



The
WHITE
PACIFIC

U.S. IMPERIALISM *and* BLACK SLAVERY
in the SOUTH SEAS
after the CIVIL WAR

GERALD HORNE

The White Pacific



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U.S. Imperialism and Black Slavery in the South Seas after the Civil War

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Introduction

Kapitani was seething with fury.

This dark-skinned man—and a number of his comrades—had been seized from his homeland at the behest of a U.S. national, Achilles Underwood, and taken to labor like slaves on a plantation. He and his comrades had been subject to frequent floggings, “often for the most trifling thing.” The tipping point arrived when they were placed in a small house, “about six feet by eight feet, the floor having been covered with chopped branches of lemon and orange trees and so full that there was no room for any of them to lie down, except upon the thorny sticks, and [they] were kept there for four days, locked in, and never allowed outside for any purpose and [had] a drink of water given them twice a day. The outside of the house was laid thick with lemon branches, so that no one could approach and pass anything through the walls or roof to the imprisoned.”

It was Underwood’s misfortune to approach this torture chamber just as Kapitani’s patience had snapped. Somehow this laborer was able to grab an axe, then “felled Underwood to the ground . . . struck him three times and most of those standing round had a blow at him, [then] they carried his lifeless body into the house and liberated their imprisoned fellows.” Strikingly, even those most close to the deceased swore that he was a cruel master. Referring to Kapitani’s story, his widow swore that “every word of it [was] true. . . . She had often warned her husband that someday they (the laborers) would retaliate upon him for his cruelty to them and cook and eat him.” Even Underwood’s son, Elias, “gave evidence of the cruel treatment inflicted on the prisoner and the other laborers.”¹

Where and when did this inhumanity—involving the familiar figures of the exploited dark-skinned and the heartlessly calloused melanin deficient—occur? The U.S. South before 1861? Brazil before 1888? No, this nasty event took place after the U.S. Civil War in Fiji, the South Seas archipelago that for the previous decades leading up to this 1871 murder had been subject to keen

influence from neighbors as diverse as Australia and Hawaii—not to mention the home of Achilles Underwood: the United States.

The writer Thomas Dunbabin has observed sagely that when “Abraham Lincoln entered reluctantly into the Civil War that was to end in the freeing of slaves in the United States, he never dreamed that that very war was by providing a market for labor of South Sea Islanders to give a new impulse to blackbirding [slave-trading] in the Pacific.”² That is, the conflict in the U.S. South created opportunities for competitors who sought to displace the Confederates in the lucrative cotton and sugar markets in particular. Fiji and Queensland, Australia, were the major sites for this rise of bonded plantation labor.

“It is a remarkable thing,” commented one Australian cleric in wonder, “that just in the decade of the terrible American Civil War (1860–1870), which resulted in the emancipation of the last [*sic*] of the African slaves, the traffic in Papuan savages arose. It is as if the hideous fiend expelled reluctant from the American soil in the throes of a civil war in which 800,000 men [*sic*] perished, and swept out into the ocean by that overflowing sea of blood, had been cast upon the Australian shores, and eternal exile from America and the West Indies, found a cordial welcome and a congenial home in Queensland and the Fijis.”³

According to one study, blackbirding, as this practice of luring Melane-sians and Polynesians to toil for next to nothing was called, occurred between 1863–1904 and involved 61,610 people, mostly men but also some women and children.⁴ Another study estimates that 62,000 Pacific Islanders went to Queensland and at least 22,000 to Fiji—though others see these figures as rather low.⁵ For example, one analyst asserts, “From first to last over 100,000 blackbirds must have been taken from the islands of the Western Pacific. Sixty thousand were carried to Queensland alone.”⁶

This abhorrent practice was an aspect of a time when the darkest skinned virtually worldwide were in jeopardy, capable of being snatched by whatever opportunistic navigator sailed into a port with the idea of transporting captives to a distant clime. This color coding was reflected in the very term “blackbirding,” which was said to derive from the custom of raiders going ashore at night clothed entirely in black.⁷ Though the Pacific islands were, for the most part, quite small, they were spread over a huge area, which at once contributed to their devastation in a way that challenges the worst depredations of the African Slave Trade and complicated the ability to apprehend the perpetrators. After all, “the first great fact of the Pacific Ocean is its enormousness. In area it occupies seventy million square miles, about one-third of the earth’s surface. It is the planet’s dominant feature.”⁸ The Pacific is 25 percent larger than all the

world's land masses combined;⁹ thus, it can be said that events in this region drive the fate of the planet.

Of course, transporting bonded labor to distant climes was nothing new—even in the Pacific before the Civil War. European trading companies in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and even as late as the nineteenth century “transported a not insignificant number of African slaves into Asia, particularly into India and southwest Asia.” Madagascar slaves were also shipped to India and the East Indies during the high tide of the African Slave Trade.¹⁰ Londoners were surprised to find in their midst in 1820 two Hawaiian chiefs who had been blackbirded, or “taken by an American schooner which sailed off with them to California,” and “after some time, during which they worked as slaves, an American captain, who wanted hands, was accommodated with the two warriors” before dumping them in London.¹¹ A sailor reported in 1816 that the Easter Island natives’ hostility toward him was traceable to the theft eleven years before of ten women and twelve men by a shipmaster who needed help with his sealing operation.¹² Then, U.S. nationals were instrumental in the propelling of the horrendous Peruvian Slave Trade in Polynesia as the Civil War was unfolding.¹³ It was as if the darkest skinned were entrapped in a cruel labor game of musical chairs, subject to being moved from one corner of the planet to another at the whim of their supposed superiors.

But, strikingly, a number of these same U.S. nationals often from the vanquished South, were to go on to play pivotal roles in the construction of a new kind of slavery in Fiji and Queensland, Australia. The magnitude of their role outweighed the size of their presence. Months after the ignominious Confederate surrender in April 1865, the British consul reported that there were 350 white settlers currently living in Fiji: 230 British, 70 U.S. citizens, 30 Germans and Scandinavians, and 20 of other ethnicities.¹⁴ These relatively sparse numbers should not obscure the importance of their presence because they were the “racial Leninists” in Fiji and the region, pioneering in developing forms of organization that had worked so well in their homeland as they took on the most intractable of tasks presented by colonialism. Like the Bolsheviks, they were a minority—but this simple term could only mask their potency. Moreover, the United States was a more sincere believer in “whiteness” than, say, their British counterparts, who were more sincere believers in monarchy and the priority of “English-ness” and the detritus of feudalism (e.g., a proliferation of earls, dukes, and the like). One post-U.S. Civil War visitor to Fiji noted how well known it was that “numbers of English in Levuka call themselves American subjects, merely in order to obtain the better protection which that country, rightly or not, is supposed to extend to her citizens”—not

subjects; it was felt that only titled royalty would receive the benedictions of London's envoys. One "large landowner actually left the group for some time and resided in the United States, in order to qualify for American citizenship, and thus to vindicate certain rights of ownership which had been grossly violated by the chief of the district in which his property lay. . . . [This] decisive step promised to be successful, for . . . a vessel-of-war [was soon to] be dispatched from San Francisco to Levuka with the express object of enquiring into his claims."¹⁵ Such gestures provided a wider basis for the United States' imperial project, as it weakened the legitimacy of its chief rival in London. Consequently, it was not shocking when in hotly contested Fiji in February 1870, a self-proclaimed Anglo-American—"an Englishman born and brought up"—expressed the "fervent hope [that] England [would] leave [them] alone." Why? "New Zealand," the Anglo-American said, "and its miserable example may be a warning to us. British rule, indeed, perish the thought!" London was not simply aggressive enough in ousting the indigenes. Had not Britain pressed the then-nascent North American revolutionaries to curtail their seizures of the indigenes' land, thus sparking London's own ouster? Perhaps a similar process was needed in the Pacific, he thought, by dint of a "great Australasian federation" or having "an American flag hoisted."¹⁶

London's man in the region in the late nineteenth century, Sir Arthur Gordon, was berated by a group of Euro-Australasians. This almighty bureaucrat with his "thin, lantern jaws" graced by a scornful expression and beard seemed to believe that all white men in the South Seas were "murderers and rogues and that every Native [was] an innocent, peaceful child of nature." Europeans in New Zealand and Australia, it was said with feeling, "have had to force their way as pioneers among savage and semi-savage races. . . . extending England's rule by rough means, perhaps, but rough work had to be done and men were needed to do it and men stepped forward." As in North America, London's attempt to restrain colonists from further assaults on indigenes was not accepted blithely by these invaders and, strikingly, as in the late eighteenth century, this led to a further boost for Euro-Americans who were not as restrained.¹⁷ Hence, in 1870 an Auckland organ chortled that "the American is the flag which would be most warmly welcomed by settlers of all nationalities here."¹⁸

Thus, the Ku Klux Klan had arisen in Fiji at the same time that Achilles Underwood was meeting a sad fate.¹⁹ As one analyst put it in 1870, "there is a small party indeed . . . which I may fairly call the American party, that objects altogether to dealing with the 'nigger' on terms of equality. They were, and are, for carrying matters with a very high hand."²⁰ This "American party" took on the difficult task of routing the indigenes who were not prone to accept ex-

propriation of their land and second-class status in their homeland. Later this KKK chapter was transformed into the more respectable sounding British Subjects Mutual Protection Society²¹—though this bow to the more tender sensibilities of the colonial power in Fiji cannot elide the point that subjugating the indigenous involved the kind of tactics honed in the U.S. South. The tactics mirrored the men, as the South Seas—from at least the time of the settling of the colonies of Australia in the eighteenth century—had long been a dumping ground for the most incorrigible cutthroats.²² The United States being a major whaling nation also contributed to a disproportionate presence of its nationals in the region, men who had “been turned ashore from whale-ships” or otherwise stranded or dumped on South Sea Islands for various reasons.²³ This was part of “an invasion by bestial scoundrels, including escaped convicts, licentious and ignorant,” a bunch of “human outcasts who began the diabolical trade in human beings and continued it until their outrages compelled effective intervention.”²⁴

Queensland also witnessed the presence of U.S. nationals. In fact as bonded labor arose in the South Seas, this trend was helped along mightily by a kind of White Pacific/White Atlantic of planters who were instrumental in developing this new regime. Thus, the area near Brisbane contained former West Indian planters from Jamaica, Demerara, St. Kitts, while “Robert Muir of Beenleigh came from Louisiana” and the cosmopolitan John Ewen Davidson had “learnt his avocation in Demerara, Jamaica, Mauritius, Honolulu and Louisiana before embarking on operations in Queensland.”²⁵

In short, the movement of U.S. nationals westward did not end with the “closing” of the frontier on the North American mainland. Of course, “the frontier impulse and the imperial impulse were related in source and performance,” rendering impotent a meaningful distinction between the two.²⁶ Thus as the nineteenth century proceeded toward its end, U.S. nationals continued moving toward the sun, traversing the defining region of the planet—the Pacific Ocean—often engaging in unsavory practices that had been first imposed on their native soil at the cost of blood and treasure. Their particular skill in the praxis of brutality served their nation well as the early stages of imperialism mimicked the early stages of the settling of the United States itself.

At this juncture, “despite the great distance between California and Australia, San Francisco was just as far away from America’s East [Coast] ports (by way of Cape Horn) as from Sydney.”²⁷ Sydney was better able to supply California in the mid-nineteenth century than New York or London.²⁸ And, as the Australian colonies developed, so did California.²⁹

An early U.S. explorer in the region, Charles Wilkes, observed more than

170 years ago that the West Coast was slated to “keep up an intercourse with the whole of Polynesia, as well as the countries of South America on the one side and China, the Philippines, New Holland and New Zealand on the other. Among the others, before many years may be included Japan.”³⁰ Wilkes’ words proved prescient when the first American armed intervention in Asia took place in the 1830s in Sumatra.³¹

As such, it is well to seek to understand what is now the U.S. West in relation to the Pacific and not just to the region east of the Mississippi River, particularly in contemplating the matter of race. Thus, the White Australia Policy arose as “similar policies began at much the same time in places of much the same character: British Columbia, California, Oregon, New Zealand” and for much the same reasons, though “studies of restriction in all these places have too often confined their attention to one country, have peered and pottered and wondered at local minutiae, sometimes becoming lost in intricate and heated debates about origins or procedures.”³² The point is that similar currents were coursing throughout the Pacific Basin helping to create commonalities between regions under the rule of various sovereigns.

Hawaii, under sovereign indigenous rule for much of the nineteenth century, was the strategic jewel in this quest. The fact that it was then ruled by a monarchy that emulated—like its flag—the modernity of Great Britain was seen as a critical impediment to overcome. “It is not practicable for any trans-Pacific country to invade our country,” said the leading U.S. naval theorist, A.T. Mahan, “without occupying Hawaii as a base. . . . The main reason why Hawaii is a strategical [*sic*] point of value to the United States is that the Pacific is so wide that battleships cannot cross it from any foreign naval station to the Pacific Coast without re-coaling, and there is no place to re-coal except Hawaii.”³³

Hawaii was viewed as the foundation for Washington’s westward thrust. It was Lincoln’s Secretary of State, William Seward of New York, who shortly after the Civil War uttered a prophecy that his compatriots sought to fulfill: “The Pacific Ocean,” he began portentously, “its shores, its islands and the vast regions beyond, will become the chief theatre of events in the world’s great hereafter.” Europe, he thought, “would ultimately sink in importance,” by way of contrast. After all, two-fifths of the world was the Pacific and its size was “more than two and one-third times that of [the] Atlantic, with all its tributary seas.”³⁴

The Pacific was where the frontier’s closing encountered the dawning of the new age of imperialism: Hawaii—annexed infamously by the United States in the 1890s as the Kingdom had been seeking to knock together a re-

gional confederation that would have thwarted the plans of the major powers, including the United States—was the epicenter of this brutal confluence. It was in 1898 that Commodore George W. Melville, Chief Engineer of the Navy, detailed Hawaii's strategic value—the “Gibraltar of the Pacific” bestriding the sea-lanes that led to the West Coast while it served to bring U.S. outposts two thousand miles closer to Asia, the site of the bulk of the planet's population. In a sense, the discovery of the Pacific's importance was related to the closing of the frontier. “In the year 1830,” said Melville, “not more than 500 men of Anglo-Saxon race [were] west of the Sierra Nevada on the continental shore; much of the island territory of the South Seas was little known and yet unclaimed and as to Australia, not until 1845 was [the idea refuted] that there existed within its borders a great inland sea.”³⁵

The movement westward was occurring as the South Sea Islands were being explored and Australian indigenes were under siege in a manner not unlike that of their North American counterparts: those of the U.S. West were in an advantageous position to play key roles in these two crucial and virtually simultaneous developments—the frontier's closing in their fatherland and the dawning of U.S. imperialism in the Pacific.³⁶

Suggestive of this critical linkage was that the transcontinental railroad, which moved settlers and troops into previously contested territory, also “opened a new era for the islands of the Southern Sea. The great through route to Japan, China, New Zealand and Australia via San Francisco [was] now an accomplished and very successful fact.”³⁷

There was also a binding linkage between the United States, the Kingdom of Hawaii, and the colonies of Australia in the nineteenth century—a connection that mirrors the structure of this book. In 1864 as the Civil War was raging, Secretary of State William Seward was informed that the New South Wales government was eagerly awaiting the completion of the Pacific Railway so that they could establish a direct mail line of steamers between Sydney and San Francisco, touching at the Sandwich Islands.³⁸ This was a trade route, a migration route, and thus, a political route.

Indeed, it was as if Washington kept one eye peeled on the Pacific even as it was steamrolling westward over indigenous Americans. According to scholar C. Harley Grattan, “Citizens of the United States have played an active role in Pacific Basin affairs from the earliest years of the Republic. Save omnipresent Europe, no area of the outside world has persistently held their interest, not even South America, nor has any external area, again save Europe, played a larger role in the thinking of Americans about the national future.”³⁹

Military and geopolitical considerations were not the only reason the

Pacific became increasingly prominent at the end of the nineteenth century. Overproduction was a hallmark of U.S. woes. Surplus products from factories and farms glutted the home market, sparking an economic crisis, widespread unemployment, and unrest. Secretary of State James Blaine, presidential hopeful and “architect of empire,” was not alone in declaring that foreign market expansion was one way to “guarantee economic prosperity and social peace.” The leading Maine republican came to believe that overseas markets were not just necessary but crucial to preserving the American system.⁴⁰ The Pacific contained island stepping stones leading inexorably to the most populous market—Asia. Consequently, between 1821 and 1896 the United States exported only about 5 percent of its goods to Oceania and Asia—a figure that jumped to 35 percent by World War II, a conflict the United States entered after Hawaii was bombed.⁴¹

New Zealand and Australia, the twin outposts of the British Empire in this vast region of stepping stones, could not help but identify with the United States, though Washington’s relations with London were often strained during the nineteenth century, partly because of the glaring role U.S. nationals played in perpetuating the illegal African Slave Trade and the similarly iniquitous commerce in South Sea Islanders—both businesses the United Kingdom was sworn to eliminate.⁴² These Pacific settler colonies all had to deal with rebellious indigenes and, therefore, had a lot to learn from Washington in handling this troublesome matter. The founding of New Zealand occurred as the California population grew, buoyed by a rush for gold. One prominent Kiwi announced as early as 1854 that “New Zealand must daily Americanize” if it were to survive and thrive. The historian Frank Parsons averred in 1903 that New Zealanders were “the Yankees of the South Pacific. In fact, New Zealand is a little America, a sort of condensed United States. If all the nations of the world were classed according to the number and importance of their points of resemblance, the United States, New Zealand and Australia would stand in a group together.”⁴³ In that vein, Australians drew upon the writings of Josiah Clark Nott to justify oppression of indigenes.⁴⁴

So close was the United States to the aspirations of Queensland that the colonial secretary in 1888 considered a scheme that would involve settling U.S. nationals in his immense, though thinly populated colony. He hoped that many Americans would be attracted to Queensland, particularly by the “liberality of [its] land legislation,” which facilitated the development of the kind of large plantations that had characterized the ante-bellum U.S. South.⁴⁵ His interlocutor, General Stuart Stanley, did not seek to hide his own distaste for egalitarianism, a dislike he thought fit the United States perfectly and would

also be compatible with the realities of Queensland. "The average American who goes abroad to settle," he declared, "[is] not in love with Mexico"—the immediate neighbor of his own California; "he has no desire to become a 'greaser' when by passing to Australia he may resume his place as one of a kindred race—a kindred people speaking a kindred tongue." The confident former military man believed that the West Coast would be "only a halfway house between England and [the] Australasian colonies: that the latter country [would] be peopled from [America] rather than direct from Europe" in the "old Anglo-Saxon spirit of colonization."⁴⁶

This prognostication proved to be overly optimistic. The bane of the existence of those who sought to develop plantations based on cheap—or free—labor as a necessary complement to the colonial and imperial project was the relative dearth of "white" labor and the relative profusion of the "colored" variety. What was "the most serious ailment plaguing settler societies in the age of industrial capitalism?" pondered one study: "the lack of cheap, durable and easily exploited labor."⁴⁷ By taking unfree labor to new heights of exploitation, the United States had provided one answer to this age-old question and the nationals of this mighty land were seeking to expand this trend further westward—though others would have preferred white labor for various reasons. Thus, it was a familiar occurrence in 1878 when S. G. Wilder, President of the Board of Immigration in Hawaii, was instructed on the "feasibility of engaging reliable and competent white labor for [Hawaii's] plantations instead of Chinese and colored help"⁴⁸—but this assertion, too, proved to be wildly unrealistic.

Yet, the difficulties involved in attracting white labor to the Pacific had various consequences. It highlighted the role of the United States as a source for white labor in that it was rapidly becoming the most populous nation containing those of European descent. It illustrated a linkage that merits more extended interrogation—that between labor and global diplomacy. It underscored the skills of some U.S. nationals who transferred their corrupt ability to capture dark-skinned labor, thereby heightening the influence of a budding U.S. imperialism in the region. But by the same racial token, the influx of colored labor to redoubts of white supremacy (e.g., Queensland and Australia) generally raised probing questions in the self-proclaimed "lucky country" as to whether following such U.S. labor practices could eventually lead to the kind of explosion that had gripped North America itself from 1861 to 1865. "Look at the black labor difficulty in America—a difficulty that threatens the very existence of that mighty Republic," said one Brisbane writer in 1892, as the high tide of blackbirding was receding and the Australian colonies were coming together as one on a platform of white supremacy. "Last

century," he continued ominously, "the American people did not dream that there would ever be a black labor difficulty. The black population was comparatively small then, [just as in Queensland—but now look]. The presence of the alien race has already cost America a bloody Civil War; today it causes bitterness and bloodshed; in the future it may cost America her very existence as a free nationality. History has been defined as teaching philosophy by example." The record demonstrated that deployment of bonded black labor presented a grave threat to the viability of white supremacy, he philosophized. "I apply the words of Lincoln to the question of the hour," he thundered, referencing Lincoln's speech about the inability of a divided house to stand. "Black labor cannot be confined permanently to one industry. . . . This land must be the white man's only or the black man's only," and the latter possibility was too ghastly to contemplate. Exposing the grimy seams of the then prevailing progressivism, he proclaimed that "capitalism, in short, seeks to use the black man as a tool by which to crush the white democrat" and, therefore, curtailing the influx of the colored was an all-purpose remedy since "the mixing of the two races is an evil to both"—an evil propelled by greedy "planters [who] put business before humanity."⁴⁹

As a partial result, blackbirding and kidnapping in the South Seas virtually ended in 1901 when the Commonwealth of Australia was formed. One of the conditions by which Queensland joined the Commonwealth was to end the importation of black labor. In 1901 an act was passed authorizing the deportation of any of these South Sea Islanders found in Australia after 1906.⁵⁰

There was an indelible implication of race throughout this process. This was the case with the subjugations of the indigenes in Melanesia and Polynesia—not to mention their being transformed into bonded laborers—and indigenes in the settler states ranging from New Zealand and Australia to the United States itself. Quite typical were developments in the crucial 51st U.S. Congress (January 1890–January 1891) where heated debates about all manner of racial matters were rife. These involved not only anti-Negro discourses but anti-Indian and anti-Chinese sentiments as well, which allowed for typically fractious regional disputes to be transcended, as southern democrats found it easier to bond with their counterparts in the U.S. West on the basis of white supremacy.⁵¹ Still, it did seem that the anti-Negro crusade animated the others and became "the model for the imperialism of the 1890s."⁵²

Simultaneously, those of African descent in particular looked longingly to the Pacific as a sanctuary from their living hell in the Americas. Pacific indigenes and Africans in the Americas shared a mutual solidarity because both were subject to random kidnappings, dragged from one continent to another to

toil as unfree laborers.⁵³ Only recently, the *New York Amsterdam News*, which targets that city's burgeoning population of African origin, with a lingering bitterness referred to blackbirders (those "who captured the state's free Blacks and sold them into slavery").⁵⁴ In the nineteenth century particularly, the term "blackbirding" represented a trans-Pacific fate, though—ironically—the darkest skinned of the Americas often found a kind of paradise in the South Seas.

By one estimate there were about two thousand West Indians in Australia alone in 1860, a development facilitated by their all being part of the very same empire. The means by which they all arrived from the Caribbean were diverse, and certainly it was not all via blackbirding.⁵⁵ Perhaps unsurprisingly, when the notorious rebellion against British rule in Victoria, Australia, occurred in the 1850s, the first case tried in court was that of an American Negro named Joseph.⁵⁶ It was not deemed overly unusual when Negro singers toured Melbourne as the U.S. Civil War was raging.⁵⁷ A man hailed in the United States as a black history hero—the talented inventor Granville T. Woods—was actually born in Australia, as were his parents. Woods was actually probably only a quarter black; his maternal grandfather was a Malay Indian and "his other grandparents were by birth full-blooded savage . . . Australian aborigines, born in the wilds back of Melbourne."⁵⁸

In 1820 Sylvia Moseley Bingham, the prominent U.S. settler in Hawaii, was surprised that Anthony Allen, a black man from Schenectady, New York, seemed to live more comfortably than anyone else on the island.⁵⁹ By 1833, "blacks were so numerous in Honolulu that they had begun to feel the need for community organizations," as nearly half of all whalers who docked there and the core of a royal band for King Kamehameha III were all of African-American descent. King Kalakaua, it was reported, was "unusually dark for a Polynesian and several of his features suggested a Negro inheritance," a presumption that caused the Tokyo press to term him a "dark almost Black King." He solidified his ties with Negroes by visiting Hampton Institute in Virginia—Booker T. Washington's alma mater—which was modeled after a Hawaii school.⁶⁰ (In turn, the otherwise moderate Washington "spoke forcefully against the hostile seizure of the Kingdom and against annexation" in 1898.)⁶¹ As sailors jumped ship and slave runaways made their way westward, Hawaii's small Negro population increased accordingly.⁶²

As this century was concluding, another African-American, T. McCants Stewart, found himself in Hawaii. As the *Negro World*, journal of the nationalist movement led by Marcus Garvey, recounted with wonder later, Stewart went there at the behest of British entrepreneurs to represent their interests. Subsequently, he was instrumental in codifying Hawaii's laws. Then he was

mentioned prominently as a possible governor of the islands. Later, the same British interests that persuaded him to go to Hawaii persuaded him to head to Liberia,⁶³ exemplifying a historic though little understood trend: how U.S. white supremacy often induced African-Americans to ally with the real or imagined foes of Washington, a trend that did not begin—and did not end—with Paul Robeson. At any rate, Stewart was not *sui generis*, as it was another Negro man, Nolle R. Smith, a prominent local contractor and republican, who came to Hawaii in the first quarter of the twentieth century and served a few sessions in the Hawaiian legislature soon thereafter, at a time when his kind were painfully rare in such bodies on the mainland.⁶⁴

Reportedly, W. D. Fard—the inspiration for the grouping in the United States now known as the Nation of Islam—was of Hawaiian parentage.⁶⁵ In May 2005, the NOI detailed the deep spiritual connection it felt with the Ratana Church of New Zealand. Ratana, comprised largely of Maoris, is remarkably similar in many ways to its U.S. counterpart.⁶⁶ U.S. Senator Barack Obama, presently one of the most popular members of this body, spent his early years in Honolulu where his brown skin made plausible his grandfather's otherwise implausible assertion to tourists that Obama was the great-grandson of King Kamehameha.⁶⁷

The examples of Allen and Stewart suggest that the Pacific was viewed quite positively by African-Americans particularly, persecuted severely as they were in their ostensible homeland. At the same time, their Euro-American counterparts often viewed the region's indigenes as being quite similar to those who had been enslaved in the United States, with the latter often providing a template for how to proceed in bonding labor. This may have been driven by the simple fact that many of the indigenes of the Pacific resembled Africans or, in fact, *were* "Africans." Writing for a Fijian audience in 1918, one analyst recalled,

A few years ago I visited Natal, and at Durban the first thing that struck me was the extraordinary similarity of the men who were coaling our liner with the Solomon Islanders at Malata in Solomon Islands. They worked in the same quick, jerky way, rushing at their work, whistling instead of breathing heavily, chaffing, challenging, chattering and making a game of work, as I have so often seen the Malata men doing; even their speech and manner of speaking was similar. Their skins were of the same color, their build and stature similar. . . . The Central East African was the first immigrant to populate the Melanesian Islands, [or alternatively, this region] was probably populated from South Africa.



FIGURE 1. Fijian and Samoan men: The resemblance of the indigenes of the South Seas to Africans facilitated the process whereby Euro-Americans—in particular—treated them like slaves. Courtesy of the Bishop Museum.

Then there were the supposed similarities shared by the Masai of Kenya and indigenous Fijians.⁶⁸ Speaking personally, as a dark-skinned African-American with “woolly” hair, I found during my research trips to Hawaii and Fiji that it was not easy to distinguish my appearance from that of the indigenes.

Thus, even the otherwise liberal Mark Twain occasionally referred to indigenous Hawaiians as “niggers” in his journal and observed that they were “almost as dark as Negroes,”⁶⁹ comments not unique to the Mississippi River sage. Samuel Chapman Armstrong was born in Maui in 1839 and later became associated with the historically black Hampton Institute in Virginia; he was a mentor of sorts to Booker T. Washington and was not alone in seeing similarities between African-Americans and indigenous Hawaiians. He avowed darkly, “Give the African or Polynesian unlimited political power and, unless restrained, political death will follow.” Interestingly, the disreputable Mississippi Plan meant to destroy Negroes politically was to provide the model for disenfranchisement in Hawaii,⁷⁰ just as for various reasons, African-Americans and West Indians were to be encountered Zelig-like at particularly fraught moments in the Pacific.

A significant difference was that in Hawaii, disenfranchisement swept within its ambit a group not of “pure European descent,”⁷¹ which (unlike the

indigenes and U.S. Negroes) had a powerful patron to object on their behalf. Tokyo objected strenuously when those of Japanese origin in Hawaii were not accorded full suffrage rights. In 1889 Count Okuna Shigenobu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, spoke bluntly to the new government in Honolulu that only recently had clipped the wings of the Kingdom: "The Imperial Government desire to have Japanese subjects in Hawaii placed on the same footing as Europeans and Americans," even though the new constitution did not give the "franchise to Japanese residents."⁷² A stern protest was in order, he thought, and this conflict was a notable step toward the Pearl Harbor debacle of 1941.⁷³

The British Empire was also not pleased with annexation. Wellington took the unprecedented step of informing President McKinley directly of New Zealand's staunch opposition to the proposed U.S. annexation of Hawaii.⁷⁴

This was part of a larger pattern of big power jousting in the Pacific that included not only Hawaii, Japan, France, the United States, and the United Kingdom, but Germany as well. The latter four powers had profound differences between and among themselves but were all united in opposition to Hawaii's conception of a Polynesian confederation—which had been conceived in the context of an alliance with Tokyo—that would have provided Honolulu a form of hegemony in Fiji, Samoa, and elsewhere. U.S. Secretary of State Thomas Bayard brought his "grave doubts" directly to the attention of Hawaii's representative in Washington.⁷⁵ Tokyo, on the other hand, was developing a special relationship with Honolulu, a tie that had brought thousands of Japanese immigrants to reside in the Kingdom in recent years—the monarchy was adamantly opposed to the kind of blackbirding that had ensnared Fiji and Queensland—and was not as exercised about Hawaii's regional pretensions. Yet the maneuvering of these budding imperialist powers for influence, especially the bickering between Tokyo and Washington, was to explode in war a few decades later with matters of "race" being readily visible.

IN SHORT, this book concerns a series of tightly woven interrelated issues: just as the Americas relied heavily on slave labor from Africa for production, Queensland and Fiji sought bonded labor in the South Seas. That is, labor automatically implicated a kind of diplomacy. This was occurring as the frontier was closing in the United States and an imperialist phase was opening,⁷⁶ which led to a lurch toward Hawaii. For the Hawaii Kingdom, an alliance with Japan meant not only a hedge against being swallowed whole by the United States, but also a source of labor. Simultaneously, the Australian colonies were consolidating on the basis of whiteness, which meant an expulsion of bonded labor of a darker hue. Just as blackbirding involved notions of ra-

cial superiority to rationalize the exploitation of bonded labor, imperialism required something similar in order to deny self-determination to Hawaii, Samoa, and the South Seas generally. The problem here was that these cocksure theoreticians of white supremacy did not altogether contemplate the rise of Japan, which led directly to December 7, 1941.

As this book covers points within the broad expanse that is the Pacific, readers may want to examine the chapter summaries below to ascertain the route of this text:

Chapter 1, which focuses heavily on the colonies of Australia, also sets the stage for a major theme of this book—the rise of white supremacy in the region.

Chapter 2 concentrates on the rise of blackbirding as the U.S. Civil War unfolds and focuses particularly on the role of U.S. nationals in the process.

Chapter 3 provides an extended examination of perhaps the most notorious blackbirder, William “Bully” Hayes, who may have been related to Ruth-erford B. Hayes.

Chapter 4 concerns Fiji and how beginning in the mid-nineteenth century this nation’s destiny became entangled with that of the United States, especially when U.S. nationals began flooding there after the Civil War and establishing plantations deploying various levels of unfree labor.

Chapter 5 extends the discussion of Fiji as it examines the rise of the Ku Klux Klan (and KKK tactics) there, a development which, in a sense, led to the archipelago embracing British colonialism as a way to avoid what was thought to be the harsher fate of embracing the United States.

Chapter 6 concerns the attempt by the Hawaiian Kingdom to blunt the thrust of the major powers in the region by providing assistance to nations like Fiji. This trend was seen as inflaming by these same powers.

Chapter 7 provides context for the run-up to the so-called Bayonet Constitution of 1887, which effectively clipped the wings of the Hawaiian monarchy and followed quickly in the wake of Honolulu’s closer ties to Tokyo; this was exemplified by the influx of thousands of laborers of Japanese origin beginning in 1885, a development that was facilitated by the king’s rapturous reception in Japan a few years earlier.

Chapter 8 looks at the role of African-Americans and West Indians in the region and the often influential roles they played, which served as a counterpoint to the efforts of their Euro-American counterparts.

Chapter 9 examines how elites in the Australian colonies began souring on the growing role in the economy of bonded labor from the region. They see the multiracial experiment of the United States as a negative example. Strikingly, a

notably vicious example of blackbirding involving a Euro-American accused leads to maximum publicity and a general revulsion toward this practice.

Chapter 10 looks at parallel developments in Hawaii as local elites scramble—unsuccessfully—to find an alternative to Japanese and Asian labor. They overreach when they finally dislodge the monarchy in 1893, as this leaves them exposed to increased pressure from Tokyo—a development foiled (or so it is thought) when annexation by the U.S. occurs in 1898 as Washington verges on war with Spain, which announces more formally the rise of U.S. imperialism. The story is brought up to date as the current bane of slavery and forced labor is discussed, along with the efflorescence of the independence movement in Hawaii.

CHAPTER 1

Toward a “White Pacific”

The system of transporting British and Irish convicts that brought so many Europeans to Australia in the late eighteenth century was, in a sense, a variant of the slave mode of production, thus *possibly* easing apprehensions toward blackbirding in the region’s superpower. With U.S. independence, London lost this huge land as a dumping ground for the indigent and the island continent emerged as a substitute. Strikingly, the use of New South Wales as a convict colony was suggested by the North American loyalist James Matra. Some who had fought against London in North America wound up in New South Wales.¹ From its inception, Australia had the earmarks of its former trans-Pacific empire counterpart in that “bonds of ethnicity” complicated the ability of poorer Euro-Australians to pursue “irreconcilable class differences” with those responsible for their exile. According to historian Kay Saunders, “It is probable though not conclusive that all categories of servants worked in conjunction with the proprietors to exterminate” the Aborigines, who—as in the United States—were often routinely referred to as “niggers.”²

Continuing the blood-feud with London, which only recently had culminated in revolution, U.S. nationals continued their mischief by hauling convicts improperly from Sydney and landing them on South Sea Islands.³ Flexing their developing muscles, U.S. nationals sought to bring goods to the region from India and China in defiance of the king and the East India Company.⁴ The relations between Australians and U.S. nationals at the Bass Strait grounds deteriorated to the point where violence took place between Americans led by Amasa Delano (President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s ancestor) and Australians.⁵ At this point there was a mordant fear in London that if New South Wales colonists were allowed to flourish and prosper by the development of commerce and industry, they too could revolt in emulation of the Yankees,⁶ just as there were similar concerns in Washington about London’s intentions in Texas, Oregon, California, and Hawaii.



FIGURE 2. “Uncle Sam.—See if you can read that sign through this hyar telescope o’ mine!” Uncle Sam attempts to wield the Monroe Doctrine in the region: The United States and Great Britain jostled in the region, though the latter’s surrogate, the Australian colonies, gave London a powerful advantage, which Washington countered with its growing encroachment in Hawaii. Courtesy of the Bishop Museum.

Suspicions were aroused in London when “about fifty American seamen were the first white [*sic*] people to settle in what is now South Australia” as they sought fur seals about two centuries ago.⁷ In search of business, U.S. nationals were also encroaching in the Dutch sphere of interest in Java as early as 1799,⁸ though the less populous Australia seemed a juicier target for poaching.

As London continued utilizing Australia as a vast refuse bin for dissidents of all types, more possibilities were created for U.S. involvement in the region. Thus, when in the 1830s London dispatched Canadian rebels down under, a number of U.S. nationals along the border with this northern neighbor were swept up in this ambit and found themselves thousands of miles away from home.⁹

U.S. seamen, whalers, and searchers for sandalwood were also frequently found in the South Pacific. By the 1840s, there were scores of U.S. whalers active off the coast of Australia.¹⁰ It was the sandalwood that led directly to "raiding for slaves. As the precious wood grew scarcer, it had to be sought with greater thoroughness. . . . The first Melanesians ever shipped to Australia came from Lifu and Uea. They were imported into New South Wales in 1847." The principal figure responsible for this—Ben Boyd—had spent time in California.¹¹

Boyd's sojourn in California and activity in the South Seas was suggestive of how the Pacific had become an immense highway moving U.S. nationals—and their antipodean counterparts—back and forth. In the 1840s, U.S. readers were apprised that the male population of New South Wales was much larger than the female population and that "many a worthy young bachelor is mourning over the want of a suitable wife." Tragically, it was thought, some married native or Negro women. "An importation of white maidens would find a good market," mused Thomas Jefferson Jacobs, "and I am surprised that no Yankee has undertaken this speculation." Transporting white women from what was rapidly becoming their most populous site—the United States—was an urgent necessity since "the mongrel or mulatto children of the Bush Rangers [were] perhaps destined to form a new race of men that [would] people the interior of [the] vast island continent and who [would] thereafter be a source of much trouble to the British colony."¹² A glimpse of the supposed downside of "race mixing" could be easily ascertained in North America.

Indicative of the parallels to be drawn between Australia and the United States was the fear that existed in both lands, at least among whites, about miscegenation. Evocative of why transporting Euro-American women to Australia may have been bruited was the widespread concern in Port Phillip in the 1840s when a rumor persisted that a white woman was being held captive by indigenes. This rumor fueled wildly anti-Aboriginal sentiments and provided justification for taking their land. Of course, the mystery woman was never found.¹³

This was all reflective of the concern often expressed by U.S. visitors about the plight and fate of this huge penal colony. In 1849, Levi Holden of the United States visited Sydney and expressed wonder that the "convict portion of the population never [sought to] intermarry with the others or *honest* settlers. . . . What will be the result of a society formed by the exclusive intermarriage of convicts? This is a subject for curious speculation," he mused.¹⁴

Remarkably, U.S. visitors in Australia often expressed their contempt for the indigenes by comparing them to the Africans who had been so shamelessly

exploited in their own land. Lieutenant George M. Colvocoresses of the U.S. Navy made such a comparison during his journey southward in the period leading up to 1852—except he found the Aborigines' appearance "far more hideous; in fact, imagination cannot conceive the extent of their ugliness. . . . [They were] perfectly satanic in appearance; . . . one fancies himself in the midst of a horde of sooty imps just escaped from the dominions of his cloven-footed majesty." These barely human individuals, he thought, were of the "lowest depths of barbarity . . . exhibiting but a slight superiority over the beasts of the field."¹⁵

That the indigenes of the region were seen as equivalent to Africans made it easier to subject them to the fate that had befallen so many of this grouping in North America—slavery. When Amasa Delano of the Roosevelt clan arrived in 1791 in the land that was to be known as Papua New Guinea, he thought the "natives" were "Negroes or woolly-headed, . . . well known to hate white people so much as to reward an individual by making him a chief when he will bring them a white man's head, . . . [though] when Europeans first visited New Guinea the natives manifested no spirit of enmity. But the Europeans seized and carried them away as slaves, in a most treacherous manner."¹⁶

Thinking of Pacific indigenes as Africans—a broad grouping whose alleged suitability for enslavement was well established—facilitated bondage for Melanesians and Polynesians; minimally, enslavement of Africans had served to "normalize" bondage generally. When Polynesians were being dragged off to Peru in the 1860s in yet another bondage induced by the U.S. Civil War, a British man remarked, "their treatment is nearly the same as Negroes in the time of slavery," while another commented, "the Polynesian emigrant, like the Negro . . . is ignorant of his destination; like the Negro he is sold; and like the Negro he has real interference in the contract which is realized upon his person."¹⁷

The antipathy for the indigenes and sympathy for the settlers—an unsurprising development coming from Euro-Americans in the midst of consummating a process also embarked on by Euro-Australians—was nevertheless bracing. A U.S. national who identified herself as Mrs. Charles Meredith was in Tasmania when one of the world's major genocides was unfolding, yet she found that the white people there were "most erroneously believed to have been the aggressors." There was "some peculiarity in the atmosphere around Van Dieman's Land [Tasmania], which is adverse to the transmission of the truth," she concluded, adding that events there were "so greatly misunderstood."¹⁸

On the other hand, the U.S. consul in New Zealand was hardly impressed with the indigenous Maoris. Writing in 1858, he found the indigenes to be "a

lazy, drunken race resembling much in that respect the North American Indians. They are too indolent to work for themselves unless forced to it by necessity and too proud to work for the whites, . . . [yet] they are shrewd and instantly alive to injustice and will fight for their presumed rights with savage exasperation."¹⁹

Other U.S. visitors resorted to more ancient comparisons beyond the typical analogies to Africans and Native Americans. During an 1847 visit to Fiji, the U.S. diplomat and entrepreneur John B. Williams found the indigenes' manners, traditions, and habits akin to those of the ancient Jews and concluded that they were "the descendants of the lost tribes of Israel." Apparently this was not intended as a compliment since he concluded that "in trading they are perfect Jews."²⁰

Though transporting legions of white women to the South Seas to spare this region the supposed tragedy of miscegenation may have been pleasing in certain precincts in both London and Sydney, such gestures could not erode a general suspicion of the motives of some U.S. nationals—suspicions that increased when credible complaints arose alleging that some of these men were fostering Maori hostility toward London across the Tasman in New Zealand.²¹ Other than Hawaii, this latter nation had the most important U.S. consulate in the entire Pacific during this time, with the possible exception of that at Canton, China. British machinations were a factor when "American whalers in the area were almost completely driven out" and "American investments were all but wiped out . . . [as there was a] destruction of American interests in New Zealand."²² But continuing this contradictory pattern of admiration and scorn is the fact that the "honor of being the first to introduce ground sluicing in Otago belongs to one James Graham, known as California Jim."²³ U.S. nationals also formed "what became Australia's greatest coaching firm."²⁴

That there was a gold rush occurring more or less simultaneously in California and in the region surrounding Melbourne increased trans-Pacific traffic tremendously.²⁵ This mighty ocean was a transmission belt transporting men and women from one distant site to another. Thus, G. N. Parkinson, vice-consul of New Zealand in San Francisco in 1959, recalled that his great-grandfather and *his* father came to the Golden State in 1848 and earlier had migrated from the United Kingdom to New Orleans and Texas, before moving to Melbourne in 1853 and then later to New Zealand, where his family became engaged in violent conflicts with the indigenes.²⁶ Robert S. Swanston, a British man born in India, was also a member of the Society of California Pioneers. "I went to California in September 1849," he recalled, "and in February 1856 I left [San Francisco] in a schooner bound on a trading voyage, via the Marquesas and Tahiti to Samoa, on my way to Australia. In Samoa I remained eighteen months,

the latter nine of which I had charge of the U.S. Consulate there.” In 1857, he headed for Fiji where at various times he was a Hawaiian consul, acting British consul (for twelve months), and advisor and secretary to the Confederated Chiefs of North and East Fiji (for six years, 1866–1872). It is no surprise, then, that he could speak both the Fijian and Samoan languages fluently.²⁷ He was changing allegiances to governments casually, as if he were changing socks, a development that could have weakened the legitimacy of the nation-state, particularly if said state objected to discreditable policies such as kidnapping men and women.

