573)

116 Jooneed Khan, “Looters’ War” in the Congo: UN report exposes role of Canadian mining companies, Nov 3 2008 (http://www.dominionpaper.ca/articles/2198)

117 Montréal Mirror June 22 2006

118 Ibid; Hiatt, A Game As Old As Empire, 168

119 Keith Harmon Snow, Pentagon Produces Satellite Photos of 1994 Rwanda Genocide, Apr 6 2012 (http://www.consciousbeingalliance.com/2012/04/pentagon-reveals-satelitte-photos-of-1994-rwanda-genocide)

120 Sean Silcoff, Out of Africa, Canadian Business, Sept 25 1998

121 Dominic Johnson and Aloys Tegera, Digging Deeper: How the DR Congo’s mining policy is failing the country, Pole Institute

Chapter Thirteen

1 Sherene Razack, Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping, and the New Imperialism, 77

2 Ibid, 78

3 Ibid, 4

4 Ibid, 97

5 Ibid, 115

6 Ibid, 4

7 Ibid

8 Ibid, 93

9 Ibid, 136

10 Jim Naureckas and Janine Jackson, The FAIR reader: an Extra! review of press and politics in the ‘90s, 172

11 James P. Winter, Democracy’s oxygen: how corporations control the news, 132

12 Mark Fineman, The Oil Factor in Somalia Los Angeles Times, Jan 18 1993 (http://articles.latimes.com/1993-01-18/news/mn-1337_1_oil-reserves)

13 David Pugliese, Canadian colonel tainted by Somalia scandal promoted, Ottawa Citizen July 25 2008 (http://www.canada.com/topics/news/story.html?id=e3e70b8a-838d-4940-817d-2b768a27ef6d)

14 Ibid

15 Ibid

16 Rob Prince, WikiLeaks Reveals U.S. Twisted Ethiopia’s Arm to Invade Somalia, Foreign Policy In Focus, Dec 8 2010 (http://fpif.org/wikileaks_reveals_us_twisted_ethiopias_arm_to_invade_somalia/)

17 Ibid

18 Xan Rice and Suzanne Goldenberg, How US forged an alliance with Ethiopia over invasion, Guardian, Jan 13 2007 (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jan/13/alqaida.usa)

19 Ibid

20 Ibid

21 Sean D. Naylor, The Secret War: Tense ties plagued Africa ops, Army Times, Nov 28 2011 (Http://www.armytimes.com/article/20111128/NEWS/111280320/The-Secret-War-Tense-ties-plagued-Africa-ops)

22Jeremy Scahill, Dirty Wars: The World Is a Battlefield, 224

23 Ibid

24 Ibid, 220

25 Patrick Lennox, Taking the Lead in the Arabian Sea: Canada Commands Combined Task Force 150 Mar 2009 (http://www.frontline-defence.com/downloads/CTF150_Lennox.pdf)

26 Stewart Bell, Ottawa eyes Somali unrest: Day ‘concerned’: Fears Somalia will become terror hotbed, National Post, Oct 26 2006

27 Isabel Macdonald, Protesters Denounce Illegal Occupation of Somalia, Dominion Paper, Jan 21 2007 (http://www.dominionpaper.ca/articles/950)

28 Resolution 1744 (2007) Security Council, February 20 2007 (http://amisom-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Resolution%201744%20%282007%29.pdf)

29 Barbara Among, MPs Expected to OK Troops for Somalia, The East African, Feb 13 2007 (http://allafrica.com/stories/200702130599.html)

30 Canada welcomes the United Nations Security Council Action on Somalia, Feb 22 2007 (http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?crtr.sj1D=&mthd=advSrch&crtr.mnthndVl=2&nid=278309&crtr.dpt1D=&crtr.tp1D=&crtr.lc1D=&crtr.yrStrtVl=2007&crtr.kw=&crtr.dyStrtVl=22&crtr.aud1D=&crtr.mnthStrtVl=2&crtr.yrndVl=2007&crtr.dyndVl=22)

31 Somali Government Officials on a two days official visit to Ottawa, Canada, Hiiraan Online, Apr 3 2009 (http://www.hiiraan.com/news2/2009/apr/somali_government_officials_on_a_two_days_official_visit_to_ottawa_canada.aspx)

32 A Shift in Focus: Putting the interests of Somali people first, Oxfam, Feb 22 2012 (https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/shift-focus)

33 Daniel Berhane, Meles Zenawi asked US for Intel, Horn Affairs, Nov 4 2011 (http://hornaffairs.com/en/2011/11/04/meles-zenawi-asked-us-for-intel-ethiopias-somalia-intervention-2006/)

34 Hailemariam confers with world leaders at G20, Ethiopia Reporter, Sept 7 2013 (http://www.thereporterethiopia.com/index.php/news-headlines/item/953-hailemariam-confers-with-world-leaders-at-g20)

35 Ethiopia: Canada is the third Top Development Partners of Ethiopia, Geeska Afrika (http://www.geeskaafrika.com/ethiopia-canada-is-the-third-top-development-partners-of-ethiopia/4053/#sthash.uUtGjeAi.8l0N8Wqh.dpuf)

36 Canada urged to stop Ethiopia from evicting villagers, The Canadian Press, Jan 17 2012 (http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/canada-urged-to-stop-ethiopia-from-evicting-villagers-1.1263593)

37 Debra Black, Canada’s aid to Ethiopia bankrolling repression, says jailed Canadian’s lawyer, Toronto Star‎, Dec 18 2011

38 Murray Brewster, Canada provides ‘direct and indirect’ support in fight against al-Shabab, The Canadian Press, Sept 23 2013 (http://globalnews.ca/news/859226/canada-provides-direct-and-indirect-support-in-fight-against-al-shabab/)

39 Geoffrey York, Human Rights Watch accuses Western backed African Union troops of sexual assault, Globe and Mail, Sep 8 2014

40 Fact Sheet: U.S. Support for Peacekeeping in Africa,” White House, Aug 6 2014 (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/06/fact-sheet-us-support-peacekeeping-africa)

41 John Glaser, US-Backed Ugandan Military Deploys Air Force Over Somalia, Antiwar.com, Aug 8 2012 (http://news.antiwar.com/2012/08/08/us-backed-ugandan-military-deploys-air-force-over-somalia/)

42 Nick Turse, The Changing Face of Empire: Special Ops, Drones, Spies, Proxy Fighters, Secret Bases, and Cyberwarfare, 72

43 Ibid, 73

44 Ibid, 72

45 Phil Stewart, U.S. discloses secret Somalia military presence, up to 120 troops Jul 2 2014 (http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/03/us-usa-somalia-idUSKBN0F72A820140703)

46 Jonathan Masters and Mohammed Aly Sergie, Al-Shabab, Council on Foreign Relations, Mar 13 2015 (http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650)

47 Carl Meyer, Canadian special forces were in Kenya before attack, Embassy Mag, Apr 30 2014

48 Firouz Sedarat, Jazeera airs video of kidnapped Canadian, Australian, Sep 16 2008 (http://ca.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idCAHO67921020080916)

49 Patrick Lennox, Canada’s presence in the ‘arc of instability’, Diplomat Online, Nov 2008 (http://diplomatonline.com/pdf_files/Diplomatnov08.pdf)

50 Why defeat of al-Shabaab could mean an oil bonanza for western firms in Somalia, Observer, Feb 26 2012

51 Rumors Abound from the Puntland, July 29 2008 (http://www.petroleumafrica.com/rumors-abound-from-the-puntland/)

52 Somalia accuses Norwegian oil explorer DNO of destabilising country, Reuters, Sep 3 2014 (http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/03/somalia-oil-idUSL5N0R44HV20140903)

53 Michelle Nichols and Louis Charbonneau, Western oil exploration in Somalia may spark conflict - U.N. report, Reuters, July 17 (http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/17/us-somalia-oil-un-idUSBRE96G06R20130717)

54 Garowe: The outbreak of the Oil & Mineral Gangs and foreign Mercenaries in the Federal State of Puntland, Jan 6 2012 (http://www.galgalanews.com/2012/01/06/garowe-the-outbreak-of-the-oil-mineral-gangs-and-foreign-mercenaries-in-the-federal-state-of-puntland-somalia/)

55 Vancouver-based Africa Oil defies Al-Qaeda in billion-barrel Somali well drill, Mar 5 2012 (http://www.hiiraan.ca/news4/2012/Mar/23079/vancouver_based_africa_oil_defies_al_qaeda_in_billion_barrel_somali_well_drill.aspx)

56 Oil firms recruit private militia for Puntland exploration, Somaliland Times, Issue 331 (http://somalilandtimes.net/sl/2008/331/2.shtml)

57 Canada Oil Firm in Puntland Hires Foreign Guards, Garowe Online, Oct 28 2008 (http://allafrica.com/stories/200810290022.html)

58 Leaked Monitoring group’s report sheds light on widespread corruption by senior TFG officials, Hiiraan Online, July 14 2012 (http://www.hiiraan.ca/news4/2012/July/24984/leaked_monitoring_group_s_report_sheds_light_on_widespread_corruptionon_by_senior_tfg_officials.aspx)

59 Somalia: Oil Exploration Triggers Deadly Clan Battle in Puntland, Mar 6 http://www.wardheernews.com/News_09/March/07_battle_puntland.html)

60 Derek Brower, Oil and troubled waters, Prospect Magazine, Jan 2009 (http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/features/oilandtroubledwaters)

61 Real wildcatters go to Ethiopia to hunt for oil, Oct 25 2013 (http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2013/10/25/Real-wildcatters-go-to-Ethiopia-to-hunt-for-oil/UPI-35291382718509/#ixzz3FoIJTKCB)

62 Ethiopian rebels warn Canadian firm against oil search, Canadian Press, Feb 18 2013 (http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ethiopian-rebels-warn-canadian-firm-against-oil-search-1.1355136)

63 John Daly, Africa’s Next Oil Frontier – Ethiopia?, Oil Price, Feb 26 2014 (http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Africas-Next-Oil-Frontier-Ethiopia.html)

64  Ed McKenna, Humanitarian Crisis’ for Ogaden Living Near Ethiopia’s Oil Fields, IPS, Feb 23 2014 (http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/02/humanitarian-crisis-ogaden-living-near-ethiopias-oil-fields/)

65 Gabriel Stein, Africa Oil and the banks: Hold or sell? (http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=2054&artikel=5301759)

66 Ahmed Abdi, How Foreign Oil Companies annihilated the lives of ordinary African population in Ogaden Region, Jan 26 2014 (http://www.6kilo.com/how-foreign-oil-companies-annihilated-the-lives-of-ordinary-african-population-in-ogaden-region/); Mohamud Ahmed, Africa Oil Bleeding Ethiopia, African Executive (http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/article_print.php?article=5402)

67 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudan%E2%80%93United_States_relations)

68 David S. Cloud, Colleagues Say C.I.A. Analyst Played by Rules, New York Times, Apr 23 2006

69 Noam Chomsky, 9-11: Was There an Alternative?, 77–80

70 Gamal Nkrumah, Sudan at the crossroads, Al-Ahram Weekly Jan 17 2002, Issue No 569 (http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/569/re2.htm)

71 Rhetoric ratcheting: Sudan denies involvement; Republicans back Clinton; Axworthy warns of fallout to Canada, The Windsor Star 25, Aug 1998

72 Canada at a Glance-AM Segment, Aug 24 1998 Resource News International

73 Sudan complained to air authority over US violation of air space, Agence France-Presse, Oct 4 1998

74 Human Security in Sudan: The Report of a Canadian Assessment Mission: Prepared for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jan 2000

75 Madelaine Drohan, Making a Killing: How and Why Corporations Use Armed Force to Do Business, 268

76 Isfahan Merali and Valerie Oosterveld, Giving Meaning to Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 90

77 Drohan, Making A Killing, 262

78 Drohan, Making A Killing, 264

79 Ibid, 248

80 Ibid, 270

81 Christopher S. Raj, Abdul Nafey, Canada’s global engagements and relations with India, 82

82 Drohan, Making A Killing, 272

83 Ibid, 288

84 Montréal Gazette June 12 2007

85 Canada supporting peacekeeping in Darfur: past, present, future (http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/sudan_south_sudan-soudan_soudan_du_sud/assets/pdfs/supporting.pdf)