The peripatetic Parkinson and Swanston were not unique in traversing the Pacific. It is estimated that about 9 percent of the first 100,000 gold seekers to reach Victoria were from the United States. “All were labeled Californians and were suspect . . . [and] unwelcome,”²⁸ just as Aussie émigrés in California had a “reputation for criminal activities” and were “one of the most maligned immigrant groups in American history.”²⁹

Yet the Yankee merchant George Francis Train was not engaging in puffery when he wrote from Melbourne in 1853: “You would be surprised to see how fast this place is becoming *Americanized*. . . . It is not an unusual thing to hear the movers of some undertaking that has been dragging its slow carcass along, remark: ‘if you want to have the jetty finished, you must let the Americans take hold of it.’”³⁰ Train’s glowing account does not necessarily contradict contrary assertions because in the nineteenth century there was an ambivalence—ranging from admiration to scorn—in Australia toward the United States.³¹ In fact, it remains true that “if Britain is the mother of modern Australia, then the United States is the accidental father.”³²

This Yankee parentage may have made it easier to accept the blackbirding that was an offshoot of the African Slave Trade, which had transformed the United States so dramatically. Melbourne was indeed a “markedly Americanized city” in the 1850s. Such influences were not unique to Victoria; as early as the 1820s two of Sydney’s leading merchants were from the United States, though they were quickly naturalized by “special acts of the Legislative Council.”³³ But it was Victoria and its glittering gold that were attracting U.S. nationals like bees to honey. In 1852, thirteen American ships came to Melbourne; in 1853, 134 ships. As well, there were 16,000 American arrivals in Sydney and Melbourne during the years 1852–1856.³⁴ Yet the Pacific was not a one-way street, as Australian colonists poured into California when gold was discovered there³⁵ and were at times treated with the kind of disdain that Californians sometimes encountered down under, perhaps illuminating that intense attraction can generate friction.

Disdain was, perhaps, too mild a term to describe London's reaction to U.S. nationals in the Australian colonies as the decade of the 1850s unfolded. In 1853 London's man in Washington, John Crampton, detected a plan by U.S. citizens to "revolutionize Australia." "There can be no doubt however," he stated, "that a revolution in Australia, by which its connection with Great Britain should be severed, would be an event highly acceptable to the great mass of the American people . . . [since] the discovery of gold has awakened public attention to that part of the world." He called on colonial authorities to exercise "extreme vigilance" since the majority of these perceived ruffians "would be found ready to encourage, if not to participate in, any factious proceedings which might be attempted by the Colonists themselves." There was sympathy in the United States, he thought, for the Irish who were gaining influence in Australia.³⁶ A Yankee expatriate in Australia, George Francis Train, was among those who recognized that the British authorities were gravely concerned about the "large body of republican Americans—including Irish-Americans—in their Australian colonies" who might be interested in an antipodean replica of 1776; they feared there was a "secret, foreign, largely American, movement for an Australian republic."³⁷

These fears metastasized when there was an outbreak of sedition in the Victorian gold fields and it turned out that it was not just North Americans who were involved but African-Americans as well. John Joseph of New York was placed on trial in February 1855 and charged with treason, accused of leading a revolt against the queen, as a result of disputes about diggings. Just before his trial, the colonial governor declared, "There are those who continue to seize every opportunity to rouse a spirit of opposition to the law among the mining population . . . and attempt was being made to organize what was termed a Diggers' Congress." Dismissing peremptorily the alleged conspirators, he said they were "headed by men of no repute."³⁸

Writing to his family back in the United States, Davis Calwell grouched about "insufferable heat, tormenting flies and whirlwinds of dust" and "rain, rain, rain;" he enclosed a few flecks of gold dust redolent of his mission in Victoria, then got down to business.³⁹ "Great changes have taken place," he said with pointed portent. "The diggers goaded to desperation by the tyranny of the gold commission officials & exasperated at the contempt of justice in the decisions of the court took things in their own hands . . . [and] revolted: 130 prisoners were taken [and] about 30 [were slain] on both sides. . . . Martial law was proclaimed." He exulted finally that the "outbreak [had] produced good effects."⁴⁰

The charges were serious, however. Joseph and his comrades were accused of arming themselves with offensive weapons; they then "collected together

and formed troops and bands under distinct leaders, and were drilled and trained in military exercise." They were said to have "fired upon, fought with, wounded and killed divers[e] of the said soldiers and other loyal subjects"; more than twenty were killed or wounded. A key moment arose when the chilling query was posed, "Did you hear anything about establishing a republic?" thereby deposing the queen.⁴¹

Joseph was seen firing a double-barreled gun in the direction of a Captain Wise, who later died from wounds. Also accused was James Campbell of Jamaica. Others provided equally damning sworn testimony, though for whatever reason the Negroes were the only defendants identified by color.⁴²

About 120 were initially arrested and about 13 were then committed to trial with—for whatever reason—Joseph being selected first to stand trial. Six witnesses asserted that he was inside the stockade; two witnesses saw him firing a gun at the military. The charge of treason was supported by evidence that included a rebel's flag, witnessing of the "drilling of armed bodies of men," and the like.⁴³

One analyst concluded that at trial "no hostility was apparent based on [Joseph's] race or color, . . . [though] the Crown challenged the Irish jurors, together with publicans [*sic*] and other questionable persons." Joseph did play the "class card" by objecting to "gentlemen and merchants" alike.⁴⁴ On the other hand, some Aussies resented that Joseph's color seemed to stop the U.S. consul from protecting him. "What sort of democracy was the United States?" it was asked. Others wondered how a U.S. Negro could be a traitor to the queen. After his acquittal, "men applauded so boisterously they were sentenced to a week in jail for contempt of court. A British-born Negro was quoted as saying that a sorry day had come for liberty in Her Majesty's dominions when it had to be upheld by a black man from slaveholding America."⁴⁵

Not much is known about Joseph (tellingly, his name was at times spelled "Josephs," suggesting the evanescence of his existence). He was "not an articulate person but neither was he as simple-minded as he made himself appear. From the outset he maintained a disarming air of bewilderment as his best defense. . . . He played his part well, grinning foolishly and sometimes whistling before answering questions," illustrating a dissembling tradition that had been honed under slavery.⁴⁶ It was a winning approach. Coming out of the courthouse after his acquittal, "he was put in a chair, and carried around the streets of the city in triumph with the greatest demonstrations of joy."⁴⁷

London's man in Victoria, B. Lyon Milne, was unimpressed. It was a "remarkable day in the annals of Australia, . . . [this] trial for high treason [that resulted in an acquittal]. . . . Victoria thus sets the example of legalizing open

rebellion against British authority," he said incredulously. This "demands the serious consideration of Downing Street," he thought. "The British Government will very soon have more upon their hands than a Russian War and that pregnant with more disastrous consequences," he added gloomily.⁴⁸ Milne may have had a point. The Yankee merchant George Francis Train claimed that he was offered the presidency of the Australian Republic after the miners' rebellion and that the leader of the uprising was James McGill, a U.S. citizen.⁴⁹

Joseph's triumph was ironic and contradictory. It boosted republican sentiments—and therefore Washington—though so many African-Americans had fled from the United States precisely because of its flagrantly anti-republican racist policies. The latter were to blossom shortly in the Pacific in the form of blackbirding, a kind of kidnapping that continuously threatened the well-being of the dark skinned globally. London, which was the major threat to these slavers, received a setback: radicals transnationally saw its monarchy as an atrocious repudiation of republicanism. Would these republican sentiments ultimately outweigh the rebellion against British authority, an authority that kept slavers and kidnappers in check?

It was not a simple question to answer, as the case of John Mitchel suggested. Just as Joseph was being acquitted, he escaped from Tasmania, stopped in Sydney, and sailed on to Batavia, San Francisco, and New York. He was hailed in Gotham by his fellow Irishmen in 1853. Yet during the Civil War, he championed the Confederacy and three of his sons joined their ranks. Again this rebellion against the crown and supposed advance for republicanism came weighted down by a crown of thorns all its own.⁵⁰ His grandson became mayor of New York in 1916 at a time when various forms of Jim Crow continued to persist in this metropolis.⁵¹

Or consider alternatively John Boyle O'Reilly. He was deported from the United Kingdom to Western Australia because of his Fenian activities, but he escaped by boarding a U.S. whaler and wound up in Boston. There he became a newspaper editor, orator, and champion of African-Americans. Association with the Aborigines had a "marked influence on his idealism in his later years" and as a result he "constantly took up the cause of oppressed minority groups such as the Jews, the indigenous Indians of America and, most especially, the Negroes." Anticipating arguments that would not prevail until decades later, this late-nineteenth-century figure "exhorted Negroes to take pride in their race," therefore "anticipating the cry of the 1960s 'black is beautiful'" campaign. Going further, he adumbrated the notion of armed retaliations against lynchings and lynchers. Yet he had an abiding hatred of London, though this power was the primary force seeking to stem blackbirding, while his current

homeland—the United States, which had rescued him—by way of comparison was relatively indifferent to this blatant violation of human rights.⁵²

It seemed that Mitchel was more of an Australian indicator than Joseph or O'Reilly when it came to the question of slavery—an institution that enjoyed a new birth of freedom in the South Seas after it was driven out of North America. Certainly this was the distinct impression left by the triumphant three-week visit in early 1865 to Melbourne of the warship *Shenandoah* of the so-called Confederate States of America. The enthusiastic reception belied the obvious fact that the CSA was on the verge of collapse, which served to underscore the evidently sincere pro-slavery sentiments then prevailing in Victoria. Tellingly, Melbourne newspapers routinely ran stories from the *Richmond Daily Whig* and other major southern papers, as the readers were apparently concerned about the fate of the slave-holding CSA.⁵³

Certainly, London was quite concerned about gathering tensions with Washington. In late 1861, London told its emissary in Queensland that the United Kingdom could soon be at war against the United States. Further reason for anger with Washington was indicated when Downing Street had to arrange for the “troops sent from Australia at the breaking out of the war in New Zealand” to be “forthwith returned” to the island continent, thus potentially jeopardizing antipodean holdings.⁵⁴

The *Shenandoah*, a “handsome, smart-looking full-rigged steam sloop of 1260 tons, with engines capable of generating 240 horsepower,”⁵⁵ and its officers and crew took to the hearts of the Melbourne people. The exclusive Melbourne Club entertained visitors lavishly, “crowds enthusiastically greeted the Confederate uniform whenever it appeared in the streets, [and] there were picnics and outings for officers and men alike.”⁵⁶ This rousing reception may not have been atypical. The Australian colonies were replete with CSA veterans and forty-two men were recruited for the CSA during the warship’s brief visit. Then there were the rebels who chose to expatriate to Australia after their loss, indicative of how congenial they found the environment,⁵⁷ since the prevailing public sentiment in Melbourne was pro-Confederate.⁵⁸

One inside account of the CSA ship’s docking in Melbourne avowed rapturously,

I do not suppose so much hospitality ever was or ever will be shown to another ship in that port, and there were few if any who sailed in the *Shenandoah*, who will not carry to their graves many pleasant memories of the days they spent on the shores of Australia. . . . Invitations to dinners and balls poured in from all sides, and every one was particular to mention that he felt

the warmest sympathy for the Confederate cause. . . . A scene of excitement was inaugurated which baffles all adequate description. . . . [There were] hundreds of men . . . [who] made application to join us here, but as we had no right to ship any in a neutral port, all were denied, reluctantly.

This Confederate memoirist also recounted another story:

An old lady came aboard with her little son. She was a southern woman, she said, and her boy had been born in the Sunny South, and she [told] Captain [James] Waddell to take him as the only contribution she had to offer to her country and educate him for the service. . . . [The warm greeting was replicated when] more than seven thousand people [came to greet their vessel]. . . . Had we been content to stay for six months in Melbourne, and charged an admission fee of one dollar to visitors . . . we could have paid a large installment upon the Confederate debt. . . . [It was] one continuous fete, . . . [overflowing with] balls, soirees and receptions followed in such rapid succession that the memory of one was lost in another, and, in brief, we were so persistently and continually lionized that we were in serious danger of becoming vain. . . . [As we were departing,] our ship's company had received a mysterious addition of forty-five men . . . [who said] they were natives of the Southern Confederacy.⁵⁹

This was a real gain for the CSA, as the ship was so understaffed that the officers had to go against protocol, take off their coats, and help raise the anchors.⁶⁰ At the same time, a number of the crew stayed in Melbourne, including at least one Negro, perhaps a slave.⁶¹

This evident enthusiasm for the pro-slavery CSA did not escape the notice of U.S. Secretary of State William Seward. Washington's representative in Melbourne averred that the *Shenandoah* was actually the British naval vessel *Sea King*, seemingly an indication of the keen collaboration between the rebels and London. "Instead of being assisted by the authorities," fumed William Blanchard, the U.S. diplomat based in Victoria, "I was only baffled and taught how certain proceedings could not be instituted." Worse, "James Francis Maguire, late U.S. Consul here, as far as I could see and learn," he lamented, "acted as Consul for the vessel and her officers."⁶²

This relative indifference to the obscenity that was slavery prepared the pathway for acceptance of the blackbirding that erupted as a direct result of the U.S. Civil War. That the victims were mostly dark skinned seemed almost "natural" in a world where these people were equally under siege in the

Australian colonies and New Zealand itself. That the United States, which was the exemplar for how advanced development could be generated through a vehicle as antediluvian as slavery, was also something of a role model for those in the South Seas chafing under the burden of London's hand only served to heighten Washington's influence in the region as it lessened the revulsion toward blackbirding.

THE STORY goes that when Satan was cast out from heaven, he fell on the Garden of Eden and struck so hard that he drove it to the other side of the earth, where it appeared as the Hawaiian Islands.⁶³ Unquestionably these strategically sited islands, sitting astride the route from the U.S. West to Australia and studded with lethargically swaying palm trees, black volcanic ash, and pristine beaches, were seen as a kind of Paradise Regained by those who set eyes upon it. This was particularly true of the United States and the original would-be colonizer, the United Kingdom. However, the rulers in Honolulu, as they espied the rise of leading powers in their neighborhood—all with imperial ambitions and willing to wink at the most severe tactics, including using kidnapping as a means to secure unfree labor—advanced rapidly on the path to modernization in the nineteenth century, only to become one of the initial victims of a burgeoning U.S. imperialism.

Kamehameha IV, monarch of the Kingdom of Hawaii, was widely considered to be both pro-British and anti-American, perhaps in part because of a preference for a faraway ally instead of one in closer vicinity. "He did dislike some American institutions and conditions . . . [and was a] great admirer of English institutions," concedes the historian Ralph Kuykendall. "Queen Victoria of England was to be godmother of the Hawaiian royal child."⁶⁴ Besides being distant, London thought it had another advantage over its former North American colony. In 1851 London warned the Kingdom that the United States was "very hard upon the natives of the countries they obtain." Later their representative, William Miller, attacked a proposed U.S. annexation of the Kingdom by "repeatedly raising the twin specters of slavery and racism as well as the treatment meted out to Indian tribes in the United States," all this in an effort to influence the monarchy. Miller went further and instructed Honolulu that the "geographical location of the Sandwich Islands south of the Missouri Compromise line . . . would, under annexation, mean enslavement of native Hawaiians."⁶⁵

It did not take much arm-twisting to convince the Kingdom of Washington's encrusted racist biases. When Prince Alexander Liholiho traveled to Washington as the Civil War was about to engulf the nation, he was appalled.

"While I was sitting looking out of the window," he remarked, "a man came to me and told me to get out of the carriages. . . . [I was] taken for somebody's servant, just because I had a darker skin than he had." The prince was beyond outrage. "Confounded fool," he sputtered. This was the first time that he had ever been treated like this and, tellingly, this was not in Europe, but the United States. "In this country," he cried, "I must be treated like a dog. I am disappointed [with] the Americans. . . . They have no manners." In contrast, he said, exaggerating to make a point, "in England an African can pay his fare for the cars and he can go and sit alongside of Queen Victoria."⁶⁶

Of course, London could only preen as a beacon of equality in comparison to the slave republic that was the United States, a development that outraged many in North America. "Our greatest source of trouble between us and other nations," bewailed U.S. settler William Lee, writing from Honolulu, "[was London]. . . . The representative of Great Britain . . . is exceedingly tenacious and unreasonable on this subject and stirs up Englishmen to quarrel and strife." Lee, a jurist, eventually became chief justice of the high court in Honolulu and was advantageously placed to ascertain what was occurring. These settlers provided London with substantial ammunition, he thought, since their "prejudices . . . against the natives on account of their color is very strong and most of the foreigners unconnected with the [religious] mission, seem to have very little charity or sympathy for anyone who nears a copper colored skin."⁶⁷

Even France, whose anti-Haitian policies indicated that it was hardly sympathetic to the aspirations of the "copper colored" thought it could more than compete with the United States in what some considered the latter's backyard.⁶⁸ In 1843, London thought it desirable for its emissary in Honolulu to "constantly keep a vigilant eye on the proceedings of the French in the Pacific," instructing him slyly that "the less you appear to watch them, the more surely you will be enabled to do [so] with effect." But even then, London knew that an even closer eye should be kept on U.S. activities, adding the instruction that "you will also not fail to exercise the same vigilance with regard to the United States."⁶⁹ Repeatedly, London's representative was told to continue to use "your utmost efforts to prevent the Annexation of the Sandwich Islands to the United States." Seeking to "place the islands under the joint protectorate" of England, France, and the United States was suggested in 1854 as yet another way to blunt Washington's obviously capacious ambitions.⁷⁰

G. P. Judd of U.S. origin was concerned with Paris, however, feeling their delegate "is every day becoming more troublesome and . . . will not be satisfied until he rules over us." He also detected bad intentions from Russia's

representative; indeed, he argued, “the French and English agents here are very thick with this Russian officer, and from their bitter hostility to Americans would naturally foment a measure such as I have hinted at,” that is, armed conflict. The United States had to take preemptive action, it was thought, to foil other powers and protect its own security. “Again,” Judd said. “If the United States hesitates and the Emperor of Russia should offer to purchase the sovereignty, what is to prevent the King from selling out?” This all raised alarm in his fevered imagination. Maneuvering to raise a U.S. flag over Hawaii “in case of hostilities” was his suggestion. This was in 1851 but was a clear precursor of the kind of imperialist jousting that was to devastate the prize that was Hawaii forty-odd years later.⁷¹

Just as the rush for gold had fueled traffic between Australia and New Zealand on the one hand, and California on the other, something similar occurred with regard to the Golden State and Hawaii. This increased traffic from all corners of the world heightened U.S. awareness of the importance of Hawaii to its own security. Moreover, a shot of economic adrenaline was provided by this thirst for the yellow mineral. One unnamed sojourner remarked in 1848, “Honolulu is emptied of goods, all gone to San Francisco to be sold & sold at enormous profits, e.g., 1 oz. of gold for a pair of shoes.” The “natives” were also fleeing eastward since they could earn \$75 to \$100/month in San Francisco, wages that dwarfed what could be earned in Honolulu. The “gold fever in California clears off a great proportion of our floating population,” it was reported.⁷²

These ambitions were on display when Washington dispatched an exploratory expedition in 1838 to the South Seas led by Charles Wilkes. A colleague referred to Wilkes as “either crazy, beyond redemption or . . . a rascally tyrant & a liar,” and the massacres and deaths he and his crew left in its wake did little to dispel the harsh description.⁷³ “There was a great contrast between the Tongese and Feejees,” he thought, referring to the people of Tonga versus Fiji. “The former being light mulattoes, while the latter were quite black. . . . It was pleasant to look upon the Tongese. . . . The contrast was somewhat like that observable between a well-bred gentleman and a boor.”⁷⁴ The indigenes of Sydney, on the other hand, reminded him—“except in the color”—of the “coffee-carrying” African slaves he had encountered in Brazil.⁷⁵ Wilkes was miffed when during his ten-day stay in Hawaii, one of his men encountered a colored man who threatened him with violence; later this crew member was seized by soldiers who brought him to trial where he received a \$50 fine and a hundred lashes, “while the person who had been guilty of using the arms received but a nominal fine.”⁷⁶ Wilkes was left to wonder what manner of land he



FIGURE 3. "Labor recruitment" in the New Hebrides in the 1890s: These scenes, eerily reminiscent of the unlamented African Slave Trade, were inspired by events emanating from the U.S. Civil War. Courtesy of the Bishop Museum.

had discovered where “white” men could be treated thusly by those who elsewhere would be deemed slaves; this was an early indication that the sovereignty of Hawaii presented a clear and present danger to white supremacy.

White supremacy was to prevail in Fiji, particularly after the Civil War when blackbirding surged, but even before then some Euro-Americans of questionable reputation were flocking to the archipelago. Extradition from Fiji was not easy, so absconding debtors and convicts made their way there.⁷⁷ “These white chaps appear to have great influence over these natives,” it was said of Fiji in 1835. “Some few have been on the [island] a long time & talk the language quite fluently. . . . [However,] the white people on all these S. Sea [Islands] bear in general a very bad character . . . from which circumstances, they are obliged to remain a long time . . . [since] masters of vessels [were] not wishing to ship such characters on board their vessels.”⁷⁸ Among these were the appropriately named U.S. national Charles Savage, a “tough seaman . . . who made himself the leader of a prime collection of renegade sailors, beachcombers and escaped convicts. . . . [These cutthroats] ushered in a new era, a period of muskets and civil wars, or rebellions, invasions and massacres. . . . [Savage] learned the native language, took all the best looking women for his harem, and provided . . . warriors with firearms.”⁷⁹ Of course, some of these “white chaps” were not exactly in a forgiving mood; they were sometimes kidnapped from other vessels for various reasons. Even so, “chiefs spoke of their tame white men as they spoke of their canoes or other possessions.”⁸⁰ As the whaling industry went into terminal decline in the middle of the nineteenth century, already horrendous working conditions and miserable pay declined further, providing a complement of rootless young men who were both ready to engage in disreputable activities (e.g., blackbirding), or susceptible to being enticed or kidnapped by Pacific indigenes.⁸¹

The larger point is that the arrival of the kind of ruthlessness that blackbirding involved was primed by the presence of a cast of notably unprincipled characters and a decided hostility to the dark skinned. That this unseemly practice flowered as an incipient U.S. imperialism began to extend its tentacles more deeply in the region was hardly accidental in that both these desperados and the more refined gentlemen who represented the country from which they hailed ultimately were more than willing to deploy violence to impose their diktat on those deemed to be lesser beings.

CHAPTER 2

Blackbirding

Between 1866 and 1891, perhaps 48,000 Pacific Islanders, mostly from the Solomons, were brought to work in Queensland, though given the nature of the trade, it is obviously difficult to gauge a precise figure. For example, it is estimated that during the heyday of blackbirding, 70,000 healthy boys and girls were taken from the New Hebrides alone.¹ The devastation induced by these alien invasions overwhelmed the New Hebrides, whose population, which in 1870 was generally thought to be 650,000, fell to a mere 100,000 by the turn of the century.² From 1863 to 1904, nearly 60,000 Coral Sea Islanders were brought to Queensland, though “what happened there was mild compared with the fate of the unfortunate Melanesians who were shipped to the Fijis,” where death tolls were a staggering 500 to 750 for every 1,000 people on some plantations.³

This was a labor source conveniently close to Queensland and Fiji, though there may have been another reason for their crass exploitation. As early as 1854, a missionary provided the intelligence that there was one crucial advantage the Papuans had over the Malays. “The ease with which they can pronounce, if not also acquire, English,” he concluded. “From the sounds in their language being so much the same as in English, the Papuans can pronounce English words, and even sentences, with great ease and correctness.”⁴

The tiny Pacific island of Fortuna in the New Hebrides, which happened to be singled out by CSA adventurers, was sadly exemplary of what descended. As of 1870, this tiny island, only ten miles in circumference, had a population of about 900, roughly divided equally between the sexes. “The Christian population,” said the missionary Reverend Joseph Copeland, “may be about 150, my family and I are the only white people on the island.” Suddenly, in 1870, fifty-one vessels, ranging from 20 to 100 tons either called at or passed this island—the same vessel sometimes more than once—but all, with three or four exceptions, engaged in the labor traffic. These were

“slavers” and their impact was predictable: “This traffic disorganizes society on the island,” he complained. “Husbands are left without their wives; more frequently wives are left without their husbands; children without their fathers, parents without their children. . . . [It was] depopulating the island.”⁵ As in North America where the indigenes were massacred and Africans brought in to labor, Queensland witnessed the massacre of the Aborigines just as South Sea Islanders were blackbirded.⁶

As the beginning date of this commerce suggests, events in the United States—notably the dislocation brought by the Civil War and the opportunities it presented for those wishing to produce cotton and sugar in particular—had quite a bit to do with this epochal development that disrupted the Pacific. “Slavery reached the Pacific just as it was about to die out in the United States,” said James Michener, “for it was our Civil War that disrupted the world cotton trade and made cotton growing [in] northern Australia enormously profitable.” As a result, he said, “the demand for Kanakas [indigenes] became very great, from Hawaii to Queensland, from Tahiti to Fiji and at one time there were more than fifty vessels in the trade of blackbirding.”⁷ Prices for attractive women were highest, about 13 pounds per head; for men, between 9 and 12 pounds; for boys and girls, from 5 to 7 pounds. Plying the waters in pursuit of this awful business were about fifty vessels based in Adelaide, Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane, New Zealand, various island ports, and San Francisco.⁸

The end of slavery in the United States unshackled the industrial potential of this sizeable nation, thus helping to create the surpluses and subsequent search for markets that so energized Secretary of State James Blaine and unleashed U.S. imperialism. This turning point in history also helped to create something of a “Confederate diaspora”⁹ that had been dispersed to Brazil and Mexico among other nations.¹⁰ There was likewise a dispersal to the Pacific, where these defrocked CSA nationals who were instrumental in the attempt to create the worst excesses of the now departed African Slave Trade, which had done so much to launch economic growth in the United States, sought a replay of history. Now, as this nation was entering a new imperialist phase, involving territorial acquisition beyond the borders of North America, it was somehow perversely appropriate that another form of bonded labor would be essential to the process.

A classic blackbirder of aristocratic French and Italian origin was James T. Proctor. Born in Mississippi in 1846, he was part of the “Louisiana sugar plantocracy.” By 1860, his family’s 1,500-acre plantation had 220 slaves and he had lost a leg in combat fighting Yankees alongside his CSA comrades. By

the early 1870s, he was in the Pacific, involved financially in Fiji, and had partnered with Julius Carr, a Melbourne socialite, in a large-scale cotton growing enterprise. In Fiji, his military experience and energetic temperament meant that he was well known in the business of routing indigenes, many of whom were converted into *de facto* slaves upon defeat. Alongside another U.S. southerner named Cooper, he led armed expeditions against Fijians. Striding to the strains of "Marching through Georgia," Proctor and his comrades sought to recreate the now discredited CSA in the South Seas.

By 1876, Proctor had crossed the Pacific and was back in California, but by the next year he was in the New Hebrides, an ideal region for one wishing to operate outside the law, where he busied himself with blackbirding. This master of the unscrupulous often hornswoggled laborers by plying them with alcohol . . . and bullets. Fluent in the indigenous languages of Fiji and Samoa, he eventually decamped to the latter nation. There he attempted to rape an indigenous woman, not an atypical occurrence for him. He died in 1900, little mourned by the indigenes of the Pacific on whom he had wreaked much havoc.¹¹

The adventurer John Cromar encountered Proctor in the region. He said he had been ruined by the abolishment of slavery. Compensating, he established a trading station in the South Seas, though Queensland was his favored destination.¹² Now the British authorities were aware of his insalubrious reputation and questionable pedigree—his uncle was General Beauregard, the infamous CSA figure.¹³ They knew such details as the fact that he labored with just one leg, the other having been shot off while serving under his uncle. Yet that did not bar them from conferring a medal upon him for an alleged act of gallantry.¹⁴

Proctor was able to do his dirty work not least because despite tensions between and among the great Atlantic powers—notably the United States, Britain, Germany, and France—somehow they all seemed to close ranks when it appeared that the "colored" indigenes were gaining leverage and confidence by defeating one deemed to be white. Thus, on the centennial of U.S. independence (July 4, 1876), a French battleship arrived in Fiji with Proctor aboard. He had been rescued after incurring the wrath of the indigenes of Fortuna, where he had been held prisoner. Despite his unsavory reputation, the French treated him with kindness. Though the U.S. representative in Fiji had to have known of Proctor's long record of misbehavior, he concluded that there was "no cause for the great outrage that Mr. Proctor had been subject to," adding threateningly, "I feel it my duty to go with Mr. Proctor to . . . Fortuna Islands and make inquiries in regard to this outrage, and see

that he is put into possession of his property.” This was so urgent that he decided to leave the following day.¹⁵

Redefining chutzpah, Proctor was demanding that his government—a government he had once sought to dislodge—become more involved in protecting his corrupt interests. “About twelve months ago,” he said innocently, “I commenced trading operations at Fortuna . . . [and] my relations with the natives at both places were of the most friendly character, . . . [but for some unexplained reason they began] beating and maltreating me with such force and violence as to fracture bones.” It was only some “deep seated malice which must have prompted and carried out these injuries,” but he was at a loss to explain further.¹⁶ Washington was convinced nonetheless. Their envoy imposed a fine of \$15,000 upon the Fortunans in response, a sum the people likely did not possess but a judgment the U.S. military could enforce at the point of a sword, demanding reparations, perhaps booty or the like in a manner that the Fortunans would no doubt consider imperialistic.¹⁷

Even when Proctor was detained by a foreign government—as happened with France, after the incident above—he managed to be released, allowing him to inflict more damage on Pacific indigenes. Thus, as his career in the region winded down, he was arrested by the British authorities, after he “unlawfully and willfully” shot and killed Harry Waatugu, a local indigene. In support of this detention a witness testified,

I was on the deck of the said steam-ship *Croydon* at anchor in Vila Harbor [New Hebrides] and heard the report of a rifle . . . and the sound of a voice which I recognized as Captain Proctor’s. . . . Then I saw Proctor suddenly level his gun and fire at the man in front of him. . . . I said to him I had heard some shooting and asked him what it was. “I have shot a native,” he said. “He is dead by now or ought to be. I shot him right through the middle. I reserve my defense for the American Government. I’m not going to be sat upon any longer. I have been sat upon too long. I don’t want anybody to interfere with me or question me.”

The witness, Hugh Roxburgh, was stunned; he watched dumbfounded as Proctor

picked up one of the Sniders menacingly, and as his face bore a most ferocious look . . . I replied, “very well,” and went on to the house. Here I found the boy still alive, but in his death agonies and a few minutes later when the doctor arrived he was quite dead.

"We consider we are in danger of our lives and property by the said James T. Proctor being at large," said the witness. He summarized by saying that Proctor shot Waatugu without provocation and was drunk when he did it.¹⁸ As with other transgressions, Proctor was able to avoid effective punishment.

Even when former CSA nationals were not directly involved, the ethos they had established so diligently provided the template. Thus, a typical plantation in Queensland, featured a house that was "large, roomy and comfortable . . . [which] tends to impress a stranger with the notion of traditional luxury, supposed to be associated with the planters' life in the Southern States of America but transferred to the same occupation in North Queensland."¹⁹

Though the focus here is on Fiji and Queensland, it is well to note that the Civil War had a similar impact on other regions, including the western coast of South America where there was an increasing demand for labor in Peru to produce cotton and rice after the onset of this bloody conflict. This in turn impelled a kind of slave trade from Polynesia to Peru—that too implicated numerous U.S. nationals.²⁰ Actually, for some time no dark-skinned person was secure and was subject to being kidnapped and transported thousands of miles to toil for free. As abolitionists succeeded in discrediting the African Slave Trade, slavers retreated to the distant Pacific where tiny islands were separated by hundreds of miles decreasing the possibility of news of depredations seeping into metropolitan newspapers.

This case from 1858 was not unusual: an American named William Meadows, who worked as a seaman and was living on Byron's Island, was implicated when about sixty natives "were landed and left" in Mauritius in the middle of the Indian Ocean. After being apprehended, he disclaimed any culpability: "I went to the American Consul and told him everything. . . . I heard that the natives were engaged for five years and that the captain got [pounds] a head for them." He declared that he was induced falsely to participate in this venture.²¹

Charles Hyde offered no such excuse. As of 1868 he was about thirty-five years old and "rather below the middle size . . . [with] piercing eyes, sallow countenance, sufficiently sunburned, bloated face and very emaciated . . . [and] no great temptation to cannibals." Despite this, some Pacific indigenes—who a London envoy thought were prone to the taste of human flesh—were threatening to cook and eat him if he fell into their hands. Why? Well, the sly and crafty Hyde arrived in the region and toiled aboard a vessel involved in the sandalwood trade. He infuriated indigenes by stealing fowls and pigs and molesting women as he traveled from island to island. Worse, he was implicated in the killing of an indigene on the island of Lifu; then he was accused of aiding

in the killing of ten more there. Sensing that the taking of life in the region brought no penalty, he took up blackbirding.²²

From the French colony of New Caledonia came the report that Hyde, like Proctor a late Southern American, was known by the natives as Charlie and—more to the point—as a notorious kidnapper. A Tanna resident named Kakosia saw Charlie “forcibly take off a man.” Reverend McNair in Dillon’s Bay recalled seeing Hyde in a vessel “wanting sandalwood and offering plenty of tobacco; some canoes went alongside the vessel, when immediately ten men were forcibly seized, and hauled on board and the vessel sailed away.”²³ Interestingly, in the Loyalty Islands, which became a happy hunting grounds for men like Mr. Hyde, blackbirding had been going on as early as May 1865—days after the collapse of the CSA.²⁴

Months later missionaries based in the New Hebrides confirmed that a sinister process was unfolding in the region. “More and more especially within the last few years,” said J. G. Paton, “a large number of the natives of this [region] are being carried away in vessels, ostensibly as hired laborers to Queensland, Fiji, New Caledonia, Tahete, Torres Straits and other parts.” A considerable number of vessels, sailing under the British, American, and French flags, were involved and within a year and a half—again, dovetailing with the U.S. Civil War—“vessels directly and avowedly engaged in this traffic, have called at one island, Fate, no fewer than eighteen times. . . . Several of the smaller islands in the northern part of this group are almost entirely stripped of their male population.” Some of the natives were severely hurt and even killed by “those who [carried] them away,” which naturally caused them to harbor bad feelings and take advantage of “opportunities of retaliation against white men generally.” This was desperately serious, Paton thought, since the men who were usually taken away were the strongest and most valuable in their villages. This was “a revival of the slave trade” at a time when the vanquishing of the pro-slavery CSA had led many globally to believe that the peculiar institution of human bondage was writhing in its death throes.²⁵ John C. Daggett may have been taken aback to find that slavery was thought to be on its deathbed. A “Down Easter from Massachusetts,” he commanded a 48-ton schooner named *Daphne* that was registered in Melbourne.²⁶ It was “fitted up precisely like an African slaver”—and operated like one in the Pacific.²⁷

There were clear signs that a remarkable transformation was taking place in the Pacific and that events thousands of miles away in the United States might be partially responsible. As the U.S. Civil War approached, the cotton growing potential of Queensland had been recognized and welcomed by British merchants, who desired new and regular sources of raw material because of

the uncertainty of the U.S. market and the arrogance of King Cotton ideology. Queensland, it was thought, “could make Britain independent of American slave-grown cotton,” a development with enormous geo-strategic consequence.²⁸ Queensland baron Robert Towns saw it coming, anticipating that the Civil War would have huge downstream consequences. Thus he bought substantial stocks of Virginia tobacco at market prices and watched them quadruple in value within a year; when cotton supply was diminished, he began a cotton plantation on the banks of the Logan River in Queensland.²⁹

The question was where and how to procure labor, a question that was solved roguishly. Without suitable colored labor, insisted a Queensland writer in the late nineteenth century, the cultivation of sugar and cotton was an impossibility from an economic point of view, or, in other words, that without colored labor it would not pay. “There does not exist a country,” he insisted, “where tropical agriculture flourishes which is not carried on by black labor. Turn to Java, the Southern States of North America, the West Indies, Central America, Africa or Southeast Asia.”³⁰

He was not altogether misguided. Months after the Civil War, Britain’s representative in the region remarked that the South Sea Islands had “always proved especially attractive to those reckless characters who wish to live without labor and free from the constraints of magistrates’ authority. Since Fiji, Tonga and the Navigator Islands have been brought into closer communication with the outer world, the more violent characters have withdrawn to the lesser known islands, . . . [including] commercial defaulters from the Australian colonies . . . [and refugees from the] American ports on the Pacific [who] not infrequently find a [sanctuary] in the South Sea Islands . . . [where they can pursue an] indolent life of habitual intemperance” that included rank exploitation of the indigenes.³¹ This was occurring as the whaling industry was decomposing, an industry known for its “intemperate, violent and abusive” characters and its “almost complete moral collapse” as the bottom fell out.³² This added to the dislocation of island cultures.³³

“It is a melancholy fact,” said one Australian writer in 1873 speaking of Fiji, “[that] there seems to be a disproportionately large number of that class of men who pass their days and nights in drinking and gambling. . . . They have no visible means of earning a livelihood . . . [and engage in] the life of idleness and dissipation.”³⁴ In this atmosphere of dissolute characters marinating in decline, blackbirding arose almost spontaneously.

Close observers realized why this might be occurring. As early as 1866, British representatives were heard to complain about ongoing problems with cotton cultivation, which served to fuel the nation’s all-important textile

industry.³⁵ Sweeteners for tea were also needed and the disruption of production in Louisiana was biting too. Writing from Government House in Brisbane, Queensland, S. W. Blackall in 1869 observed that “some kind of colored labor must be introduced if sugar is to be cultivated to any great extent in the tropical portions of this colony.”³⁶

As if on cue, Britain’s consul in Fiji and Tonga countered that “the importation of these natives is increasing from day to day and will continue doing so in proportion to the extending [of] cotton cultivation and the highly remunerative results with which it is attended. . . . The number of imported natives at present in Fiji is estimated at two thousand, and in the event of disturbances with the indigenes, these two thousand would constitute a valuable auxiliary force to the settlers.” As Euro-American and European settlers began flooding into Fiji and encountered fierce resistance, the importation of unfree labor was not only valuable in picking cotton but also in repelling military-style assaults. “I believe that many of the planters have always had this fact in mind whilst importing South Sea Islanders,” he said.³⁷ Meanwhile, neighboring Queensland soon came to be regarded as a “second Louisiana” because of the fecundity of its sugar crop.³⁸

Supposedly London was dreading the “mortification of seeing a systematic Slave Trade breaking out in a new quarter” with one of the main markets turning out to be the Fiji Islands. The amount of foreign settlers was quickly rising, with a considerable number being U.S. citizens, who were said to be behind promoting “schemes of territorial acquisition in the Fiji Islands.” Some speculated that their failed secession in the United States could be transmuted in the Pacific into another attempt to create a permanent homeland for bonded labor. “If the capabilities of the islands for cotton production should appear to be favorable,” said the Earl of Clarendon, “a considerable emigration may be attracted in that direction from the Southern States” of the now departed CSA.³⁹

London was in a bind. Their experience with the United States during the bad old days of the illegal African Slave Trade to Brazil⁴⁰ had left British officials convinced that Washington would move with lethargy at best to rein in their often out-of-control nationals when it came to an issue like abusing the dark skinned, which seemed to be deemed part of the birthright of being born “white and free.” And if London sanctioned their own subjects but the United States did not, the “actual and unexpected result,” moaned one high-level naval officer, would be “to drive the trade from the hands of the larger English firms.”⁴¹

This was like an open sesame for the United States, which had developed a well-merited reputation for producing footloose freebooters. Their trepida-

tions were not assuaged when it was found that all the interested powers provided an assent to a global accord on curtailing the proliferation of arms and alcohol in the region. All the powers, that is, except the United States,⁴² as Washington again proved reluctant to bar its nationals from the most questionable forms of commerce. Likewise, the latter-day abolitionist Reverend Dr. John G. Paton acknowledged morosely that “the Governments of France and Germany have already intimated their willingness to prohibit [labor] traffic among their traders. The United States alone holds back . . . and, of course, till America agrees the other foreign powers will not issue their prohibition.”⁴³

This laissez-faire attitude that Washington adopted at times attracted to their banner the most corrupt and dodgy criminals but also those quite capable of gaining influence on small Pacific islands where the population often did not exceed 1,000. One way in which Washington gained an advantage over its rivals was by being more ruthless. Thus, the Colonial Office in London “sourly regarded” the U.S. refusal to accede to the aforementioned convention on the “sale of firearms, dynamite and, later, of liquor to natives . . . [as a] civil refusal to join the work in order that American subjects may get possession of the trade.”⁴⁴ Certainly there were those in Washington who viewed the labor traffic similarly.

The profits were so handsome and the difficulty of controlling the labor trade so immense that it seemed made to order for the unprincipled from North America. Soon it was reported that “such cotton as Fiji produces is far too valuable to be used for ordinary purposes. It is to the common cotton what a chronometer is to an eight-day clock. While American or Bombay cotton may be worth from sixpence to ninepence a pound, as much as five shillings has been obtained for an unusually good sample of Sea Island grown in Fiji.”⁴⁵ This valuable commodity would serve to attract even more investors and roustabouts from North America.