86 Grant Dawson, Player, partner and friend: Canada’s Africa policy since 1945, International Politics 50, 2013

87 Canada, Sudan, and the stench of hypocrisy, Creekside, Mar 5 2009 (http://creekside1.blogspot.ca/2009/03/canada-sudan-and-stench-of-hypocrisy.html)

88 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abousfian_Abdelrazik)

89 Paul Koring, Canada feared U.S. backlash over man trapped in Sudan, Globe and Mail, July 24 2008

Chapter Fourteen

1 David Pugliese, Canada Delivers Spec Ops Training to More Allies, May 19 2014 (http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20140519/DEFREG02/305190023/Canada-Delivers-Spec-Ops-Training-More-Allies ); Carl Meyer, Canadian special forces were in Kenya before attack, Embassy Mag, Apr 30 2014

2 Ray Spiteri, Sharing his military passion, QMI Agency Feb 9 2012 (http://www.stcatharinesstandard.ca/2012/02/09/sharing-his-military-passion)

3 Tactical Operations Staff Course 20 Sep – 08 Oct 10 Kenya; Catherine Sasman, Canada Runs Military Observer Training

4 After some 25 years of dedicated and loyal service, Major Cary Arthur Baker (http://www.cmea-agmc.ca/sites/default/files/retirements//09.12.Baker_e.pdf)

5 Peter Langille, Canada in Peacekeeping and Peacekeeping Training in Africa, AISA Policy Brief, No 16

6 International Military Training and Policy (http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-international-policy/index.page)

7 Christopher R. Kilford, The Other Cold War: Canada’s Military Assistance to the Developing World 1945-1975, 219

8 Address by Parliamentary Secretary Obhrai at the Global Counterterrorism Forum, Sept 27 2013, New York City (http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/speeches-discours/2013/09/27d.aspx?lang=eng)

9 David Pugliese, Canada Delivers Spec Ops Training to More Allies, May 19 2014 (http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20140519/DEFREG02/305190023/Canada-Delivers-Spec-Ops-Training-More-Allies)

10 Global Counter Terrorism Forum (http://www.international.gc.ca/crime/forum.aspx?lang=eng)

11 Global Counterterrorism Forum, US State Department (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/gctf/)

12 Sean Chase, 427, CSOR heading to Africa Pembroke, Daily Observer, Jan 22 2013

(http://www.thedailyobserver.ca/2013/01/22/427-csor-heading-to-africa)

13 Eliza Griswold, Can General Linder’s Special Operations Forces Stop the Next Terrorist Threat?, New York Times Magazine, June 15 2014

14 Allan Woods, Canadian commandos focus on foreign forces, Toronto Star, Dec 9 2011

15 Scott Nielsen, African-led Exercise Flintlock Kicks off in Niger, U.S. AFRICOM Public Affairs, Feb 24 2014

16 David Pugliese, Uprising in Mali postpones Canadian military training mission, The Ottawa Citizen, Feb 28 2012

17 Steven Chase, Canada moves in to Nigeria to aid in search for kidnapped girls, The Globe and Mail May 13 2014; David Pugliese, Canada’s secret soldiers: Special Forces’ work takes place under the radar, Ottawa Citizen, Dec 30 2014

18 Michael Skinner, Canada’s Ongoing Involvement in Dirty Wars Like the U.S., Canada is “outsourcing” warfare in Afghanistan, July 1 2013 (https://www.policyalternatives.ca/publications/monitor/canadas-ongoing-involvement-dirty-wars#sthash.F9EmMDiG.dpuf)

19 Canadian special forces offering protection in Mali; but there will be “no mission”, The Canadian Press, Jan 28 2013 (http://www.macleans.ca/general/canadian-special-forces-offering-protection-in-mali-but-there-will-be-no-mission/)

20 Gadhafi stashed more than $2 billion in Canada, CTV, Feb 28 2011 (http://www.ctvnews.ca/gadhafi-stashed-more-than-2-billion-in-canada-1.613147)

21 Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions, SC/10200, Mar 17 2011 (http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm)

22 Colin Freeze, Silent killers: Secrecy, security and JTF2, The Globe and Mail, Dec 7 2010

23 David Pugliese, Shadow wars: Special Forces in the New Battle Against Terrorism, 174

24 David Pugliese, Canada’s secret commandos: The unauthorized story of Joint Task Force Two, 81

25 Pugliese, Canada’s secret commandos, 80

26 Ibid, 63-64

27 Denis Morisset and Claude Coulombe, Nous étions invincibles, 158; Wayne Madsen, Genocide and Covert Operations in Africa: 1993-1999, 215

28 Pugliese, Canada’s secret commandos, 100

29 David Pugliese, JTF2 to stay in Ottawa for at least another five years, Ottawa Citizen, June 6 2014

30 Canada’s Military JTF2: Canada’s super-secret commandos, CBC, July 15 2005 (Http://www.cbc.ca/news2/background/cdnmilitary/jtf2.html)

31 David Pugliese, Shadow Wars: Special Forces in the New Battle Against Terrorism, 175

32 Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 under Canadian command (http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=standing-nato-maritime-group-1-under-canadian-command/hnocfof9)

33 Tatah Mentan, The New World Order Ideology and Africa, 192

34 Tony Seed, Canada sends warship to Africa, part of NATO Rapid Response Fleet, Aug 1 2007 (https://tonyseed.wordpress.com/2007/08/01/canada-sends-warship-to-africa-as-part-of-nato-rapid-response-fleet/)

35 Ibid

36 We’ll hear about a Canadian frigate on a voyage around Africa, CBC Radio - World Report, Sept 3 2007

37 Claude Lévesque, La marine canadienne a affronté des pirates au large de l’Afrique, Le Devoir, Jan 24 2008

38 Jeff Davis, Modern Pirates are High Tech and Dangerous, Embassy, Feb 6 2008 (http://www.maritimeterrorism.com/2008/02/06/modern-pirates-are-high-tech-and-dangerous/)

39 Angus Topshee, Circumnavigating Africa: A Sign of Things to Come?, Frontline Defence No 3, May 2008 (http://www.frontline-defence.com/index_archives.php?page=1611)