Such was the case, as the lucrative nature of the trade was attracting freelancers. San Francisco, a major Pacific port in any event, was said in 1872 to be a major node in the Pacific Slave Trade. “I have met some American sailors living in Tahiti,” said one correspondent, “who go into it on their own hook, as they get very good wages . . . besides having a share in the bounty of so much per head allowed for all they capture and bring on board, this in addition to their regular wages.” Echoing other close analysts, another said dolefully that it was “worse and more inhuman than the old African Slave Trade.”⁴⁶ Jim Watkins was typical, a “reckless, dare-devil fellow, who would stick at nothing in the way of getting ‘recruits’ for every native obtained meant a bonus to him of \$20.” That he was fluent in the Gilbert Islands language meant that this South Sea territory was to be decimated.⁴⁷

More established forces in the fog-bound city were also following the money westward. The *Hallie Jackson* of San Francisco, a brig, was said to be involved in the labor trade. There were four guns on her deck and she bristled with a “very complete armament of Berry’s repeating and Winchester rifles as well as a great number of Smith and Wesson revolvers of the latest and most approved patterns.” This armament facilitated aggressive recruitment of labor. In 1874, years after a war that was thought to have obliterated the stain from the nation’s escutcheon, it was reported mournfully that the “American flag [was] made to cover the iniquities of the slave trade.” The accused denied all and resuscitated the age-old rationale for this hateful business, demanding that interlocutors of the accused display a “spirit of charity . . . toward their fellow white men . . . engaged [in] civilizing the savage [and] opening through commerce the way for Christianity.”⁴⁸

Though former CSA or actual U.S. nationals were heavily involved in this process, there were others implicated—particularly Euro-Australians who resisted London’s crackdown on this nasty business and, instead, opted to emulate their trans-Pacific neighbors in North America. However, it was the latter who were more skilled in prosecuting illegal slaving and more experienced in reducing humans to slavery.⁴⁹

The kinds of devious tactics deployed to entice the unwitting on board vessels were not necessarily innovative or diverging from similar practices used to inveigle Africans for generations. There were two sets of books, of course, in case one’s vessel was halted on the high seas. On board there was an ample complement of firearms, ammunition, cutlasses, leg-irons, hatchway gratings, and the like. During the day, the slaver would anchor off a village and dispatch ashore a “party of men ostensibly to trade but in reality to reconnoiter. He then sails away, returns at night, makes a raid on the place, captures as many able-bodied men as he can, takes them on board and leaves for other island.” When London’s consul in Fiji and Tonga interviewed a British sailor who was involved in this odious commerce, he observed that his ship was of American build—indicating further how U.S. nationals profited bountifully from this enterprise, even when they were not directly involved—had a crew of at least thirty white men, and was “in all respects armed and equipped as a slaver.”⁵⁰

One blackbirder, James Patrick Murray of Melbourne, “was one of the first to use the trick of having his men reverse their collars, carry black books under their arms and go ashore disguised as missionaries. When the congregation was assembled to hear the word of God, the good doctor flashed his guns, drove the islanders into his boats and bolted them under the ship’s hatches.”

But even here there was a lingering touch of the CSA as Murray “encouraged his fellow hunters by lustily chanting ‘Marching through Georgia.’”⁵¹

At times, local indigenous leaders—as in Africa—were useful in the process of creating bonded labor. As a spokesman for the Aborigines’ Protection Society, the successor to abolitionists, put it, “The chief of one of the tribes or islands enters into an agreement with the master of a ship that if he will supply him with so many heads of his enemies, which they keep as trophies, he will give him an equivalent to be sent away for labor.” Not surprisingly, the most attractive girls fetched higher rates than the “ordinary class of imported laborers.”⁵²

Proctor, known as Timber-Toes because of his cork leg, had several artificial legs designed for various activities. After “very deliberately having made sure that everybody was watching, he would reach for a revolver and shoot himself through his trousered leg. If this produced the right effect, he would then take a sheath-knife and plunge it into what appeared to be fleshy part of the calf. The object was both to impress them and at the same time make them laugh and forget their distrust of the white man—for the moment at least.”⁵³

Proctor’s approach depended on hoary stereotypes—but he was not alone. In Queensland in the late nineteenth century, the consensus seemed to be that “the blacker the man the stronger he is, and the paler the Islander, the more readily is he attacked by . . . sickness, and there can be no doubt that the finest men are those from Tanna and they are very black.”⁵⁴ This trend tended to penalize Melanesians against Polynesians.

Trickery most foul was deployed against the indigenes. Attempts were made to convince them that their antagonists were extraordinary. One blackbirder wore a KKK costume with a huge waterproof bag beneath it. He would appear to drink vast amounts of salt water. As he seemed to get visibly fatter and fatter, the indigenes stared—until he ripped away the costume.⁵⁵ By that juncture, the mesmerized and disarmed indigenes were ready to be snatched. One contemporaneous observer noted that these “unfortunate natives are drilled into holding up three fingers—an act which is considered sufficient proof that they have been procured by fair means and fully understand that they have contracted to serve a . . . planter for three years.” Such deceit was employed since a strong man in good health sold at Levuka for a hefty 15 pounds, while girls between the ages of fifteen and twenty sold for a much higher price. The unscrupulous were not above stoking intertribal wars to supply their plantations with Fijian POWs. The mountain tribes were conquered, then “reduced to a state of slavery.” This, concluded F. W. Chesson, was “an institution [that] in no essential respect differs from Negro slavery . . . [and, sadly] has taken root in Fiji.”⁵⁶



HIS TURN TO BE EATEN.

HAWAIIAN: "Hol' up. Didn't you say it was wrong to eat man?"

AMERICAN MISSIONARY (*benevolently*): "Yes—but—well, circumstances alter cases, and the interests of civilization and commerce, you know—you keep off John, he's my meat."—
From *Grip* (Toronto), Feb. 11.

FIGURE 4. The caricatures of the indigenes of the region evoked negative images of Africans. Courtesy of the Bishop Museum.

The conceit of the traffic was that this was nothing like “Negro slavery” but more akin to a form of contract labor and—at worse—a cultural misunderstanding between labor and capital over the terms of work. Yet in 1871 it was acknowledged in Fiji that a new feature in the labor trade had arisen—the habit of retaining laborers after their term of service has expired. Actually, it was the “cupidity” of the employer that was the real cause.⁵⁷

Advocates of the ill-fated U.S. national Achilles Underwood argued before he was killed by victims of the labor traffic that what had sparked the bloodshed was not his cupidity but a misunderstanding of the terms of the agreement. Kapitani, who felled him with an axe, begged to differ. “He had been kidnapped,” Kapitani argued vociferously, “[and] kept at work from daylight until long after dark. . . . [When he] simply looked round from his work, . . . [Underwood] burned him and struck him with a hot iron, searing and burning into his skin.”⁵⁸

Underwood was no novice when it came to charged encounters with bonded laborers. A few years earlier, Washington’s representative in Fiji groaned about “an outrage of almost unparalleled atrocity” that had recently been committed by indigenes upon two U.S. citizens, Underwood and his business partner, George Burt. Indigenes killed two children and eight laborers and burned their home as Underwood and Burt “barely escaped with their lives, the latter badly injured.”⁵⁹ Though persistent reports about the labor trade did not seem to raise a whimper in Washington, this time the authorities chose to send the *Jamestown* to the Caroline and Fiji Islands to investigate certain complaints of and alleged outrages against U.S. citizens,⁶⁰ a journey that could easily lead to an imperial retaliation.

As in Africa, it was recognized at the time that this labor trade was placing inordinate stress on small societies that could hardly absorb the strain. It was “perfectly true,” said Dr. T. P. Lucas, writing from Melbourne, “that coast tribes kidnap or in other ways obtain men from the inland tribes, and that these are forced to go as recruits, or if they dare to refuse, forfeit their lives for their temerity, the kidnappers receiving the bounty money. And thus not only are the evils of the particular kidnapping, but also the origins of feuds and tribal wars.” He continued, “The old slave trade was really less baneful than the labor traffic,” not least since the latter was operating in smaller lands; the Polynesian Slave Trade, he argued, destroys family life. He cautioned his fellow Australians to heed what happened across the Pacific: “America had to learn the lesson of humanity through a baptism of blood.”⁶¹

How was this inhumanity rationalized? There was some comfort in Queensland in the “knowledge that society in the American ante-bellum South

had operated precisely after these principles” of bondage; as such, this dulled the senses and outrage that might otherwise have fueled stern objection. As in the CSA, a “distinct color line was drawn, so that the non-European laborer, regardless of talent, experience or capacity was to be kept permanently and unalterably in a subservient position.” Akin to “‘Sambo’ in the American South and ‘Quashee’ in Jamaica, ‘Mary’ and ‘Tommy Tanna,’ the female and male appellations of this racist stereotype in Queensland, were irresponsible child-like beings who needed guidance and discipline” that wrenching and back-breaking plantation labor helpfully provided. At that juncture, the term “Kanakas” was “closely related to the term ‘nigger’ and ‘boy’ as used in the American South.” The bonded laborers, these blackbirds, like their slave counterparts in North America, were habitually described as “happy, singing at work and jolly” or as “docile, laborious, light-hearted, good-tempered and most faithful and affectionate.” Like enslaved Africans, they were said to have an almost “feudal” attachment to their “kindly master,” though in the same breath, fieldwork was harshly described as “only fit for a nigger.” This burning epithet took on trans-Pacific resonance: this was a commonly used phrase in Northern Queensland and again, like the United States, this “same sentiment made all unskilled manual work more or less disgraceful to a white man.” Little wonder that one opinion-molder became so carried away that he asserted effusively that “his highest aspiration for Queensland would be realized if in the next fifty years [the] colony was one patch on the United States of America.”⁶²

There were those in Fiji who thought similarly. One visitor in 1870 met a professional U.S. gambler there. He was a middle-aged man, square-jawed, and powerfully built. He had served in Mexico and had been with the disreputable William Walker in Nicaragua, a well-known soldier-of-fortune. He was among those from North America stamping an indelible imprint on Fiji. On the cotton plantations that were springing up all around they were to be found in profusion. Just as for sport, enslaved Africans were given humorous or sarcastic names, these new masters were providing these Tanna men with “fancy names” such as Jeff Davis, General Jackson, and other CSA heroes. Rules under siege in the U.S. South were receiving a rebirth in Fiji—a “colored person is no more allowed in Fiji than in India or the Southern States of America to eat with a white man,” it was stated audaciously. To enforce these norms, a secret society called the Ku Klux arose; they bore weapons and were “formidable both from the number and character of [their] adherents, and appeared all the more formidable because the real extent of [their] power could not be known.”⁶³

As in the U.S. South, at the same historical moment planters in Fiji had difficulty in compelling dark-skinned and woolly-haired sons and daughters of

the soil to labor under the kind of onerous conditions then being meted out. In both societies, a “convict labor” system arose that greased the skids to imprisonment then allowed the incarcerated to be leased for a song by planters.⁶⁴ One of those so engaged was Thomas Wilkinson, who was born in the United States and had the misfortune of having four indigenes involved in “jumping and endangering his life.” It was insisted that the offenders be brought to justice, “otherwise no one near such people [would be] safe.”⁶⁵

Also as in the United States, bonded laborers were fleeing in every direction possible, thus heightening the need for more blackbirding. Typical news was delivered in Levuka, Fiji, in early 1872: “last evening . . . two of the Solomon Islanders . . . on board the Penal Hulk *Orpheus* made their escape. It is presumed that they swam ashore.”⁶⁶ This was creating a none too virtuous circle as the dearth of bonded labor was hampering production, as well as creating a need for more blackbirding. In June 1872, one planter complained of the “abduction” of fifty-four of his Fijian workers. That same month, another planter rued that because thirty-one of his plantation workers disappeared during harvest time, cotton was now just falling to the ground.⁶⁷ This was an abduction—that is, indigenous Fijians were engaged in a kind of blackbirding of their own, stealing away with the bonded laborers of the planters.

Actually the convict-labor system in Fiji was more pernicious than its Southern U.S. counterpart because in the latter, the unfortunates were arrested for crimes, while in the former, war was waged against them. As POWs, said a reader of the *Fiji Times* in early 1874, they “were intended to be sold by the Government, not at the auction block, but at a fixed price—a kind of retail system . . . no doubt in order to save auction fees.”⁶⁸

This latter-day abolitionist may have been taken aback by the opinion of his fellow resident of Fiji, a U.S. diplomat named I. M. Brower, who in 1870 argued that the charge of a resurgence of slavery was questionable at best. Yes, he conceded, “kidnapping was undoubtedly resorted to in order to secure a cargo” and, yes, “the present system of immigration is pregnant with great evil,” but he found talk of bondage so much overheated rhetoric.⁶⁹

CHAPTER 3

“Bully”

In 1872 as the United States was in the painful midst of adjusting to a postslavery future, U.S. national Henry Gardner, then at Strong’s Island in the South Seas, was stunned when witnessing a glimmer of the U.S. past at Providence Island and proceeded to swear to what he saw: the notorious buccaneer and fellow U.S. national William “Bully” Hayes arrived with his vessel. Gardner recalled, “[Hayes] had a young Penjelap girl on board with him and one day he brought her on shore and took her to the bush. About half an hour afterwards I saw the girl coming out of the bush. She was crying and blood was running down her legs. I called Hayes’ attention to her but he said it was nothing. . . . I afterwards inquired from the women what was the cause of the blood, and they told me that he had had connection with her, using great violence and lacerating her terribly. I should say the girl was about ten years old.”¹ Three other British nationals supported Gardner’s testimony. “Emma, an Ocean Island girl, came to Strong Island in a whale ship about six months ago,” they said. “Mr. Hayes on coming to this island took her to his house and assaulted her, he used most brutal violence and the girl bled very much. . . . the girl is not recovered yet and can hardly walk.” James L. Whitney, the staff surgeon on the HMS *Rosario* who examined her, offered the opinion that “she cannot be more than eight or nine years old. A Penjelap called Beloza actually saw the assault committed and described it as being brutal in the extreme.” Evidently, this was not the first rape committed by Hayes. “I have known him [to] treat other young girls the same,” said a half-caste Fiji man named William Hicks. “The above is a true statement.”² British subject George Westbrook met the unfortunate rape victim six or seven years later, when the girl was about eighteen years old. He said that she was very attractive. “But the men of the island would have nothing to do with her,” he said balefully, “she had been so injured that [she] could not be any man’s wife.”³



FIGURE 5. "His first Christmas in Hawai'i." U.S. soldier in the region in the late nineteenth century: Just as women of African descent were subjected to wholesale sexual abuse by Euro-American men, something similar occurred in the South Seas. Courtesy of the Bishop Museum.

What manner of man was this?

William Henry “Bully” Hayes was born, according to his own account, near Cleveland, Ohio, in 1815.⁴ He grew to be tall for that era—about six feet—was well-built, strong, and muscular until he was fifty when he began to put on weight. He had very blue eyes, light brown hair that had turned gray at the back (the crown of his head was bald), and a gray beard and mustache. He was said to be intelligent and able to adapt himself to any company in which he was found, but this accompanied an ungovernable temper—though some suspected that his exhibitions of volcanic rage were, in some cases at least, assumed for dramatic effect. Still, he was known to knock men down with a bare fist or with a belying pin or a handspike, though reputedly he did not brandish firearms, unusual for those of his ilk. He was unscrupulous in his methods of acquiring money or goods or labor, however. He was a confident man and a swindler and an infamous blackbirder.⁵

These ill practices were aided by the fact that he was a practiced performer—at times he claimed to be Chilean. Though he expressed himself poorly in writing, he spoke a few languages colloquially.⁶ One of those languages was Malay.⁷ Reputedly, he deserted and was “wanted” by the CSA warship *Shenandoah*. Many thought him to be “exceedingly handsome”—despite the fact that he had just one ear, the other (he claimed) having been “chawed [*sic*] off in a fight”—and perhaps of Spanish or Portuguese origin.⁸ Supposedly this 240-pound behemoth played several musical instruments (violin, piano, and accordion), loved animals, and married frequently—though divorce was alien to this accused bigamist.⁹ Unlike his abuse of Pacific indigenes, he treated all animals, especially birds, with the utmost of care. “He was never without some caressed favorites,” people said, “and [he] sauntered about Hokitika wharf, followed in the most affectionate manner by three white little poodle dogs.”¹⁰ He was a “psychological problem,” said one analyst, adding that “his appearance was gentlemanly and handsome, while his manner, when not enraged, was dignified. He habitually dressed in a frock coat, while his flowing beard and benign countenance made him look more like a missionary than the desperate outlaw that he really was.”¹¹ Though the nickname “Bully” was entirely appropriate, it was thought to have stemmed from the Samoan and Tongan word “*bulli*,” which meant “elusive or evasive.”¹²

As suggested by the controversy over how he actually obtained his nickname, who Hayes was and what he did—even what he looked like—remains bathed in contention. He was of a “tall and powerful build with long arms,” said one who knew him. He had a “rather swarthy complexion,” said another, “[and he] wore a beard about six inches long with [a] big flowing mustache.

His beard was trimmed to a point something like the pictures one sees of Bernard Shaw. He had bush[y] eyebrows, brown eyes rather close together. . . . [He] generally wore a long alpaca coat, reaching to the knees with black broadcloth trousers, . . . [topped off with a] black slouch hat with a broad brim [and] high top without a dent.” His clothes, it was deemed, made him “conspicuous as well as a tall handsome figure.”¹³

According to writer Frank Coffee, there are many contradictions in Hayes’ biography. “Myths and legends have become inextricably woven in with facts,” he said. “Some declared . . . [that he was] over six feet tall. Others were just as sure he was only medium sized. Some whispered of his terrible temper and his wonderful swearing. Others found him rather gentle, fond of animals and even inclined to religion. Some told of his countless alliances with women, white and native; how he tired of them, then murdered them. Others stick to proper marriages for him. One fact alone is undisputed.” He was killed by his cook in a quarrel aboard ship in 1877 and then thrown overboard¹⁴—perversely appropriate as Reconstruction in his homeland was itself being tossed overboard.

In reality, a number of facts about Hayes were undisputed, particularly his patent ruthlessness and corruptness. Of all his predilections one stands out: “he would swoop down on some lonely islet, where a hundred natives were living in simple harmlessness, and seize the whole lot, men, women and children. . . . he would sell them into slavery on the South American coast” and elsewhere.¹⁵ This is why in his heyday one Honolulu journalist spoke disparagingly of his “consummate villainy and barefaced mendacity, . . . reputation for fraud and high-handed villainy which entitles him to a high rank among rogues, . . . foolhardy exploits and too successful rascalities, and the numerous Hawaii merchants who “were more or less fleeced” by him.¹⁶ Yet despite his well-documented record of multiple abominations, since his death he at times has been treated gingerly, even heroically,¹⁷ though the writer James Michener has concluded that “the slaves he impressed must have run into the thousands.”¹⁸

Though he ranged widely in the Pacific—from ‘Frisco to Sydney, from Calcutta to Shanghai and from Singapore to Wellington¹⁹—he was frequently to be found in Hawaii during a time when the Kingdom was staunchly opposed to the kind of brigandage that was winked at in Washington. His first appearance on the islands was in the fall of 1858, when he was typically “said to be accompanied by a female companion of some kind or other whom he [picked] up . . . as the fancy [took] him.” At the time, his wife and children were living on the Navigator Islands.²⁰

In 1871 a Honolulu newspaper, in describing the notorious Hayes, rued

his “flitting about from port to port of the Pacific during the past ten or fifteen years. He twice did our Islands the honor of a call on both of which occasions he victimized some one and on the last disturbed not a little the equilibrium of an official.” With asperity it was noted how his specialty was that he “kidnapped a number of natives from one of the unfrequented islands of the South Pacific and took them to Fiji where he expected he would be able to dispose of the cargo at a good figure.”²¹

Hayes was the consummate blackbirder of U.S. origin. Hawaii, as a site for replenishment of water and victuals, was a key node in this chain of iniquity, as were Fiji and Queensland. “Blackbirding was largely carried on in the South Pacific,” said one commentator, with ports in San Francisco and Australia being critical, and Hayes was well recognized in both.²² In 1871 a line of steamers was established to run from San Francisco to Sydney, stopping in Honolulu and New Zealand.²³ At once this route mimicked the road Hayes was already traversing, while raising the possibility of more scrutiny being brought to his outrages.

Hayes was a study in race and gender oppression. His blackbirding was inextricably tied to his promiscuous sexual exploitation of girls and women. Blackbirders, including Hayes, flocked to Strong Island “mostly for women, who [were] much better looking than the women of the more Southern Groups; they fetch[ed] at Fiji Islands twenty pounds a head, and [were] much more profitable to the slavers than the men.”²⁴ When Hayes swooped down on the unsuspecting on postage-stamp-sized isles, it seemed he had a penchant for seizing the most comely among them. Typical was an 1865 incident when he “ran away with a young girl from Akaroa, having got her on board under pretence of taking her to Lyttleton to join a theatrical company which he was forming to take to China, . . . [but] having got her on board he sailed north (probably for the Feejees [Fiji] to trade her to the King!).” For this less than admirable captain, his favorite “trade” was that in “niggers”—especially those of the female persuasion.²⁵

A few years later it was reported that Hayes and his crew arrived in a distant port with four men in irons and Hayes “distributing” three women: one to the mate, one to another crew member as a kind of bonus payment, and the other for himself. “This night,” said one witness, “he committed a rape on the little girl. . . . I know he has violated . . . 2 children for he asks my wife to administer to their wants.”²⁶

Humphrey Island was a favored site for Hayes’ raids. One eyewitness recalled in 1869 the anxiety caused by this pirate as he sought to “get the whole of the female population on board and his deflowering a child, a child of ten-

der years. . . . Suspicion was aroused as to the intentions of Capt. Hayes towards them and it was proposed by the elders to leave their women and girls behind and send none but males on board: this arrangement was objected to, Capt. Hayes saying it would not look well." In response Hayes resorted to "promising as an inducement to give each female a new dress on going aboard. . . . The old woman finding her appeal was useless said that if you take my son, take me; the same desire to accompany his son was expressed by the old man."²⁷

Hayes was simply the leader of this ship of unchecked lust. One of his shipmates, Mr. Hussey, swore he was single in the United States, married an island woman, and then abandoned her to be with someone else, all the while actually having a wife back home in the United States. As if this weren't enough, he also swore that he "sent off two little girls for Capt. Hayes to do what he liked."²⁸

Unfortunately, this kind of behavior was not that unusual. It seemed an attraction of the South Seas for a certain category of European and Euro-American men in particular was the opportunity to engage in a riot of carnality. One man recalled a Dutchman who was "altogether too fond of the brown women. In six months he had married three times, discarding each wife at intervals of a couple of months or so." On Hayes' vessel, all the officers were permitted to have indigenes as wives, as well as freelance opportunities for pleasure.²⁹ But this may not have been for the men's benefit since Hayes felt entitled to every woman on board, no matter who she "belonged" to.³⁰

His infamy was propelled in part by the fact that he took full advantage when, as one New Zealand newspaper put it, he "had discovered Britain cannot prosecute an American who commits a crime in non-British lands." With London handcuffed and Washington relatively indifferent, the disreputable Hayes had carte blanche to commit mayhem in the South Seas.³¹ The U.S. Secretary of the Navy was told by one of his underlings at one point that Hayes was "cruising unlawfully in the Micronesian Islands with an armed vessel and crew, levying forced contributions on the natives" but, he pleaded, lack of resources meant capturing him would be difficult at best. "I must fear that we have so much work before us," he said, "that we may run short of coal and bread before being able to proceed to Australia."³²

Like other U.S. nationals in the region, Hayes took full advantage of instructions to the queen's warships employed in the suppression of the illicit labor traffic that they were unauthorized to "exercise the powers of visit, search or detention over any vessel which [was] positively [known not] to be . . . a British vessel, even though she is actually engaged in the kidnapping trade."³³ That he was reputedly a close relative of Rutherford B. Hayes, the

man who presided over the suffocation of the United States' postslavery promise, may have aided his global machinations and peregrinations,³⁴ just as that one of his "special pals" was the U.S. consul in Samoa did not hurt either.³⁵

Like James Proctor, it seemed that the authorities of whatever nationality were none too keen in apprehending Hayes. "I fear," said one analyst of a particularly lethargic diplomat in Apia, Samoa, "[that] Consul Williams did not try too hard to restrain Bully from getting away."³⁶ When Hayes docked in Apia, the U.S. consul, harbor master, and officials all came to greet him. Though he already had a well-deserved reputation as "the worst pirate since Captain Kidd and as a buccaneer, brutal blackbirder, manstealer and ravisher," trusted sources reported that he was greeted "like a prince come home."³⁷ In fact, the British consul recalled that in 1872 a U.S. ship arriving in Apia found Hayes there and surprisingly arrested him on "certain charges" and arranged for him to be sent to trial California for trial. To the shock of the Apia residents, he was acquitted "and is now walking his own quarterdeck." Perhaps collusion was at play, he asked rhetorically.³⁸

London did have occasion to pursue blackbirding charges against the brazen Hayes at one point since the audacious pirate was at that time captaining a British vessel, sailing under the British flag and therefore subject to British jurisdiction. On this occasion, the unprincipled Hayes was said to have collaborated with missionaries and fooled indigenes into boarding his vessel to face an uncertain fate as a direct result; in a pattern to be repeated, there was another charge against the missionary of having sent Hayes two young girls. The British official H. C. Rothery was dyspeptic in recounting the escapades of this well-known "man of desperate character, . . . whose career has been one of roguery so there are but few parts of the world where he can go without being apprehended by the Law." Yes, said Rothery in 1870, it was fair to say that the African Slave Trade was not repeating itself. What was occurring and what the likes of Hayes was engaged in was "slave trading in the larger sense of the term; it is the forcible or fraudulent carrying off of persons against their will to be used and dealt with as slaves."³⁹ Despite these impressive words, in 1871 a leading British official observed that "to the existing difficulties in the way of punishing Captain Hayes should be added the refusal of the Home and Colonial governments respectively to bear the expense of prosecution."⁴⁰

Yet in late 1869, London had detained Hayes once more, this time in Pago Pago; once more it was said that he had "stolen" about thirty indigenes, mostly young boys and girls. But here the primitiveness of the infrastructure of the region intervened, since facilities were not present to provide Hayes with a proper hearing—or so it was said. It was proposed that these indigenes

of Pukapuka should remain at Pago Pago, as they were afraid to travel in the vessel with Hayes to a more appropriate trial venue. If they were to do so, they thought, they would somehow wind up enslaved in Fiji—the living hell for indigenes who could be subject to both bonded labor and fierce attacks from Fijians themselves who resented their presence. Hayes, insisted a British official, should travel to Samoa for trial. The problem was that this was a U.S. bastion where chances of conviction were unlikely. Moreover, Hayes was abusive and nearly uncontrollable; London’s agent demanded to be relieved of managing him. In such a situation, it was relatively simple for Hayes to slip through the cracks.⁴¹

For his part, Hayes’ squirming made this result more likely. “I was made a prisoner,” he said disingenuously, “and most of my crew, it owing to my having native labor on board who for some reason or other . . . [appeared] dissatisfied and have caused all the trouble. . . . [Although,] I am a citizen of the United States . . . now in an English vessel under English colors and have the same right to ask your protection as if English born. The reason why I mention the above is because the natives that come from your place stated that you were under the impression that I was an American and had no claim on you.” He complained, “I am a prisoner now by the natives, and I request the rights of an English ship master to be taken under your jurisdiction.”⁴² It was understandable why Hayes sought to elude the grasp of the indigenes and why there was “anxiety evinced” by him.⁴³ Indigenes had good reason to wish him dead.⁴⁴

The British consul evinced perhaps too sincere a concern for the welfare of Hayes once the Royal Navy had seized him and his human cargo. “My house was surrounded by men, women and children,” he said, “watching every opportunity to get a peep at him much to the annoyance of Capt. Hayes and myself.” There was on the part of the indigenes “an impression arising partly from fear, partly from hatred” of the cowering prisoner. The consul shrank, therefore, from dispatching Hayes to Apia. “I did not like to put arms in the hands of the natives,” he said, “which I well know they would be too glad to use on any white man if they were sure to escape all consequences.” As was the custom, the consul seemed to be overly solicitous to the needs of this detained criminal. “I have no personal ill will to Capt. Hayes,” he said, “since he has been under my care. . . . [Indeed] if [he] were my brother I could not have treated him differently . . . [since] he has had no restraint from going where he likes in this place. He has [eaten] daily at my table and slept nightly in my own bed.”⁴⁵

This caressing solicitude was all the more striking since the British had extensive foreknowledge of Hayes’ transgressions. In their files was an 1868 letter from Savage Island indicating that Hayes was there waiting for his

schooner. As soon as it arrived, the letter stated, he would buy a lot of pigs and send them straight to Tahiti. But, it was widely known that pigs were a “secondary object,” the primary one being to obtain a “cargo of men and women,” akin to the “men-stealing vehicles from Samoa, Tahiti and Queensland” that had been plying the waters of late. Most who had been seized were young men, though Hayes was thought to specialize in seizing women, including mothers and wives who had children to take care of. According to the indigenes, the avaricious Hayes desired 200 of them.⁴⁶

Two years later the British authorities were still grappling with Hayes. He was in Samoa accused of kidnapping, but the consul acted as if he were incapable of responding effectively, adding “I fear that if the charge is proved against him, I have not the means in this port of securing him and he will again make his escape.”⁴⁷ Hayes had recently fallen ill and couldn’t get out of bed, which the consul said hindered his pursuance of the case. Hayes had actually arrived a few weeks earlier at Humphrey’s Island where he had agreed to bring 20,000 coconuts to a neighboring island, along with the indigenes themselves, all at no charge. Eight boys, two girls, and a few old men were taken to this island where they were supposedly to work for six months, all “sailing under the American flag.” This contract to work was forged by Capt. Hayes. Yet despite the evidence against him, it seemed that the captor was more worried than the captive; the consul was gravely concerned since Hayes’ character was often referred to as notorious. “You will see how difficult my position is,” he said with exasperation.⁴⁸ Then the foreordained occurred as the consul reported passively the “escape of W. H. Hayes out of my hands.”⁴⁹

London, no doubt concerned about infuriating its former colonial child in Washington, was loath to be seen to crack down heavily on U.S. nationals and, thus, accepted blithely assurances that were questionable. Thus, in late 1868 the British consul in Tahiti described a “brig called the *Rona* belonging to the port of Lyttleton, New Zealand, W. H. Hayes-Master” with “about one hundred and fifty natives of . . . Savage Island” aboard, “under contracts of service for a term of from two to three years.”⁵⁰ London knew that Hayes had fooled indigenes of the Humphreys and Danger Islands on board, though they professed they were unable to trace him and, consequently, there was “no means whatsoever of calling him to account.”⁵¹

But whatever concern was manifested over Hayes’ offenses seemed to be overcome by sympathy for him as a white man besieged by those who were not. This is what appeared to happen when Sidney Spencer Broomfield, a fellow adventurer, witnessed four or five Chinese attacking a white man in Singapore. Exhibiting what appeared to be a primal instinct of the racial type,

he rushed to Hayes’ defense though he was unclear why the beating was being administered. Though aware that Hayes had committed everything from blackbirding to “fighting for a bed of oysters”—and knowing that the epithet “nigger” was an essential part of his vocabulary—he eventually became Hayes’ business partner.⁵²

Despite some attempted prosecutorial efforts by London, it was the indigenes themselves who put a major cramp into the far-flown plans of Hayes. Thus, by the fall of 1870 he had been seized at Tutila by indigenes and turned over to the British authorities at Apia on the charge of kidnapping islanders and stealing property belonging to residents of Manahiki.⁵³ After another kidnapping by Hayes a few months later, the indigenes tried to file a complaint to the U.S. consul, but to no avail.⁵⁴ A few months before he was murdered, he was arrested again for kidnapping, this time at the Landrone Islands. This time the Committee of the Aborigines Protection Society was helping in the campaign to bring him to justice.⁵⁵

As time passed, Hayes’ criminal affronts were attracting a wider range of attention. Sitting in Hong Kong in the sweltering summer of 1872, Vice Admiral Charles Shadwell was informed that “slavers had been twice to Knox Island (one of the Malgrave Group) the last time two months ago only, ten natives were taken the first time and eight the second.” The ruse deployed was for the arriving vessel to offer a high price for goods such as fruit and cocoa nuts, which “brought [ever] more natives off to the ship, and when a good many were on board, they were seized and put below, one old man . . . escaped the last time by jumping overboard.” The culprit, one W. H. Hayes, also “threatened to seize the King and flog him, if he did not bring him oil and [more] cocoa nuts; and Hayes’ mate Pillman took the King’s daughter away by force, and still had her in his possession.”⁵⁶

The devastation unleashed on these microscopic islands was fomenting ghastly consequences. The Rev. Mr. Snow, a U.S. missionary for ten years near Strong Island, said, “The presence of a man-of-war . . . [is] much required, as the kidnappers . . . [are] getting very bold . . . [and] many of the islands are quite depopulated, and others [are] becoming so, by the kidnapping and that the remaining natives are so exasperated that in revenge they have murdered several ship crews lately, more especially in the southern parts of the Gilbert Groups and round about the Solomon, Ellice, Santa Gulf and other adjacent islands, although formerly the natives of these Groups were very friendly to Europeans.” When this earnest missionary visited Ebon Island recently, he was told that several months before, Hayes had robbed the island of a tank, oil, and cocoa nuts.⁵⁷ Calling for warships would mean more British

vessels poking around in these waters, more confrontations with U.S. nationals doing their dirty work and, thus, more tensions between the leading power and the emerging power. Further down the road the antics of the blackbirders could be taken by Pacific indigenes to be typical of whites generally, thus complicating the attempt just a few decades later to blunt Tokyo's pointed racial appeals.

Yet the ultra-casual attitude of the United States toward its nationals' misbehavior helped to attract many (i.e., whites) to its banner, not least since this nation allowed for more latitude for mischief of various sorts. Given that imperialism inherently involved interference in the internal affairs of various lands, this attitude—though it may have complicated relations with some—also had the upside of providing jet propulsion for the extension of U.S. tentacles to various shores. Supposedly Hayes was once embroiled in the internal affairs of China.⁵⁸ Allegedly, his role rose to the level of complicity in war-making in Asia.⁵⁹ He was charged with hanging twenty-five Chinese pirates without the formality of a trial.⁶⁰

Yet this stunning capital crime did not occasion capital punishment and Hayes was able to go on to commit other flagrant misdeeds. Thus, Hayes was "the chief fomenter of the war in Samoa," as he had sold to both sides cannons, various small arms, and ammunition. His chronicler, Louis Becke, adds that he did not try to conceal it either.⁶¹ He was accused credibly of smuggling arms and ammunition to the Maoris fighting the British in New Zealand.⁶² On the island of the Kiwis, where he spent a considerable period of time, his activity was varied: at one point he was associated with a touring theatrical troupe and took as a companion a Maori half-caste woman; he was also thought to be the first man to discover gold at Woodlark Island.⁶³ There were also reputable rumors that he was accommodating the Malay pirates in the Little Coral Sea.⁶⁴ In 1874, "he made his way to Guam . . . in an American whaleship, and meeting there a little schooner called the 'Rabia' which belonged to him, he entered into an arrangement to effect the escape of several Carlist prisoners" of Spain.⁶⁵ Hayes and other U.S. nationals like him were akin to updated versions of Sir Francis Drake; that is, he was a pirate in the service of his government, performing tasks that at least were not incongruent with Washington's aims, while allowing "deniability" that his government officially sanctioned said activities.

Hayes has also been presented as an exemplar of the so-called democratic pirate in that his crew was a polyglot lot. The white men were few. Every one of them had a questionable past and a reluctance to making their appearance in very many ports where their past was known. The seamen who were not white

came from all parts of the world. Hayes “allowed them to wear knives at all times” but befitting the raging racial conflict then raging in his homeland, he “would only let a trusted few have rifles or revolvers and then only when a landing was to be made on any island the natives of which were treacherous and dangerous.” These men were primarily from the Caroline, Marshall or equatorial islands, though they were sailing far beyond these shores. A man as deceitful and crooked as Hayes perpetually had to watch his back lest a dagger be placed between his shoulder blades; possibly, having South Sea Islanders as crew members—setting aside their ability to insinuate themselves in island cultures the better to kidnap the unsuspecting, not to mention their steely ability to tolerate poor working conditions—reduced the odds for such a macabre eventuality.

Still, complications arose. Thus, one rare Dutch crew member asked Hayes for a rifle so he could go ashore and shoot some pigs for meals. He absconded instead (yet another reason why a South Sea crew might be preferable). He was captured, placed in irons, then the “bo’sun” (a black man) was tasked to flog him but did not because “no white crew would stand by and see a white man flogged by a nigger.” Those who were attracted to this line of work—kidnapping, rape, plunder—often were not the most advanced ideologically and the region generally served as flypaper for reprobates and sociopaths of various sorts, who often found their way to Hayes’ crew. There was a white man named Buck Dawson, an “ugly looking creature even for that part of the South Seas where there [were] many noted toughs and desperadoes.” Dawson stood out prominently nonetheless. On the Caroline Islands, for example, there was an incredibly eccentric white trader who had purportedly fought in Chile and Peru on both sides and was one of the garrison at Fort Sumter when the first shot was fired.⁶⁶ Of the “estimated fifty whites on Pohnpei,” running amok and enjoying privilege, “ten were Americans,”⁶⁷ though how many were Confederates was unclear. In such an environment, Hayes—an “American”—with his multiethnic crew could come across as enlightened.

“Enlightened” would not be one of the first words to tumble from the lips of Hayes’ crew to describe him. Indeed, as many of them saw it, the cruelties that Hayes masterminded on tiny islands were of a piece of what he concocted aboard his ship. James Robinson, “colored” and born in Norfolk, Virginia, was a boatswain for Hayes, having joined the crew in Siam on April 24, 1871, after agreeing to serve at \$20 per month. Wages may have been sparse, but abuse was ample. Kicking and flogging of the crew were common. One crew member was “landed against his will” at Ascension Island, suffering a common fate of the sailor: abandonment at an unfamiliar site. “Capt. Hayes has treated me

badly,” lamented Robinson. “He chased me round decks with a belaying pin, knocked me down and used the end of the rope on me.”⁶⁸

Jon Anthon, also “colored” but hailing from Malta, joined Hayes in Siam and, as he recalled it, his maltreatment mirrored that of Robinson. He had agreed to “serve” for considerably more, \$72 per month, but balancing the equation was his allegation that he had “received but a dollar and a half and ’bout 20 lbs. of tobacco and \$1.00 per lb.”⁶⁹

Manuel Antonio, a “colored” native of Cape de Verde Island, signed on with Hayes in Shanghai to serve for one year at the rate of \$16 per month, but was detained for an additional three and a half months, suffering a kind of maritime blackbirding. Manuel asked for his discharge at Apia, but Hayes refused and beat him instead. Still, he was treated better than one of his comrades who may have been put unwillingly on shore in the middle of the Pacific. Manuel had seen him crying. “All hands on board were badly treated and poorly fed,” he said, echoing previous sentiments. “Captain often times knocking down men and kicking them and flogging them with a rope’s end which he kept twisted up in the house aft.”⁷⁰

The indictment of Hayes was bracing. Just as he kidnapped Pacific indigenes and took them to far-flung sites to engage in bonded labor, he enticed his crew to toil, then at the slightest whim would forcefully land many of them on remote, uninhabited Pacific islands.⁷¹ Such outrageous acts were easier to commit, it seems, against the “colored.”

But Hayes did have a comrade who was not “colored.” Ben Pease, described as a “slender dandy, a womanizer, fond of perfumes . . . arrived on the China coast around the 1850s”; his “contemporaries agreed that Pease had served as an officer in Uncle Sam’s Navy and had been cashiered for taking part in a mutiny.” According to legend, Pease was a first-class double-crosser—and, thus, made to order for Hayes’ crew. Also qualifying him was that he had previously forcibly abducted indigenes from Polynesia and Melanesia to work in slave conditions on the Gilbert, Caroline, and Marshall Islands.⁷² Reputedly he was the first man to import island labor into Fiji, a feat that helped to plunge the archipelago into turmoil.⁷³

Yet Hayes received a comeuppance of sorts when in 1872 he encountered the African-American known as “Black Tom” in Samoa. For some years African-Americans, along with Africans from various British possessions, notably the Caribbean, had been making their way to the Pacific, where—as the example of Victoria, Australia, exemplified—they often played pivotal roles. Their presence was not negligible and left an imprint as evidenced by the fact that Hayes, who reportedly had a pleasant voice, had once belonged to a

vaudeville troupe of “Nigger Minstrels” on a tour of country towns in the hinterland of Sydney; during this era—circa 1859—he was “dressed as a nigger minstrel.”⁷⁴

“Black Tom,” the man some knew as Tom Tilden, was born in one of the southern states as a slave. His master, a Mr. Tilden, was prominent in the United States, but the unimpressed Tom ran away and, like so many exploited Africans before him, went to sea and after a few years got to Samoa, where he developed much influence with the indigenes. It was in 1872 that he was introduced to Hayes as Mr. Thomas Tilden, “the damnedest rascal in Samoa.” Tilden was then in business. He had a boarding house, a small store and bar and a baker’s shop, enjoying a level of affluence and influence that his compatriots in the United States would find difficult to imagine. Tilden was friendly with Parker, who was sometimes called the “American Jew,” from whom he would buy various goods for his various establishments. It was usual for him to be accompanied by indigenes; like them, Tilden was rather large, “muscled like a tiger,” weighing 270 pounds, and much admired by the Samoan people. His wife was a lady of rank and he was treated like a chief; he also professed to be Roman Catholic.

A wife of Hayes accused him of stealing, however, and a controversy ensued. As Hayes’ fellow swashbuckler Alfred Restieaux recalled it, “Tom took it all very quietly until at last she called him a filthy nigger,” perhaps thinking of him—because of his color—as an indigene of the Pacific. But that was too much for an enraged Tom Tilden. Thus ensued a Hayes-Tilden controversy that was to rival its 1876 counterpart on the U.S. mainland.

“Now Mrs. Hayes,” he roared, “don’t you say another word about niggers, for you have taken many a bigger and blacker p____ [sic] than I can produce.” This, of course, kept her quiet but she recounted the episode to Mr. Hayes, who became so furious that he proceeded to destroy Tilden’s bar. The following day, the authorities sent Hayes a bill. “What?” he exclaimed. “Do you think I am going to pay that bill? Not a cent does the damned nigger get out of me!” He was premature in his peeved declaration for finally with a “very bad grace Hayes forked out the dollars and Tom started with a better show than before.”⁷⁵

Still, Samoa remained part of a region where the dark skinned had no rights that those who were not were bound to respect. Later it was reported that Tilden was in irons for burglary, sailing from Apia in Samoa to be marooned at the Marshall Islands. During the course of the journey, Hayes and “Black Tom” became friends. Tilden was freed at Mili, and the two men became partners who some believe buried \$250,000 on the island of Kusaie.⁷⁶

Whatever the case—whether Hayes was compelled to bow to or assist a Negro or not—Hayes represented a disturbing role played by U.S. nationals in the region. In filling the need for labor via the vehicle of kidnapping, he was able to sate his own unbridled lust while busily engaged in the primitive accumulation of capital. Hayes was a U.S. national to the core, using the future state of Hawaii, not to mention San Francisco, as a port-of-call for his ventures. Strikingly, just before he passed away, his “American schooner” was bound for Africa for purposes that were unclear,⁷⁷ but sorrowfully could be imagined easily.

CHAPTER 4

Fiji

According to historian R. A. Derrick, in early-nineteenth-century Fiji, “Negroes, who were sometimes landed from American ships, were even more prized than white men. . . . There was at least one North American Red Indian, known as Indian John, who, having been paid off in Fiji from an American whaler, acquired Tawadromu Island, in Galoa Bay, Kadavu, and settled there.” But Negroes, from the United States and former British West Indies, were cherished particularly because their English language skills were accompanied by a complexion that meant they were virtually indistinguishable from indigenous Fijians, which allowed them to integrate more effectively into that complex society and, after a while, serve as effective translators. Of course, Europeans were not ignored; they were occasionally kidnapped from visiting ships. Thus, chiefs at times spoke of “their” white men as they spoke of their dwellings or other possessions, and yet—in this topsy-turvy archipelago where, at least in the early days, melanin deficiency was not a badge of domination—were even more glowing in their encomia for Negroes.¹ In fact it was reported by some of the first U.S. nationals to encounter Fijians that the latter were “under the command of an American Negro.”²

It was thought there was a confluence between those of African origin and Fijians. According to a leading historian of Fiji, over the years “attempts have been made to prove, from the similarity of Fijian place-names to certain place-names in Africa, especially around Lake Tanganyika, that the Fijians are of African origin [and that] the Africans and the Oceanic Negroids may have been derived from a common source.”³ The remarkable resemblance of Fijians to Africans may have influenced visiting Euro-Americans to treat them in the same horrific way in which U.S. Negroes were treated.

The growing global role of the United States and this nation’s ability to project power and influence beyond its shores made such maltreatment more likely. And, ironically, a U.S. Negro was near center stage when this began to

manifest. In February 1846, John Brown Williams was appointed the U.S. commercial agent in Fiji; he had been the U.S. consul in New Zealand until the British took over, a takeover that had put a crimp in a previously lucrative trade championed by U.S. nationals in rum, tobacco, and firearms. So, it was on to Fiji where he became involved in selling arms to one side in a war involving indigenes. But in a perversely ironic event, while the U.S. national holiday of the Fourth of July was being marked in 1849 by the traditional means of firing off explosives, an accident occurred. Two results of the explosion were the “tearing off” of the arm of a black man who lit the fuse while a store and consulate caught fire and burned to the ground.⁴ William James was the African-American who fired the infamous cannon.⁵ This led to the looting of these sites by indigenes and massive indemnity claims being pressed by Washington as a result, claims that ballooned with interest, which led to U.S. nationals seizing an ever-larger share of Fijian assets; this finally drove the nation into the arms of British colonizers, not least because it helped in shielding Fiji from the seemingly more aggressive and avaricious Yankees.⁶

REFLECTING THE prejudices of his class and era, Williams was hardly culturally sensitive. He believed firmly in severe punishment of the indigenes for real and imagined transgressions. Like Bully Hayes, he was accused of abetting Maoris in rebelling against the British in 1844, which was not a reflection of empathy with indigenes as much as it was yet another attempt to twist the London lion's tail.⁷ Certainly he was a staunch defender of his homeland, stressing to the Secretary of State in 1857 that London sought to “hoist the English flag taking possession of this group of islands.” It was a very valuable colony as well, located between California and the Australasian colonies, with rich soil for coffee, sugar cane, cotton, tobacco, and the like. Peering over the horizon, Williams noted that the indigenes were “not fond of continuous labor.” Yet, he opined, “cotton of a very fine fibers grows spontaneous, indigenous to the country, as well as tobacco resembling the Spanish leaf.”⁸ He was prescient because later a Fijian official declared that Kidney Cotton was to be cultivated throughout the colony with government-supplied seed.⁹ Early on, this matter of cultivating cotton was based on intelligence from one of the “latest and best of the American authorities.”¹⁰

In any case, the experience of Fijians with the United States—Williams included—had been conflicted, at least since Washington dispatched an expedition there in the 1830s under the command of Charles Wilkes. The same could be said of Fiji's neighbors. Arriving at one South Seas island, the visitors greeted Wilkes by saying, “Go to your own land; this belongs to us, and

we do not want to have anything to [do] with you.” Then Wilkes shot at the indigenes with a gun armed with birdshot. This was an emblem of what Fijians were to face, as Wilkes’ crew were involved in turning yet another Fijian village into a “smoking ruin” and was implicated in seeking to “drench its sands in blood.” Later, in a particularly violent confrontation with Fijians, these U.S. nationals began slaughtering to the extent that one notably active assailant remarked, “[The Fijians’] heads were so hard that they turned the edges of the cutlasses and our men had in some cases to finish them off with their boat axes.” That night, a group of sharks were seen swimming around the vessel. “The sharks must have had their fill of Fiji meat,” said one sailor, “[because they] refused even to taste a piece of fat pork that was put over for them.” Then through an interpreter, Wilkes lectured them about the alleged power of the white man, insisting that if anything like this should ever occur again, he would return to the island and murder them all. He also asserted that early the next day they must come to a nearby town with all the provisions they could gather and that they would spend the entire day filling casks of water for his ships. Perhaps not surprisingly, one colleague spoke of Wilkes—one of the first U.S. nationals that many Fijians encountered—in less than glowing terms.

In what seemed like his spare time, Wilkes produced the first complete chart of Fiji, which contained more than sixty islands and reefs he himself named. Yet he is likely best remembered by the indigenes for the violence of his intrusion. In a sense, Wilkes did not stand out prominently in Fiji, as the first U.S. warship to dock there left with the Rewa Chief Veidovi, who was never heard from again. The chief was being punished for various transgressions.¹¹

Like other South Sea Islands, Fiji tended to attract adventurers from the Pan-European world, though Euro-Americans tended toward leadership of this exile community. David Whippy was the acknowledged leader of the white traders and settlers who had drifted to Levuka over the years; born in Nantucket, Whippy acted as their spokesman in discussions with the chiefs. In addition, he established the first business firm there and fathered several children by a number of Fijian women, descendants of whom continue to reside there. Whippy also befriended Jacob Andrews, a young West Indian Negro who had somehow made his way to Fiji and went on to play a major role in the nation’s history.¹²

However, it was John Brown Williams and his Negro aide who had as much impact on the nation’s history as any. For by the time of Williams’ death in 1860, this native of Salem, Massachusetts, was the greatest land proprietor in Fiji, as he mixed his roles as diplomat and entrepreneur promiscuously.

Thus, when his presence was required for a land transaction, he was not beyond wearing his blue consular uniform in order to impress and as necessary awe the Fijians into signing. Like Bully Hayes, Williams also was not above the temptations presented by the indigenous Rewa women, who were brought to him to keep as company for several days or even a month. After his death, he was succeeded by Isaac Brower of Ohio, a former coffee planter in Madagascar and trader in Australia who had been in Fiji since 1860. Brower and David Whippy, the former vice commercial agent, forged the cotton and sugar industries together, even building the first sugar mill in Fiji.¹³ Brower had served during the war of aggression against Mexico as a surgeon and was also the owner of a San Francisco-based ship that was trading in Fiji for oil and involved in co-owning an island in the region.¹⁴

"I have lived here . . . for two years past," said Brower of Fiji, "[and] am somewhat acquainted with the language and dispositions of the people."¹⁵ At this juncture, Brower would need all the local cultural awareness he could muster in order to compete with the British—or so he thought. It was "useless to disguise the fact," he moaned, "that those who from their position as spiritual advisers of the chiefs" and that have "induced [them] to become Christian, possess [the] most influence here" held allegiance to London. Worse, they had a "very strong antipathy to United States citizens acquiring a footing"¹⁶—at least that was believed.

Actually, in his pre-Civil War jousting with London, Brower was at a certain disadvantage. "No American vessels have visited the site of this consulate during the present quarter," he announced in the early fall of 1860, "[though] several American whalers have visited some of the islands on the outskirts of the group."¹⁷ Three years later, things were still glum. "Importations from the United States have entirely ceased," he said, "and English and German vessels have taken the entire business formerly in the hands of Salem merchants. Within the past year two new articles of export have appeared, cotton and wool."¹⁸

But the crafty U.S. official had something in mind to alter this state of affairs profoundly. For it was at Brower's behest that the Polynesia Company was established; they agreed to purchase the Fijian debt—a good deal of which had been accrued as a result of the 1849 explosion. They were able to obtain 200,000 acres of land and, thus, gained effective sovereignty of the islands.¹⁹ Later one British official was to suggest that this company and their investors were known as the "Forty Thieves" in Melbourne and Fiji.²⁰ The reach and significance of the enterprise is gleaned from the fact that it was initially compared to the East India Company by its promoters.²¹ No wonder since their

methods were so seamy and underhanded. Thus, a Fijian official recognized that the contract between the Polynesian Company and their interlocutors involved the “undoubted fact” that much of the land given up to them was not subject to the authority of King Cakobau of Fiji. Executing this agreement would involve ejecting from their hereditary planting grounds the inhabitants of 200,000 acres of agricultural land and could well spark a blood conflict. Thus, they sought a compromise involving the cession of 20,000 acres near Suva and 10,000 acres at Natewa Bay.²² However, the upside of the more ample course preferred by the Polynesian Company would be to provide simultaneously countless numbers of POWs who could then be deployed to work the land for a pittance—or less.

This was occurring as the U.S. Civil War was curtailing the production of cotton and sugar, thus providing a profitable jolt for those in Fiji who sought to fill the breach. Actually, just before the onset of this titanic conflict, there were captains of industry in Britain who felt their interests were all too tied to the fortunes of a nation—the United States—with which they were enmeshed in a repetitive cycle of conflict. Thus, in 1859, resolutions approved by the executive committee of the Cotton Supply Association in London indicated that the Fijian cotton samples they had received were “of qualities most desirable,”²³ suggesting that King Cotton of the Slave South could be taken down a peg.

The potential for profit and the perceived necessity to import bonded labor through means fair or foul also attracted to Fiji a coterie of cutthroats, freebooters, and roustabouts who then spread like bacteria to surrounding islands. It was not long before Fiji, particularly the then-principal city of Levuka, was filled with derelicts and debtors, runaway sailors and rogues; it was nearly lawless.²⁴ Writing a few years after the Civil War, Lord Belmore concurred, observing that a “state of utter lawlessness prevails in Fiji [where] even murder may be committed with impunity.”²⁵ Declassed elements expelled by the dislocation exerted by the Civil War and the decline of the whaling industry were pouring into Fiji at this fraught moment. According to Henry Jones, Britain’s consul posted to Fiji, “About one half the entire number [of recent exiles] were seafaring men who—in the generality of cases—have deserted from the trading vessels that frequently touch at these islands. . . . The other class of white settlers are those who have established themselves in Fiji as cotton and coffee planters. . . . [In sum,] the low class of settlers . . . as a rule comprise the white population.”²⁶

Unsurprisingly, at that juncture, weeks after the end of the Civil War and the onset of the Confederate Diaspora, the U.S. consul, Brower, perked up and noted, “The American interest in the country . . . is steadily increasing. A

number of enterprising Americans have lately settled in the different islands and have purchased tracts of land suitable for the cultivation of cotton and coffee—to which the soil and climate is particularly well adapted.”²⁷ This was part of an influx of a “semi-criminal class” that had “increased to such an extent that the very name of Fiji was looked on in Sydney and Melbourne with loathing and contempt. ‘Gone to Fiji’ bore the same significance in Australia as ‘Gone to Texas’ did in America a few years [earlier]”—a parallel that was appropriate given that U.S. nationals were an essential component of this migration to the South Seas.²⁸

It was then that many among this scum got involved in internal Fijian politics: they assisted the Fijian leader Cakobau in his attempt to be proclaimed monarch of the archipelago, then when dissenting groups such as the Lovoni refused to adhere to this regime by refusing to pay tax, they were sent to European and Euro-American plantations. Cakobau confiscated these indigenes’ lands, later mortgaged some to the European and Euro-American invaders, and then “sold” these dissenters as *de facto* slaves to anyone willing to buy them.²⁹

This internal bonded labor trade was accompanied by an external version and U.S. nationals were quick to capitalize. This commerce was facilitated since evidence from indigenes was “not admissible” in the New South Wales Supreme Court where many of these cases could be tried. Moreover, there were hardly interpreters; most of the natives taken from their homes had little idea of the distance or nature of the place where they were carried, the work they were to perform, or the length of the workday.³⁰

The rising numbers of invaders buoyed this ugly business. “The number of Europeans and Americans daily arriving in my Kingdom [is] rapidly increasing,”³¹ the recently minted king told U.S. President Grant in 1871 (interestingly, in this series of letters, the first sovereign contacted was Grant and the second was Queen Victoria).

Land and labor were the stock-in-trade of these expatriates, as they seemed to be remaking the experience from which they had fled in North America, or closer to home, New Zealand. One official of the Cakobau government acknowledged candidly that the contract between the king and the Polynesia Company reflected a historical process that reached its zenith in the western hemisphere.³²

London looked askance at all this, with one of their officials asserting that the U.S. claim against Fiji was “unfairly made and unfairly pressed” and simply “led to speculations of a questionable character”; this claim by the U.S. citizens, it was concluded, was simply an injustice.³³ As the indigenes saw

it, the snatching of their land and the importation of bonded labor to work it was a signal that they were to be pushed out—and they responded fiercely.

According to some in the region, Fiji and the surrounding islands were creating a replay of the lucrative business that evolved in the wake of the African Slave Trade. “There is a certain analogy,” concluded one cleric in the 1870s, “between the colonizations of these two immense continents,” Australia and North America. Fiji was considered “the Australian West Indies. The foreign aboriginal savages in the former case . . . were Africans; the foreign aboriginal savages in the latter case, Papuans, chiefly as yet from the New Hebrides.”³⁴ It could have been added that U.S. nationals played a pivotal role in each branch of this odoriferous commerce, as they responded to a felt need for labor to work on plantations.

“The Labor Question presents itself again to our urgent consideration,” declared the *Fiji Times* in 1869. “Some practical steps should be immediately initiated for the procurement of labor.”³⁵ An influx of expatriates from the Pan-European world facilitated the procurement of Pacific labor to fill the bill. The Earl of Clarendon detected this early on. In 1869 he detailed how “one of the principal markets in which the operators have been engaged in introducing immigrants appears to be the Fiji Islands” where there was a “rapidly increasing number of foreign settlers . . . over whom it must be difficult to provide effective jurisdiction and control. “Amongst these, I am given to understand,” he confided, “are to be found a considerable number of American citizens; and it is said that schemes of territorial acquisition in the Fiji Islands have been promoted by them; and from statements which have been brought under my attention it would seem that, if the capabilities of the islands for cotton production should appear to be favorable, a considerable emigration may be attracted in that direction from the Southern States.”³⁶ Echoing this prediction, the *Melbourne Argus* agreed that the islands’ cotton-growing capabilities were indeed the main reason for many families preparing to leave the U.S. South to live in Fiji.³⁷

A. B. Leefe of the Indian army shed light on why the harsh tactics of the Confederates might be at a premium in Fiji. “Fiji labor is too uncertain to rely upon when embarking in a business which requires plodding and systematic exertion,” he opined. Akin to the Native Americans, he said, “they are too near their homes to expect this from them and the more civilized they become the less they seem to work.”³⁸ Yes, said the British consul in Fiji, it is “impossible to obtain labor in Fiji for any length of time. A Fijian will not work with constancy and he generally becomes a defaulter at the moment when his services are most required. To work in the persevering manner of civilized man is to a

Fijian disgraceful and slavish. He will toil with energy to obtain the means of gratifying some immediate want, but that satisfied, he lapses into idleness. In the settlements, he will not render the most trifling service for less than a shilling and for a day's work demands a dollar."³⁹ As such, the desire for imported labor reached a fever pitch. "Labor is still the cry," the *Auckland Weekly News* exhorted, reporting from Levuka, "and the demand for it greater than ever." The first wave of Chinese immigrants was eagerly awaited, but it was unclear if they could fill the bill.⁴⁰

In 1870 one British observer said of Fiji that "though the population is mostly English and therefore accustomed to think in pounds, shillings, and pence, . . . in their transactions they talk dollars and cents, from an insane ambition to appear Yankified [*sic*] and go-a-head." This may have been driven by the fact that cotton planting was the primary occupation for Europeans in Fiji, and those from the U.S. South in particular had certain advantages in this realm. But there was a hovering dilemma that even Yankee ingenuity had trouble navigating. "If cotton is to be produced in Fiji at a price that can compete in the markets at home with that grown in other countries," he asserted, "it is absolutely necessary that labor should be profitable at very reasonable rates. The difficulty of procuring this cheap labor is the main cause of Australia's inertness in developing her natural advantages."⁴¹ The United States, whose mainland was about the size of Australia, had relied on a flood of European migrants—but it did not seem that such were then available in comparable numbers—and bonded labor from Africa, who also appeared to be unavailable: so, what to do?

Instead of Chinese labor, other alternatives arose. "Prisoners of war taken during the late campaigns at the Head of the Rewa River," said an official of the newly installed Cakobau regime, "shall be forthwith brought to trial and, as such, prisoners . . . may be sentenced to various terms of imprisonment with hard labor . . . [and] shall be assigned and hired out to such of the Planters as having applied for their services."⁴² But these Fijian indigenes seemed to some planters to be more trouble than they were worth. "Some laborers hired under the Govt. Regulations have absconded from their hired service . . . [by] stealing a boat from my plantation" one settler reported.⁴³ Another settler discussed Nathan, a native missionary who "interferes with the natives . . . to prevent them (by threat of fines) from working on my plantation thereby preventing them from earning the money for their taxes, in fact the man takes the power of a chief on himself."⁴⁴

The experience of the settler David Hannah was not unique. "While the people were at work on my plantation," he informed the Minister of Lands in

late 1871, “a number of men from the adjoining town . . . having lain in ambush all night watched the people as they were coming to work and killed one of the female workers—the tribe to whom she belongs rushed to my house so exasperated that I barely escaped with my life.” Somehow, Hannah was held responsible for the incident, as he found himself in the vortex of a “tribal war.”⁴⁵ “The tribe to which she belonged were so enraged that they were about to take my life,” he said. “One of them had his gun leveled within a few inches of my body and [was] just about to draw the trigger when on promising to send a statement of the affair to the Government and have the man punished or permanently withdrawn they deserted.” But Hannah was far from satisfied, adding morosely, “If the government is unable to afford some protection in such cases, I most certainly would not think of living under such a state of things.”⁴⁶ Later, he noted, “Things are bad in a bad state here. . . . The people are afraid to work my land. . . . They have already killed one of the women working on my plantation & threatened to kill another fourteen men if they worked on my land.”⁴⁷

Inexorably, other alternatives were sought—though it was unclear if they were actually worthwhile. “At what age are youths to begin paying taxes,” a local governor was asked, “and are infirm, blind and cripples to be exempted?”⁴⁸ As the most “successful” of settlers (i.e., Euro-Americans) could have told him, seeking to exploit the labor of indigenes on their own soil could only come with a punishing price.

Yet the settlers relentlessly pursued this alternative of exploiting bonded indigenous labor despite the painful cost. Days after the Hannah episode, another settler reported that some of the men who escaped from his plantation had been spotted. “Prompt measurers should be taken,” he demanded, “to have these men arrested and returned as soon as possible as the impunity with which they have escaped have had a very bad effect on those that remain.” There was a possible contagion, he thought, unless something was done. “I am very apprehensive,” he said forebodingly, “that they will all abscond if those who have done so are not speedily returned, a great deal of insubordination and dissatisfaction exists amongst them and one of them actually threatened that if he were punished he would run away.”⁴⁹

Fijians were escaping and revolting, perceiving they were under siege, fearing that perpetual bonded labor would otherwise be their fate. One man told the Ministry of Native Affairs in early 1872 of how sullen and mutinous Levoni prisoners—compelled to toil “at hard labor for life”—had become. Like enslaved Africans in North America, some had been separated from their families, which only fueled their ire.⁵⁰

The poor Levoni were being worked unremittingly. In early 1872, one

planter reported that forty Levoni laborers he acquired from the government were not working out. "Out of that number there is at least ten old men and women quite unfit for ordinary work," he said. "One man named Ovasie ran away from the plantation a month after their arrival and I have had no tidings of him since tho put to a great expense in searching for him. There has also been three deaths." He demanded a reduction in his payment to the government for this unsatisfactory labor, but scribbled on this request were the words "The department has no alternative but to demand the full amount due."⁵¹ A planter named John Hill was likewise dissatisfied, as he too was hemorrhaging cash.⁵²

With the Chinese not being a viable alternative and Fijian indigenes fleeing in all directions, options for labor were narrowing. In early 1869 an all too frequent incident of what appeared to be slavery involving "imported" labor was reported. The daughter of a Tanna chief was kidnapped, thrown naked into the ship's hold, and raped in front of the ninety islanders who were already stowed away there. To enforce this diktat, indigenes were subjected to flogging "with nettles [and] sometimes with the cat, and then applying the juice of a Chili plant to the raw flesh; also chopping off [their] toes and ears." A reporter for the *Melbourne Age* was horrified. "It is not so very long since . . . the slaveholding confederacy of America was in its death-grapple with the republic," he said. "Kidnapping, slave trade and slavery words are ugly words to us." But history was repeating itself with small outcry. Why? He continued, anger rising, "If Jeff Davis and his confreres were heroes when they sought gain and power by the sacrifice of 4,000,000 of an inferior [*sic*] race, why withhold the need of praise from [blackbirders] because their victims [were fewer]?"⁵³ Anyway, said the British consul in Fiji and Tonga, "the [indigenous] labor system throughout the South Seas is evidently founded on slavery, if it be not actually such. Whenever a house or canoe is to be built, land to be cleared, or yams to be planted, the principal Chief contracts for and supplies the laborers who are fortunate if they receive any portion of the price, which has been paid for their services."⁵⁴ So if indigenes could enslave each other, why couldn't invaders do the same?

Along with the proliferation of illicit labor came the corrupt seizing of land. Early in 1868, the U.S. consul in Fiji was reporting on a gathering crisis. "Large tracts of land and, not infrequently whole islands," he declared, "have been purchased for a comparatively nominal consideration, a few trinkets, jews-harps, old muskets, a few bullets or a little lead and powder, a few yards cotton cloth, even empty bottles and articles of like value. . . ." Further complicating the situation, he claimed, was that "frequently the lands are sold twice or oftener by the same grants or by different chiefs claiming rights to the

same lands. . . . Lands are sold by one white man to another under a pretended title and application is made by the real native owner for the restoration of possession.”⁵⁵

U.S. nationals seemed to be in the vanguard of those purchasing plots of land, often on a spurious basis, then stocking it with bonded labor in a replay of the arrangement that only recently had culminated in civil war in North America. Brower spoke with Fijian leader Tui Cakau concerning complaints of citizens of the United States against him. Among them was William Schwedler, who said that he had bought a block of land from Tui Cakau in 1866 and that this leader agreed to remove the natives from said land, but he had not done so. Instead, they continued to plant on “his” land and their pigs destroyed most of the food planted for the plantation, including nuts and breadfruit. They had even threatened to drive him off the land. This was not idle chatter since the indigenes’ behavior was getting worse. “They steal [my] fowls from [my] yard,” Schwedler complained, “[and] they damage [my] pig fence in the night so that [the] pigs get astray. . . . What they can’t eat, they destroy and instead of traveling in the road they carry timber and firewood through [my] cotton plantation thereby doing much damage.” These “natives,” he said with exasperation, “have for the last two or three years pursued a systematic course of persecution towards [me] in order to drive [me] off the land.” The United States was demanding nothing less than compelling Tui Cakau to honor his alleged promise to remove the natives from Schwedler’s land and put an end to “the annoyances.”⁵⁶

U.S. national William Peckham had a similar complaint against a similar group of natives. “[One] raised a club over my head,” he said, “and threatened to kill me, while I was cutting down banana trees on my plantation. . . . [Then] eight men . . . came to my plantation [and] threatened to attack my partner. . . . And in the scuffle they nearly knocked him down—they took away his hoe.” The indigenes were also stealing pigs, coconuts, and breadfruit from him. The U.S. consul demanded that Peckham be compensated for all damages.⁵⁷

The busy consul also complained on behalf of another U.S. citizen, S. A. St. John, who was complaining angrily about “petty thefts.” He had suffered the loss of seventy-five turkeys.⁵⁸ And that was not all. “They robbed my banana plantation,” he cried, “taking every bunch fit to cut.”⁵⁹

Then there were the forty men working for the aforementioned Peckham. “They have threatened to shoot my foreign labor and burn my houses,” he said, “compelling me to keep a watch day and night. They will only work when they please and how they please. Some days they will not work at all. At no [time] have I been able to get them all to work at once. They are incessantly

insolent and are doing mischief with my other laborers.” Most urgently he wanted the ringleaders removed and punished⁶⁰—perhaps to be consigned to a life of hard labor on another settler’s plantation.

The laborers fled instead. The authorities then arranged for the forty Kandava men who had absconded from Mr. Peckham’s plantation to be duly returned to his employ.⁶¹ Yet Peckham—and the U.S. consul who invariably backed him to the hilt—continued to complain because his laborers kept rebelling and/or fleeing. In May 1872 he was again carping. “These men were procured from the Government for the term of two years and [Peckham] demands,” said the consul, “that the Government furnish him with forty men in the place of those that ran away.” How much they took with them was still unknown. What was known, however, was that Peckham’s investment in Fiji was not panning out.⁶²

Peckham could be so bold in his demands since he knew his was not a lone voice. Backing up his fellow citizen in a manner that London generally did not, the local U.S. consul made a direct request to the Cakobau regime, in Schwedler’s case for example, to “take such steps as you deem necessary to remove all the natives from Schwedler’s land.”⁶³ Finally, the Cakobau government agreed to remove them “as soon as they have dug their yaws, which are now nearly ripe.”⁶⁴ But this delay would inevitably cost the U.S. national money. And Schwedler, who evidently was not the most gentle of employers, continued to gripe about runaways.⁶⁵

He was not the only settler losing money. S. A. Snellings complained about his own escaped laborers, whose absence caused a loss of cotton estimated at 300 pounds sterling. “I wish you would get them back,” he told the bureaucrat who supplied them, “and sell them and give me others in their place, as I am afraid they would be very troublesome to manage.” Warning mutinously, he added, “If they were rebellious I would be obliged to take the law into my own hands and I do not wish to do this.”⁶⁶

Apparently others were not as reluctant to become lawbreakers. Besieged by rebellious Fijians of various sorts, settlers began to seek a more tractable workforce, one unfamiliar with the terrain and its denizens, one who through the very process of recruitment might be stunned into submission. In late 1872, the *Fiji Times*, no friend of the indigenes, reprinted an article from the more enlightened *Sydney Morning Herald* about kidnapped islanders now working and living under the Fijian government. It was said forlornly that these were “disgraceful proceedings on the part of certain planters,” including more than one charge of the abduction of a girl. The reporter worried that such activity would bring more British ships to their waters, then draw in the French and

other powers with unforeseen consequences. This was awful, it was said: “to have the same story” of forced labor “repeated after the American Civil War as before” was “exceedingly annoying.” Didn’t these transgressors realize that the “American Negro” was forevermore to be “free labor”? Didn’t this settle the question globally? “We have reason to rejoice at these strongholds of slavery demolished,” the *Fiji Times* concluded.⁶⁷

Some of their settler readers were not as convinced.⁶⁸ Among them was Achilles Underwood, the U.S. national who was felled with an axe by Kapitani, an enraged Tanna man who had been told he was to work on his plantation for a set term but found, to his dismay, that this term in practice was interminable. Underwood’s flummoxing of Kapitani was of a piece with his overall shady dealings,⁶⁹ a trait not unknown among those U.S. nationals who had decamped to Fiji.

Reflecting the atmosphere foreshadowed by the *Sydney Morning Herald*, the judge at Kapitani’s trial spoke movingly of mercy while declaring him guilty of manslaughter—“whereupon the American Consul became very excited and expressed himself with regret that he had ever brought the case before the Court at all and had not held the man over till the next USA ship of war had arrived and submitted him to the captain to be hanged from the yard arm as an example that a white man could not be murdered with impunity.” Going further, the consul warned bluntly that “if such a course was to be followed in such cases” going forward, “the Supreme Court of Cokabau’s Kingdom would be brought into contempt and no white man’s life would be safe in the islands.” On appeal, the prisoner was sentenced to a year of hard labor, shackled for one week each month. Later, it was reported that Kapitani “spent some two or three months in gaol when he was handed over to the King, who gave him his liberty and employed him in his cook-house. . . . [Kapitani] had the sympathy of the whole community and especially of the native population.”⁷⁰ Presumably some of the latter were among those who refused to allow Underwood’s body to be buried there, threatening to “exhume and eat it” if it was.⁷¹ As it turned out, Underwood was only one of a number of settlers who met their deaths at the hands of furious bonded laborers.⁷²

The U.S. diplomat Isaac Brower was angered to the quick by this turn of events, though the deceased was no saint. In fact, Underwood was a scofflaw, having been implicated earlier when two children and eight laborers were killed on his plantation under conditions that were unclear. This brought forth what Brower termed “outrage of almost unparalleled atrocity,” when Pacific indigenes attacked the property of Underwood and his partner, burned their house, and nearly killed them.⁷³ Underwood’s partner made a

claim for \$1,380 plus loss for damages to his cotton plantation,⁷⁴ a claim that ballooned two days later to a whopping \$46,000⁷⁵ and represented yet another attempt—not unlike the original claim by John Brown Williams—to leverage such claims for larger gains. The workings of compounded interest were a key vehicle by which U.S. nationals, backed by their government, sought to enforce their imperial aim of seizing land.

This was a mirror image of a fact that even those lacking five senses could hardly ignore. According to the *Fiji Times*, there was a Polynesian Slave Trade,⁷⁶ rampant kidnapping in the South Seas,⁷⁷ and slavery being practiced in Queensland and Fiji.⁷⁸ In the Fiji islands, the paper proclaimed, “slavery, pure and simple is in full force.”⁷⁹ There was a South Sea Slave Trade, it was announced in early 1872, seven years after the U.S. Civil War presumably had repudiated this peculiar institution.⁸⁰

That same year, the Ministry of Native Affairs was made aware that “certain imported laborers which have lately arrived here have been or are being separated and hired out one by one in Levuka or elsewhere & that such natives are mostly girls or women.” This was not typical since “hitherto it has been customary that natives of the same island should as far as possible be hired out together & not parted”; there was a different rule “as far as men & boys are concerned,” yet it was felt that “if it be permitted in the case of females that it is certainly likely to bring the labor traffic into more bad repute & disfavor [than] is at present”; it was a “bad thing to allow.”⁸¹ Meanwhile, George McKissack, a self-described Fijian ship owner and planter, suggested that twenty tons be the limit for vessels seeking foreign labor for planters.⁸²

CHAPTER 5

The KKK in the Pacific

“Mr. Proctor arrived in Levuka yesterday from the Ba” in Fiji to report on the desperate plight of “white settlers along this part of the coast”; their lives were jeopardized by the government due to their alleged inertia.¹ Thus was the Ministry of Native Affairs informed about the arrival of the notorious Timber-Toes, James Proctor, the epitome of the Confederate Diaspora and now a noted blackbirder. He was now riding to the rescue to bail out settlers under siege by angry indigenes, furious about the influx of settlers who were seizing land and stocking it with de facto slaves from Fiji itself and abroad. At this frenetic moment, it was not surprising that one indigenous to North America, a Euro-American, was leading the charge on behalf of white supremacy.

The historian R. A. Derrick acknowledges that the settlers regarded the indigenes “as inferior folk, almost subhuman” and therefore inflicted “severe reprisals” when their encroachment was resisted. They “thought only of indiscriminate shooting and of extermination.” Akin to the 1776 revolution in British North America, the settlers were infuriated with the government, which was thought to be too restrained in seizing the land of the indigenes. This led directly to what was termed the “Ba Rebellion.” Thus, the planter John Hall James in 1871, as U.S. Negroes were in the process of being lynched and burned at the stake, described killing Fijians as fun. “We rushed in and shot all we saw,” he said. “We then plundered it and burnt everything, destroying all else we could. We then sat down and had a smoke.” At this point, the price of cotton was falling, anger at the Cakobau government was rising, and some settlers were pushing for annexation by either the United Kingdom or, if they were really militant, the United States. “The country is in a state of ruin,” moaned James. “I do not think there are half a dozen men who know where they could get five pounds if they wanted it, which they all do.” There were frequent hurricanes on this storm-tossed archipelago riven with rivers and streams; there was also a measles epidemic that decimated Fijians in particular.² Like the

aggressive, contemporary technological start-up business that seeks a market niche so as to entice a lucrative buyout from Microsoft, the settlers were now seeking to cash in on their adventurism by compelling a major power to bail out their investment, via annexation. "Should the country be annexed," said the settler Montague Johnstone in 1873, "it will be well worth investing more money [in Fiji]."³

These settlers-cum-investors knew, however, that if they did not suppress the indigenes effectively, it would not be easy to attract London or Washington; the latter was bogged down in suppressing an indigenous revolt of their own, while the former was involved in conflicts virtually wherever on the planet the sun was setting. Thus, a firm rebuke was needed for these Pacific indigenes, it was thought. And just as the Ku Klux Klan was rising in the U.S. South to administer an unyielding admonition to those so bold as to resist the logic of white supremacy, a similar need arose at precisely the same moment in the South Seas. Thus it was that white men in Levuka banded themselves together into a body known as the Ku Klux Klan, to which everyone who was unable to obtain a Government billet, or had been fired out of one, naturally belonged, and their deeds were celebrated in a series of ballads, one of the most popular being "The Lament of the Ku Klux Klan."⁴ And, yes, those who felt that the government was not sufficiently audacious in sending the indigenes fleeing also flocked to the ranks of the KKK. After all, the Klan—or at least its apparition—was not new to the region. Some blackbirders, perhaps inspired by the fallacious idea that U.S. Negroes were terrified of the very outfit worn by the Klan, took to wearing unconventional clothing for the "edification" of the indigenes: tall, cone-shaped cardboard hats; flowing calico robes; and black masks.⁵

Strikingly, at this moment, there arose a number of groupings bent on defending the interests of what were called "whites," an evolution away from the jousting that typically characterized relations between and among Euro-Americans and the British in particular, with Germans and French lurking nearby. This evolution was a reaction to the stiff challenge provided by the indigenes who were similar to the Maoris in the ferocity of their response to this latest invasion. Thus, the KKK included many British nationals who had overlapping membership in the British Subjects Mutual Protection and Volunteer Society; just as in many small towns in the U.S. South, the secret of being a Klan member was actually no secret at all.⁶ The British consul himself was said to be a known ringleader of the KKK.⁷ This development was noticed by a member of Cakobau's cabinet, who in 1872 observed that whites were organizing the so-called "Volunteer Corps" and armed themselves with weapons.⁸ It was significant that British nationals seemed to be willing to wear the insignia



FIGURE 6. This Fijian leader (Cakobau) hailed from a land where the Ku Klux Klan was rising at the same time it was thriving in the U.S. South. Courtesy of the Bishop Museum.

of a terrorist group headquartered in a land that had crossed swords with London on more than one occasion. The larger point was that those who sought to advance white supremacy felt compelled to do so under the dastardly cloak of the Klan.

Still, allied groupings were proliferating nonetheless. Hence, it was an auspicious occasion when at eleven o'clock on Thursday, March 14, 1870, as one journalist noted ominously, "the largest and most influential meeting of whites ever held in Fiji took place at the Reading Room, Levuka to consider the most desirable policy for Europeans to pursue against native aggression." The object of the meeting, said one U.S. national, was "to form a league or society for the natural protection of the life and property of the whites against the outrages committed by the natives." Thus, it was a unanimous decision to form the Association of Fiji Settlers, whose top priority was to suppress the sale of arms to indigenes.⁹ By November 1873, there was a White Residents Political Association in operation, with the U.S. consul C. W. Drury playing a leading role.¹⁰ Drury, in fact, was a spark plug in organizing the settlers; he was prominent when this grouping met at the appropriately named Empire Hotel. The main issue discussed there was the case of Burt and Underwood and what had befallen them.¹¹ William Peckham, one of the more aggressive settlers hailing from the United States, was also a leader of the White Residents Political Association.¹²

With the testosterone of whiteness surging, it should have not been surprising when the *Fiji Times* recounted: "one fine morning all Levuka was surprised to find [the town] in the hands of the Ku-Klux and made into a sort of barracks and an earthwork thrown up and a gun or two" brandished. "After this the Ku-Klux grew and multiplied in secret and often at night put sentries on across the beach." Writer John Gaggin was once stopped by a Klan sentry armed with an enormous Enfield rifle who refused to let him pass until he gave the KKK countersign.¹³ Though the frightened Gaggin might have thought Levuka was the sole bastion of KKK sentiment in Fiji, the settlers of Nadi and Nadroga also formed a kind of provincial Klan as the archipelago descended into chaos.¹⁴

Complementing the rise of the Klan in Fiji was the simultaneous attention devoted by the prosettler *Fiji Times* to U.S. Negroes and the alleged affronts perpetrated by them in the postslavery era. Thus, in May 1871 as readers of the journal were learning of the latest machinations of the Polynesia Company, the U.S.-backed entity bent on seizing Fijian land, they also learned of the deviltry of "colored members" of the U.S. Congress. "A man black as a hat," it was reported with alarm, a "pure Negro; his hair is woolly, his forehead retreats, his chin protrudes, his lips are thick and unfinished"¹⁵—that is, a man not unlike

the indigenes they were now battling—was operating at the highest levels in the United States. Did this portend a similar development in Fiji? The KKK in the U.S. South—and in Fiji—would guarantee that this development would be short lived at best. Thus, this settler journal also carried a detailed article about a KKK raid in South Carolina as if it were an instruction manual and/or device to bolster morale in the South Seas.¹⁶ The Palmetto State, whose black majority had long been a sore point among those who held white supremacy dear, was attracting significant attention thousands of miles away in the South Seas. This state was administered by a black democracy said to be “the most ignorant that mankind ever saw invested with the functions of government.” With barbed wonder, it was reported that “at some of the desks sit colored men whose type it would be hard to find outside Congo”—or Fiji, it could have been added more appropriately. “Their apt scholarship in the arts of corruption,” it was adjudged, was a thing to behold.¹⁷ Seemingly worse was the presence of Negro jurymen in the Red River country of Texas. “I haven’t got used to the smell of it yet,” asserted one Lone Star resident. “Of a hot day in a close room with a lot of fat niggers sitting on a case, it’s pretty hard. But we have to submit,” he concluded pusillanimously.¹⁸ And just in case some believed that the bonded labor trade in the South Seas was unique with the settlers meriting a unique opprobrium as a result, analyses were being devoted to the East African Slave Trade still unfolding¹⁹ as well as slave catching in the Indian Ocean.²⁰

And if readers did not grasp the presumed connections between the South Seas and the U.S. South, a Queenslander made it plain. In December 1873, as the promise of Reconstruction had yet to be squelched, he assayed this development with no small apprehension: “So much trickery and fraud have sprung up in the American cotton trade that merchants feel utterly disgusted with it. . . . Doubtless the true explanation is to be found in the altered relations of employer and employed in the Southern States since the war.” He also noted with some concern that arguments over wages were common. Was this the fate to which Fiji and Queensland itself were destined, compelled by their own dark-skinned bonded labor?²¹

This obstreperous proclaiming of “whiteness”—a solidarity in the face of the taut trial provided by the indigenes—sat oddly with the gathering conflicts in the region between the United States and United Kingdom particularly. According to the scholar Jean Ingram Brooks,

[London’s] attitude of lofty indifference toward the political future of the Fiji Islands became modified by a growing realization on the part of both the imperial government and the Australasian colonies, of the strength of

American interest in Oceania. Among the Powers, the United States was the only one at this time which really desired territorial as well as commercial expansion in the Pacific. As far as Great Britain and the new German Empire were concerned, the disadvantages of expansion in Oceania more than outweighed the benefits. France, far from seeking new annexations, came closer to losing one of the groups already under her protection. The administration in Washington, however, stood ready to welcome strategically located insular possessions; in fact, it would have been glad of holdings in the Pacific both north and south of the equator.