40 Jeff Davis, Modern Pirates are High Tech and Dangerous, Embassy, Feb 6, 2008

41 HMCS Toronto will be part of a mission of firsts, The Daily News (Halifax) - 21/07/2007

42 John Lewandowski, Canadian frigate leaves Halifax for Libyan coast on humanitarian mission, The Canadian Press, Mar 2 2011 (http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2011/03/02/canadian_frigate_leaves_halifax_for_libyan_coast_on_humanitarian_mission.html)

43 Kris Sims, NATO air strikes pound key Tripoli port, May 19, 2011 (http://www.nugget.ca/2011/05/19/nato-air-strikes-pound-key-tripoli-port-7)

44 Aly Thomson, HMCS Charlottetown departs for Mediterranean counter-terrorism mission, The Canadian Press, Jan 8 2012 (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/hmcs-charlottetown-departs-for-mediterranean-counter-terrorism-mission/article4085638/)

45 Kathleen Harris, Canada’s sailors set for more conflict zone, Arctic missions than time on high seas, Oct 26 2011 (http://ipolitics.ca/2011/10/26/canadas-sailors-set-for-more-conflict-zone-arctic-missions-than-time-on-high-seas-rcn-commander/)

46 David Pugliese, The Libya Mission One Year Later: The rules of engagement, Ottawa Citizen Feb 19 2012

47 Ibid

48 HMCS Toronto intercepts heroin haul off African coast, The Canadian Press, Jan 19 2014 (http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/hmcs-toronto-intercepts-heroin-haul-off-african-coast-1.2502775); HMCS Toronto seizes heroin in drug bust near Kenya, The Chronicle Herald, Dec 20 2013 (http://thechronicleherald.ca/novascotia/1175258-hmcs-toronto-seizes-heroin-in-drug-bust-near-kenya)

49 David Pugliese, Canadian military personnel take part in U.S. sponsored exercise to counter sea-based illicit activities, Ottawa Citizen, Feb 4 2015

50 Allan Woods, Canada’s military hunting for seven new foreign bases, Toronto Star, June 5 2012

51 Lee Berthiaume, Canadian military building network of international outposts in push for more overseas missions, Postmedia, July 19 2012

52 Allan Woods, Canada’s military hunting for seven new foreign bases, Toronto Star, June 5 2012

53 Nick Turse, AFRICOM’s Gigantic “Small Footprint”, Tom Dispatch, Sept 5 2013 (http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175743/tomgram%3A_nick_turse,_africom%27s_gigantic_%22small_footprint%22)

54 Nick Turse, AFRICOM Becomes a “War-Fighting Combatant Command”, Tom Dispatch, Apr 13 2014

(http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175830/tomgram%3A_nick_turse,_africom_becomes_a_%22war-fighting_combatant_command%22/)

55 Nick Turse, The US Military Has Been ‘At War’ in Africa on the Sly For Years, The Nation, Apr 14 2014 (http://www.thenation.com/article/us-military-has-been-war-africa-sly-years/)

56 Pádraig Carmody: Africa’s natural resources, climate change and security, July 2009 (http://www.exploringgeopolitics.org/interview_carmody_padraig_africa_security_natural_resources_climate_change_conflicts_geoeconomic_competition_africom_united_states_china/)

57 Jeffrey N. Krulick, Airlift in Africa: Building Operational Logistics Capability for the African Standby Force USAF (www.alu.army.mil/alog/pdf/janfeb2013/airlift_africa.pdf)

58 Ibid

59 Evaluation of the Global Peace and Security Fund, Feb 2011 (http://www.international.gc.ca/department-ministere/evaluation/2011/gpsf_fpsm11.aspx?lang=eng)

60 Delivering results: Canada Fund for Africa, Canadian International Development Agency, 2006, 11

61 Tim Murithi, Handbook of Africa’s international relations, 157

62 Hany Besada, Crafting an African security architecture: Addressing Regional Peace and Conflict in the 21st Century, xxiii

63 Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations (en.g8russia.ru/load/983157457)

64 Besada, Crafting an African security architecture, 186

65 Peter Langille, Canada in Peacekeeping and Peacekeeping Training in Africa, AISA Policy Brief, No 16

66 Canada Fund for Africa: Summative Evaluation Executive Report, Sep 8 2014 (http://www.international.gc.ca/department-ministere/evaluation/2011/dev-aeer-aer11.aspx?lang=eng)

67 The African Union training exercise for police and civilian personnel of the African Standby Force kicks off in Addis Ababa, Oct 31 2012 (http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-african-union-training-exercise-for-police-and-civilian-personnel-of-the-african-standby-force-kicks-off-in-addis-ababa)

68 Shejal Pulivarti, International Partners Inaugurate Amani Peace Operations Training Village, Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa, Aug 20 2012 (http://www.africom.mil/newsroom/article/9119/international-partners-inaugurate-amani-peace-oper)

69 Shejal Pulivarti, International Partners Inaugurate Amani Peace Operations Training Village, Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa, Aug 20 2012 (http://www.hoa.africom.mil/story/7675/international-partners-inaugurate-amani-peace-operations-training-village)

70 Besada, Crafting an African security architecture, 183

71 Canada Supplies Darfur Peacekeepers with Equipment, No 297, Oct 7 2009 (http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiques/2009/297.aspx?lang=eng); (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/African_Union_Mission_in_Sudan)

72 Geoffrey York, Human Rights Watch accuses Western backed African Union troops of sexual assault, Globe and Mail, Sep 8 2014

73 Murithi, Handbook of Africa’s international relations, 58/158

74 Marco Wyss and Thierry Tardy, Peacekeeping in Africa: the evolving security architecture, 79

75 Courtney Kube, US Deploys Small Military Team to Somalia, NBC News.com, Jan 10 2014 (http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/10/22258125-us-deploys-small-military-team-to-somalia?lite)

76 General Carter Ham, United States Africa Command 2012 Posture Statement, Feb 2012 (http://www.africom.mil/newsroom/article/8832/2012-posture-statement-statement-of-general-carter)

77 Vince Crawley, In First-Ever Communications Test, AFRICOM Assists African Union Peace Ops Center, U.S. AFRICOM Public Affairs, Aug 23 2010 (http://www.africom.mil/newsroom/article/7652/in-first-ever-communications-test-africom-assists-)

78 Murithi, Handbook of Africa’s international relations, 350

79 Vince Crawley, AFRICOM assists African Union Peace Ops Center in first-ever communications test, Aug 28 2010 (http://www.army.mil/article/44437/AFRICOM_assists_African_Union_Peace_Ops_Center_in_first_ever_communications_test/)

80 Murithi, Handbook of Africa’s international relations, 350

81 NATO assistance to the African Union, Oct 27 2010 (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8191.htm?selectedLocale=uk)

82 Benedikt Franke, A Pan-African army: The evolution of an idea and its eventual realisation in the African Standby Force, African Security Review, Vol 15 No 4

83 Simon Allison, Standing by to standby: The African peacekeeping force with more problems than solutions, Daily Maverick, Aug 14 2012 (http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-08-14-standing-by-to-standby-the-african-peacekeeping-force-with-more-problems-than-solutions#.Va35lbVPoZM)

84 Jeffrey N. Krulick, Airlift in Africa: Building Operational Logistics Capability for the African Standby Force (http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/JanFeb13/Airlift_in_Africa.html#.Va36ErVPoZM)

85 Max Forte, Slouching Towards Sirte: NATO’s War on Libya and Africa, 194

86 Rick Rozoff, Africa: U.S. and NATO Build Neo-Colonial Proxy Forces, July 1 2012 (https://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2012/07/01/africa-u-s-and-nato-build-neo-colonial-proxy-forces/)

87 Olaf Bachmann, The African Standby Force External Support to an ‘African Solution to African Problems’?, IDS Research Report 67, Apr 2011 (http://www.ids.ac.uk/idspublication/the-african-standby-force-external-support-to-an-african-solution-to-african-problems)

88 Learning How to Keep the Peace, Embassy, Apr 23 2008 (http://www.embassynews.ca/talking-points/2008/04/23/learning-how-to-keep-the-peace/35588); AU POLCIVEX, Exercise NJIWA Official Opening, AU HQ, Remarks from the Embassy of Canada Oct 31 2012 (www.peaceau.org/.../au-polcivex-njiwa-31-oct-2012-canada-speech.pdf)

89 Phillip Apuuli Kasaija, The African Union (AU), the Libya Crisis and the notion of ‘African solutions to African problems’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol 31, Issue 1, 2013

90 Horace Campbell, Global NATO and the catastrophic failure in Libya: Lessons for Africa in the Forging of African Unity, 20

91 Ibid, 135

92 The African Union and the Libyan Crisis: Putting the Records Straight, Nov 17 2011 (http://www.nepad.org/economicandcorporategovernance/knowledge/doc/2573/african-union-and-libyan-crisis-putting-records-st)

93 Extraordinary AU summit to be convened in May, Xinhua, May 21 2011 (https://laaska.wordpress.com/2011/05/21/extraordinary-au-summit-to-be-convened-in-may/)

94 Campbell, Global NATO and the catastrophic failure in Libya, 136

95 Scott Baldauf, How AU’s boycott of London Libya meeting may hurt Africa’s interests, Christian Science Monitor, Mar 29 2011 (http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2011/0329/How-AU-s-boycott-of-London-Libya-meeting-may-hurt-Africa-s-interests)

96 Phillip Apuuli Kasaija, The African Union (AU), the Libya Crisis and the notion of ‘African solutions to African problems’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies Vol 31, Issue 1, 2013

97 Forte, Slouching Towards Sirte, 277

98 Jeffrey N. Krulick, Airlift in Africa: Building Operational Logistics Capability for the African Standby Force USAF (www.alu.army.mil/alog/pdf/janfeb2013/airlift_africa.pdf); Forte, Slouching Towards Sirte, 198

99 Dan Glazebrook, Libya’s lesson for Iran: Beware of rapprochement, Nov 10 2014 (http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/libya-s-lesson-iran-beware-rapprochement-870650788)

100 Forte, Slouching Towards Sirte, 139

101 David Antonyshyn, Jan Grofe and Don Hubert, Beyond the Law? The Regulation of Canadian Private Military and Security Companies Operating Abroad, PRIV-WAR Report, Canada National Reports Series Mar 2009 (http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/reports_and_stats/think_tanks/privwar_national-report_antonyshyn.pdf)

102 Ibid

103 Nelson Bennett, Benefiting from risky business abroad, Business in Vancouver Nov 18 2014 (www.biv.com/article/2014/11/benefiting-risky-business-abroad/ Nov 18, 2014)

104 Jonathon Gatehouse, This cabbie hunts pirates: Former Toronto taxi driver is now in charge of a Somali coast guard, Jan 12 2009 (http://www.macleans.ca/news/world/this-cabbie-hunts-pirates/)

105 Ibid

106 Ibid

107 James R. Davis, Fortune’s Warriors: Private Armies and the New World Order, 31

108 Ibid, 137

109 Marina Jimenez, Canadians seek fortune in land of anarchy, violence Ex-soldiers go unarmed, National Post, Aug 23 1999

110 Ibid

111 Ibid

112 David Pugliese, Elite troops get more pay to stay, Ottawa Citizen Aug 26 2006

113 Security services in Nigeria (http://www.garda-world.com/locations/info/nigeria)

114 Matthew McClearn, Why is Montreal’s GardaWorld on the outs in both Afghanistan and Iraq?, Mar 17 2014 (http://www.canadianbusiness.com/companies-and-industries/the-enemy-unseen-6/)

115 Private military and security companies in Somalia need regulation, says UN expert Group, Dec 18 2012 (http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12898&LangID=E#sthash.kBcpJZ2X.dpuf)

116 Why GardaWorld in Libya? (http://www.garda-world.com/locations/info/libya)

117 Sarah A. Topol, As Libya War Winds Down, Security Consultants Tout Iraq, Afghan Experience, Bloomberg, Sept 21 2011 (http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/magazine/as-war-winds-down-in-libya-enter-the-consultants-09212011.html)

118 Hin-Yan Liu, Mercenaries in Libya: Ramifications of the Treatment of ‘Armed Mercenary Personnel’ under the Arms Embargo for Private Military Company Contractors, Journal of Conflict & Security Law, Vol 16, No 2, 2011

119 Canadian drone helped rebels in Libya, AFP, Aug 24 2011 (http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Canadian_drone_helped_rebels_in_Libya_999.html)

120 Why GardaWorld in Libya? (www.garda-world.com/assets/media-centre/GW_Libya_A4_spread.pdf)

121 Garda’s double whammy in Libya, Intelligence Online, Feb 19 2014

122 Argus and Garda face off, Intelligence Online, Issue No 714 June 18 2014

123 Morning Joe sits down with Fred Burton and Samuel M. Katz, authors of “Under Fire”, Apr 9 2013 (http://www.msnbc.com/morning-joe/morning-joe-sits-down-fred-burton-and)

124 Ibid 

Chapter Fifteen

1 Patricia Adams and Brady Yauch, How Canada encourages corrupt companies, Financial Post, Nov 4 2013 (http://business.financialpost.com/fp-comment/how-canada-encourages-corrupt-companies).