At this point, political arguments in the United States, she continued, “were centered almost exclusively upon Great Britain’s activities in the Pacific, only the most casual mention being made of French holdings in that area, or of possible German plans there.” “Is there any place in the wide world that Great Britain does not want?” demanded one congressman. “The history of this country is but one history of difficulties which we have had with Great Britain,” he added with asperity. But unlike Hawaii, which was a major flashpoint between London and Washington, Brooks concluded, “Fiji found no takers among governments competent to act, though the islands offered a variety of pretexts for annexation. Germany had refused a petition from her nationals resident in that group. The American State Department likewise sent a negative reply in October 1870.”²²

Nevertheless, jousting in the region did not cease. The *Fiji Times* sought to allay concern about the notion floated in “some of the Victorian papers” which “seem to regard the most distant probability of an American colony in the Pacific as a threatened danger to Australia.”²³ Not true, said this writer, not a danger. But another observer took a different tack. “Some day,” he said, “a new Munro [*sic*] Doctrine will in the name of the United States of Australia [*sic*] forbid old Europe to set foot on a single island in the Pacific. . . . Australia can have the advantage over the United States . . . [and] she will one day contend with the United States for commercial and political supremacy in the East. This she must do. . . . China then will, in all probability, be to Australia what India has been to England.”²⁴ Given the then state of the disunited Australian colonies and their relatively small population, these predictions seemed outlandish. Yet, perhaps not surprisingly, this prediction was accompanied by startling rumors about a “filibustering expedition” to storm the region that was brewing in America.²⁵

Such rumors could not be easily dismissed because, as was their wont, Euro-American exiles were conducting themselves like buccaneers, a law unto

themselves. Thus, in 1872 the Ministry of Native Affairs received an urgent report about an American citizen who “has for some time been selling arms [and] ammunition, etc. to the natives” for “candle nuts and other products”; thus, it was reported, “many complaints have been made to me.” This presumed miscreant was no pacifist either: “this man will make resistance to any attempted application of the laws against himself,”²⁶ though this was more a function of self-aggrandizement and tweaking British authorities, as opposed to seeking to aid the indigenes in their just struggle. Nor was this person unique. That same year, Benjamin Levack denied “in toto” that he had sold firearms and ammunition to indigenes, though he incriminated a prominent U.S. settler whose efforts were placing them all in a difficult position (i.e., “that of a drowning man catching at a straw”).²⁷

Despite this latter demarche, it did not take long for the settlers to realize that it was more likely for their narrow interests to be defended by Washington than London. This was an extension of the notion that their interests, as well, would be better served by flocking to the Klan. As London’s consul in Sydney reported in 1869, “At present the settlers in Fiji are much annoyed at England’s refusal to accept the Protectorate of the islands, and they talk of applying to the American Government.” There was the “want of effective administration of law” and it seemed that only Klan-type elements were up to the confrontation.²⁸ The consul was not exaggerating. One hundred settlers signed a petition to the U.S. president requesting a Washington protectorate; they were backed by the U.S. consul.²⁹

Settler discontent with London was growing, which ironically served as a form of pressure on the United Kingdom to intervene, if only to foil other powers. “The policy of Great Britain,” began one pamphleteer, “is exactly the reverse of that pursued by France. While the latter nation lays hold of every complaint of its citizens as a means for enlarging the sphere of its influence and for inclusion in the minds of the islanders a wholesome fear of its power—the British government and its representatives seldom interfere either for the protection of its own subjects against native aggression or for restraining the former, when they, as is more often the case, the aggressor.” In contrast, it was said, was U.S. policy, which was considered wiser than that of France and Great Britain because it did not seek to acquire “territorial possessions”; it only engaged in “pretty severe chastisements” of Polynesians. That is, the United States would presumably support a kind of Fijian settler independence and would come to this nation’s defense, not least in the name of a kind of ersatz white solidarity.³⁰

London was wracked with anxiety. Their man in Auckland was simply

worried, informing “My Lord” in 1869 that “adventurers of several nations are settling in the Fiji Islands, much as was the case in New Zealand thirty years ago.” Once more, London could be dragged into another brutal conflict with bellicose indigenes, draining blood and capital alike. “If the English government were to interfere,” he said gloomily, “it may be expected that Fiji would soon become a second New Zealand in point of trouble and expenditure, but without the great adventures of this colony.”³¹ But London could hardly ignore the kind of sentiments expressed by William Drew while in Levuka during that same year. “There is a very strong feeling here,” he said, “in favor of America; and the white inhabitants are petitioning the States to take possession of Fiji, or give it protection of their flag. . . . [Already, there is a] petition with over 800 signatures of British subjects to the United States, all of whom are prepared to take the oath of allegiance to the States.”³² The very existence of an aggressive nation like the United States put pressure on competing powers to adjust accordingly—or run the risk of facing a fast break of its nationals toward Washington. A. B. Leefe, a former lieutenant in the Indian army, had shown he was willing to shed blood for the Union Jack. But even he warned specifically that the blackbirding traffic would continue if not in British vessels than in those of the United States, so London might as well acquiesce. “Petition after petition,” he cautioned, “[is] being signed to the government of the United States from men of all shades of opinion and nationality to take these islands.”³³ Presumably, Lt. Leefe was among these men.³⁴ It was a “fact well-known in the Pacific,” said Sir. J. B. Thurston in 1888, a former official of the Cakobau regime, that “formerly (and occasionally even now) runaway seamen and fugitives from the English colonies of Australasia frequently called themselves American in hope of avoiding their responsibilities to British authorities.”³⁵ Perhaps if London did not move more forthrightly in the direction of the Klan, this trend might accelerate. When in 1872 settlers “resolved that petitions should be drawn up to both the United States and [UK] consuls praying that a ship-of-war might pay a visit,” as indigenes took forcefully to the warpath, the smart money was on the former nation responding with alacrity.³⁶

Finally, a key aide to King Cakobau delicately raised this issue with his sovereign. “In several European papers lately received by me,” he said, “I find it stated that a memorial has been forwarded to the United States . . . praying it to annex this Group of Islands. . . . This report, as far as I am aware, I believe very incorrect but as the subject is one of importance may I ask you to inform whether you the principal Chief in Fiji have signed or sanctioned any such memorial?”³⁷ Rather promptly the sovereign replied, “I never signed any memorial

to America. . . . I had sent or signed a memorial to Britain and that I wished a reply. This is all I know about it [the U.S. memorial].”³⁸

FINALLY IN 1874 Fiji acceded to British colonialism, which some indigenes may have seen as the lesser of evils (i.e., a victory over the KKK element tied to Washington). This occurred as the social and economic situation in the archipelago was deteriorating acutely, increasing the desperation of the settlers and their Herculean effort to exploit shamelessly the indigenes. The indigenes’ will to fight was sapped simultaneously by an epidemic of measles and other diseases: between one-quarter and one-third of Fiji’s population died within six months in the period ranging from 1874–1875.³⁹ This also had the effect of spurring some settlers to increase their importation of labor as indigenes were dying off.

The settler Montague Johnstone was not atypical. “Where I had confidently reckoned on 7 or 8 tons of cotton,” he said in 1873, “I have only picked 3, and thus, I am induced to write this semi-official letter [to the Ministry of Native Affairs] to ascertain whether you can offer me any appointment in your department. . . . Unless I can obtain some appointment, I shall be obliged to leave the country.”⁴⁰

Placing more failed planters like Johnstone on the government payroll would necessitate an increase in taxes, which in turn would mean increasing the already crushing tax burden upon indigenes; this had the added advantage of allowing for the indefinite servitude of those who chose not to pay taxes, a wind-fall for hard-pressed planters seeking labor. “The most successful and the more just way of punishing defaulting tax-payers,” said the Cakobau regime, “would be by sentence to labor in their own province upon public works or a Government plantation upon the main-land far from Nananu.”⁴¹ Thus, according to the regime, indigenes could be placed “in the service of Europeans” and the latter “pays the tax ‘recouping himself out of their wages’ when he pays them off”⁴²—a process that could stretch on interminably. This was a variation of the debt slavery that was then sweeping like a tornado throughout the U.S. South.

Hence, it may not have been astonishing that this system being imposed in Fiji was attracting attention from potential migrants from the United States. Writing from Salt Lake City, one U.S. attorney requested information on “Fiji as a country to settle in.” “Laborers can be obtained from two sources,” he was told: “by obtaining them from Islands [nearby] beyond the Fiji Group, under similar conditions and cost to those engaged for plantation work in Queensland”; or “by obtaining them from amongst the Fijians themselves at a yearly rate of from 4 to 5 [pounds].”⁴³

This Utahan must have heard of the bonanzas being reaped in the South Seas by “ordinary seamen in colonial merchant vessels” who were “now the proprietors of whole islands,” and were “becoming the possessor of large tracts of land.” They “have removed or are now striving to remove the inhabitants” which, of course, was a source of some difficulty—this was “bought at a high cost” and it was added tellingly by a regime official, “it is open to doubt whether the Fijians have received anything but a spurious article.”⁴⁴

The tarnished Polynesia Company, in which U.S. nationals played an essential role, was instrumental in this dispossession of the indigenes, which was to lead to a bloody war with the indigenes in which the Klan and Timber-Toes Proctor would play pivotal roles. They were firm in their demands, asserting in July 1869: “The Directors of the Company, however, expect to receive possession of the Lands ceded to them by you *entirely free from native occupation* . . . so that no difficulty or disputes as to ownership may arise between the natives and the parties.”⁴⁵ Now this company may have had a plan to “annex the islands to the American republic,” as the *Fiji Times* put it, but it was “all to end in a ‘fizz,’” it was thought; “had the company been well managed,” this journal sniffed, “it would have been a great success.”⁴⁶ Perhaps. But the point missing was that the forces set in motion by this company led to a massive land rush in Fiji, then a mad search for labor—even if the Polynesia Company were not the sole beneficiary.

Those who resisted the process, be it from this enterprise or otherwise, were in violation of the law and could be subject to onerous consequences, including incarceration, then being hired out to work the land they once trod, on behalf of alien invaders. Thus, applications came pouring in to the Cakobau regime—“200 (two hundred) Fijian laborers,” said one⁴⁷; “sixty (60) laborers for plantation purposes,”⁴⁸ said another; “the Livoni prisoners now in the possession” of the government “may be assigned to us for the terms of his sentence,” said yet another enthusiastically.⁴⁹ In early 1872, quite typically, “handed over to private service” were “fourteen (14) prisoners,” some with indefinite terms of service.⁵⁰ Unfortunately, these numbers have to be accepted cautiously. “I found the Livoni prisoners to number seventy (70) instead of forty (40),” one observed noted in 1872. “I am sure that in nearly every instance where Livoni laborers are employed many more are held in servitude than the Government receives payment for.”⁵¹

In Fiji, the bad news was good. In other words, when indigenes did not pay their taxes, it made them susceptible to being dragooned for labor on plantations controlled by settlers or to toil as officers imposing settler law on other indigenes. “Having finished collecting taxes,” the Minister of Finance was in-

structed in 1872, “a very large number of natives in all the islands have evaded their tax payments.” Moreover, he revealed, “[the] Lau people [have] disobeyed the instructions of the Governor and have in many instances not only not appeared personally but failed to bring up their young men for selection as soldiers, to appoint the native police or to furnish the names of women & children.”⁵² As a result, their punishment could be compelled labor. And as things turned out, quite frequently this maltreatment ensued in response to “complaints urged by citizens of the United States against the natives.”⁵³

SPURRED BY events created by the U.S. Civil War, settlers of abysmal reputation—particularly from the United States itself—had flooded into Fiji. Reenacting their experience in North America, they seized the land of the indigenes and then proceeded to work it with bonded labor. Putting forward Cakobau as king facilitated this process in that those indigenes who resisted his rule could be accused of violating the law, then penalized by being cast into an indefinite servitude.⁵⁴ Things seemed to be going swimmingly—for the settlers.

However, it was not long before storm signals arose and what occurred was akin to the events that led to the ousting of the British from the land that became the United States. In early 1872, the Cakobau regime issued regulations seeking to restrain labor exploitation and particularly the conveyance of Fijian labor.⁵⁵ As 1873 was unfolding, settlers were battling hill people in the so-called Ba War that had attracted the likes of Timber-Toes Proctor on the side of the aggressors. Like London a century earlier, the regime of Cakobau was seeking to restrain the aggressors so as not to be drawn into a bloodier conflict; thus, the settlers turned against the government. Soon, the latter was reportedly “insolvent, the white settlers refuse to recognize its authority or to pay its taxes”; they were in open rebellion against a “Cannibal King”—it was a “strange state of things,” concluded the *Fiji Times*.⁵⁶ Actually, the viscerally antimonarchial United States was much better positioned to take advantage of settler anger than the United Kingdom, which saw no inherent difficulty in adhering to the rule of a king. What might be called a “racist republicanism” or “herrenvolk democracy” was working to Washington’s advantage, as some began to grouse about the idea of “fifteen hundred . . . foreigners [seeking] to rule the two hundred thousand Fijians; [seeking] to make them a race of serfs”⁵⁷—if not slaves.

The settlers thought they had reason to be suspicious of Cakobau himself. After he visited a plantation in early 1872 “the following Tuesday the Fijian laborers refused to go on clearing land stating that that [Cakobau] had given orders that no more land should be cleared. . . . Work is therefore

almost at a standstill.”⁵⁸ This was just one example of a wave of extraordinary labor unrest, of a magnitude comparable to developments occurring anywhere else at that precise moment. This was spearheaded by Fijians in particular, which increased pressure on settlers to find laborers—illicitly if need be—from surrounding islands. From the Mount Marie Plantation came the report of “great annoyance and loss through the natives round about us”; this included robbery of blankets, sheets, calico prints, and mosquito curtains. They demanded government compensation that could only burden the tottering regime further.⁵⁹ Around the same time, another Fijian laborer complained to a settler, “If I did not pay him . . . silver he would come on Monday with his men. . . . I am quite alone and expecting a domiciliary visit at any time of day or night from a party of natives, my position is not very enviable.” He demanded that the government put an end to such things, a demand the regime was hardly in a position to satisfy.⁶⁰

Then there were the runaways, particularly Fijians,⁶¹ who took on tidal wave proportions and increased the felt necessity for heightening the illicit labor trade. A settler from the United States, William Schwedler, was noticeably keen in making complaints about this practice.⁶² As a prelude to all-out war between the settlers and indigenes, there were increased threats by the latter targeting the former.⁶³ Yes, this was a cultural misunderstanding to the extent that invaders had sought to implant a system of law they deemed to reflect universal human values but actually privileged themselves: this led to indigenes threatening them—and worse.⁶⁴ Thus, settlers demanded government action when a number of Fijians began planting on property a settler claimed as his own. “They are doing me considerable injury,” he cried, “by flooding for taro patches land available for cotton.”⁶⁵ Armed Fijian indigenes were also not above “murderous attack” on imported laborers.⁶⁶ The same plantation that suffered this loss was also robbed in a “most audacious manner” at least four times.⁶⁷

U.S. settlers were at the heart of this tumult. The murder of Achilles Underwood was a turning point,⁶⁸ then the “cutter” of U.S. national William Peckham was “stolen” by forty Kandava indigenes and laborers on his plantation. These men then jumped overboard and ran into the bush; their would-be captors were unable to determine whether they took anything with them⁶⁹—though losses, to be sure, were absorbed.

Finally, the settlers’ patience shattered. King Cakobau’s chief secretary detailed the “personal violence” deployed against his regime; Sir J. B. Thurston was “execrated and threatened with violence.” Why? He pointed to the “ever growing tendency of the Europeans in Fiji to grasp an undue share of power . . . that I attribute all present trouble in the country.” There was a

reign of terror unleashed against indigenes: "convictions against Fijians can be obtained upon the faintest evidence" and "punishing natives for the most trivial offences" was the norm, as "the Fijian is assumed to be guilty until his innocence is proved." Yet "the white man is assumed to be innocent in the face of the clearest evidence." As in the U.S. South, race had class dimensions, as of the European-derived population in Fiji numbering some fifteen hundred persons in 1873, two thirds were perhaps employers.⁷⁰

This small coterie of settlers also unleashed a reign of terror against the regime itself. These KKK elements had formed a league to resist the laws of the Kingdom by dint of violent threats and attempts to burn down public buildings; they were mostly persons "of low character" and whose main goal seemed to be robbery.⁷¹ This "armed rising of the whites" sought to topple the government; there was assassination, violence and forcible deportation attempted against otherwise powerful "ministers in order to break up the government and so favor the chances of annexation. The lives of the regime's chief secretary and his "colleagues (or rather our deaths)," he added morbidly, "have been drawn by a lot." Just as the KKK was running roughshod in the U.S. South, their brethren were acting similarly in the South Seas. "Whites," said Sir J. B. Thurston, "some of the veriest [scum] of the earth have bound themselves under oath to take our lives—quite irrespective of any Constitution, but on account of personal and particular dislike."⁷²

The regime was decomposing. The police were overworked and needed an increase in numbers. "Last evening when a Samoa prisoner was brought to the station," it was reported, "no constable [was] there to receive him."⁷³ It was "impossible to maintain an efficient police force on the pay at present given," said one inspector in Levuka with disgust; "the force under my command (excepting Fijian constables) at present is limited to an acting Sergeant and two privates." One of the latter was "on duty on board the Hulk in charge of foreign laborers under custody for . . . murders" and could hardly be deployed elsewhere though there was a very great probability of "disturbances arising in collection of taxes."⁷⁴ That weapons were malfunctioning was not improving the temper of these authorities.⁷⁵

Finally, the King summoned his privy council to assess the deteriorating situation. While they were deliberating, their sanctum was entered violently by an angry bevy of men bent on intimidating those assembled. Many were armed. A fracas ensued and at least one indigene was shot, as KKK tactics proliferated.⁷⁶ The invaders retreated but intimated their intention of returning with more men and arms in tow, bent on seeking to dethrone King Cakobau.⁷⁷ The regime was fragmenting. The Cabinet was informed in 1873 about a state

of political confusion; inland towns were “virtually independent, each one a nest of freebooters” who were “always intriguing & causing annoyance.” Magistrates on their own were commanding government troops to attack towns often unbeknownst to the governor and secretary of the province. “If this be permitted,” it was said with gravity, “the govt. is at no time safe from the recklessness of any foolhardy fellow who to gain a notoriety would not hesitate to plunge us into all the horrors of a war of race.”⁷⁸

Actually, the Ba Rebellion,⁷⁹ where Timber-Toes Proctor was presiding over the massacre of indigenes, bore all the earmarks of this feared racial Armageddon. Settlers were incensed by outrages committed against William and Jane Burns, their two children, and others in their vicinity⁸⁰—and by the apparent inability of the regime to respond forcefully.

The regime certainly had forewarning from Mr. Burns about what was befalling his family. Writing desperately from the Ba River in early 1872, he cried, “We have been kept in a constant state of apprehension . . . [and] we are in no position to withstand an attack in force.” Worse, there was “no assistance within miles of us” and only twelve or fourteen white residents in the vicinity, and they were “wide apart”; it was all “worse than ever.”⁸¹ There was an “unsettled state of this district,” he warned, “where we have the mountaineers hovering almost to our doors. . . . I am compelled to keep an extra number of white men for protection” since “during the last ten days they have sufficient time to reconnoiter our position and watch our movements” so “that if we have an attack in force I should not be the least surprised.” A “small vessel has been selling ammunition lately to the natives,” he added—perhaps one of the opportunistic Yankees? It was “very uncomfortable,” he added with understatement, “to live in a state of suspense.” Furthermore, he added, this state of affairs “effectively prevents further settlement so long as there is no protection for life or property,” thereby forestalling the development of another New Zealand.⁸²

Lastly, Burns reported hysterically that his camp had “been attacked. . . . The Mountaineers are visible in the adjoining hills and every probability of an attack” existed. “Send a protective force . . . *at once*,” he demanded, “[and] let the white settlers know of their whereabouts & the danger we are surrounded by.” But it was too late.⁸³ Another settler wailed that they had been driven from their plantation by indigenes with firearms. “The Bau officer at our place,” he said, “was immediately knocked down and trampled upon when he interfered.”⁸⁴

A group of besieged settlers conceded “it is quite impossible for us to join the expedition against the mountaineers” since “by taking up arms against the

mountain tribes we should leave our houses and the imported labor under our charge defenseless”—or perhaps susceptible to joining the indigenes. Besides, they were standing on ceremony since with “one exception” they were “foreigners” and “subjects of HM Queen Victoria” and “taking up arms and service for and under any but our own Sovereign” was illegal.⁸⁵ Timber-Toes Proctor and his band of Klan elements were hardly so restrained. No doubt some indigenes may have considered themselves lucky that it was London—and not the United States—that in 1874 chose to become a colonial master.

Of course, there were alternatives to colonialism. In 1871, for example, Cakobau contacted his fellow monarch, Kamehameha of Hawaii, in an effort “to further cement our amicable relations by availing myself of [your] invitation to visit Hawaii.”⁸⁶ His constitution was based on that of Honolulu and the Fijians would be grateful for any information the king could offer “relative to the general working and policy of [his] government, the appointment and pay of officials, methods of raising revenue and total yearly expenditure.”⁸⁷ Perhaps it was the influence of Honolulu—which was adamantly opposed to blackbirding—that caused the Cakobau government to express interest in cracking down on the illicit labor traffic, a development bound to infuriate the local Klan.⁸⁸ Honolulu then had ambitious plans to knock together a confederation to include far-flung Pacific islands, then ally with a rising Japan to ward off the avatars of white supremacy. Yet the accession of Fiji to British domination was a step forward, ironically, for the long-standing desire of some U.S. nationals in the Hawaiian Kingdom to subject this earthly paradise to a similar fate—a development that in the 1890s would mark the formal unveiling of full-blown U.S. imperialism.

CHAPTER 6

Hawaiian Supremacy?

Very early in the nineteenth century, the Hawaiian Kingdom toyed with the idea of assuming a role as the leading Pacific power and of annexing or establishing protectorates or spheres of influence over various other groups in this vast ocean region. Kamehameha I, the “Napoleon of the Pacific,” after uniting the larger islands in the Hawaiian chain, dreamed of new worlds to conquer and allegedly contemplated using a fleet built for the subjugation of Kauai to obtain ascendancy in Tahiti.¹ As Fiji was spinning toward British annexation, this notion of the hegemony of Honolulu had not disappeared. The controversial Hawaiian diplomat Charles St. Julian raised explicitly the question of “Hawaiian Supremacy.” In a lengthy report in March 1870 to his superiors, he observed that “in several quarters—in part of Fiji for example—there [are] rapidly growing needs for the establishment of some Supreme Authority under the shadow of which (self supporting) government institutions might be organized, and failing (as they probably will) to obtain the use of any great maritime flag, there would be a ready acceptance of Hawaiian Supremacy. By some, the latter would be preferred to the protectorate of any of the great powers.”²

As the “great powers”—especially the United States—began to flex their muscles in the late nineteenth century, they took sharp umbrage to the ambitions of tiny Hawaii, whose population even in 2006 barely amounted to a mere million. Indeed, in 1823 as the influx of Euro-Americans and Europeans began to accelerate, the population of indigenes was an estimated 172,000—a figure that had fallen precipitously to less than 50,000 by 1872.³ The decline was so sharp that one newspaper in 1850 published a tabulation showing “the probable future decrease of the Hawaiian Race” to the point where there would be fewer than a hundred Hawaiians by the year 1930.⁴

Though relatively small, this indigenous population still dwarfed the European minority. Referring to Euro-Americans, one Hawaiian magazine in

1893 reported that “1928 actual Americans constitute the ‘ruling race.’ Of British there are 1344, of German 1034. The Portuguese”—whose “whiteness” credentials were suspect—amounted to 8602 but they were “of the poorer class,” that is, their class bona fides were equally questionable.⁵ “Of the capital invested in the islands,” it was announced in 1897, “two-thirds is owned by Americans.”⁶ The point was that some in Washington considered the very idea of “Hawaiian Supremacy” laughable—when not deemed a threat to U.S. national security—not least because of its relatively tiny population. By the same token, the editor of *The Polynesian*, writing in 1841 about the attitude of the indigenes, stated, “They profess to see, and perhaps justly, the decline of their own power with the increase of whites.”⁷

Still, Hawaii was a modern nation, the envy of its Pacific neighbors, with a skilled diplomatic corps with representatives in major capitals and a modern infrastructure. In 1893 as settler rule was being imposed, a Hawaiian journal boasted that “the country enjoys all the advantages of modern civilization in a higher degree than most European countries: Postal services, telegraphs, telephones, railroads and lighting by electricity. . . . In the government schools two-thirds of the children are educated in the English language and one-third in Hawaiian.”⁸

Nevertheless, for those who cherished white supremacy, the idea of Honolulu challenging this ideology was viewed as outrageous. This outrage metastasized into morbid concern when Hawaii not only sought a diplomatic alliance with Japan—a non-European nation whose rise challenged the very essence of white supremacy—but began to import droves of Japanese workers, permanently altering the demography of the region while compromising the white supremacists who objected to suffrage rights for these migrants and exposing the easy canard that only blackbirding could address the question of labor. That Honolulu was long on record as being opposed to this odious traffic was one more reason for white supremacists to conclude that strangling and suffocating this nation should be a top priority.

Thus, though the Hawaiian Kingdom was contemplating ambitiously extending its influence throughout the Pacific, the United States in particular was casting a covetous eye upon this strategically sited chain of islands. As one naval commander put it in the late nineteenth century, Hawaii was “second in importance to no other single point on the earth’s surface.” The “distinctive feature of Hawaii,” Lucien Young continued portentously, “is that it lies at the center of an area so great the commercial and military operations across it are practically impossible, except by using Hawaii as a coal and supply station. Eliminate Hawaii from the map, and there are scarcely any battleships in

existence which can operate across the Pacific, by reason of the fact that they cannot carry coal enough." As the United States expanded across the North American continent, this presumed asset brought a detriment in that it expanded the territory that needed to be defended, a potential danger as the nation faced European powers in the East and a rising Japan in the West. "There can be no surer defense to the Pacific Coast of the United States," said Young, "than to prevent any other foreign country from getting possession or control of Hawaii."⁹

THE QUESTION of white supremacy was not new in Honolulu-Washington relations. In the mid-nineteenth century it served as a deterrent to the brewing talk about the United States annexing Hawaii.¹⁰ "The specter of slavery . . . weighed heavily on the minds of native Hawaiians," asserts the scholar Merze Tate. There was fear that if Hawaii entered the union it would be well on the way to becoming a slave state, not least since it was difficult for the undiscerning to distinguish the indigenes from the already enslaved Africans. Not reassuring was the widely spread notion that even British subjects who did "not happen to be quite white" were frequently placed "into jail at night" upon visiting less enlightened U.S. precincts.¹¹ Would the same happen to visiting Hawaiians?

Prince Alexander Liholiho of Hawaii had an answer. June 1850 found this scion of royalty in the fetid and humid swamp that Washington continued to resemble. This dark-skinned fifteen-year-old was struck, however, by the swamp of racism that he had encountered.¹² So moved, the 1852 Hawaii Constitution proclaimed in a bold challenge to its slave-dominated neighbor and chief trading partner across the Pacific, "Slavery shall under no circumstances whatever be tolerated in the Hawaiian Islands; whenever a slave shall enter Hawaiian territory he shall be free."¹³

The prince's comparison of the United States with London and Paris was telling, as the two European powers also had Pacific pretensions, which were seen in Washington as a threat to U.S. national security. Not for the last time fealty to white supremacy was serving as an impediment to the realization of national security. Ironically, acquisition of the Hawaiian Islands was popular only in Southern slave-holding states, while simultaneously there was an effective Anglo-French campaign against annexation; the latter was made that much more effective because of the existence of the unique folkways of the U.S. South.¹⁴ Honolulu recognized early on that a strengthened United States could prove to be a mortal danger to Hawaiian independence, just as it recognized that amiable relations with London and Paris—then Tokyo—served as a

counterweight to a burgeoning U.S. imperialism. Thus, in late 1843 when Great Britain and France jointly declared their complete recognition of Hawaiian independence, it was widely perceived as a message targeting the United States especially,¹⁵ particularly since just before then U.S. President John Tyler speaking before a joint session of Congress sought to extend the Monroe Doctrine to the Hawaiian Islands.¹⁶

The discovery of gold in California further linked this state to the Pacific,¹⁷ as traffic increased—in both directions. “Everything faces toward California,” said one Hawaii resident. “Hundreds of our best men have gone there to dig gold and die.” The lust for the yellow mineral was causing all manner of ructions. “In the scramble to grow rich,” it was said, “all is confusion, and change follows change as rapidly as cloud chases cloud.”¹⁸ Hawaiians too were scurrying eastward but some found, to their dismay, that the color of their skin and their national origin placed them in a disadvantageous posture. Even before the lust for gold arose, indigenous Hawaiians were enduring harsh conditions on the mainland. In the 1830s it was said that “the Kanakas” working in the Oregon territory were “little better than slaves and were frequently flogged or imprisoned.” They were employed by the Hudson Bay Company because of their excellent seamanship and, as well, as lumbermen.¹⁹ And in 1863 when hostile white ranchers in California forced the government to round up the Indians and place them on a reservation, Hawaiians “had to go along with the . . . Indians.”²⁰

Still, that thousands were moving westward in search of gold increased the possibility that yet another ravenous eye would be cast upon California’s neighbor, Hawaii. Indeed, the fear of filibusterers from California helped to spur discussion about U.S. annexation of Hawaii, just as apprehension about the intentions of U.S. nationals helped to drive Fiji into the arms of Britain.²¹ Thus, in 1852, one Hawaiian official was being informed about “the return of the Filibusters” and those who sought to “extend the area of freedom to [the] Sunny islands.” Annexationists argued that Hawaiian sugar could be imported duty free to the United States. But the sectional dilemma—along with opposition from other great powers—for the time being nixed the possibility. The South would “insist on your being a slave state—the North on your being . . . free” and “your admission as either would in all probability result in the dissolution of the [United States] Union.” Thus, the Honolulu official was advised that Honolulu “look to Sydney or some other market for the sale of their present stock.”²²

It did not take a wizard of geostrategy to prod Hawaii to look westward to bolster the regime. In 1856, Charles St. Julian, Honolulu’s man in the region,

was waxing eloquently about the importance of the Samoan archipelago. “The geographical situation,” he said, “the general fertility and the many latent resources of these Islands render it certain that sooner or later they must attain a high position as to commercial if not as to political influence in Central Polynesia.” Even then, however, it was acknowledged that “this very importance renders it utterly impossible that things can remain as they are. Either there must be some independent government established in the Archipelago . . . or it must become a dependence of some other power. I need not point out,” he added sagely, “how much more desirable it would be to secure, if possible, the former result.” Inferentially, St. Julian indicated why Honolulu and London often found themselves in agreement. “My own predilections [for Samoa],” he confided, “are strongly in favor of constitutional monarchy.” Even then he counseled that Honolulu consider the “expediency” of “carefully, deliberately and earnestly” establishing Malieatoa as a “constitutional sovereign”—the kind of maneuver that some in Washington thought was beyond the ken of the Hawaiian Kingdom.²³

Despite Honolulu’s bold ideas, the indigenously based kingdom was heavily dependent upon Euro-American and European planters and their complement, foreign labor. “Unless we get more population, we are a doomed nation,” said Honolulu official R. C. Wyllie in 1863. This suggested the wide net that was cast for workers.²⁴ Unlike Fiji, however, where fractiousness reigned among the indigenes, the far-sighted consolidation of Hawaii at the turn of the nineteenth century allowed for staunch opposition to blackbirding.

Nevertheless, Hawaii did not escape the labor dilemma that compelled this detestable praxis. From 1877–1881, Hawaii recruited South Sea Islanders, albeit in a manner not as illicit as in Fiji and Queensland; still, during this period and beyond about 2,500 Pacific Islanders, including a rather large percentage of women and children, were shipped to Hawaii; approximately 400 of these were from the New Hebrides and other Melanesian islands; most of the others were Gilbert Islanders. About 1884, this particular immigration movement came to an end,²⁵ as the next year the flood of Japanese migrants commenced, which was at once a labor and diplomatic demarche. In fact, there was a close linkage between this hostility to the so-called Kanaka labor trade in Hawaii²⁶ and the decision in Honolulu to ally with Japan as a way to counter such brigandage.

Thus, allegations in 1886 about blackbirding in Honolulu received Cabinet-level attention. A government agent found on December 7—a date that should live in infamy—that a Hawaiian labor vessel, the *Allie Rowe*, arrived off Buka Buka in the Torres Group. “[The] natives of Buka Buka informed me,” he said,

“that seven natives had been kidnapped. . . . Kidnapping was effected by the boat’s crew . . . by their jumping out of the recruiting boats and catching them by the hair whilst in the water swimming . . . [and] running them down in the bush.” He concluded that it was impossible to determine the exact number of how many boys had been kidnapped.²⁷ Further investigation found that this vessel, which was sailing under the Hawaiian flag,²⁸ was also stocked full of various firearms, ammunition, and dynamite for its ignominious purposes. “People had been stolen by the *Allie Rowe*,” it was added with sobriety, “and they were fired at for objecting to it.”²⁹ The captain was dragged into the dock and, typically, he denied all, asserting that that he obtained the labor “through the influence of the chief.” The dynamite, he said, was for “shooting fish.”³⁰

Yet such vigorous responses still did not resolve the basic quandary: who was to work the fields? In 1872, for example, indigenous Hawaiians constituted 82.8 percent of the plantation workforce; ten years later, their proportion dropped to 25.1 percent, as the Chinese surpassed them as the largest group, totaling 49.2 percent. By 1890 Japanese workers exceeded Chinese,³¹ an outgrowth of the kingdom’s diplomatic scramble designed to confront the major powers, particularly the United States.

This transition to imported Asian labor was occurring as Fiji and Queensland, seeking to take advantage of the dislocation engendered by the U.S. Civil War, were moving aggressively toward the deployment of bonded plantation labor. Thus, in 1869, the U.S. representative in Honolulu told U.S. Secretary of State William Seward, “One of the most interesting questions in connection with these islands is that of Labor. It is well understood both at home and elsewhere, that the native population is gradually but surely passing away and that without the introduction of life and vitality from abroad, the present race will soon become extinct.” The powerful Board of Immigration was authorized to take measures for the introduction of Polynesians of both sexes from other islands of the Pacific Ocean but unless coercion and/or deception was used, it would be difficult to entice the indigenes to toil as plantation laborers.³²

Now the kind of bonded labor that was blighting its distant neighbors was not altogether unknown in Hawaii. The difference was that there were powerful elites within the kingdom who were willing to object to the proliferation of such practices. Thus, in 1871, the Hawaii-based *Pacific Commercial Advertiser* deplored the fact that the “mitigated form of slavery which, under the pleasant title of ‘foreign immigration’ has for some years been in full force in Fiji and Queensland.” This, the publication reported, was little more than kidnapping in the South Seas. The journal prayed that a Vigilance Committee akin to

contemporaneous developments in San Francisco would arise that would make Lekuva “too hot for the seedy villains” that were perpetrating this ugly commerce. The *Advertiser* cheered on those islanders who had organized themselves for “mutual protection against ‘recruiting and trading’ vessels.”³³ Blazing with fury, it berated “the manner in which laborers have been procured for the plantations of Queensland and Fiji from among the inhabitants of the New Hebrides and Hervey Islands”; it was “shameless,” revealing “crime and barbarity” and “man’s inhumanity to man.” This trade “stirs a deeper indignation than even the details of the wretched coolie trade” that was then afflicting Chinese and Indian nationals particularly. For these Pacific indigenes were “pursued and shot like wild beasts and dragged from their peaceful homes to toil and die in strange lands to satisfy the greed of the ‘civilized’ white man.” Don’t these men know that “there is an inevitable Nemesis for all these terrible wrongs? It is a fearful thing to incur the sure vengeance of Heaven.”³⁴

These words were bolstered by action. When some enraged residents of Hawaii discovered that some of their compatriots were recruiting labor in surrounding islands, they began sending letters to indigenes and mission teachers informing them that the people who left their homes for Hawaii were all either sick or dying from hard labor and starvation. They were “advising the natives not to ship . . . as immigrants to Hawaii. The consequence is,” it was said in 1881, “that for a time immigration is stopped among these islands.”³⁵

When the Hawaiian authorities dispatched agents to recruit labor in surrounding islands, they were armed with restrictive protocols. No liquor, guns, or ammunition were allowed, and agents were instructed sternly to “be honest and above all reproach” and, of course, no deception of any kind was to be used. “Make all contracts for three years and no less,” they were told and “pay for men \$5 per month for the first year” with “good food, a house and bed.”³⁶ Similar laws were passed in Queensland but were not enforced as vigorously as in Hawaii. The president of the Board of Immigration in Hawaii was more meticulous and judicious about this labor force than his counterparts in Fiji. There was a “high cost of the South Sea Islanders” in that there was “great expense in fitting out, storing and maintaining the vessels” in transporting them. Moreover, these workers had “not, generally, given satisfaction. They quickly yield to disease and the rate of mortality is great.” He warned:

[The New Hebrides people] made excellent laborers but the conditions under which they are obtained make it impossible for the Board to make fur-

ther efforts in this direction. These people are still savages and their islands cannot be approached with safety. There is much reason to believe that kidnapping is constantly practiced in securing them. If only legitimate means are resorted to few could be obtained. . . . [The] demand from Fiji and Queensland . . . [made for a] sharp competition for them and any serious attempt on our part to enter that labor field would probably be thwarted by those who are now supplying those countries.³⁷

This kind of forbearance was even more striking given the perception by Hawaiian planters that they were facing desperate straits. The situation was such that London's representative in the island chain felt Honolulu would have to bend to this competitive pressure. "So long as emigration from the South Sea Islands to Queensland" persisted, Honolulu "would not be in a position to object to a similar emigration to the Sandwich Islands." As it turned out, he was largely wrong, though the Hawaiian economy was under great pressure.³⁸

"The question of labor," it was said in Hawaii, "was the most serious, the most imminent of all. . . . [There was a] want of labor. In some parts of the Kingdom it was already perceived." For strategic and political reasons the mostly European and Euro-American planters felt it was not safe and not desirable either that the plantations should depend wholly upon the indigenes for labor, or that the indigenes should all be compelled to resort to the plantations for support. China was being targeted for labor but even there care should be taken, it was advised. It was desirable to "procure" immigrants from Germany but it had yet to be shown that this was feasible.³⁹ Thus, it was resolved by the planters to be "in communication with other similar societies existing in the West and East Indies, in Louisiana, in Brazil and Peru, in Java, Manila, Bourbon and the Mauritius with the view of obtaining information of all discoveries" concerning the cost of laborers.⁴⁰

The Hawaiian diplomatic corps, which was highly professional, was actively monitoring how labor was being deployed. The leading official of the kingdom, R. C. Wyllie, forwarded to Hawaiian diplomat Charles St. Julian his own translations from a Spanish document about Peruvian vessels kidnapping indigenes from several Polynesian islands.⁴¹ "I hope to furnish you," Honolulu's man in Sydney told his Foreign Minister, "with the information you desire regarding available labor from the Eastern Archipelago or other quarter and also the action of the Queensland sugar planters in this respect and the laws regulating the importation of 'Coolie labor.'"⁴² This diplomat, A. S. Webster, acknowledged his Foreign Ministry's objection to Chinese labor—

this was in 1876, a few years before the influx of Japanese labor. As a result, he was now exploring Java as a source of plantation labor, though this was to prove to be unavailing.⁴³ Webster was keeping a close eye on developments in the Australian colonies for pointers on what was to unfold in Hawaii. "The Squatters and Sugar Planters have availed themselves of the South Sea Island labor to a considerable extent," he reported in 1876, "with but moderate success and satisfaction to themselves. No labor has yet been imported from India." Confirming Hawaii's own predilection, he asserted that in these colonies too "there is a general belief that China *is the only* sure field for labor."⁴⁴

Nonetheless, planters did seek out laborers in Rotumah in 1877 and the New Hebrides in 1881, including nearly 2,000 indigenes from the Gilbert Islands "with a sprinkling of black Melanesian cannibals." Unfortunately for them, the costly experiment did not pan out.⁴⁵ Such importations were not a major trend, however, not least since there were potent forces in Honolulu who—for various reasons—were opposed to the influx of Melanesian and Polynesian laborers. The kingdom was concerned about the misuse of their flag by masters of the illicit labor trade. In 1881 Honolulu's diplomat in Sydney remarked that in light of the "present state of troubled questions of Native Labor and Polynesian Massacres in the Pacific, the colorable possession by an unscrupulous trader of the Hawaiian Flag would prove fatal to Hawaiian independence."⁴⁶

Nonplussed, planters in Hawaii dispatched agents as far as Calcutta in a frantic search for labor. The kind of reserve that was advised for the Pacific islands was also counseled for what turned out to be the major site for labor: China. Recruiters of labor were of the most disreputable character, it was said, as many of them were connected with piracy: "all kinds of disreputable practices are resorted to in order to entice coolies. Some atrocity or other arising from it is published almost monthly in Hong Kong papers"—kidnapping was common too.⁴⁷ Yet that such practices were highlighted negatively by officialdom—including planters—again distinguished Hawaii from Fiji and Queensland.

On the other hand, the mostly European and Euro-American planters in Hawaii strived energetically to bolster white supremacy by seeking to import labor from Europe.⁴⁸ Northern Europe, particularly Germany, was regarded by the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society early on as "affording the class of laborers best adapted to secure the results aimed at."⁴⁹ Much later U.S. Diplomat William Haywood applauded the arrival of Polish workers in Hawaii. "Their coming," he said, "was hailed by those favoring annexation as an important step towards supplanting the Asiatics with good white labor."⁵⁰ In 1897 a

group of U.S. patriots acknowledged that “an active movement has been on foot here [in Hawaii] for some time to abolish the system of contract labor, and to seek white workers from the United States under a system of profit-sharing which is already in operation on some of our plantations and has been successfully tried in Queensland.”⁵¹ Yet it was not coincidence that South Seas planters sought out Asian, Polynesian, and Melanesian workers since the dictates of white supremacy meant that even the most financially strapped European migrant workers had certain liberties that these “other” workers did not enjoy. Thus it was not long before complaints arose against these Polish workers for repeatedly refusing work and griping about “alleged ill-treatment.”⁵²

In 1878, before the onset of a massive influx of Japanese labor, an employment agency in San Francisco told the president of Hawaii’s Board of Immigration of the supposedly superior advantages of white immigration, compared to the “less intelligent & more unreliable Chinese & other black coolie system.” Recognizing that he was straining credulity, he conceded bluntly, “I do not pretend to say that there are [no] drawbacks to *white* immigration or that they are not often troublesome and unsuitable . . . but the *quantity* and *quality* of their labor is higher in rank than the class now used and less expensive to import.”⁵³ Of course, this labor recruiter had managed to expose why white labor was not favored despite their bolstering the minority position of European and Euro-American planters: their racial status conferred de facto class advantages that were incompatible with the gross exploitation of labor—advantages that Chinese and Pacific Islanders (and, at that juncture, Japanese) did not possess.