2 Strengthening Canada’s Fight Against Foreign Bribery, Feb 5 2013 (http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiques/2013/02/05b.aspx?lang=eng)

3 Brett House and David Landry, As world moves to weed out graft, Canada remains a laggard, The Globe and Mail Dec 9 2013

4 Ibid

5 Ibid

6 Massacre in Zaire; Canada should reassess aid, The Ottawa Citizen, June 28 1990

7 Rachel Louise Ensign and Christopher M. Matthews, Barrick Gold Unit is Accused of Bribery in Africa, Wall Street Journal, June 18 2014

8 New report slams Buzwagi contract, Thisday, Mar 12 2008 (http://www.protestbarrick.net/article.php?id=272)

9 Ibid

10 Ibid

11 Nevers Mumba in $122,000 scandal, Daily Mail, Dec 21 2011 (http://www.zambianwatchdog.com/daily-mail-nevers-mumba-in-122000-scandal/)

12 Matthew Hill, Zambian Opposition Leader to Review Mining Tax If He Wins, Bloomberg, Jan 4 2015 (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-04/zambia-opposition-leader-to-review-mine-tax-if-he-wins-vote)

13 Alain Deneault avec Delphine Abadie et William Sacher, Noir Canada: pillage, corruption et criminalité en Afrique, 207

14 Lori Pottinger, “Scandal in Lesotho: Caught Wet-Handed”, Southern Africa Report SAR, Vol 15 No 2, Feb 2000 (http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=3662)

15 Deneault, Noir Canada, 207

16 Alain Deneault et William Sacher, Paradis sous terre: Comment le Canada est devenu la plaque tournante de l’industrie minière mondiale, 122

17 Eric Reguly, Off the map in Africa, Globe and Mail, Jan 11 2008

18 Christopher Helman, Trouble Is My Business, Forbes, Sept 28 2007 (http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2007/1015/099.html)

19 Timothy Sawa and Lynne Chichakian, South Africa’s corruption watchdog probes Bombardier rail deal, CBC News, Apr 1 2015 (http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/south-africa-s-corruption-watchdog-probes-bombardier-rail-deal-1.3017026)

20 Ibid

21 Ibid

22 Security Council Distr.: General 16 October 2002 Letter dated 15 October 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/96/96819_congo_20021031.pdf)

23 Kinross Gold and Katanga Mining: Part of the Pillage of the Democratic Republic of Congo?, Apr 8 2006 (http://www.miningwatch.ca/fr/node/4548)

24 Toby A.A. Heaps, The heart of darkness, Corporate Knights, Issue 15, 2006 (http://www.africafiles.org/printableversion.asp?id=12399)

25 Dave Seglins, SNC-Lavalin International used secret code for ‘bribery’, CBC News, May 15 2013 (http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/snc-lavalin-international-used-secret-code-for-bribery-payments-1.1386670)

26 Graeme Hamilton, RCMP charges SNC-Lavalin with fraud and corruption linked to Libyan projects, Financial Post, Feb 19 2015

27 Ibid

28 Graeme Hamilton, SNC-Lavalin paid $6M in kickbacks to Tunisian president’s son-in-law: RCMP, May 21 2013 (http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/snc-lavalin-paid-6m-in-kickbacks-to-tunisian-presidents-son-in-law-rcmp)

29 Patricia Adams and Brady Yauch, How Canada encourages corrupt companies, Financial Post Nov 4 2013 (http://business.financialpost.com/fp-comment/how-canada-encourages-corrupt-companies)

30 Greg McArthur, SNC division created web of illicit payments, documents show, The Globe and Mail, May 15 2013

31 Ibid

32 Dave Seglins, 10 countries where SNC-Lavalin contracts under scrutiny Invoices, budgets list scores of ‘illegitimate’ project costs, May 15 2013 (http://www.cbc.ca/news2/interactives/snc-lavalin-payments/)

33 Greg McArthur, SNC division created web of illicit payments, documents show, The Globe and Mail, May 15 2013

34 Kelly Cryderman, Hunt for Griffiths bribery gains turns to former ambassador’s wife, The Globe and Mail, Mar 22 2013

35 Glencore set to pay $1.35 billion for Canada’s Caracal, April 14 2014 (http://www.plsx.com/news/article/glencore-set-to-pay-135-billion-for-canadas-caracal)

36 Jacquie McNish Carrie Tait Chrétien played key role in controversial Chad oil deal, The Globe and Mail, Feb 1 2013

37 Ibid

38 Ibid

39 Peter C. Newman, Titans (The Canadian Establishment, Vol. 3), 192

40 Alan Freeman, The little fixer from Shawinigan?, Globe and Mail, Mar 5 2005

41 Ibid

42 Ibid

43 Ibid

44 Gambia: Ex-Canadian Prime Minister Meets Jammeh, The Daily Observer Banjul, Feb 22 2006 (http://allafrica.com/stories/200602220885.html)

45 Brian Hutchinson and Theresa Tedesco, How Heenan Blaikie’s Stunning Collapse Started with a Rogue African Arms Deal, Financial Post, Feb 15 2014

46 Jean Chrétien joins another law firm as Heenan Blaikie winds up, The Canadian Press, Feb 10 2014

(http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/jean-chr%C3%A9tien-joins-another-law-firm-as-heenan-blaikie-winds-up-1.2531522)

47 Hugo Fontaine, Jean Charest en mission en Afrique, La Presse, Apr 5 2013 (http://affaires.lapresse.ca/economie/international/201304/05/01-4637803-jean-charest-en-mission-en-afrique.php)

48 Geoffrey York, Canadian miners take another look at Africa, The Globe and Mail, Feb 3 2014

49 Suprex Energy Corp Sells Tanzania & Mozambique Properties, CNW CORP, July 2 1997

(http://www.siliconinvestor.com/readmsgs.aspx?subjectid=10229&msgnum=3871&batchsize=10&batchtype=Previous)

50 Bonnie Campbell, Canadian Mining Interests and Human Rights in Africa in the Context of Globalization, Section II: Canadian Mining Interests in Africa, Jan 1999

51 William Mbaho, West African Hardwood: Out of Africa, BC Business, July 1 2006

52 Ibid

53 Patrick McGroarty, Africa Loses $60 Billion a Year Illegally, Report Says, Wall Street Journal, Feb 1 2015

54 Ibid

55 Nicholas Shaxson, Treasure Islands: Uncovering the Damage of Offshore Banking and Tax Havens, 157

56 Ibid, 27

57 Alain Deneault, Canada: A New Tax Haven How the Country That Shaped Caribbean Tax Havens is Becoming One Itself, 114

58 Shaxson, Treasure Islands, 11

59 Ibid, 158

60 Nicole Reinert and Zach Dubinsky, How Canada’s banks help money move in and out of tax havens, CBC News, Jun 25 2013 (http://www.cbc.ca/m/news/business/how-canada-s-banks-help-money-move-in-and-out-of-tax-havens-1.1384336)

61 Ibid

62 Deneault Canada: A New Tax Haven, 256

63 Ibid, 257

64 Ibid, 104

65 Ibid

66 Ibid, 109

67 Ibid

68 Canadian $$ in Tax Havens Reach $199 Billion Taxfairness.ca (http://www.taxfairness.ca/en/news/canadian-tax-havens-reach-199-billion)

69 Statement Prepared for the International Monetary and Financial Committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, Apr 25 2009 (https://www.fin.gc.ca/n08/09-040-eng.asp)

70 Deneault, Canada, 192

71 Jamie Doward, Glencore denies allegations over copper mine tax, The Observer, Apr 17 2011 (http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/apr/17/glencore-denies-copper-tax-allegations)

72 Ibid

73 Ibid

74 Tax Evasion in Zambia: NGOs File Complaint Against Glencore, First Quantum for Violation of OECD Guidelines Apr 12 2011 (http://www.miningwatch.ca/news/tax-evasion-zambia-ngos-file-complaint-against-glencore-first-quantum-violation-oecd-guidelines)

75 Mark Curtis and Tundu Lissu, A golden opportunity?: How Tanzania is failing to benefit from gold mining, The Christian Council of Tanzania CCT, The National Council of Muslims in Tanzania BAKWATA, and The Tanzania Episcopal Conference, Oct 2008

76 Ibid

77 Ibid

78 Michele Fletcher, Why Tanzania Needs to Be Careful about Gas Revenues, July 18 2014 (http://www.gfintegrity.org/tanzania-needs-careful-gas-revenues/)

79 Clarification sought from Barrick and Acacia By RAID, Mar 27 2015 (http://www.raid-uk.org/blog/clarification-sought-barrick-and-acacia)

80 RDC: Tenke Fungurume Mining accusé de surévaluer son investissement, Radio Okapi, Nov 2 2012 (http://radiookapi.net/emissions-2/linvite-du-jour/2012/11/02/rdc-tenke-fungurume-mining-accuse-de-surevaluer-son-investissement/)

81 Annual Information Form For the Year Ended Dec 31, 2010, Mar 31 2011 (http://www.lundinmining.com/i/pdf/2010_AIF.pdf)

82 Canada in Mali: Aid, Gold, Cotton, Migration, version 20090922 (web.ncf.ca/fm122/mali/canada-mali.doc)

83 Ibid

84 Kofi Adu Domfeh, GRA tasked to retrieve 6.6m from Prestea Sankofa Gold Ghana, Luv News, Mar 30 2015 (http://www.myjoyonline.com/business/2015/march-30th/gra-tasked-to-retrieve-66m-from-prestea-sankofa-gold.php#sthash.8e78acXe.dpuf)

85 Ibid

86 Consolidated Financial Statements of Teranga Gold Corporation For the periods ended December 31, 2012 and 2011 (http://member.afraccess.com/media?id=CMN://6A625647&filename=20130221/TGZ_01384116.pdf)

87 Abdoulaye Massalaatchi and Mark John, Niger committee says studies Semafo gold contract, Reuters, July 9 2010 (http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/07/09/niger-semafo-idUSLDE6681FR20100709)

88 Scandale des richesses minières : le Niger crie famine, la Semafo célèbre son « millionième » once d’or, Ouestafnews, Mar 22 2010 (http://www.ouestaf.com/Scandale-des-richesses-minieres-le-Niger-crie-famine-la-Semafo-celebre-son-millionieme-once-d-or_a2857.html)

Chapter Sixteen

1 Nnimmo Bassey, To cook a continent: Destructive Extraction and the Climate Crisis in Africa, 110

2 Temesgen Kifle, Africa hit hardest by Global Warming despite its low Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Institute for World Economics and International Management, 2008

3 Paul Vallely Climate change will be catastrophe for Africa, Independent, May 16 2006 (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iran-nuclear-deal-satirical-website-the-onion-accidentally-breaks-story-about-the-us-offering-missiles-to-israel-10404684.html?icn=puff-7)

4 Mark Hertsgaard, Climate Change Kills 400,000 a Year, New Report Reveals, Daily Beast, Sept 27 2012 (http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/09/27/climate-change-kills-400-000-a-year-new-report-reveals.html)

5 Naomi Klein, This changes everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate, 276

6 The Cost of Adaptation to Climate Change in Africa, African Development Bank, Oct 2011 (http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Cost%20of%20Adaptation%20in%20Africa.pdf)

7 Michael Fleshman, Climate change: Africa gets ready, Africa Renewal, July 2007 (http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/july-2007/climate-change-africa-gets-ready#sthash.FYktP0QW.dpuf)

8 What Climate Change Means for Africa, Asia and the Coastal Poor, World Bank, June 19 2013 (http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/06/19/what-climate-change-means-africa-asia-coastal-poor)