These Hawaiian planters were no saints, in other words, and the consolidation of ethnic Hawaiians earlier in the century hampered their ability to do what their peers were doing at that precise moment in Fiji. Thus, like their counterparts in Fiji, they were skeptical of utilizing indigenous labor with one among them expressing the viewpoint as early as the 1830s that there was a “complete worthlessness [of the indigenes] as laborers on a farm. The habits and customs which have been handed down to them from their forefathers and which they so tenaciously adhere to, will ever remain the great obstacle to their employment in cultivating the soil. Centuries at least will intervene ere they will understand that it is a part of their *duty* to serve their masters faithfully.” It was clear, it was said with confidence, that 400 indigenes were seen as equivalent to “10 white men (poor) or 2 ½ smart Yankees.”⁵⁴

Since planters had difficulty in attracting European and Euro-American labor and since some had reservations about employing indigenes, this did not leave many options. “[The] difficulty of getting men for the plantations is

continually becoming greater,” said a morose agent of the soon-to-be agricultural giant Castle & Cook in 1866.⁵⁵

THE HAWAIIAN Kingdom was not as enmeshed in the illicit labor traffic as Fiji. To the contrary, it was offering its good offices to the archipelago, a maneuver seen as officious meddling by some in Washington. In 1859 with rising concern, Charles St. Julian of Hawaii’s diplomatic mission kept an eye on important events that set the stage for blackbirding (i.e., the “idea is to make Fiji a great cotton producing country for which it is admirably suited”).⁵⁶ In 1871 St. Julian was in confidential communication with representatives of the regime with the intent to establish a “protectorate under the Hawaiian Crown.” Honolulu’s man was in contact directly with Cakobau. “[He is a] powerfully built man, over six feet high and although showing age not feeble,” St. Julian reported. “I saw him several times . . . [and] paid him two especial visits. I was upon the whole favorably impressed by him. . . . [He is an] extraordinary man.” The monarch was “intensely pleased with my mission,” said St. Julian “and with the invitation to visit the Hawaiian Majesty, for whom and whose government he expresses the greatest respect and admiration, and he proposes going to Honolulu”—and soon. He was also in touch with another indigenous leader, Maafu. “I carefully cultivated his acquaintance,” he said. “He was several times my guest and we had repeated conversations on passing and coming events.” They had a long and confidential communication and he too was invited to Honolulu for further consultations. He was reported as asserting that he would “*not hesitate to apply to His Hawaiian Majesty’s Government [for] advice [and would] continually and especially correspond with myself.*”⁵⁷

Through such contacts, St. Julian was able to conclude that he had established Hawaiian influence, including the “means for using and increasing it.” His idea was a union of Fiji with Hawaii, or Fiji under Hawaiian protection. He took a particular interest in a bill then being bruited in Fiji calling for the suppression of kidnapping and other illegal practices in connection with the “labor trade” of the Pacific. St. Julian also was pleased with a movement designed “to remove from Fiji the present stigma which rests upon it of being a place to which any rascal may abscond with an assurance of being safe from all who have lawful claim upon him.”⁵⁸

Seeking a protectorate over Fiji, lobbying for antiblackbirding legislation, and crusading against the idea of Fiji as a refuge for cutthroats, Honolulu was staking out bold positions and that was bound to enhance ire against the kingdom. Thus, the scholar Merze Tate concluded, “None of Fiji’s white leaders wanted a Hawaiian protectorate; they preferred either a native government

under their guidance or intervention by one of the major powers.”⁵⁹ Their patrons in Washington and Western Europe were even more opposed to Honolulu’s maneuvers.

Honolulu was not unaware of this. In 1870 St. Julian reported from Fiji that “some American gentlemen of my acquaintance anticipate success” in annexing that archipelago but were already thinking ahead. “[They] speak of alleged information from authentic sources of the annexation,” he said, “not only of Fiji *but of the Hawaiian Islands* as events *seriously contemplated and fully intended to be brought about* by the United States government. A statement to this effect has even been put forward here, in the leading columns of a leading journal on the *avowed authority of the present United States Consul*.” St. Julian, Honolulu’s Charges d’Affaires for Southern Polynesia and consul general for Sydney and Tasmania, was alarmed.⁶⁰

He was not the only Hawaiian diplomat expressing unease. In 1873, George Oakley, the kingdom’s consul general in Melbourne, referred to the notion that the U.S. government was increasing its naval strength in the Pacific with the intent of annexing Hawaii. Oakley may have thought this rumor to be foolish,⁶¹ but others were not so sure.⁶²

What to do?

Though Honolulu had long looked to London as a counterweight to Washington, the kingdom had a sneaking suspicion that Great Britain would be unwilling to expend blood and capital—if need be—to save Hawaii. Other alliances were deemed necessary.

When King Kalakaua visited Japan in 1881, according to the scholar James H. Okahata, he “did much to further friendly relations between Japan and Hawaii. His was the first nation to recognize Japan as an ‘equal’ by offering to abrogate the extraterritorial rights clause in the treaty. Some contend that this gesture proved to be [a] wedge that made the western powers eventually concede to abrogate the clause.”⁶³ During this journey, King Kalakaua asked Japan to join with Hawaii in a “Union and Federation of Asiatic Nations and Sovereigns.”⁶⁴

The king, perhaps wary of further alienating powerful Euro-Americans back home or in Washington, offered to visit Japan “*incognito*. . . . The Japanese government, however, concluded to take no notice of the private character of the King’s visit, and determined upon a public reception”—a reception that proved to be highly enthusiastic. When the king’s delegation entered the emperor’s carriage and was driven to his summer residence, the streets were filled with people and Hawaiian and Japanese flags were flying together. Suggestive of the importance Japan lent to this journey, the rooms occupied by the



FIGURE 7. King Kalakaua of Hawaii (*seated, center*) was greeted rhapsodically during his 1881 visit to Japan. This journey led to a mass migration of Japanese to Hawaii. Courtesy of the Bishop Museum.

Hawaiian prince were those occupied by General Ulysses Grant and family while in Japan. The Japanese were appreciative that in 1853 when their nation was being pried open by the United States, the churches of the Hawaiian Islands contributed the sum of one thousand dollars toward building a church in Japan.⁶⁵

William N. Armstrong, a member of Kalakaua's Cabinet and part of his delegation, recalled later that His Majesty "contrived a scheme of matrimonial alliance between the thrones of Japan and Hawaii" based on his vague fear that the United States might soon absorb his kingdom. He was desperately seeking an alliance with Japan as an antidote.⁶⁶

The growing reliance of Hawaii on Japan was reflected in the growing influx of Japanese laborers. Powerful forces in Honolulu had objected to the emulation of Fiji and its undue reliance on blackbirding, which did not leave many options. Honolulu saw a benefit in the importation of Japanese workers in that it would further cement a nascent alliance and perhaps foil the designs

Tokio, Japan
Jan. 14th, 1882.

Sire,

I write a few lines to your Majesty to express my grateful sentiments for the marked consideration you showed me during your sojourn in Japan and I also to thank your Majesty for the beautiful thermometer so kindly sent me, I am greatly obliged to your Majesty for it and I am sure I shall guard as a pleasant souvenir of your Majesty. Through the Reception Committee, I was informed of your generous kindness, in asking me, if it would be my happiness to be united to your Royal niece in marriage, I am at a loss to express fully my appreciation of this honour

FIGURE 8. Seeking to escape being swallowed by the United States, Hawaii sought an alliance—via matrimony—with the royal family of Japan. Courtesy of the Bishop Museum.

of those in Washington who were contemplating annexation of Hawaii. Thus, just as 1820 marks the landmark incursion into Hawaii of a substantial Euro-American population,⁶⁷ 1885 marks the beginning of “the *great* Japanese migration,” and a lessening reliance on the Chinese.⁶⁸

The official 1878 census in Hawaii revealed a Chinese population of 5,916, which had jumped in 1884 to 17,939.⁶⁹ But this was occurring as anti-Chinese sentiment was surging on the mainland and the ripples inevitably reached the Hawaiian Islands. In 1883, U.S. Diplomat David McKinley reported that “[planters had] petitioned the government to permit a sufficient number of Chinese laborers to land in the Kingdom to relieve the stringency in the labor market. . . . [They] began to bring them in at the rate of one thousand per month.” But alarmed at this prodigious influx of Chinese, the government, the people, and even the planters themselves demanded an immediate suspension of immigration and the government of Hawaii, after pressure from the Great Powers, and especially from the United States, suspended it. At that juncture, the kingdom moved to bring in more Japanese and persistently refused again to throw open the doors to the Chinese. Perhaps unaware of the sensitive diplomatic minuet that was taking place—or of Japan’s desire to become a “Great Power” and ally with Honolulu—McKinley cheered the suspension of Chinese migration. It “cannot be too highly commended,” he asserted, since alleged Chinese “clannishness, their perfect system of guild” and their uncanny ability—“however many there may be”—to “dictate the price of labor” and “to be in every case the masters of the situation” were distasteful. With “unrestricted Chinese immigration,” he thought, “not only will they crowd out the native, but in a short time the European [too, and the kingdom] will become virtually a Chinese colony.”⁷⁰ Agitation against the importation of Chinese was strong in Hawaii in the early eighties. In 1883, the first legislative restriction on the importation of Chinese was imposed.⁷¹ William Armstrong, an influential Euro-American in Hawaii, distilled the sentiments of many of his compatriots when he confessed in 1880, “The Chinese Question troubles me. Here there are over 10,000 of them. . . . They can rise and kill us all. We must have some force to handle them.”⁷² He was to accompany the king on his fateful journey to Japan a few years later.

Thus, though by 1898 the number of Chinese residents in Hawaii reached 25,000, by 1907 they did not exceed 15,000 because they were gradually replaced by the Japanese.⁷³ But in moving from reliance on the Chinese to Japanese, those who worshipped white supremacy were increasing their peril as Tokyo was emerging as a major power and was hostile to the idea that their nationals should be deemed second-class citizens—a contradiction that would

explode at Pearl Harbor in 1941—and unlike China they were able to do something about this bigotry. Thus, worried that the Nipponese were becoming “too numerous,” planters scrambled for new sources of labor as early as 1900 looking to Puerto Rico and even the despised African-Americans from the South.⁷⁴

For mainstream Euro-American sentiment, Hawaii was the land of no good options as far as labor was concerned. Indigenous Hawaiians were viewed with dread. “The planters fear the Legislature,” conceded William Armstrong. “They say the native majority may or will tax them out of existence.” There was, he said, a “clearly defined . . . native Hawaiian party, a foreign missionary party and a cosmopolitan foreign party”—but it was the first of these that ignited trepidation.⁷⁵ How could the labor of these indigenes be exploited ruthlessly given their perceived political strength?

One prominent citizen and old island resident was convinced that indigenous Hawaiians were “unquestionably the most efficient laborers on plantations, especially when they have had several years experience. But”—and this was a big “but”—“the number of able-bodied Hawaiians suitable for this service is quite limited—probably not over three or four thousand at the most—and all of them are more or less independent, i.e., want to be off from plantation work when they choose. They are not steady and reliable help.” The Chinese were arriving in significant numbers but there were issues here too. As these comments were being made in 1879, U.S. Consul William Hunter reminded his interlocutors that the “Chinese Question” was already beginning to excite earnest discussion. Private parties were dispatching vessels to the South Sea Islands, but there was considerable sentiment in Hawaii against the idea of becoming a Fiji or Queensland. As for British East India, there was the major issue of London maintaining judicial jurisdiction over the migrants, which would make Washington very unhappy. This left Japan.⁷⁶

Of course, though 1885 signals the organized government-to-government influx of Japanese laborers, individuals from these islands had been making their way eastward for some time. As early as 1840, Hawaiian pioneer Dr. G. P. Judd was recording the entry of the Japanese into the island. “[I] saw Japanese,” he wrote, “they are fishermen from an island they call Tosa and were found 5 days sail off at an island they call Semiana. . . . They say their island is 10 days sail from Kiusiu.”⁷⁷ As early as 1868, 148 Japanese arrived in Hawaii as sugar workers and even before then it was likely that for centuries shipwrecked sailors and fishermen had drifted from Japanese waters on the powerful Kuroshio current to the Hawaiian shores.⁷⁸

The Kingdom of Hawaii had posted diplomats in Japan for some time. In

1870—two years after the Meiji Restoration, which set Japan on the path to modernization and great power status—Honolulu’s consul general acknowledged that “many Japanese have begged passages to go abroad if such could be arranged” and it seemed Hawaii was more than willing to accommodate them. Seemingly, Honolulu was willing to go further than welcoming laborers. “Should Japanese Princes desire to establish a colony,” asked the Kingdom’s consul general, “and request a grant of land from [the] Government could such be obtained, and if not at what rent might a good location be obtained for?”⁷⁹ Certainly Japan was more than pleased with the king’s visit, which signaled Tokyo’s growing strength. The king’s advisor was not alone in recognizing the importance of Hawaii’s diplomatic recognition of Japan: it was “the first treaty which recognized Japan as an independent nation,” he enthused.⁸⁰

Years before King Kalakaua’s arrival in Japan, his representative in this nation was hailing the potential arrival of Japanese workers to the kingdom. “Japanese will never be employed in America!” he exclaimed in 1871. “The times are against the introduction of their labor as well as the Chinese; so much the better for the Hawaiian Islands!” As he saw it, “no other field is open but Hawaii,” which was a plus since “these are a people with ability to grasp any undertaking.”⁸¹

Later in 1882 the consul general in Tokyo conceded that “the Japanese people are *not* an Emigrating Race” but he had been “working for nearly four years to render Emigration possible from a political point of view.” The recent trip of King Kalakaua also had helped to change the atmosphere. “The personal friendship of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor and the Imperial Princes for His Majesty the King,” he reported, “will undoubtedly materially assist in perpetuating the friendly relations between the two countries.” Furthermore, based on his fifteen years of experience in Japan and his extensive travels around the world, he was confident that “planters [would] consider the Japanese male and female laborer (agricultural) superior to Portuguese, Chinese or any other.”⁸² Beyond the recruitment of thousands of laborers, further solidifying relations between Honolulu and Tokyo was the kingdom sending its best and brightest students to Japan for study. In 1883, the consul general reported that the Hawaiian youths now attending the Nobles School in Japan were “becoming very proficient in their knowledge of the Japanese language and customs. . . . They speak Japanese with great fluency. I recommend that they should remain here at least three years longer. . . . They are very contented and happy.”⁸³

There was nervous apprehension in Washington about some of the maneuvers of the kingdom—the close ties to Japan and the attempt to establish

Hawaiian supremacy in the region in particular. As if that were not enough, by 1886 a Hawaiian diplomat in Melbourne was seeking swift, heavily armed excellent sea boats capable of going anywhere” for his military.⁸⁴ Later Kalakaua expressed interest in weaponry (e.g., a machine gun capable of firing 600 rounds per minute).⁸⁵ Washington had to wonder in what directions this newly purchased armament would be turned—and to what end.

Hawaii Conquered

The tiny Kingdom of Hawaii was more sophisticated than its Pacific counterparts—for example, Fiji—and sought to avoid their fate: blackbirding, annexation, and all the rest. To that end, it played a desperate diplomatic game, seeking to ally with Great Britain, then Japan in order to avoid the power that was bearing down on it—the United States. However, after London annexed Fiji, powerful momentum was generated in Washington behind the idea of the United States countering this maneuver by annexing Hawaii, as the great powers played a kind of diplomatic chess in the Pacific. When Honolulu sought to play the role in Samoa that it had attempted in Fiji, even London seemed to be more concerned with Hawaii's reach and influence than that of its former colony, the United States.

FROM THE time of Vancouver's last visit to Hawaii in 1794 until about 1825, Great Britain was viewed with admiration in Honolulu. London was viewed as a benign protector of Hawaii.¹ During the time of the California Gold Rush, when rumors were being spread relentlessly about U.S. filibusterers invading Hawaii or, perhaps, their nation simply annexing the island chain, Britain's representative in Honolulu warned the kingdom that the United States was very hard on the natives of the countries they obtained. Later this diplomat, William Miller, attacked the proposed annexation in the 1850s by repeatedly raising the twin specters of slavery and racism as well as the treatment meted out to Indian tribes in the United States in order to deter the ailing king. Miller had been through the U.S. South and was well acquainted with the racism there. He bluntly informed Honolulu that given their location, being annexed to the United States would amount to the enslavement of native Hawaiians.²

Though Washington thought London had the upper hand in Honolulu, the United Kingdom begged to differ. In 1843, it was announced that U.S.

citizens were already the “virtual rulers” of Hawaii and the directors of their government. The islands were “scarcely more than nominally governed by a Native Sovereign & Native Chiefs.” The jousting between the two countries meant, said Lord Aberdeen, that a “great jealousy has existed between the English and Americans. It is difficult [to judge where] the most embittered feelings have been exhibited,” either by Washington or London, though “it must be confessed” that “on the side of the Americans” existed a “tendency to domineer.”³

This was effective propaganda. Continually, U.S. representatives in Honolulu complained about what they perceived to be the lack of respect they received from the government. During the middle of the Civil War when Washington was worried justifiably that the conflict left the nation exposed diplomatically, it had to worry further that London was making continued diplomatic inroads in Hawaii. “The King is strongly predisposed in favor of the British in preference to the Americans or those of any other nationality,” Secretary of State Seward was informed in 1863. “English policy, English etiquette and English grandeur seem to captivate and control him, [while] American diplomacy has been a complete failure.” London had sent over representatives to evaluate the cotton-growing capacity of the islands, and the report was said to be “remarkably favorable.” “There is some cotton,” it was, “now growing in the suburbs of this city as rich and luxuriant a growth as I ever saw in the South States.” But hope still reigned as even then this U.S. diplomat was contemplating seizing this sovereign state. “This group of islands under the control of our Government, in my judgment,” he said, “would be far more valuable than the ownership of both Cuba and the Bahama Islands.”⁴

After the Civil War ended, concern about Washington’s position in the kingdom did not. Economic distress contributed to this, as the decline of whaling—which was mostly a U.S. enterprise—was seen as circumscribing the role of Washington, a development also reflected in the draining Civil War. Yet this conflict had illustrated the difficulties encountered by a U.S. fleet that was “homeless everywhere but in its own mainland harbors, and the more [Secretary of State] Seward looked into a future barren of sails the more he coveted the scattered possessions once scorned as a source of weakness to their European possessors. The hopes for the immediate future lay in the transcontinental railroad then under construction. It was believed that this road, when completed, would draw a much larger share of the commerce of Asia toward California ports,” thereby highlighting Hawaii’s role as a way-station. Still, even with the railway, Hawaii loomed as a key to U.S. national security and a gateway to the wealth and markets of the planet’s most populous continent—Asia.

But the Civil War had not only exposed U.S. weakness, illuminating a debilitating lack of national unity, but also correspondingly strengthened the hand of those in Hawaii who thought an orientation away from Washington was the wisest course, a lengthening list that included Confederate sympathizers. So prodded, the United States responded with vigor. Still, the anti-U.S. cause was bolstered when the Civil War coincided with the decline of the U.S.-dominated whaling industry, again to the detriment of Washington's influence in Honolulu. Thus, by the late 1860s cynics were claiming that Kalakaua would rather give away his islands to Great Britain than sell it to the United States. But undermining this apparent anti-Washington sentiment was the point that a plantation system was developing that was dominated by settlers—disproportionately from the very same reviled United States.⁵ The Civil War also ruined a number of Louisiana sugar plantations, thereby opening the door for their erstwhile Hawaiian competitors. Not surprisingly, at the conclusion of this titanic conflict, the U.S. Navy doubled its presence in Pacific waters and rotated as many as five warships into Hawaiian waters.⁶

In 1868 Secretary of State William Seward was fielding a familiar gripe with his representative grouching about the “slight offered to my Government through my own humble person,” which was “but another evidence of the [disrespect] certain Hawaiian officials . . . show their entire alienation from their native country.” The king, he felt, was friendly toward them only when not influenced by his ministers, which was, perhaps, overly sanguine, if not delusional. Still, he continued to insist, “The Hawaiian people and many of the foreign residents look upon the United States as the great hope of the islands, but the Ministry, not one of whom is a true American, will continue to direct the affairs of state . . . [and] will ever prove treacherous to our interests on the islands.” Londoners in the Pacific could only shake their heads at such thinking since Seward was informed that foreigners felt “Americans ought to be content with their present influence in the Hawaiian Islands because Americans [held] the majority of the official positions.” But Seward was told, “We would be better off if not a single American held office under the Hawaiian government. In most cases the said officials are better off, both pecuniary and socially, than they would be in any other country, and hence have no desire for desiring a change of Government. Furthermore, they seem to regard disrespect towards the United States the test of Hawaiian loyalty.”⁷ As Washington saw it, just as some dispatched from the United Kingdom to North America before 1776 developed an unnatural attachment to their adopted homeland, a replay of this trend was playing itself out in the Pacific—except that now the United States was to be victimized by this process.

Fierce protestations notwithstanding, London was probably correct in wondering why Washington was complaining about its position in Honolulu. According to Ralph S. Kuykendall, "In 1842 American interests and American influence in Hawaii were superior to those of any other foreign power—probably superior to those of all other foreign powers combined." Whaling was a critical industry for Hawaii and during the 1842–1843 period, 1,700 ships arrived, of which 1,400 were from the United States and 300 from Great Britain.⁸ In 1855 London acknowledged, "The amount of trade between Great Britain and the Sandwich Islands at the present time is so small, that the question, so far as this country is concerned, is one more of principle than of practical value."⁹ As the United States began to focus westward after the Civil War, this trend had hardly collapsed.

Still, it remained true that bitter antagonism prevailed between King Kalakaua and the Americans,¹⁰ and when the Dowager Queen Emma visited England after the Civil War, Washington saw it "as another link in the chain that was being forged to bind Hawaii closely to Great Britain."¹¹ James Wodehouse, the well-informed British consul in Honolulu, noticed in 1874 that the indigenes exhibited an "excessive dislike" of the United States.¹²

This was a reflection of the fact that—particularly after the annexation of Fiji—the kingdom had good reason to fear being swallowed by the United States and felt that cozying up to London might forestall this. A leading architect of post-Civil War U.S. foreign policy, presidential contender, and Secretary of State James Blaine asserted that Hawaii was "the key to the maritime domination of the Pacific states." It was little more than an outlying district of California. As he saw it, the critical nodes of the developing U.S. empire were Cuba, Panama, and Hawaii, with the latter island chain being, perhaps, most critical of all.¹³

Correspondingly, Wodehouse's instructions after the Civil War were to prevent annexation of Hawaii and failing this to establish a joint protectorate of Great Britain, France, and the United States.¹⁴ Thus in the fall of 1874, Wodehouse was able to garner two interviews with King Kalakaua, one held privately at the royal palace and the other at the home of the French commissioner. At the first meeting, the king opened the conversation by saying that he wished to extend his visit to England and France in order to show the U.S. government that he did not intend to throw himself into their hands—that his real wish was to go to England! The startled Wodehouse replied, "Your Majesty then fears a coup d'état on the part of the Americans during your absence—would that not be a reason for staying at home!"¹⁵ No reply was recorded but no doubt the king felt that the possible diplomatic bolstering abroad was worth the risk of being deposed.

The king may have been paranoid but he had real enemies. An anonymous correspondent writing from Honolulu informed Secretary of State Blaine in 1881 bluntly that the indigenes were “incapable of self-government.” But the indigenous were not without weapons to wield since they could seek to manipulate tensions between London and Washington. As ever, the labor question was intertwined with diplomacy in the region as the English were laboring earnestly for the importation of large numbers of “East Indian Coolies—British subjects,” as was occurring in Fiji, and Euro-Americans were wary about the augmentation in the ranks of those with supposed fealty to the queen. Yet this correspondent reflected the tensions of the era, acknowledging, “These Islands can be made the key to the naval control of the Pacific [by the United States, while the King was] now an avowed believer in English supremacy.”¹⁶

Blaine, a highly influential member of the U.S. elite, was the right man for this anonymous person to contact. This Maine republican “believed in a racial hierarchy with Anglo-Saxons at the top,” which did not bode well for Pacific indigenes, precisely because it was a creed clung to fiercely by so many Euro-Americans. Blaine also came to believe that overseas markets were absolutely essential to the preservation of the American system and that the largest potential markets were in Asia, for which Hawaii served as a stepping stone. During his first tenure as secretary of state, Hawaii served as a diplomatic battleground between the United States and Great Britain, a conflict which initially grew out of the 1875 reciprocity treaty between the United States and Hawaii. British officials balked at the preferential treatment accorded to the United States by the terms of the pact, which they claimed violated the most-favored-nation clause of Britain’s own treaty with Honolulu. Tensions had not ceased when King Kalakaua traveled to Europe. President James Garfield confided to a close friend that conditions in Hawaii gave him “a good deal of anxiety.” He feared that the monarch was considering either selling the islands or establishing a commercial treaty with Great Britain, which would be a huge embarrassment for the United States. Secretary Blaine had come to distrust King Kalakaua as a “false and intriguing man.” The idea of Indian nationals arriving in droves in Honolulu also frightened Washington, which saw it as further British leverage that—according to Blaine—“would subvert the independence of Hawaii by joining it to an Asiatic system.”¹⁷ In this respect, Honolulu’s decision to rely upon Japanese labor can be seen retrospectively by Washington as something of a relief.

Washington was getting increasingly irked by the activities of the kingdom, particularly in the diplomatic realm (i.e., its ties to London and Tokyo and its attempt to construct regional hegemony). As Washington saw it, it was bad

enough that Honolulu sought to make Fiji into some sort of protectorate, but when it sought to do something similar in Samoa—which already the United States was seeing as essential to its Pacific interests—well, that was simply going too far. Symptomatic was Robert Wilcox, who was of indigenous Hawaiian descent and had been sent to study in Italy by King Kalakaua, who himself “had his fill of the overbearing, Bible-thumping Yankee advisors to earlier Hawaiian monarchs and looked to the Old World and to the East for models”; Wilcox and the monarch “dreamed of a Hawaii in charge of its own affairs, led by Hawaiians equipped with the best education the world had to offer.”¹⁸ This ambitious thinking was not viewed benignly by the U.S. State Department.

This was particularly the case in the 1880s when—after the king’s visit to Japan—Hawaii became more aggressive in speaking up for its fellow Pacific Islanders. This was occurring as the king suggested that the Japanese emperor take over leadership of a “Union and Federation of the Asiatic Nations and Sovereigns.” In 1883, he sent commissioners to the Gilbert Islands and the New Hebrides to set up Hawaiian protectorates. His overall plan included bringing Samoa and other island countries such as Tonga under Hawaiian rule.¹⁹ Honolulu, in short, devised an ambitious plan of attempting to create a Polynesian federation headed by Hawaii’s King and directed in its international relations by Hawaii’s Foreign Office. This was not greeted with equanimity among the contending European powers—nor in Washington—including Honolulu’s erstwhile ally in London. “When news of the Samoan-Hawaiian confederation agreement reached the governments of the United States, Great Britain and Germany,” wrote leading scholar Ralph S. Kuykendall, “it encountered strong opposition from all of them.”²⁰

Tiny Hawaii was in a bind. In 1872 the British diplomat James Wodehouse offered the opinion “founded on his confidential relations with two Hawaiian Kings in succession and on . . . personal intercourse with President (Johnson) and Secretary (Seward) that were England to take possession of Fiji, [then] the Stars and Stripes must soon wave on the fort of Honolulu.” In response the king was said to have informed him that “if any pressure were put upon him in that direction,” (i.e., annexation to the United States), “he should offer his Islands to the British Government.”²¹ This was a high-stakes gamble on the king’s part that was complicated further by his own effort to extend Honolulu’s influence in the region—a maneuver that apparently foiled his simultaneous attempt to use London as a counterweight against Washington. King Kalakaua was proceeding on two tracks that may not have been consistent. He was, as ever, snuggling closely to London to fend off Washington, but he was also striking out boldly in seeking to forge a Pacific confederation. The problem—

and the king may not have recognized this—was that the latter approach undermined the former since London was quite unhappy with the idea of a Pacific alliance to the point that it was willing to at least not stringently object to Washington's own ambitious plans in the region, which included swallowing Hawaii whole.

Moreover, the major powers felt that it was quite enough to compete between and among themselves—the United States, Germany, Britain, France, Russia at times—without including Hawaii, which some were beginning to see as a pawn of Japan in any case. Competition in Samoa—the major point of contention—was sufficiently fierce without including another player.

Certainly Great Britain was not pleased by Hawaii's initiatives in the Pacific. In a confidential missive from the Foreign Office, skeptical comment was made about "copies of a convention between King Malietoa [of Samoa] and King Kalakaua binding each other mutually to enter into a political confederation."

"Her Majesty's Government," it was said with disdain, "cannot regard this intervention of Hawaii in Samoa as likely to lead to any advantageous result." King Malietoa, it was thought, was "ill-advised to make the Hawaiian alliance without consulting the Treaty Powers and cannot look for their sympathy or support." London was so incensed that it instructed its representative to ally with its persistent antagonists in Berlin and Washington. "Her Majesty's Government view with dissatisfaction the action of Hawaii in Samoa," it was said coldly, "the more so as they have reason to believe that it is calculated to create anarchy and disorder."²² There was constant and repetitive hand-wringing in London about what was termed "Hawaiian interference in the affairs of Samoa."²³

London's hysteria about Hawaii reached the point that it took on an air of unreality. "It would appear that the United States' government approve such action and will probably look favorably on the claims of King Kalakaua to interfere in Samoan affairs," said the Marquis of Salisbury in a confidential message; therefore, London's delegate was instructed to "unite with his German colleague in opposing the pretensions of Hawaii."²⁴ From Berlin, London's representative denounced the "mischievous" Hawaiian intervention in Samoa, which had inspired such serious alarm at the German Consulate at Apia that the Commander of the German ship-of-war, which was preparing to leave those waters to attend to more important duties elsewhere had thought it necessary to postpone this departure. Yet he too alleged that Hawaii relied on support from the United States and elsewhere; note was taken of the telling point that even in Honolulu, the mission in Samoa was being called the "Samoa farce" by the press, which did not bode well for King Kalakaua.²⁵

Actually Berlin, London, and Washington were jousting furiously in Samoa, though one analyst alleged in late 1886 that Berlin was prevailing. In fact, "every third foreigner with whom he meets either [is] an employee of the [German] company or as one who was formerly employed by it and it is indebted to it for his present position." Thus, "of the 210 foreign residents of Apia (not including members of families) ninety belong to Germany alone . . . considerably more than the English (33) and American (24) population together." It was telling that the business done by English firms in the year 1885 amounted to \$90,000; that done by U.S. firms amounted to \$123,000; while the business of the colonies of New Zealand and New South Wales [Australia] amounted to \$48,000; making a total of \$261,000. The trade carried on by the German firms with the Samoan group alone amounted to \$576, 413. The same disproportion held true in land ownership. This report, which was addressed to "His Highness Prince von Bismarck," did not even deign to mention any Hawaiian interests.²⁶

Washington's representative in Samoa, George Bates, also knew that Germany was the rising power in Samoa—not Hawaii. "The German line of steamers that are about to run between here and Sydney," he was told in 1886, "will entirely do away with most of the American trade for the simple reason that merchants will be able to carry on their business with less than one quarter of their present capital and have their goods fresh every month from Sydney." Recall Fiji, where U.S. goods were in demand before they had steamer lines to New Zealand and Australia; afterwards, it was quite the contrary. This was critical in light of the trying climate that challenged the freshness of meat and fish. Thus, not only Germany but the British Empire had an advantage over the United States since New Zealand and Australia were both able to get fresh goods to the Samoan market in a quicker fashion.²⁷

This was no trivial matter, as the United States saw it. As far as U.S. security was concerned, said Washington's emissary George Bates, Samoa was of even more important than Hawaii. The Monroe Doctrine should be applied to this region, he thought. "Remember," he said, "that Mr. Monroe in his day could not possibly have conceived that the time would come when Hawaii and Samoa would be more closely connected with our national interests than any of the South American republics can ever become." The United States, he continued, "require[s] a naval and coaling station in that part of the Pacific" and, in any case, "construction of an Isthmian canal" was "now a mere matter of time and when the world's commerce floats through such a channel it needs no prophet to assure us that Hawaii will resign to Samoa the key of the maritime domination of the Pacific."²⁸

Like an oil spot or a hyperactive amoeba, the concept of U.S. security was

spreading to encompass ever greater parts of the Pacific, to Hawaii, then Samoa. The problem for Washington was that others had Samoa in their sights as well. "There exists much conflict of claim to land [in Samoa]," said the British Colonial Office, "as between American, British, and German subjects." This was accompanied by rivalry between German and British traders; the commerce of the former was said to be "far greater than" that of the latter, a recipe for sharp contestation.²⁹

Then London had to worry about Washington. Thus, in 1877, a controversial murder took place in Apia. A U.S. citizen stabbed another man, in cold blood and was tried and found guilty before the U.S. consul. Dissatisfied foreign residents held a meeting to consider the question of the sentence and the advisability of hanging the perpetrator since previously when an Englishman had been murdered by a U.S. national, the murderer—on being sent to the United States for punishment—was released. So it was voted 43-3 to hang the accused. Yet when Sir Arthur Gordon, High Commissioner for the region, arrived he allowed the U.S. consul to prosecute both the British consul and W. J. Hunt, a merchant, for "conspiring to murder the murderer."³⁰ New Zealanders and Australian colonists were outraged in particular, not just at Washington but at London, which only complicated the cascading ire. Samoa was becoming a Pacific version of Alsace-Lorraine or Kashmir, fiercely contested by armed behemoths. There was a possibility of war over Samoa, it was reported, with Germany and United States squaring off, and Britain, perhaps, making it a three-way bout.³¹

Carl Schurz, the most famous of German-Americans, warned Bismarck that war could easily result if his Samoan policy was not abandoned; later rumors abounded that Berlin was secretly helping the Filipino rebels in their battle with the United States. This was all a reflection of a basic fact of imperialism: by the end of the nineteenth century, as the Kaiser was wont to remark with rising anger, the most valuable colonial territory had been occupied. What remained therefore assumed an outsized value, particularly in view of the national rivalries, Social Darwinism, economically-based worries about the future, intemperate newspaper commentaries, and a "manipulated social imperialism."³²

As the nineteenth century was closing, Samoa was undergoing the same kind of process that the islands of Hawaii had endured decades earlier—that is, struggling toward consolidation, a situation that elicited an internal tension that was exacerbated by the meddling of the major powers.³³ Understandably, Honolulu thought it had something to offer so it sent John Bush to Apia. He was the minister plenipotentiary to Samoa and Tonga, commissioner to the independent chiefs and people of Polynesia, and also of Hawaiian ancestry.

One Honolulu official regarded Bush as an intelligent man, a “Noble of the Kingdom and formerly Governor of Kauai . . . [who] had seen many foreign lands.”³⁴

Thus, early 1887 found this representative of Honolulu in Apia, visiting the Government House where he met with a high-level official “who greeted me cordially extending a piece of kava as a Samoan token of friendship,” then “in full uniform we repaired” to a meeting with the “members of the King’s Cabinet.” Within a few minutes afterward His Majesty himself entered. On January 15, 1887, John Bush had dinner with the king, his Cabinet, and several prominent chiefs.

After I had [toasted] the health of King Malietoa, the King [toasted] in the most flattering language the health of King Kalakaua, which was dr[u]nk with vociferous cheers by all present. After dinner the chiefs approached me and expressed the great interest in my mission and the hope that it might help Samoa. Some even spoke in the strongest terms of their desire for an alliance or confederation with Hawaii. Subsequent to this a great number of powerful and influential chiefs have called on me and voluntarily expressed their earnest support of an alliance recognizing our superiority as a state, and advanced condition. [I met with the king] accompanied by several of his intimate chiefs [and told him of King Kalakaua’s] great interest in and sympathy with the Samoans and his earnest intent to assist them [in] forming and maintaining [an] independent government and even his willingness to favorably consider a plan of confederation.

King Malietoa, it was reported, was ecstatic. “We have had treaties of friendship with America, England and Germany,” he said, “but from what you have said tonight, I now know that my best friend is my brother Kalakaua.” Of course, the Samoan monarch had a rival, Tamasese, who was aided and abetted by Berlin. Germans supplied Tamasese with arms and ammunition and that kept his revolt alive. Previously, Berlin had inveigled the king and Tamasese to sign a document backing a German-Samoan government, then Malietoa repudiated it, which led to a rebellion spearheaded by Tamasese and Germany, with the intention, however, of eventually displacing Malietoa with a powerful Catholic chief named Mataafa. This, said Bush with understatement, “complicated [the] situation of affairs in Samoa.”³⁵

And, as things turned out, it complicated the situation for Hawaii, too. But as the major powers saw it, Honolulu was complicating matters for itself, such as when King Malietoa told “my dearest and good brother,” King Kalakaua,



FIGURE 9. In the 1880s, the Kingdom of Hawaii sought to build a confederation of the indigenous in the South Seas. On the upper deck, second from the left, King Malietoa of Samoa meets with the Hawaii diplomatic corps. Courtesy of the Bishop Museum.

that he looked forward to when “for the first time a Hawaiian Gun Boat [will be] seen in the Samoan waters.” Yes, he chortled, “her arrival will be welcomed.”³⁶ He did not have to wait long, as it was in the fateful summer of 1887 that in a confidential message London was informed that King Kalakaua’s gunboat *Kaimiloa* returned to Apia from a cruise.³⁷ Samoa had been enduring what London termed a civil war, at least since the early 1870s, and London was among those extremely irritated by Honolulu’s intervention.³⁸

But Hawaii was not alone: it was simply that its idea of Polynesian unity seemed to roil unduly. Thus, London knew that throughout the rebellious actions taken by Mataafa of Samoa his chief adviser was Mr. Harry Moors, a U.S.-based trader in Apia. “I have consulted the U.S. Consul,” said London’s representative in Samoa, perhaps a tad naively, “and he tells me that he has repeatedly urged the U.S. government to take steps against Mr. Moors”³⁹—but to no avail. Moors, according to a former U.S. consul in Apia, “has played in many respects an important part in the political history of Samoa during the last twenty years. . . . [He was] ever found in the thick of the fray supporting

the claims of the candidates for kinship, who he believed [were] the most eligible and thereby drawing upon himself the wrath of cliques professing an opposite opinion.”⁴⁰

Moors was preceded by A. B. Steinberger, who had been a clerk but arrived in Samoa in 1873 calling himself a colonel, asserting that Washington had sent him down to organize a new government, bringing heavy weaponry for indigenes as his calling card. He was among a glut of deceitful white traders who had descended like locusts in Samoa after the U.S. Civil War; three-masted center-board schooners that hailed from California were doing a brisk business in the region. The doings of these California adventurers did not show off the Golden State to advantage.⁴¹ It was well known, said one commentator, that “attempts have been made to bring the Samoan Islands under the power of American adventurers who represented a ‘Ring’ in California and elsewhere.”⁴² Steinberger, described by a former U.S. consul in Apia as an American political adventurer, somehow became prime minister of the then de facto government. The consul thought it worth noting that he was of Jewish descent. Still, in the beginning of 1876 a Captain Stevens of HMS *Barracouta* made him prisoner on the representations of the U.S. consul and he was deported to the United States.

This was a continuation of a long-term trend of involvement of U.S. nationals in the internal affairs of Samoa. In the 1860s, the leading retail business in one major town there was Devoe from St. Louis. U.S. nationals were complicit in the “native civil war of 1869.”⁴³ The notorious Captain “Bully” Hayes was said to be involved in a “filibustering expedition to Samoa.”⁴⁴ It was thought widely that a replay of what had occurred in Fiji—where a predominantly Euro-American crew sought to seize great swathes of land—was repeating itself in Samoa.

Washington’s consul in Apia—who thought the “aboriginal Samoan possesses a very large share of crude intelligence” with “great quickness of perception”—was worried about the Central Polynesia Land & Commercial Company of California, which was seeking annexation of the islands to the United States. Like their counterparts in Fiji, they were enjoying an extensive and profitable speculation in the lands of the Samoan people—this was unquestionably the primary and sole object of this company, he thought. Taking advantage of the civil conflict in Samoa, they basically provided arms in exchange for land: “the great eagerness with which the Samoans seized upon any means of obtaining a supply of arms and ammunition enabled the company at that time to effect these extensive land transactions with them upon any terms,” he said. But as a result, the consul was “anticipating . . . disputes and I

fear serious complications between the whites and Samoans when the latter come to be practically dispossessed of their property.”⁴⁵ Washington itself was complicit. The state department was reprimanded, as it was considered remarkable that a “person of dissipated habits of such a peculiar temperament as well as utterly unfit in every manner [filled] the important position of Commercial Agent as these Islands.” That this person was allied with the very same despised San Francisco land company illustrated the depth of the problem.⁴⁶

In response, a number of Samoans welcomed Hawaii’s intervention. “The act of confederation with Samoa is certainly an accomplished fact,” said Walter Gibson, a member of the Church of Latter Day Saints who had become a key minister in Hawaii’s government, though he demurred on the idea of annexation or the attempt to assist King Malietoa with any force—no, he said, this “has never been thought of.”⁴⁷ Presumably, Gibson thought that the magnetic appeal of Hawaii was such that Samoa would willingly confederate with it, without the idea of forcible annexation being contemplated.⁴⁸ When Hawaii’s delegate in Washington was appointed as Samoa’s representative as well, further confirmation was provided about the tightening relations between the two strategically located Pacific nations.⁴⁹

Hawaii knew that the major powers were not supportive of this. In a confidential message, Honolulu’s representative in Washington acknowledged that “it is plain” that Washington “consider[s] the question of confederation as ill timed, to say the least.”⁵⁰ Forcible or passive, the major powers were displeased with Hawaii’s apparent ascendancy. One U.S. official later reported on Hawaii’s *de facto* proclamation of a Monroe Doctrine for the Pacific, which was seen as terribly cheeky.⁵¹ In 1883, for example, there was a signed protest on the part of the Hawaiian government against the annexation of archipelagoes and islands of Polynesia by foreign powers, and especially by Great Britain. London, which had risked bad relations with Washington in order to extend its protective umbrella to Honolulu, was not gleeful about this protest. There was contention about the immediate protection and eventual annexation of the New Hebrides, the Solomon Islands and the immediately adjacent groups and whether Washington saw these as “geographically allied to Australasia rather than Polynesia”—with Hawaii being seen as part of the latter.⁵² Undeterred, Honolulu dispatched a mission to England, Germany, and other European states to “urge consideration for the Polynesian communities which still remain independent.”⁵³

In the early 1880s, delegates from the Gilbert Islands chain were requesting King Kalakaua to assume a sort of protectorate over that island and to send teachers there, something that Honolulu seriously pondered.⁵⁴

This was seen as terribly uppity by the major powers. The German foreign minister contacted Lord Salisbury in London, expressing the hope that the latter would not consent that Hawaii take part in the proposed conference at Washington on Samoan affairs.⁵⁵ Washington, London, and Berlin saw it slightly—but tellingly—differently, averring that it was not desirable that Hawaii should seem to take the whole question of Samoa out of the hands of the three powers⁵⁶ particularly via confederation.