9 Costs of Climate Change Adaptation Expected to Rise Far Beyond Africa’s Coping Capacity Even if Warming Kept Below 2°C, United Nations Environment Programme, Mar 4 2015 (http://www.unep.org/newscentre/default.aspx?DocumentID=26788&ArticleID=34788)

10 Jason Straziuso, Global warming may have fueled Somali drought, Associated Press, Mar 15 2013 (http://news.yahoo.com/global-warming-may-fueled-somali-172950248.html)

11 Climate Vulnerability Monitor 2nd Edition (http://daraint.org/climate-vulnerability-monitor/climate-vulnerability-monitor-2012/)

12 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014 – Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Regional Aspects, 1225

13 Bryan Walsh, Malaria Climbs Mountains as the Climate Warms, Time, Mar 6 2014

14 Peter Aldhous, African conflicts spurred by warming, New Scientist, Nov 23 2009 (https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn18185-african-conflicts-spurred-by-warming/)

15 Forecast: the consequences of climate change, 27

16 Klein, This Changes Everything, 270

17 David Shukman, Geo-engineering: Climate fixes ‘could harm billions’, BBC News Nov 26 2014 (http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-30197085)

18 Klein, This Changes Everything, 276

19 Ibid

20 Carbon emissions 2010 (https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0AonYZs4MzlZbdGNQcEtMeF9VSzZvU3FOQ0F4V3pDbFE#gid=0)

21 Ibid

22 Adam Vaughan, A history of CO2 emissions, Guardian, Sept 2 2009 (http://www.theguardian.com/environment/datablog/2009/sep/02/co2-emissions-historical)

23 Ibid

24 Barry Saxifrage, Climate pollution: 140 nations vs Alberta’s tar sands, Vancouver Observer, Nov 21 2013 (http://www.vancouverobserver.com/blogs/climatesnapshot/climate-pollution-140-nations-vs-albertas-tar-sands)

25 Andy Rowell, Keeping their head in the sands: Canada’s EU Fuel Quality Directive lobby diary, Friends of the Earth Europe, Jan 2013 (http://www.foeeurope.org/sites/default/files/publications/keeping_their_head_in_the_sand_january_2013.pdf.)

26 Tories spend on Keystone XL ads, while cutting environmental funding, Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, news release, May 27 2013 (http://www.newswire.ca/en/story/1172403/tories-spend-on-keystone-xl-ads-while-cutting-environment-funding).

27 Desmond Tutu and the oil sands’ misguided critics, National Post, Dec 1 2011

28 Canada wins ‘Lifetime Unachievement’ Fossil award at Warsaw climate talks, Nov 22 2013 (http://climateactionnetwork.ca/2013/11/22/canada-wins-lifetime-unachievement-fossil-award-at-warsaw-climate-talks/)

29 Wisdom Mdzungairi, South Africa Asks Canada to Reconsider, Dec 2 2011 (http://allafrica.com/stories/201112021607.html)

30 Edwin Musoni, Canada’s withdrawal from Kyoto unfortunate – Kamanzi, New Times, Dec 15 2011 (http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2011-12-15/37731/)

31 Suzanne Goldenberg, Canada reveals climate stance with praise for Australian carbon tax repeal Nov 13 2013 (http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/nov/13/canada-climate-australia-carbon-tax)

32 Chris Arsenault, Drought, expanding deserts and ‘food for jihad’ drive Mali’s conflict, Reuters, Apr 27 2015 (http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/27/us-climatechange-mali-conflict-idUSKBN0NI16M20150427); The magnitude of the problem (http://www.fao.org/docrep/x5318e/x5318e02.htm)

33 Canada quietly pulls out of UN anti-droughts, The Canadian Press, Mar 27 2013 (http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/canada-quietly-pulls-out-of-un-anti-droughts-convention-1.1388320)

Conclusion

1 Angus Maddison, Growth and Interaction in the World Economy The Roots of Modernity, 7 (http://www.ggdc.net/Maddison/other_books/Growth_and_Interaction_in_the_World_Economy.pdf)

2 Ewout Frankemaa and Marlous Van Waijenburga, Structural Impediments to African Growth? New Evidence from Real Wages in British Africa, 1880-1965, CGEH Working Paper No. 24, Dec 10 2011 (http://www.cgeh.nl/sites/default/files/WorkingPapers/CGEH.WP_.No24.Frankema&vanWaijenburg2.pdf)

3 Ibid

4 Michael Barratt Brown, Africa’s Choices: After Thirty Years of the World Bank, 21

5 Léonce Ndikumana and James Boyce, Africa’s Odious Debts: How Foreign Loans and Capital Flight Bled a Continent, 38

6 Honest Accounts? The True Story of Africa’s Billion Dollar Losses, Report by Health Poverty Action, Jubilee Debt Campaign, World Development Movement, African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD), Friends of the Earth Africa, Tax Justice Network, People’s Health Movement Kenya, Zimbabwe and UK, War on Want, Community Working Group on Health Zimbabwe, Medact, Healthworkers4All Coalition, groundWork, Friends of the Earth South Africa, JA!Justica Ambiental/Friends of the Earth Mozambique, July 2014 (http://www.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/honest-accounts_final-version.pdf)

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About the Author

Dubbed “Canada’s version of Noam Chomsky” (Georgia Straight), “one of the most important voices on the Canadian Left today” (Briarpatch), “in the mould of I. F. Stone” (Globe and Mail), “part of that rare but growing group of social critics unafraid to confront Canada’s self-satisfied myths” (Quill & Quire) , “ever-insightful” (rabble.ca) and a “Leftist gadfly” (Ottawa Citizen), Yves Engler’s seven previous books are:

The Ugly Canadian: Stephen Harper’s Foreign Policy

Lester Pearson’s Peacekeeping: the Truth May Hurt

Stop Signs: Cars and Capitalism on the Road to Economic, Social and Ecological Decay (with Bianca Mugyenyi)

Canada and Israel: Building Apartheid

The Black Book of Canadian Foreign-Policy

Canada in Haiti: Waging War on the Poor Majority (with Anthony Fenton)

Playing Left-Wing: from Rink Rat to Student Radical

For more information about Yves go to his Web page at

www.yvesengler.com