According to Germany, Hawaii's behavior was not only "not desirable" but a potential *casus belli*. H. A. Carter, Hawaii's representative in Washington, said, "Germany, never, so far as I know, intimated in any way to Hawaii that Mr. Bush's [mission] was offensive and it seems very strange that they should have contemplated a declaration of war against us without having presented any remonstrance or ultimatum." Perhaps Berlin thought it was unnecessary to negotiate or even engage with small Pacific nations that were only worthy—in the best case—of being annexed forcibly.⁵⁷ Or maybe Berlin was simply disoriented by Samoa, which seemed to be disconcerting the major powers generally. U.S. policy toward Samoa was, according to the scholar Paul M. Kennedy, confused. There were groupings in the United States (e.g., publicists, businessmen in the western states, naval officers, and politicians like William Seward) that favored expansion, but a majority of U.S. nationals opposed seizing Samoa.⁵⁸

Afterwards, King Kalakaua was rather defensive about the Bush mission and his Samoa initiative. He was irked that Washington blamed him for the "trouble [which] commenced with Germany . . . for having sent Mr. Bush" to Apia. "Of course," he said, "I did send Mr. Bush, but it was from a repeated call from Samoa as well as all the other South Sea islands [for a] Confederation or solidarity of the Polynesian Race." After all, they were all being overrun by blackbirders and freebooters, not to mention imperialist brigandage. Should not they band together, if only for purposes of survival and defense?⁵⁹ The great powers thought not, as one annexed Fiji, another annexed Hawaii, and they carved up Samoa between and among themselves.⁶⁰ President Benjamin Harrison and presidential contender James Blaine were among those who accepted the basic argument favoring equal three-power control to guarantee Samoa's autonomy—and Honolulu was definitely not amongst the favored three.⁶¹

From worrying about Hawaii collaborating with Washington, London veered to the concern that would animate its foreign policy in the twentieth century—the machinations of Berlin. Speaking from Washington, L. Sackville West informed "My Lord" of the "aggressive action of Germany in the [South] Pacific & the endeavors which that power is said to be making to obtain a footing

in Hawaii.”⁶² The problem for Honolulu was that such speculation could make London more willing to acquiesce to the very real and present danger of the United States annexing Hawaii.

Yet another problem for Hawaii was its own internal conflicts, fueled by the decline of the indigenes and influx of Euro-Americans with little respect for monarchy, which could only propel the intrigues of the major powers. In the spring of 1874, James Wodehouse, the British delegate in Honolulu, analyzed closely the riot that was intended to kill the representatives who had voted for Kalakaua, the present king, and also to burn the courthouse where the election for the sovereign had taken place. The landing of the British and U.S. naval forces alone perhaps prevented the destruction of Honolulu and the loss of many lives. There were sixty persons arraigned and forty-one were convicted, but such unrest did not bode well for the kingdom—or so thought Wodehouse. “The King is not popular in this island,” he said shortly thereafter. If the warships were withdrawn, “there would be a Revolution in which he would lose His Throne and possibly his life. It is the fear of foreign intervention alone that keeps the Hawaiians quiet.”⁶³ He added, “Within the short space of a little more than a year and a half, the independence of this Kingdom has been in imminent peril four times.”⁶⁴ Of course, the apparent shakiness of the Honolulu regime made London particularly all the more upset about the kingdom’s supposed interference in the internal affairs of Fiji and Samoa.

As Hawaiian indigenes surged in confidence, their assertiveness was perceived by some others as runaway chauvinism. Elections in 1882 featured the slogan “Hawaii for the Hawaiians,” which left some Euro-Americans unsettled.⁶⁵ Lorrin H. Thurston, a pioneer Euro-American in Hawaii, blamed King Kalakaua’s minister, Walter Gibson, for this so-called “anti-*haole*” campaign,⁶⁶ referring to the striving by indigenes for self-determination and a higher level of representation in their government.

By the fall of 1884, Washington’s consul in Honolulu, David McKinley, detected a “somewhat uneasy and disturbed feeling that exists . . . with most of the European community against the present government.” Plus there was a very low price of sugar and the consequent bleak outlook for the future. His recommendation? “I would suggest that a man-of-war be ordered here, as often as convenient,” he said.⁶⁷ In turn, Washington in late 1886 took careful note of the attempt to organize the military forces of the kingdom.⁶⁸

Finally, in the summer of 1887, a so-called Bayonet Constitution was imposed on the Kingdom, primarily by a restive *haole* clique (primarily Euro-Americans). They clipped the wings of the monarchy and, not coincidentally, defenestrated politically the indigenes. This was a prelude to the final liquida-

tion of the kingdom in the 1890s, a major advance for white supremacy in the region and a decided setback to self-determination for the indigenes.

On July 26, 1887, U.S. Secretary of State James D. Porter was briefed about these developments in a report by Honolulu Consul General John H. Portman that captured the tensions of the region and era. "The peculiar composition of the population in the Islands is at the base of the widespread discontent," Portman said. "The American and European immigration, excluding the Portuguese has not kept pace with immigration. Especially is this true of Americans, as the exodus has been much greater than the influx . . . [and thus,] nearly one-third of the entire population is composed of Asiatics." The Portuguese, an increasing segment of the European influx were, it was thought, "in natural qualities . . . are not the superior of Japanese or Chinese." Shockingly, "many of them" were as "dark" as the darkest indigenes. Fractiousness was exacerbated by the "almost equal division of the Republican American with the monarchical Englishman and German, the one believing in the absolute supremacy of the people and the other in a division of authority between royalty and subject, produces divergence of opinion and little jealousies of race which prevent the homogeneity of the elements which must combine." The "forms of government were heretofore modeled after the English system" (i.e., a strong constitutional monarchy), but the Bayonet Constitution meant a weakening of this system.

So, "the little breezes of discontent grew stronger and stronger as Royalty gave evidence of intention to enlarge the importance at home by increasing the National Guard and abroad by sending expensive embassies to nations with which the government has no political or commercial connections, by fitting up an armed vessel and sending it with an embassy to islands of the southern Pacific to tender them the fostering care of Hawaii."

More than this, it was thought, "race jealousy" was at the heart of the political neutering of the kingdom. "Finding the white man really the ruling power" in Honolulu—after all, King Kalakaua was surrounded by the likes of Walter Gibson, H. A. Carter, and a host of other *haole*—"the sentiment [was] generated that 'Hawaiians should rule Hawaii' and a jealousy of the white political predominance [grew] and a fear that the Islands would eventually be a government of white men spurred them to action." The "result was that although the Cabinet and principal officers of the Kingdom were, two years ago, almost entirely white, there being only one native in the Cabinet, at the date of the dissolution of the late Cabinet the figures were found to be reversed, only one white man in the Cabinet and nearly all the other principal positions in the possession of the natives. These facts excited the apprehension of the whites," who "foresaw increased and burdensome taxation." Thus, a semirevolution



FIGURE 10. Said to be Queen Liliuokalani's flag, this royal Hawaiian banner was hauled down from the palace on January 17, 1893. Courtesy of the Bishop Museum.



FIGURE 11. Those who overthrew the Hawaiian monarchy prepared in December 1893 to resist an attempt to restore lawful rule. Courtesy of the Bishop Museum.




FIGURE 12. The annexation of Hawaii in 1898 was of questionable legality. It was also a gigantic step toward the construction of a “White Pacific.” Courtesy of the Bishop Museum.

took place as an independent, white military organization was established—not unlike what had developed in Fiji—“under the supremacy of an organized and armed league of white men, banded for revolution, peaceable or forcible.” At this juncture, the whites were split in two: one favored abolition of the monarchy (mostly Euro-Americans of the “racist Republicanism” variety) and the other, a limited monarchy (mostly Germans and British).

At this point, the former did not have enough muscle to establish their absolute diktat and the latter tended to prevail. “The American capitalists,” the Secretary of State was told, “were afraid of the results of too radical changes and were willing to make such compromises as would retain the old forms, [so] they inserted a qualification which excludes the great mass of the Portuguese and native population from participating in their election. The clause requires the voter to own three thousand dollars worth of property or have an income of

six hundred dollars per year.” The system was rigged to allow Euro-Americans and Europeans to reside in Hawaii and participate politically without renouncing ties to their homelands.

All told, 1887 was a major victory for imperialism and white supremacy (the bounty of which excluded the Portuguese, ironically, who had pioneered in developing notions of racial chauvinism) and a profound setback for Pacific indigenes, especially those of Hawaiian origin.⁶⁹ As it turned out, 1887 marked the beginning of the end for the kingdom, a rendezvous with an ill-fated destiny that finally arrived in 1893 with its overthrow and 1898 with the annexation of Hawaii in an early expression of U.S. imperialism.

CHAPTER 8

A Black Pacific?

As the local opponents of the Kingdom of Hawaii surged to power at the end of the nineteenth century, they quickly unsheathed a powerful weapon against their opponents. They whispered that King Kalakaua and his sister were not true Hawaiians but rather the children of a Negro coachman, John Poppin, who had been their mother's secret lover; these Euro-Americans became even bolder and followed King Kalakaua to his speaking engagements, where they held up an effigy of the coachman and jeered "nigger" as he spoke.¹ This crusade reached a zenith three days before the 1873 election—as black voting rights on the mainland were under siege—when a black effigy labeled 'David Kalakaua Blossom' was paraded through the streets of Honolulu, alluding to the allegation that David's mother had taken Jamaican John W. Blossom as her paramour in the 1840s and had borne him a son.² Thus, there was a certain "Negro-ification" of Hawaiians with a concomitant degradation. One of his white contemporaries referred to King Kalakaua as "a man apparently of Negro type rather than Hawaiian with thick lips, flat nose and hair more wavy than that of the pure-blooded Hawaiians,"³ Speaking of the last monarch, Queen Liliuokalani, U.S. naval officer Lucien Young asserted that "she was darker than the ordinary native, showing evident traces of Negro blood."⁴ The visiting writer Mark Twain was struck similarly, observing, "the majority of the people almost are as dark as Negroes."⁵

THE OVERTHROW of the monarchy was occurring as white supremacy on the mainland was asphyxiating Negro suffrage rights, as African-Americans generally were being demonized. Perhaps, inevitably, Hawaiians—who, after all, were generally dark skinned—were tarred with a similar brush. They were thought of as being part of a hardly differentiated mass of "non-whites" who were not worthy of self-determination, nor of being deemed peers of their presumed Euro-American "betters." Thus, when Hawaiian royalty visited

Washington, D.C. before the Civil War, Julia Gardiner (future wife of President John Tyler) noted that one member of this delegation had a complexion “about as dark as a Negro but with Indian hair,” while John Quincy Adams described the prince as “nearly black as an Ethiopian, but with a European face and wool for hair.” Adams even suspected that the difficulty the United States had with the “tangled question of extending formal diplomatic recognition to the Hawaiians” was that they were black.⁶ Scholar Noenoe K. Silva observed accurately that the rationales used to subjugate Negroes were eerily similar to those deployed against Hawaiian indigenes.⁷

Yet this dual denigration coexisted uneasily beside another undeniable fact: African-Americans and their black counterparts in the Caribbean often fled to Hawaii and the South Seas generally during the nineteenth century precisely because they perceived—correctly—that their opportunities would be less circumscribed there than in their homelands. W. E. B. Du Bois was rhapsodic in discussing Hawaii, with its beauty and mixture of peoples. “If one could but die and find this paradise forever, endless with youth,” he suggested, nirvana itself would be attained.⁸ Writer Susan Bell confirms that “blacks early found in Hawaii a freedom from racial bias seldom experienced in the settled and more ‘civilized’ societies of the mainland.”⁹ As Hawaii became a familiar port of call during the heyday of whaling, the number of blacks flooding into the island chain—in search of a kind of paradise all their own—escalated. Honolulu was such an enchanting port, in any case, that many strong-minded captains refused to touch there, for desertions of nearly half a ship’s complement were not uncommon. A disproportionate percentage of these would have been U.S. Negroes.¹⁰

The sociologist Lloyd L. Lee once remarked that “a Negro might well be mistaken for an ethnic Hawaiian,” which facilitated the assimilation of the former. This group of migrants—mostly male—often mated with Hawaiian women with their progeny being classified as part Hawaiians, which complicates the attempt to trace their lineage because it signifies a kind of racial integration that was starkly distinct from that of the mainland.¹¹ When post-Civil War exhortations accelerated, calling on African-Americans to migrate to work in Hawaii, the presumed absence of racial distinctions there became a favorite theme of those who encouraged blacks to sign contracts with the islands’ sugar plantations, just as Negroes routinely expressed sympathy for the “Hawaii for Hawaiians” movement that upset so many Euro-Americans. Frederick Douglass was not alone in condemning what he termed the “unwarrantable intermeddling of Americans in Hawaiian affairs,” while a black editor in Washington suspected that cartoons in white newspapers depicting the queen

as a “thick lip and unrefined Negro” were indicative of the status which Hawaiians would be assigned if they came under the protection of the U.S. flag. African-Americans generally objected to making the island chain an American plantation of Claus Spreckels, the sugar baron. Their “prevailing view appeared to oppose any annexation scheme which would exploit darker races or deny the fulfillment of their national aspirations.” These African-Americans feared that increasing Euro-American encroachment in Hawaii would endanger its unique environment. “Whether they favored selective emigration or mass deportation,” one writer reported, “Negro and white advocates of black colonization maintained that Negro Americans would find the climate, society and economy of the Pacific islands congenial to their welfare and prosperity.”¹²

Exhibit A in contemplating the Negro in Hawaii was Anthony Allen, formerly the slave of a man residing in New York state. He is said to have escaped from slavery and arrived in Oahu in 1810 settling at Waikiki; during the 1820s he was described as possessing a dozen houses, the premises clean and orderly; a native wife and three children; and a farm well stocked with cows and goats. He was a “dog-fancier” and a blacksmith and both well connected and respected in the island chain, enjoying a life that was generally beyond the imagination of his compatriots on the mainland. However, he was not alone since the peripatetic of the Cape Verde islands were also to be found in the Hawaiian Islands.¹³ But Allen towered over these and others, having “taken to himself a Hawaiian wife and became a prosperous farmer through patent industry.”¹⁴ He had come a long way since the day in 1774 when he was born into bondage in New York,¹⁵ to the point where he was widely regarded as one of the wealthiest residents on Oahu.¹⁶

In June 1820, Sylvia Moseley Bingham of a pioneering Euro-American family in Hawaii observed: “I believe [Allen] lives the most comfortably of any on the island—has a wife and two pretty children, the eldest of whom he has taught its letters. He has been very kind to us, sending us potatoes, squashes, etc., as often as once in two weeks, a goat or a kid neatly dressed—every morning, two bottles of goat’s milk and many things I cannot mention. He lives too far from us to benefit his family as we wish.” She added with equal curiosity that his beneficence was an example of “how the Lord provides for us,” eliding—as was all too typical—how African-Americans “provided” for all too many Euro-Americans.¹⁷

Again, Allen was not singular.¹⁸ When the budding writer Herman Melville arrived in Honolulu a few years after Allen’s death, he encountered a “jolly little black called Billy Loon, the royal drummer and pounder of the tambourine,”¹⁹ who was emblematic of the substantial role that Negro musicians played there.

Generally, U.S. Negroes—like the nation from which they had sprung—were steadily moving westward during the nineteenth century, though they had an added incentive since it was thought that racism would be less intense the further one moved away from the Deep South.²⁰ One visitor to Hawaii during Allen's heyday observed, "Commerce brings to the Sandwich Islands the most colorful examples of all the world's peoples. Among the servants of fashionable women, I detected a young Negro and a flathead from the north-west coast of America. Here for the first time I saw Chinese."²¹ In such a diverse atmosphere, far beyond the polarized European-African dynamic that dominated the South and the racial discourse there, a site where the former were simply a minority amongst minorities, it was possible for an African-American to better flash his colors and excel.

Traditional attitudes remained obstinate, however. Titus Coan, for example, was born in Connecticut and in 1835 came to Hawaii as a missionary; writing from the Pacific, he instructed his coworkers in South Africa, who were also engaged in a spiritual quest. Thus, he had a unique perspective on Hawaiians and their opposite numbers in Africa. He spoke of the "common bond of brotherhood" that he believed already existed, as he sought to unite Africa and Hawaii "by a cord whose vibrations will be constantly felt at each extremity." Yet he also told his peers about the "rude [and] strange" indigenes with their "barbarous language," a mind-set that was then prevalent among all too many Euro-Americans in both the Pacific and Cape Town.²²

Coan was not unique in this regard. Samuel Chapman Armstrong was a founder of the historically black Hampton University in Virginia (where he left a lasting impression on Booker T. Washington, the preeminent African-American leader), though he was born in Maui in 1839. "Sometimes when I stand outside a Negro church," he said tellingly, "I get precisely the effect of a Hawaiian congregation, the same fullness and heartiness and occasional exquisite voices and am instantly transplanted 10,000 miles away, to the great Kawaiahao Church where father used to preach to 2500 people." Like others, he often spoke of the similarity of the problems of the U.S. South and of Hawaiian life, each encompassed by a large population of dark-skinned people.²³

The royal family may have noticed that U.S. Negroes were sited strategically throughout the region and this may have recommended them. Armstrong's brother, William N. Armstrong, served as attorney general in King Kalakaua's Cabinet and thus went to Japan then China with the monarch. When they arrived in China, he took note of the presence of the manager of the China Merchants Steamship Company, which owned a fleet of thirty-six large steamers and several vessels of the Hawaiian group. "[The] manager,"

he said, “was a fine American Negro who had shown much ability when employed by the American legation in Pekin [*sic*]; he was not only well educated but spoke several languages, including Chinese; his father was a Negro preacher in Washington, D.C. He had married a handsome English girl in Shanghai, who was an artist; but his marriage to a white person had much incensed the Americans living in Shanghai, though it was cordially approved by the English, German and French residents.”²⁴

The resemblance that existed between many Pacific Islanders and Africans facilitated such comparisons. One scholar has described the Melanesians as Oceanic Negroes, while the Polynesians were believed to be derived from “Caucasoid, Mongoloid, and Negroid” strains. Quite often it was the latter strain that was highlighted.²⁵ Thomas Trood, former U.S. consul in Apia, Samoa, observed about a century ago that “the Fijians also intermixed with the Tongans, in consequence of which the latter are much more of the Negro or Papuan type than their straight-haired Samoan ancestors.”²⁶ Visiting the South Seas in the 1830s, writer Milo Calkin referred to the indigenes as being “tall, strong and well formed” with “light copper complexion and straight black hair. They are very indolent and their propensity to steal”—something that was also thought to be a characteristic of Negroes—“made it necessary for us to conceal everything about the ship on our own persons that they could get hold & notwithstanding all our precaution they succeeded in carrying off several articles which we were never able to regain.”²⁷ Another writer in 1880 noted that an acquaintance “always connected the Papuan race with the Negroes of Africa” since they were “all children of Ham.”²⁸ Even those who dissented from these parallels left the inference that these comparisons were hegemonic. Thus, one Euro-American missionary went to some lengths to point out that the “eastern or brown Polynesian race [were] in no way, however distantly, related to the Negro.”²⁹

Of course, there were also comparisons between indigenous Americans and their counterparts in the South Seas. In 1880, as both groupings were under deadly siege, one writer observed,

I was informed by a “beachcomber” that in some islands of the Low Archipelago (which includes the Marquesas) there is a tradition of some of the ancestry of their people having gone or returned from the big land to the East—or more properly speaking . . . West—i.e., America. It is a fact that the skeletons found in the caverns of Kentucky and Tennessee are wrapped in feather cloaks which was a custom of the Sandwich Islands; while it is the opinion of most American antiquaries that the best-defined specimens of art among the antiquities of Ohio and Kentucky are of a decided Polynesian character.³⁰

Similarly, the epithet “nigger” was not reserved for U.S. Negroes or Africans but was often wielded against South Sea Islanders,³¹ particularly by blackbirders³² and not only by Euro-Americans,³³ a complement to the point that there was a curious analogy between the African Slave Trade and the Pacific blackbirding.³⁴ The latter, according to one writer, was “slavery, with incidents as black and as inhuman as the worst cruelties ever attributed to the planters of the American southern planters.” As in the U.S. South, it was “absolutely profitable for the planters to work the Kanakas to death within the three years for which they [were] legally enslaved.”³⁵ Reverend John Inglis, a Scottish missionary in the South Seas, asserted, “The same line of defense [that] has always been set up on behalf of slavery [was] the very same kind that was always set up in defense of slavery in the Southern States of America.”³⁶

“For one particularly vile crime,” said one writer, “there is no parallel even in the African Slave Trade. This was the sweeping off of the Kukulaelae people in the Ellice Islands.” But around 1864, as the U.S. Civil War was demolishing African slavery, the “man-stealers” came and snatched everyone except fifty elders and children. This was a time, like the era of the bygone African Slave Trade, when the barques and the brigs, brigantines and schooners engaged in the labor trade went armed and equipped like privateers, or like the man-stealers of the old Middle Passage of infamous slave-trade memory. Some mounted guns on their decks. All of the crew was armed with rifles and revolvers.³⁷ Referring to one vessel outfitted for blackbirding, a British official remarked, “She is fitted up precisely the same as an African slaver with the exception of leg irons.”³⁸

Conclusions being arrived at concerning Pacific Islanders and blackbirding were akin to those involving Africans and slavery. “What is it that causes a certain class of persons to throw off all restraint and decency,” lamented one writer, “when they live under a tropical sun, and see other human beings with skins darker than their own? It is like flourishing a red flag before a bull to show an aboriginal of the South Seas to some Englishmen, with the thermometer at 90 [degrees] in the shade. They go mad.”³⁹

Their antagonists would have referred to the behavior of some South Sea Islanders as mad. The indigenes realized that the “labor season” lasted between May and September, when the snatching occurred especially. Thus, they were particularly on their guard then.⁴⁰ During this period, the indigenes of Melanesia would lie in wait for, attack, and whenever they could, kill the crews that the skipper sent to shore. “To kill a white man,” said Captain Moore, “is a great exploit in the New Hebrides and the Solomon Islands.” As guns proliferated, this became easier; it changed the face of things in the West-

ern Pacific when gunpowder became a medium of exchange. One German writer lamented, "A source of perpetual danger to the life of the white settlers on these islands consists in the fact that the natives are ignorant of the distinction between various nationalities, and, according to their customs, they seek to avenge a wrong inflicted by a white man, on the first white man who comes."⁴¹

The racial essentializing of indigenes had inexorably generated a mirror image. Thus, a few years before war erupted in the Pacific in 1941, one writer detailed that in the New Hebrides there was an indicative saying by mothers: "Be a good boy now. If you are naughty, look out [or] the white man will get you!"⁴² During that same prewar era, it was also asserted that there was always a "big demand for white men's heads."⁴³ A century earlier it was already reported from the Solomon Islands, which along with the New Hebrides were most often subjected to blackbirding and most frequently compared to Africa. "The natives obstinately refuse all communication with strangers and if some disembark from ships they kill all those they are able to by surprise"; this was an aspect of the "policy of killing all white people. . . . White men were not killed for their things, but because their very presence brought death."⁴⁴ According to writer John Gaggin, things had deteriorated in the Solomons to the point where "a man going about without any weapons is looked upon as an idiot. Almost every native one meets now has his Snider, or Martini, or Winchester even—thanks to Yankee traders—or double-barreled gun." If this same observer could be believed, the growing dislike of whites was not limited to the indigenes. It was a well-known South Sea fact, he said in 1900, that "when sharks attack a mixed party of white and native swimmers, the former are invariably chosen first."⁴⁵ It was as if a version of the U.S.-based Nation of Islam, an African-American grouping that viewed Euro-Americans as devils, had arisen in the South Sea—even among wild-life.

It seemed that the "Negro-ification" of the South Sea Islanders was a complement to their increased exploitation, just as southern U.S. tropes had a pointed resonance in the region. One writer commenting on the region noted, "[The] skipper sang the doleful old chanty of Louisiana nigger origin, adapted to the Australian-New Zealand trade: 'oh, I wish I was in Sydney town—away—oh, aye-oh! Where all de gals walked up and down a long time ago! Oh, I wish to Gawd I'd never been born, a long time ago—oh-oh! Away down yonder where dey grew de corn—a long time ago. To go wandering around Cape Horn, a hundred years ago!'"⁴⁶ The reference to Cape Horn acknowledged the umbilical cord that linked the United States to the South Seas.

Even novelists drank deeply from this well of analogies. More than a century ago, James Fussell wrote of a "Kanakan slave" whose new master owned

“Cruelton Plantation” and was the son of an old slave owner in America. The indigenes, like U.S. Negroes, were deemed lazy and South Sea Islanders specifically were described as “not as black as their skins,” which was intended as a compliment.⁴⁷ The nonfiction writer Robert B. Minturn, Jr. concurred; writing in 1858 from Sydney, he cheered the “necessity of emigration,” which was “made more urgent by the character of the black race, on whose labors the settlers cannot rely. They will work perhaps steadily for some time, and then leave, without notice, to attend a palaver, of fight with a hostile tribe. . . . They are a cheerful, harmless race. . . . The few that I saw were wretched looking objects, begging in the streets.” They were similar to others of the black race, said this Euro-American traveler.⁴⁸

Robert Louis Stevenson, who spent a considerable amount of time in Samoa, was also taken by the dark skin color of the South Sea Islanders. In January 1892, he wrote from Vailima:

Aha, say you, what is a black boy? Well, there are here a lot of poor people who are brought here from distant islands to labor as slaves for the Germans. They are not at all like the King or his people, who are brown and very pretty; but these are black as Negroes and as ugly as sin, poor souls, and in their own lands they live all the time at war and cook and eat men’s flesh. The Germans thrash them with whips to make them work, and every now and then, some run away into the bush. . . . Sometimes they are bad and wild and come down on the villages and steal and kill.⁴⁹

It was also evident that—just as in the African Slave Trade—a key reason for the demise of blackbirding was the fierce resistance of the indigenes. The “body-snatchers” came to recognize that a high price was to be paid for their villainy. “After 1880,” one scholar asserts, “the numbers of whites engaged in the trade who were to die at the hands of Melanesians also increased.”⁵⁰ A signal was sent in 1869 when Thomas Powell, residing at Pago Pago while serving with the London Missionary Society, reported, “The chief . . . came up to our house and said that some of the people on board had been kidnapped and that they (meaning he and his people) were going to liberate them.”⁵¹ This kind of revolt was regional and encompassed other powers. There was a terrible slaughter of settlers in 1878 in the French colony of New Caledonia when “8000 natives . . . massacred hundreds of helpless people and simultaneously the blacks . . . broke loose and a bloody onslaught was made.” As in the case of Hawaii, the otherwise conflicted powers sought to close ranks as the settlers of New Caledonia appealed to New South Wales to send a British warship to pro-

tect the lives of the whites.⁵² The challenge to white supremacy was deemed more important than the ins-and-outs of big power rivalry.

"Sometimes the tables were turned," acknowledged one writer. "The natives, whether kidnapped or lawfully recruited, suddenly turned on the crew, massacred all the white men and seized the ship." Thus, in 1876 a 70-ton Auckland-built schooner had aboard five whites with—strikingly—an American Negro as recruiting agent. At Guadalcanal Island in the Solomons, many indigenes were recruited and taken on board. The vessel was at anchor off Gela Island, when "the blackbirds" suddenly rose at a signal from their chief. "With an awful yell they attacked the whites and native crew, [swinging] tomahawks and sheath-knives [as] the captain, the recruiting agent and others were struck down." These boats were floating cauldrons of seething hatred. A few years later in the same region a "young Negro was below in the cabin. Joseph Pistoli called down on him to come on deck, the captain wanted him. The darkey [*sic*] ran up the companion way. Big George seized him by his woolly hair and thrust his dripping knife again and again into his body and his four companions rushed in too, and every one of them took a hand, stabbing and hacking at the shrieking lad. The steward fell knifed to death."⁵³

In 1889 the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate, which included members with fresh memories of alleged "Negro domination" in the South, was told a story that suggested that Pacific indigenes presented a similar threat. On Samoa, the committee was informed, there were "black laborers [on] the plantations, of whom the Samoans are in great dread and whom they dislike." Indigenous Samoans were supposedly a "superior people to the blacks who come from savage islands south of Samoa." The despised were "of the Negro race, but inferior to them, having all the Negro features abnormally developed and undersized"; they were a "very brutal race." One southern congressman received an affirmative response when he asked whether they were more like Hottentots than any other race. But he quickly got to his main line of inquiry, which reflected what his region had just experienced. "Do the Germans use these blacks as soldiery, militia; anything of that kind? . . . Do they arm them with guns?"⁵⁴

But it was not just South Sea Islanders who were compared to Negroes. In 1867 as Hawaii was surveying the planet for labor, an emissary of the planters posited that the "Chinese character" was essentially unlike "that of a Negro in [terms] of submissiveness" since revolt and mutinies occurred frequently. The Chinese were compared not unfavorably to the Negroes, the point of reference for exploited labor. Chinese labor, it was said, was "more profitable, in a commercial point of view, than that of other races, unless it be that of the

Negro in the condition of slavery; and even this latter exception holds good only for a few countries." Chinese were not like "a Negro nor a Polynesian in character," however, in that they were said to possess "strong tenacity of rights, quick ebullition of temper and readiness for fight."⁵⁵ The informant William Hillebrand was not extraordinary in his perception. Writing a few years later from Honolulu, another representative of the planters, Z. Y. Squires, spoke of the Chinese as "the very lowest order of humanity . . . belonging to a species of the African chattering bushman or the direct descendant of the ourang outang [*sic*]." Their presence had caused much of the white population to leave the islands.⁵⁶ Actually, this equation of Chinese laborers with Africans was appropriate in the sense that few could differentiate between the Hawaiian penal contract and other forms of unfree labor, all of which were akin to "brutal slavery."⁵⁷

At times when considering the stew of color in the Pacific, some Euro-Americans went a step further in conflation, imagining that what was developing was a united challenge to white supremacy. "In the Negroes [of] the South, the Indian in the West, the Chinese in the Pacific, have we not enough problems to tax our philanthropy?" queried Julius A. Palmer rhetorically, speaking disparagingly of Hawaii. "Do we covet another set of national wards? Must we add to these another of the dark-skinned races, to say nothing of the Asiatics, the Portuguese and the difficult questions of contract labor and the employment problem?"⁵⁸

But in Hawaii the dominant comparative racial theme, particularly by visiting Euro-Americans, focused on African-Americans. Visiting Honolulu in April 1866, Mark Twain focused on General George Washington, an "aged, limping Negro man" who was "seventy years old and he looked it. He was as crazy as a loon" and "very violent" with "arms corded with muscle." It was "thought that he was one of a party of Negroes who fitted out a ship and sailed from a New England port some twenty years ago. He is fond of talking in his dreamy, incoherent way, about the Blue Ridge in Virginia and seems familiar with Richmond and Lynchburg." Twain also employed the Negro as a point of reference in assessing the labor situation, which in that year was in flux in light of the jolt to the sugar and cotton industries provided by the U.S. Civil War. "The hire of each laborer," he said, "[is] \$100 a year—just about what it used to cost to board and clothe and doctor a Negro—but there is no original outlay of \$500 to \$1000 for the purchase of the laborer."⁵⁹ Twain also took the time to scribble a "little ditty" in his notebook that reflected the unease of finding African-Americans in the island chain. It concerned white men who "smell berry strong but black men stronger." He added that to stand beside a "swelter-

ing Negro was a 'rough' experience."⁶⁰ Actually Twain, who referred to indigent Hawaiians as "niggers" in his journals, and Melville, who had a "selective embrace of British imperialism in the Pacific" are suggestive of the fact that even the supposed best and brightest of the United States left much to be desired on the battleground of racism, indicating simultaneously why Negroes were fleeing to Hawaii and why they might face difficulties upon arrival.⁶¹

The degradation of Negro labor had not disappeared on the mainland, in other words, and Negro sailors arriving in the paradise that Hawaii was thought to be nonetheless encountered obstacles, even after the U.S. Civil War. Thus, in 1868 Secretary of State William Seward was informed about the death of William Roberson of Baltimore at the hands of a Negro seaman named Outerbridge. His ship had sailed from Maryland in March 1867 and stopped in Bermuda for repairs when Outerbridge came aboard and was threatened with death by Roberson. The tables were turned, however, and the deceased was found "upon the deck with marks of violence upon the head and face, as if struck with an axe or sharp weapon." Outerbridge, who was thought to be "inoffensive and truthful," then confessed to the murder.⁶² He was not lynched, at least, which may have been his fate if he had been snared on the mainland.

This was suggestive of the point that Hawaii could only be described as a paradise for the Negro in comparison with developments on the mainland. In fact, context is critical in assessing how the Negro was treated—good and bad. For Hawaii was torn by an unpleasant dilemma. As the sugar market expanded on the mainland, more laborers (mostly Asian) were needed but this was precisely what menaced white dominion and, in the case of workers of Japanese origin, placed the planters on a collision course with a rising power. Thus, the planters were reduced to trying to induce U.S. Negroes to come to the islands. But the Euro-American elite also realized that this too contained "many dangerous possibilities involving the color line," in terms of alienating white supremacists for whom the Negro was the *ne plus ultra* of odiousness.⁶³

Their concerns were beaten back. The question of importing U.S. Negroes was considered in Honolulu at a meeting on January 7, 1879, with the number of 1,000 being tossed around. Later Secretary of Interior Hoke Smith, a Georgian, originally opposed for racial reasons to the annexation of Hawaii, modified his attitude when he considered the possibility that it might help the South to rid itself of some of its Negro population.⁶⁴ After annexation, John Hind and J. B. Collins, agents of the Koloa Plantation, established themselves in New Orleans in order to recruit 300 Negro laborers. During the next nine months, other agents appeared in Tennessee, Alabama, and Texas. Those

black laborers who went to Hawaii from the South signed contracts to remain there for two or three years.⁶⁵ However, the arrangement proved mutually unsatisfactory.

Thus, Lihue Plantation attracted a group of these Negroes, but was displeased with their performance, deeming them to be unreliable and indolent. From the Koloa Sugar Company came a similar evaluation. The Hawaiian Sugar Company stated emphatically that Negroes were “no good whatever on Hawaiian plantations.” And according to the Pioneer Mill Company, they were worthless.⁶⁶

This dilemma reached the U.S. Congress after annexation. “There remains the all-important consideration that even if a white man could labor in the cane fields,” the Hawaii Sugar Planters Association told the solons, “and were willing to undertake such work, there is no possibility of obtaining from any quarter, and least of all from the U.S. mainland, a sufficient number [to] fill our needs.” Japan, it was stated with a decided lack of enthusiasm was their only source. Unconvinced, a number of senators began to pepper the planters’ representative with questions that pointed to African-Americans as the way out and obtaining more Negro labor from the South. This was in response to the arrival in Hawaii of a few hundred southern Negro workers.

One legislator inquired whether they made good laborers on the plantation. “No,” was the blunt response, “most of them were sent to the Spreckelsville plantation. They gave a great deal of trouble. When they could not quarrel with anybody else they quarreled with themselves. A number of them have landed in jail. There are several in jail yet. Most of them have gone.” Still seized with the notion of Hawaii as a racial paradise, these Negroes arrived with the idea of making their fortunes and were unprepared for sweating in the fields; thus, it was said, “they liked to fight and everything else more than work.”

Yet despite this apparent less-than-exemplary record, sentiment lingered for bringing more Negroes westward. Why? As one witness told Congress, “The Asiatics are our carpenters, our drivers, our salesmen, our cooks, our servants, our gardeners, our grocers, our tailors, our farmers. God knows what they will be next. They may be our masters yet [for] as long as the Asiatics are running the country, this can not be a white man’s land.”⁶⁷ As long as such an attitude persisted, Negroes would be in demand.

WALTER COOTE was stunned. Here he was in relatively remote Levuka, Fiji, in 1882 when a Negro entered. “[He was] born in Virginia an indefinite number of decades ago,” Coote recalled, “and had been in Fiji for many, many years. He told me that his name was Black Bill, adding with some pride that he was

generally mentioned in ‘the books.’ He seemed to have visited most parts of the world and was—as what Negro is not?—full of narrative and humor. In his time he had been a factotum of King Thakombau’s [*sic*] and informed me with much pathos that had he served his God as he had served the Fijian king, he would not be mending sails in that village that day.” Black Bill had lived in Baltimore “and San Francisco where he had begged in the streets, and London where he had been in a hospital and half a hundred other places.”⁶⁸ He was a symbol of the fact that a pernicious racism on the U.S. mainland had driven many of African origin to the four corners of the planet, including the South Seas.

I have visited Fiji and can attest personally that African-Americans resemble the indigenes and often are indistinguishable from them. Certainly this would have made this secluded archipelago a prized hideaway for those Negroes seeking refuge. This sheds light on the case of John Brown, who was carefully described as a “colored man,” not a “mulatto.” He was petitioning a Fijian commission about his land rights there—a farm of fifty acres. “He was a boat steerer in a whaler which visited Fiji about 1860,” a Fijian official observed. “He left the vessel (whether by desertion or discharge I am unaware) and ever afterwards lived with the natives, with whom he had become so much identified that he gave his evidence before the Commission in Fijian, and not in English.” Despite his apparent success in Fiji, Brown may have felt right at home when the official report on his claim concluded,

neither the Commissioners, nor the Governor in Council, nor the Board of Rehearing attached the slightest credence to the allegation that a Negro sailor had paid . . . 220 [pounds] for a piece of land or had ever possessed such a sum.⁶⁹

Of course, it is doubtful if a similarly situated Euro-American would have been greeted with such a supposition.

Then there was the “case of Berwick, an American Negro, claiming ‘Dere’ on the island of Koro. . . . His title is founded upon that of a man who had disposing power over the land, who had never lived upon it, was not a landholder there. Berwick himself,” it was claimed, “never even hoped to obtain the land, never could have got it, never went to it, never even tried to obtain a footing there . . . [indigenes] never heard of Berwick’s claim. If they had, [they] would have laughed in derision.” This was “rascality,” it was said, and of a piece with a general attempt to dispossess indigenes—a process in which Berwick’s fellow Euro-American citizens had become pioneers, suggestive of the point that the

kind of privilege enjoyed by “American Negroes” was partially derived from their nationality, as opposed to “race.” Thus, said London’s representative, a “blue bead in the early days of the Pacific might have purchased a young girl in Samoa. But would any British authority or Court, on being appealed to confirm the purchase? A whale’s tooth may have been, and, indeed, was the value of some wretched creature’s life in Fiji.” When Berwick obtained his land, “the state of trading and planting was rotten to the core”—so why should London uphold this thievery, not least on behalf of an “American Negro”?⁷⁰

Still, though Berwick did not receive a sympathetic hearing, as in Hawaii the example of “American Negroes” was sufficiently pervasive that when the British colonists began contemplating education for the indigenes, they examined at length Booker T. Washington’s admonitions about manual labor, with one writer adding that they should train the Fijian so that “he can take advantage of the forces of Nature.”⁷¹

Thus, as in Hawaii, though Negroes often found the South Seas much more congenial than the U.S. mainland, it was not necessarily a literal paradise. After all, the KKK had not established a foothold in the region by happenstance. Consider events that occurred as Reconstruction was being lynched: an actual lynching was happening in Samoa. “A man named Cochrane of mixed blood [i.e., of partial African ancestry] murdered one of his friends, Fox, without any quarrel or cause, while they were both drinking at the bar of a public house, kept by a colored man, William Henry.” Upon being arrested, he was brought to trial before Consul Foster of the United States at Mulinuu, as he claimed to be a U.S. citizen. He was convicted and was to be returned home. Angry men, overwhelmingly Euro-Americans, thinking he would “never be brought to justice. . . . And by unanimous vote by ballot, it was decided that he should be taken out of the vessel, brought on shore and at once hanged.”⁷² Among the lynchers, said the writer James Cowan, was “my old acquaintance Frank Cornwall,” who evidently agreed with the notion that the “Apia settlement was a model of behavior for a long time after that ‘necktie party,’” suggesting how violent disciplining of African-Americans as a tool of social control had great utility beyond the shores of the United States.⁷³

Then there was the aforementioned “Black Tom” (an acquaintance of “Bully” Hayes)—often called Tom Tilden—of Samoa, described as “more like a great bull than a man.” He had built a trading station after being deported from Samoa for a robbery. He was a giant—at least 6 feet 7 inches, muscled like a tiger, and 270 pounds—and a “full blooded Negro” born a slave in Delaware and formerly had served as “coachman and boy-in-waiting” for the governor. At age seventeen, he was apprenticed to an iron-builder but was found

to be insolent, indolent, and untrustworthy. He was ordered to flogging. He was stripped, tied up to a triangle, and lashed before the other slaves. This was the first time Tom had ever been flogged and he cursed inwardly and vowed vengeance—which he did, as he beat the overseer with his own instrument of torture and then fled. He fled, worked with fishermen, shipped on a whaler sailing out of Boston, and made a trip to the Arctic Circle. Then he joined the crew of a sperm-whaler bound for Apia; like many a good sailor before him, he was enamored by the beauty and “insinuating grace of the brown maids [and] on account of his magnificent body he was much admired by the natives and treated as a chief. He married the taupou of Manono, a lady of rank and this gave him considerable social prestige among the Samoans.” He opened a boarding house and ran a saloon, small store, and bakery.

But his good fortune crested when he was ousted from Samoa and deported to the Marshall Islands in the mid 1870s.

Despite his illiteracy, he managed to keep a record and ledger of sorts in “hieroglyphics of his own” in his new role as a trader. Apparently this move placed a strain on his marriage to his Samoan spouse, as their relationship descended into sharp conflict, something that no doubt disconcerted their children. He had forced on their daughters a marriage to an old Scot who was well off, but one night the Scot was found stabbed through the heart and the girl shot through the head. It was widely believed that Black Tom had killed both of them; however, on arriving at his new home he immediately insinuated himself into the good graces of the king of the island who was very anxious to have a trader there, so no penalty befell him. Indeed, the king not only gave him a piece of land to erect a trading post on, but even placed a taboo on him and his people. Anyone molesting Tom would be severely punished.

He had settled into a kind of domesticity with a continuous supply of liquor made from the coconut palm to lubricate his tongue and imagination. He would often be found bursting into song in his rich voice. His favorites were old Negro melodies such as “Marching through Georgia” and “John Brown.” With the income generated from his business, he was mobile, winding up at Butaritari in the Kingsmill Islands, where he lived to be at least ninety years old.

Black Tom had been preceded by another black man this time from the Cape Verde Islands who had been killed by the indigenes a few years earlier. There were other Negroes who arrived in the region after the Confederate ship *Shenandoah* caught and burned a number of whalers at Ponape and they had nowhere else to go. At Rotuma, there was still several of the old beach-combing class alive. One was a “mulatto” named West India Jack. He was in

his nineties when encountered in the 1930s and was still strong and hearty. He had resided in the South Seas for decades.⁷⁴

Samoa also became the home of John King Bruce, a Negro who was born in Liverpool. He had somehow been educated and could read and write, speak English “without any Negro innovations,” and had lived in Samoa longer than any white man there. According to W. B. Churchward in 1888, who met the migrant when he was ninety-one years old, “Being dark, the natives looked upon him as one of themselves and treated him accordingly.” He had been shanghaied in Britain by a “Yankee barque” from New York, who kicked him and called him names, and eventually wound up in Sandy Hook before traveling southward to Montevideo. “I never had one moment’s peace,” Bruce recalled with a lingering bitterness. “It was forever you d—d nigger, here! You cussed nigger, there! [plus a] blow or two with every word. . . . There was never a single day that I didn’t get kicked and punched. . . . The Yanks brag that they never flog a man [but] they do much worse. They have punishments that drive men mad.” One of the worst was the promiscuous use of the “sweat box.” Finally, Bruce escaped in the South Seas.⁷⁵

Then there was a West Indian named James Gibbons, who deserted from a whaleship around 1860 and wound up in Palau,⁷⁶ eventually starting a family who grew to become rather influential there. He worked for a German firm and also served as chief of police. He even helped the Germans open the first jail in Palau.⁷⁷ Blacks from the empire also made it to Australia, though since U.S. Negroes—among others—often masqueraded as West Indians in order to better fit into Britain’s far-flung possessions, their actual numbers may have been inflated. Thus, in 1872, the colonial secretary in Brisbane was informed that “we have recently had anything but a desirable addition to the fishermen in the straits in the shape of two West Indian natives who have . . . settled in Murray Island where by the help of natives, principally women taken by force from two other islands they are carrying on the Beche de mer fishery—they have already become a terror to the natives of the smaller islands in the straits.”⁷⁸ There was a fear that their business activity might inspire indigenes to the alleged detriment of Euro-Australians.

Still, one of the largest migrations of Negroes to the region came in the wake of the mid-nineteenth-century Gold Rush in Australia. Their treatment was at odds with how others described as black (e.g., Australian indigenes) were being treated at that precise moment. There was an attempt to promote “emigration of free Negroes from the U.S. South”; noted was the idea of the “immense advantage of a thriving colony of free Negroes in northern Australia.” By 1855 at Wattle Flat on the Turon was a group of “colored Americans”

who were instrumental in setting up a variation of a horse-puddling machine; in the north at Hanging Rock were men identified as Jamaica blacks who were successful in finding a decent amount of gold nuggets. In Victoria, five African-Americans at Mount Alexander discovered a mother lode of gold, selling their claim for a hefty 200 pounds. The presence of these Negroes was so pervasive that in Sydney, for a time the job of a cook immediately conjured up the vision of an American black. Others worked as servants, ran refreshment stands or brothels. Henry Johnson, an African-American, opened the Exchange Hotel in 1853 and turned it into an elite establishment where French, German, and Spanish were spoken and where crystal chandeliers, Belgian carpets, satin drapes, and rosewood furniture were only surpassed by the first-class food and wines. A black American named John Byng opened the first hotel at Mount Gambier, South Australia, in 1847. And at Port Fairy, Victoria, the Star of the West, with its traditional cast-iron verandahs, was built in 1856 by a West Indian Negro named John Walwyn Taylor.

There was also a profusion of minstrel groups operating in the Australian colonies in the gold era that included a number of Negroes. Among these were African-Americans who demurred in marking the Fourth of July and instead commemorated August 1 as their national holiday. For example, in 1855 African-Americans at Ballarat joined together with West Indians as the "friends of liberty" to remember the twenty-first anniversary of Emancipation Day. This was consistent with the idea that African-Americans often masqueraded as West Indians in order to assimilate more effectively in the British Empire. This perception notwithstanding, "reports of American blacks on the goldfields [were] surprisingly numerous."⁷⁹

CHAPTER 9

Toward a “White” Australia

With U.S. Negroes pouring into the colonies of Australia, especially the area surrounding Melbourne, and darker-skinned bonded labor flooding into Queensland, those who deemed the most literal and chauvinistic variety of white supremacy to be precious were growing ever more concerned. As in Hawaii, a kind of racial protectionism arose to blunt the free trade in labor, whereby Euro-Australians of various stripes began to object to what they saw as the competition presented by the “darkening” of the colonies. This Australian discourse was profoundly influenced by similar trends in the United States. Indeed, says scholar Marilyn Lake, “it was in identification with white Americans, in the decades following the Civil War, that many English and Australians came to think of themselves as white men.” But this was a two-way street. Charles Pearson, the Oxford educated historian who migrated to Australia in the late nineteenth century and became emblematic of this kind of racial thinking, influenced Theodore Roosevelt. This U.S. political leader spoke movingly of the “great effect” of Pearson’s thinking in the United States. “All our men here in Washington,” Roosevelt told his ideological comrade, “were greatly interested in what you said. In fact, I don’t suppose that any book recently, unless it is Mahan’s *Influence of Sea Power* has excited anything like as much interest or has caused so many men to feel that they had to revise their mental estimates of facts.” Pearson, a resident of Melbourne who frequently visited the United States, had plenty of opportunity to address his trans-Pacific counterparts directly. His book, *National Life and Character*, anticipated and influenced subsequent more alarmist U.S. tracts by Madison Grant and Lothrop Stoddard, both of whom spoke with gloom and doom about the downward trajectory of white supremacy in the face of challenges from the non-European world. So influenced, when the Australian colonies came together in a union in 1901, a guiding principle was that multi-racial democracy was not a possibility, just as Roosevelt—like some newly

minted Australians—became an advocate of national reinvigoration through racial struggle, an increased birthrate and imperial expansion. Thus, the Commonwealth of Australia was marked by the mass deportation of bonded labor of a darker hue—as Canberra pulled the trigger and did what the United States was unable to do as the Civil War was unfolding: expel the darkest of them all. Australian elites hailed those who drew up the Australian constitution for heeding the lessons of U.S. history, showing that even when its example was not followed, the United States continued to influence the Pacific region.¹ Again, this concern was bilateral. As Roosevelt was marching to the altar in December 1886 to be betrothed, his sister observed tartly, "I warned Theodore to start immediately for the church as it was a foggy day, and they were intensely preoccupied in a discussion over the population of an island in the Southern Pacific."²

But there was another side to elite Australian sentiment at this time. More than once trepidation was expressed in Victoria about the growing U.S. role in the region following the Civil War.³ As competition between and among the major powers increased in intensity in the Pacific, as Africa was about to be carved up in 1884 at the Congress of Berlin and the amount of available real estate available for colonizing was shrinking—there was sentiment in the Australian colonies that was not at all favorable toward Washington. As the large island nation now known as Papua New Guinea began to be eyed hungrily by the powers, the British Empire articulated a kind of Australasian Monroe Doctrine, warning away rivals, including the United States. This was in the run-up to the Berlin Congress and, thus, the precipitating factor for this pronouncement was Papua New Guinea, rather than the primary cause. Like then U.S. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, who sought to build a Maginot Line around the western hemisphere, leaders of the Australian colonies and New Zealand suggested that the British preempt the South Pacific. It was suggested that "to Frenchmen, Germans, Americans and all other 'foreigners' the whole of the Pacific south of the Equator is to be forbidden ground." But Washington was in a bind. It sought to foil London, yet refused to join Hawaii in diplomatic representations⁴ against the empire's preemption. The dictates of white supremacy with its promise of cross-class unity among those of "pure European descent" and wealth for all proved decisive, which in the end also facilitated relationships with colonial elites in Australia and, ironically, helped to blunt the sharp edge of their Monroe Doctrine for the Pacific.

Then London had to be concerned with the encroachments of French then German imperialism in the region. As early as 1855, London's man in Melbourne rued the fact that "New Caledonia has been indolently and stupidly

permitted to slip into foreign hands. . . . [The] future mischief of her contiguity to the Australias, may, however, be yet remedied to a great extent by the immediate occupation of the Papuan group—New Guinea, New Britain, New Ireland and their dependencies.”⁵ As the century wound down, concern about Germany rose accordingly. As one German writer saw it, “The future of the German plantations [in the Pacific] depends upon a supply of foreign labor. Chinese labor would be too expensive. . . . Indian coolies can be exported only to English colonies and the supply of laborers from the nearer islands has almost ceased. Hence, the largest and more populous islands of the Western Pacific, including the New Hebrides, New Britain and the Solomon Islands have become the principal recruiting ground”⁶—which portended conflict.

This occurred as attitudes in the colonies toward the United States fluctuated. There was a bit of early skepticism toward Washington in the Australian colonies in the early 1850s due to a perceived lawlessness brought by gold seekers, then admiration, then criticism in the 1860s—and, of course, the different interests of Victoria versus New South Wales versus Queensland also dictated varying reactions to the United States.⁷ “The politics of race,” one scholar claimed, “can be differentiated only by degree in a comparative analysis of the colonial projects of varying imperial powers.”⁸ Conflict aside, however, the commonalities between the two continental-sized powers—particularly in the realm of white supremacy—were hard to ignore or overcome.

ESTIMATES VARY of the number of Pacific indigenes who were brought to Queensland to labor. One scholar estimates that 62,000 Pacific Island laborers went to Queensland alone in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, while another estimate claims the figure is actually 120,000.⁹ By one account there were 9,197 brought there by May 1876, though this figure is distorting since 2,681 were brought in 1875 alone, suggesting how the numbers were peaking after 1876. (There were 153 bonded laborers in 1875 from the tiny though critical Pacific War battlefield of Guadalcanal, suggesting how this labor trade may have come to complicate regional security.)¹⁰ By another account in 1901 there were 9,324 Melanesians in Queensland; five years later this number dropped to 6,389, as a racist counterattack on their presence gained traction.¹¹

There was a rise in the deployment of bonded labor as plans accelerated for bringing more U.S. colonists to Queensland as some in North America continued to cling to fond dreams of replicating what they had lost when the so-called Confederate States of America went down in flames. But setting aside this conflict, it is evident that there was a special affinity between the United States and Australia based on a common language, similar cultures,

and similar national tasks (e.g., dispossessing indigenes on the basis of white supremacy).¹² Yes, London was Australia's mother, while Washington was the putative father.¹³ Former Australia Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser affirms that some of the great names of Australian history are Americans, including "George Chaffey, the pioneer of irrigation in Australia; J.C. Williamson, a giant in Australian theatre and Walter Burley Griffin, designer of [the] national capital"; the very idea of Federalism itself was "borrowed" from the United States; "three Americans accompanied [Captain] Cook on his last and greatest voyage" to the region.¹⁴ It was an American who "first placed the Australian iron industry on a firm footing, and [the Australian firm] Broken Hill has drawn largely on American technicians. And Americans provided the model for lesser Australian industries."¹⁵ The "world's richest gold mine in 1899 was on the Golden Mile at Kalgoorlie in Western Australia and was managed by Henry Clay Callaham from Colorado."¹⁶ There was more than one top political leader down under who hailed from North America.¹⁷

There was a similar trend in New Zealand. North Americans played a not inconsiderable role there during the half-century before it became a British colony; thus, by the 1830s, New Zealand whaling had become almost a U.S. monopoly. The heralded Treaty of Waitangi between settlers and indigenes was inked in the presence of American traders and captains. When gold was discovered in Otago in 1861, it was the New Zealanders who attracted attention from California¹⁸ to the point where there was very temporary talk of New Zealand becoming a part of the United States.¹⁹ Some colonists noticed the generous help to frontiersmen struggling with Indians at a time when Britain coldly told them to manage the Maoris as best as they could. In both England and New Zealand it was widely believed that an independent New Zealand would gravitate toward the U.S. sphere.²⁰

This trend accelerated after the U.S. Civil War, which left some in North America unsettled and spurred the desire for a different climate. General Stuart Stanley, then resident in balmy Escondido, California, but wishing for a more enticing clime, was in the vanguard of this development. In 1888, he had devised what he termed a "plan of colonization pure and simple." "Every adult who pays in full his passage from the United States to Queensland," he said, "receives a land order of the value of 20 [pounds] which order enables him—on certain well-defined conditions—to become the absolute owner of one hundred and sixty acres of land at the end of six years. Now we are prepared to pay to the government of Queensland \$300,000 for 500,000 acres of land that is at the rate of half a crown per acre." Though Queensland was riven with escalating and sharpening labor conflicts and unresolved disputes with local

indigenes over the land itself, these potential colonists were undeterred. "It is evident to all men," said General Stanley, "that it would be to our interest to settle up the country as rapidly and as solidly as possible." He added cagily, "The payment of the purchase money [should] be spread over a number of years."

With equal sagacity, he held out the prospect of an enlivening white cavalry arriving down under. "The first slender stream of emigration from this country to Queensland," he said, "would in a few years assume such proportions as could not fail to produce a marvelous development of the resources of that most favored nation of Australia." He also raised the flag of ethnicity and implicitly questioned the viability of the United States itself, which had been assaulted militarily only recently.

I happen to know from a sure source at home that our Government favors and that, too for reasons which Your Excellency will not be slow to divine, the [stop] of English and Scotch people in this country becoming American citizens and Americans settling in Australia would I am equally certain have no objection to becoming British Subjects; for in so doing they would be but once again squaring the circle that was so rudely ruptured when George the Third was King. Moreover, our common tongue will yet enable the Anglo-Saxon race to form a bond of brotherhood around the earth and thereby to view all questions that may arise not in a parochial but in an imperial light.²¹

General Stanley also had other transcontinental concerns. The Chaffey brothers of Southern California had "already undertaken" the task of colonizing in New South Wales and Victoria, with others in the pipeline. A key reason was that the frontier was closing in North America and more roseate horizons loomed. "I have become firmly convinced," he insisted, "that our Australian colonies will in the near future be peopled from this coast rather than direct from Europe." Like the Hawaiian planters, he was realizing that attracting Europeans was extremely difficult and attracting Asians compromised white supremacy. Euro-Americans were the only alternative, he thought.

He also offered another reason.

Because the amount or extent of Government land of a desirable nature is being rapidly reduced within the boundaries of the Union whilst in this region of Southern California . . . the price of land is wholly beyond the range of the ordinary farmer or settler. . . . With the natural increase of population in this country, a limit must soon be reached, a limit in the price

of land, beyond which few can afford to pass. The promised increase of steamship communication will facilitate the passage of people from here to the other side of the Pacific and those who cannot or will not pay fancy prices for land in this region will prefer to go on board a steamer and in fifteen days reach a continent where land equally good can be had for a merely nominal sum.

Stanley also had experience in other arenas that were relevant to the colony. When he arrived in the Golden State, it was after the Sudan campaign in Africa's largest state by territory.²² If he could tame Africa and rout California indigenes, then Queensland would be a cakewalk by comparison.

The authorities were not unenthusiastic, though they were quick to add the obvious that "European extraction" for emigrants was relevant. They also noted that since there wasn't a state church in Queensland, "all denominations of Christians [were] placed on one common platform," though those who were Jewish, Muslim, or other religions were curiously unmentioned.²³ There was a Euro-American migration to the colonies, as it turned out, but not on the scale that General Stanley imagined. The attempt to replicate the North American experience of dispossessing indigenes, replacing them with bonded labor and importing colonists of European extraction—this time from the United States, which was rapidly becoming the chief repository for whites—was pursued in Australia with mixed results. In 1855 a group of colonists arrived in Sydney from New York, though their stinging protest about ventilation and light and their general discontent echoed on both sides of the Pacific.²⁴ As noted, during the Civil War certain bonds developed between the colonies and the CSA, an ideological trend that continued after this conflict. In a confidential 1870 note, Captain W. B. Birch of Calcutta alerted Sydney about the impending arrival of a "Fenian at heart" who "had been in America" and was a U.S. national. "He was one of the thirty who had drawn lots to shoot President Lincoln," Captain Birch said, "[and] stated that he knew intimately the twelve . . . in Australia [who sought] to shoot HRH the Duke of Edinburgh."²⁵

This jolting episode did not sour the colonies about the prospect of receiving other migrants from the United States. As Reconstruction was winding down there, a New South Wales emigration agent for the U.S. East Coast reported happily that emigration applications were received daily and that all received immediate attention.²⁶ "I have had to turn away large numbers of suitable parties," he exclaimed, "who have been greatly disappointed at not being able to secure assisted passage."²⁷ Soon the ship *Ivanhoe* was dispatched with 173 U.S. emigrants.²⁸

However, there seemed to be no unanimity of opinion about the advisability of bringing to the colony nationals of a rival power. Was London acquiescing to the arrival of a Trojan horse? R. W. Cameron, the emigration agent based in New York City, was “surprised to see it stated that the cost to the Government of landing emigrants from this country is greater than from England.” “In the present state of the labor market here and the large number of applicants who address me,” he said, “I am of [the] opinion that from one to two thousand desirable emigrants should be obtained.” His supervisors, unfortunately, were balking.²⁹ Not dissuaded, Cameron insisted that of the “50,000 [pounds] voted this year for immigration” to New South Wales, “the same proportion as before shall be applied to emigration from America, namely [the] amount of 12,500 [pounds],” which was at once indicative of the large role envisioned for the United States in contemplating the growth of New South Wales, and the apprehension concerning same.³⁰

This apprehension was not ill-founded. Early on, U.S. nationals reaped a large profit in trade with the South Sea Islands and China because of restrictions on colonial trade imposed to the detriment of New South Wales—along with, as it turned out, Britain.³¹ As early as 1822, competition with U.S. merchants in the Asia market was bringing grave concern from their Sydney counterparts.³² Thus, as New Zealand was coming under British rule, the interests of U.S. nationals was a key concern raised by the U.S. consul,³³ though when in 1847 U.S. seamen were found guilty of arson and piracy and were subject to deportation,³⁴ London had an idea of what interests were at play. In 1851, U.S. nationals were reported to be on the northern coast of the continent of Australia, procuring gold without a license or paying royalties.³⁵

During the mid-nineteenth-century gold rushes that affected Victoria and California alike, there was enormous trans-Pacific traffic. An estimated 5,000 persons from the colonies came to California, for example. The cross-fertilization was so intense and significant that one student observed that “one of the striking features connecting one gold rush to the next is the common personnel with feelings of shared experience”; thus, instead of Californian or Victorian or New Zealand colonists, what was operative was a “variety of the *genus* Pacific Man whose habitat is no particular country but the goldfields.”³⁶ However, with the United States as the dominant Pacific partner, this arrangement almost guaranteed a prevailing influence by the North American power. This may be why the visiting Mark Twain noted, “The Australians [do] not seem to differ noticeably from Americans, either in dress, carriage, ways, pronunciation, inflections or general appearance.”³⁷

This commonality between the colonies and the United States was con-

spicuously noticeable in Queensland, whose plantation agriculture with bonded labor mirrored the model in the states that once constituted the Confederate States of America. Visiting in 1889, writer Gilbert Parker thought that Brisbane reminded him of Los Angeles. "[The] 'Queenslander,' he thought, '[was] not unlike the American in the pungency of his criticism on men and things. . . . Townsville Harbour looked not unlike that of Honolulu.'" ³⁸ Another commentator remarked, "I also observed in Queensland that some of the children had a tendency to the American twang." ³⁹ Others might have detected a closer comparison between Queensland and the CSA itself (though Los Angeles then was noted for its Confederate complement), particularly in its fondness for minstrelsy of the African-American variety. ⁴⁰ Certainly some U.S. nationals seemed to find something appealing in Queensland. ⁴¹

But it was not just Queensland that reminded so many of the United States. Visiting Sydney in the late nineteenth century, Mark Twain termed the metropolis an "English city with American trimmings" while in Melbourne the American trimmings were even more evident. ⁴²

Hence, the apprehension about the arrival of U.S. nationals in the colonies was not universal. In 1857, U.S. Secretary of State William Marcy was informed that immigration to the colony of Victoria had for some time been increasing and yet the demand for labor so far exceeded the supply that all wages were very high. In any case, most who arrived headed for the gold fields—among them was a considerable number of U.S. nationals. ⁴³ In the early 1880s, those migrating to Queensland from the United States included the mariner Charles Andrews, the storekeeper W. S. Bundren, the sugar planter W. J. Cruger, the newspaper proprietor J. C. Hart, the farmer S. Lewis, the "beche-de-mer-fisher" E. Mosby, the mining manager O. Thompson, and the curiously described "bushman" C. S. Jenkins. Though most of these men—and they were almost all men—were seamen, there was a fair assortment of others as well. ⁴⁴

Nevertheless, there was hemming and hawing on whether more Euro-Americans should be admitted to other colonies, though this could not staunch the flow across the Pacific, especially since it seemed that easy fortunes could be made in performing a task in which this grouping was expert—routing indigenes and compelling blacks to work. Thus, in the pivotal year of 1884 when the Australasian Monroe Doctrine was being launched, the U.S. consul general decided to "transmit a petition signed by the leading American citizens praying that your Excellency" exercise the "prerogative of mercy on behalf of their countryman, Bernard Williams, who is now under sentence of death charged with the murder of a South Sea Islander." Williams, a native of Maine, according to the petition,

was a boatswain on the Queensland ship *The Hopeful* who had been sentenced to death. The gravity of the alleged crime notwithstanding, the upstanding U.S. nationals of Melbourne stressed that “for many years in the Western Pacific white men have been massacred by natives without any retribution,” as if Williams was engaged in a kind of racial payback. “When the white sailor or trader in the Western Pacific knows he may be killed by the natives without their receiving any punishment,” they said, “he is too apt to take the law into his own hands and ultimately acquires a disregard for human life.” Thus, Williams’ harshness should not be penalized but praised as restoring a kind of racial balance. “American citizens in the Western Pacific have already suffered from the anomalous rule of want of rule,” they wailed. In 1878, two U.S. citizens, Messrs. Cheffyn and Johnston, were living on Aoba, an island in the New Hebrides. Although they were well-known, respectable traders, when Johnston was shot on March 2, 1880, by the indigenes in revenge, “nothing at all was done by the British authorities,” which was one of many incidents where “white men may have been the victims”—coming from the United States, this was not just anomalous but outrageous. “The native,” it was proclaimed, “takes pigs for the blood of a white man, yet now demands the life of Bernard Williams for slaying a native, or blood for blood.”⁴⁵ Where was the justice? exclaimed these thirty-odd Euro-Americans.⁴⁶ They were joined by Queenslanders communing in the largest, “most influential and thoroughly representative meeting ever held in this community,” who demanded “mercy . . . following resolutions unanimously and enthusiastically adopted.”⁴⁷

Interestingly, there were residents of Cocktown and the surrounding district who forwarded a similar petition also enthusiastically adopted that chose to note, “With the exception of Edward Dingall, a Mariner and carpenter and one Albert A. Messiah, ship’s cook, a West Indian Negro, all the witnesses for the prosecution were Polynesians.”⁴⁸ Similarly disdainful of the indigenes was a group from Brisbane who observed that “instead of going as she should have done to well known and partially civilized islands in the S. Pacific,” Williams’ vessel “without any instruction to the contrary made for the shores of New Guinea where [she] came into contact with an uncivilized, barbarous and savage race.”⁴⁹ Yet another resolution by upstanding citizens—one among many—emphasized in demanding mercy “the lawlessness of the traffic, the absence of premeditation, the no proof of death, and the questionable nature of the evidence, further extenuating circumstances.”⁵⁰ Tellingly, the case of this Euro-American and his comrades struck a chord in Queensland, then torn with issues of race and gross exploitation of unfree labor in a manner that had just led to civil war in North America.

They all chose not to note what captivated the court that heard the defendant's plea: Williams' vessel "pursued the natives who were in the water, swimming towards the village [and] six were picked up. One of them . . . jumped overboard and was swimming away [when Williams] raised his rifle, fired and missed, fired again and missed, and after saying, 'you son of a bitch, if you don't come in, I'll shoot you,' fired again and hit the native in the back of the head. The native immediately raised his hands, seemingly in agony, sank and did not rise again"; this occurred though Williams had been previously asked to hold his fire. Expressing irritation, the Queensland official Chief Justice Charles Lilley asserted, "There can be no doubt that the crime was committed in aid of a kidnapping raid on the islanders. . . . I did not and do not now assent to the recommendation of mercy."⁵¹ But as it turned out, his death sentence was commuted.⁵²

The powerful lobby on Williams' behalf explains this leniency. The minister of justice, for example, disagreed sharply with Lilley. "The experience of the learned Chief Justice," he said caustically, "leads him to believe that the Polynesians as a rule are of a truthful character. At the same time it is only right to record the fact that men of high reputation and of long and daily experience with Polynesians regard them as very deficient in the virtue of veracity."⁵³

Such slanted observations were reflections of the kind of conflict the colony was enduring as a system of unfree labor was being imposed. Gold was discovered in Queensland in 1870s and people of every kind arrived. Writer Edward Palmer, a relative newcomer, marveled, "Men went there who had been wanted by the police for years. Horse stealing and forging checks were very common. . . . [Simultaneously,] in no district in Queensland have the blacks shown themselves more hostile to the settlers than in the Peninsula. . . . [There were] continued and unprovoked attacks by blacks [to the point where a] war between the races [was bruited]." In such a context, sympathy for Williams' acts cascaded, as a felt desire for more Euro-American arrivals—who had a demonstrated talent for dispossessing indigenes—escalated coincidentally.⁵⁴ And since at least some Euro-Americans thought less of the indigenes of Australia compared to those of North America, there was a reciprocal sympathy for Euro-Australian colonists.⁵⁵

Nevertheless, the castigation of Williams was supported by Hugh Hastings Romilly, a former British official in the region having served as private secretary of New Zealand Governor Sir Arthur Gordon.⁵⁶ The first labor ships, he said, had visited New Guinea in late 1883 but a new low was reached with the arrival of Williams' vessel, which had an extensive record of deceit and murder. This vessel, he opined, had "been the cause of more harm in estranging the natives from us than all the rest put together." At Moresby Island,

Williams and his confederates commenced operations by dragging natives into their boats in spite of their repeated assertions that they did not want to go. At Bently Bay, some young men were taken on board under threats of being shot if they refused as the culprits wantonly set fire to the houses on shore. Then there was a horrid scene that further shocked the conscience:

[Williams] found that he was overhauling the canoe he was chasing, but they [were] making for the reef with shallow water on it, where his boat would not float; the boat, however, caught them up before they could reach it and all the natives jumped into the sea. . . . [Williams] jumped on the reef with a large knife in his hand as the man's head appeared again above water, he seized it by the hair and bending the poor wretch's neck back, deliberately cut his throat. . . . [Still] one canoe remained afloat; it contained the dead body of the steersman [Williams' comrade] had shot. Williams cut off the head, and the body was thrown overboard. In this manner eight natives were recruited at Ferguson Island. . . . [Later Williams] fired three shots at a boy swimming in the water and the third shot killed him.

Fortunately for Williams, at the time of his trial the full atrocity of the case was not known, nor did it come out in evidence. A study by Romilly's colleagues lamented that Williams' vessel had a long record of deceit, cruel treachery, deliberate kidnapping, and cold-blooded murder. "The number of human beings whose lives were sacrificed during the 'recruiting' can never be accurately known," it was added desolately.⁵⁷

This lack of sympathy for the U.S. national was a reflection of an ineffable trend of skepticism toward Washington—and vice versa. Few were surprised when in June 1886, William Blanchard of the United States filed a sworn statement acknowledging that he had witnessed (British) James Byron selling arms and ammunition to the Maraki indigenes. Blanchard also swore that he had seen (British) Fook Chune doing the same thing to these same indigenes.⁵⁸ London may have been justified in viewing such affidavits with skepticism given the demonstrated record of U.S. nationals in supplying indigenes with weapons.

Opinions in Queensland notably were souring toward the United States, and this merged with an attitude that was skeptical of Washington's challenge to London. This was occurring as Melanesians—often referred to as "niggers"—were streaming into Queensland, where they were *de facto* chattels bound securely to the new owners of the land; their position resembled that of slaves in the Caribbean or the ante-bellum South. As long as this was happening, it would be difficult at best for anti-U.S. views to reach fruition. Like Afri-

cans brought to North America, those taken to Queensland were unprotected by a government and, thus, easier to snatch. Queensland was akin to the United States also in that within the Australian context, the classical plantation system was unique to this colony; it locked the northern colony inextricably and securely into the patterns developed in former slave societies of Mauritius and the Caribbean, which was one reason perhaps why Euro-Americans and West Indians tended to flock to this part of the continent.

This economy, as noted, was marked by the U.S. Civil War and Queensland's attempt to produce the agricultural commodities that the war-torn nation had been churning out. Agriculture expanded eightfold during 1860–1900, but as the United States began to return to normalcy with the war's end, cotton production in Queensland started to decline and attention became sharply focused upon another tropical product, sugar cane.⁵⁹ Actually, agricultural Queensland was an empire project in that "overseers and managers had come [there] from Jamaica, Trinidad or Mauritius where they had gained experience in sugar growing and the management of an indentured labor force, others had come from Kenya and England." And there was also some cross-fertilization between plantation areas of Queensland, Fiji, New Caledonia, and even Samoa and Hawaii.⁶⁰

The issue of agriculture also suggests the congruities of the United States and the colonies of Australia. In the fall of 1866, Secretary of State Seward was contacted by a group of U.S. merchants in Melbourne. "Commercial relations between this colony and the United States," they said happily, "are very extensive and are annually increasing and from the large number of Americans residing in this Colony and the great influence they have and are exerting renders the American consulate the most important of any here." But once again, this sunny view of close ties between the present and past British colonies was clouded. "With deep shame," these U.S. merchants observed, "we have seen our Consul excluded (and properly so) from all the courtesies of the Government on all State ceremonies." They wanted him removed because his immoral habits were a disgrace.⁶¹

Undoubtedly there were those in Melbourne who would have been more than happy to continue excluding the U.S. consul, as two years later another Melbourne meeting was held "with reference to the trade, etc. of the Fiji islands," where the "purpose [was] not so much the monopoly of trade as preventing the United States getting a foothold in such *suspicious* proximity to these colonies."⁶² Among those in Melbourne concerned with a growing U.S. presence was Charles Williams, a U.S. citizen residing in the city. "He has acknowledged," said the U.S. consul in 1866, "having shot an officer of the

United States during the late war and was, I think, arrested twice for the offense, escaping from prison both times.”⁶³

The reason that a Confederate like Williams found the colonies to be congenial was that social attitudes mirrored those back home. Apparently, there was unity on this score with the French colonialists in New Caledonia, too. In 1874 a Royal Navy officer told the Queensland governor that he had been informed by the governor of New Caledonia that “during a recent visit to the island of Lifue he had found three or four English girls living as wives of natives of that island. He happened to see one of those girls, who came to him with bare and lacerated feet and torn clothes, and tried to arouse her to a sense of her condition; he found, to his surprise that she was intelligent and could read, write and sew. By her own account she had been a pupil teacher in the north of England at a school.”⁶⁴ Just as in the United States, racist propaganda in the colonies “declared that no white woman was safe from a potential sexual attack by lascivious Melanesians.”⁶⁵

Such scenes helped to convince certain elites in the colonies that if they were not careful, they would recreate the kind of multiracial society that many believed had led to a murderous Civil War—not to mention miscegenation—in the United States. Intriguingly, the incident involving the Euro-American murderer, Williams, who had slain indigenes, was critical in this process, as this event contributed heavily to the act passed in November 1885 to stop importation of South Sea Islanders after 1890. That indigenes’ cost seemed to be more expensive than those of white immigrants was not incidental either.⁶⁶ This was a concrete step to the creation of the now discredited White Australia policy, one of the more profound expressions of white supremacy in the region.

Of course, there were those who opposed curtailing of blackbirding. The writer Anthony Trollope sneered at this legislative turnabout and praised the treatment of the indigenes. “I never saw one ill-used,” he said. “The charge is that they are kidnapped [and subjected to the] horrors of the middle passage—as we used to call it when we spoke of the sufferings of the poor Africans.” This was piffle, he thought. “I believe the charge to be substantially without foundation,” he huffed. “Protection of white labor is the cause of that opposition.”⁶⁷ Trollope was not alone. Some planters—mimicking their counterparts in the old Slave South of the United States—threatened to secede and become a separate state unless the labor trade continued.⁶⁸

What about Asian labor? There was a movement in New South Wales in 1881 to restrict the influx of Chinese⁶⁹ that proliferated to the point that New Zealand joined in a coordinated effort by the Australasian colonies to prevent

faraway Western Australia from importing these migrants,⁷⁰ though the *Sydney Morning Herald* noticed that the latter region suffered from a lack of population.⁷¹ Early in 1881, representatives from the colonies and New Zealand formally requested "uniform legislation of all the Colonies to restrict the influx of Chinese into these colonies," though they felt constrained to add, "[our] objection to the Chinese is not altogether one of prejudice or color or race."⁷² Even here there was a North American angle as the visiting U.S. engineer Herbert Hoover, who arrived in Western Australia in the 1890s, became identified with the evolving policy of the colony. He had a "hatred of the white worker"—a "dislike for the white miner" that compelled him to demand "removal of the restrictions on Asiatic labor."⁷³

Still, at a mass meeting in 1880 protesting the presence of the Chinese, it was charged that these persons "obstructed the social progress of Europeans" since "their habits were antagonistic to those of Europeans." They were arriving at the rate of 400 per month, and London was blamed, which could only benefit the perception of Washington. Feelings were so inflamed that one debater suggested that "unless their representatives protected their sovereign interests the people might take it into their head to sever the Gordian knot existing between the United Kingdom and the colonies." An aghast Sir Henry Parkes blanched at this threat of seditious republicanism of the U.S. variety, warning bluntly and chillily that he would not advise them to try it.⁷⁴

Yet the surging tide toward a White Australia could not be dammed. The New South Wales delegation to the Columbian Exposition in Chicago in 1893 captured these sentiments. Edward Dowling, honorable secretary of the Australian Natives Association and secretary to the late Board of Technical Education of New South Wales, acknowledged that his compatriots were "now being agitated over the question as to the desirability or otherwise of continuing the introduction as laborers into the Australian continent of Kanakas from the South Sea Islands and coolies from India, so that the large experiences of Africans and Asiatics gained in the United States, the West Indies and the Sandwich Islands are invaluable and often cited in the discussion." To Dowling, the lesson was clear. "It is the desire of Australia," he said, "that no semblance of slavery should be tolerated on our shores, or that a conflict similar to that of the American Civil War should ever be fought in Australia." The "results of the recent terrible civil war, [which] cost 400,000,000 [pounds] and half a million of lives, has taught Australians the undesirability of importing foreign colored laborers." He had noticed that "similar arguments to those once used for the retention of slavery by the American cotton planter are now being urged on behalf of colored labor for sugar industry in Queensland,

which it is asserted cannot be profitably carried on except with the assistance of Kanakas, although similar work on the Northern Rivers in [New South Wales] is done by white laborers receiving the ordinary wages." "The colored labor question on the Australian continent," he said, "bids fair to be hereafter almost as engrossing to the colonists as the Negro question in the United States, especially as China with its 400 millions of population is a very near neighbor to Australia, the two countries only being separated by narrow seas. There will no doubt hereafter be a determined opposition made against the introduction of Asiatics [by] white laborers in Australia, whose means of living would be affected by colored competitors from China, India and the South Sea Islands working for wages on which an European could not possibly exist." But it was to the United States that Dowling kept returning, noting that "the large introduction of large numbers of the colored races into Australia" was opposed widely, not least "in view of the experiences of the importation of Africans into the United States."⁷⁵

Dowling was heeded. He spoke as an inflammatory revolt had erupted in the colonies about a kind of racial protectionism; that is, an effort to limit colored labor on behalf of those of European descent, not least since the negative example of the United States could be avoided. Thus, during the 1901 election campaign for the first Commonwealth Government of Australia, the future of South Sea Island labor was a major issue; ultimately, many of these bonded laborers were deported. But the enunciation of the White Australia policy, which was influenced by trans-Pacific currents blowing from the United States, brought both of these continent-sized nations that were avatars of white supremacy into sharp conflict with a power that was rising to the west: Japan.

Toward Pearl Harbor—and Beyond

The prominent official of New South Wales Edward Dowling had not only advice on how the colonies might avoid the fate of the United States, but also pointed opinions about the issue that was ever linked to that of global diplomacy: labor—or from whence on the planet workers would emerge to produce the wealth necessary to propel the economy. Thus, he favored South Asians, principally Indians, over the Japanese as migrant laborers for neighboring Fiji since they were not as “dangerous as the intelligent Japanese to the permanent occupation of Fiji by the white races. The proximity of China, Japan, and India to Australia renders it easily accessible to many millions of the Asiatic races, and in this nearness to the hives of the colored races is one of the great dangers to preserving the present homogeneity of the Anglo-Australian race.”¹

Writing from Victoria, E. W. Cole argued against the development of a White Australia policy of racial exclusion avowing that it was simply not feasible given the neighborhood, pointing particularly to Japan as their “first danger” but also worriedly declaiming about Java, China, and India.²

In their apprehension about Asians generally—and Japanese specifically—Dowling and Cole echoed concerns then emerging in Hawaii and among their backers in the United States, who recognized that when the king had arranged to transport thousands of Japanese workers to the island chain, he had not only altered the face of the labor force, but also affected global diplomacy. The rising power that was Japan did not take kindly to the type of measures (e.g., barring those of Japanese origin from voting) that the Euro-American elite saw fit to impose as they began to clip the wings of the monarchy and take power. But these elites, for reasons of white supremacy and what it saw as self-preservation found it hard to accept the idea of these Asians having access to the ballot box. It was in such racial slights that a train of events was set in motion that ultimately led to the Japanese military dropping bombs on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in December 1941.



FIGURE 13. In its constant search for cheap labor, the Euro-American planter class was not above playing the race and ethnic card, which was not conducive to unity as Japan began to challenge the construction of a “White Pacific.” Courtesy of the Bishop Museum.

Things began to go downhill with the imposition of the so-called Bayonet Constitution in 1887, whereby Euro-American elites effectively undermined the royal family through a show of force. This body of law that King Kalakaua was compelled to sign under pressure from an assortment of European and Euro-American businessmen denied suffrage rights that in 1886 had been guaranteed to those of Japanese origin.³ Hawaiian diplomats in Japan were quick to forward home a disapproving editorial from a Yokohama newspaper that asserted brusquely that the motivating force behind the political crisis in Hawaii was “not party politics but race prejudice. . . . The King during the past few years has apparently acted on the intention of introducing the native Hawaiian element as largely as possible into the Government,” whereas “the white subjects and residents of Hawaii . . . would sooner or later have contrived to be governed by men of their own color.” As in the Australian colonies, “the general feeling among the white residents of Hawaii is understood to be opposed to all Asiatic immigration.”⁴

It was not as if unwarranted paranoia was reigning in Japan. In the run-up to the tumultuous events of 1887, a prominent organ in Hawaii had attacked

Walter Gibson, a key kingdom official, for allegedly “Asiaticizing” Hawaii, while a Hawaiian Anti-Asiatic Union was taking form.⁵ Just as some had difficulty distinguishing between African-Americans and Pacific indigenes, others had difficulty distinguishing between the latter and the Japanese—which meant they all would receive the undistinguished treatment accorded to Negroes.⁶ But try as they might, the white elite could not escape a distasteful dilemma. As the market for sugar expanded in the United States, backbreaking labor was needed; and however vast, this labor was difficult to obtain from the Pan-European world. By the 1890s blackbirding was expiring, African-American workers were generally unavailable and, thus, the only option left was Asia. Yet as the planters imported more and more labor from Asia, their racial rule was threatened to a degree, particularly as Japan was rising as a power, a development that might not have been noticed since it was relatively new for a non-European power to be deemed powerful. Thus, as the decade of the 1890s unwound, virtually the only choice remaining if this rule was to persist was annexation by the rising heavyweight champion of white supremacy—the United States.⁷

The planters faced the worst of all worlds in the 1890s as a labor shortfall developed with a concomitant hike in wages at a time when tariff legislation on the mainland posed a clear and present danger to the crucial sugar industry.⁸

Samuel Gompers, the chief of mainland labor unions, acknowledged that the white population of the Hawaiian Islands . . . only comprise 8 6/10 percent. This does not include Portuguese. The Japanese population comprises 59 percent of the entire population and “the unions have fought them tooth and nail.” “The Chinese,” he said, “[are] not near as aggressive as the Japs [so] in admitting the Chinese we are choosing the lesser of two evils.”⁹ The writer Katharine Coman concurred, adding that the Nipponese were “remarkably clannish, clubbing together for their common interests in a way that was distinctly embarrassing”; plus, they “cherished allegiance to their native land with peculiar tenacity.” The threat of Hawaii becoming “Orientalized” because of their influence was greater than in the days of unstinted Chinese immigration, it was said with no fake amazement. Besides, these Japanese were prone to militancy: of the twenty-two strikes recorded by the United States Labor Commissioner for 1900, twenty were undertaken by plantation laborers, all of them Japanese.¹⁰

The Chinese were viewed as acceptable only when the Japanese were deemed to be the only alternative. After all, the all-important rice industry was financed and controlled mainly by Chinese merchants of Honolulu, not to mention that the rice farmers and laborers were for the most part

Chinese,¹¹ which too was seen as frontal challenge to the prerogatives of white supremacy.

Moreover, as was noted about the Kipahulu Sugar Company, “Europeans will object to work in gang[s] with Orientals. They will not mix at joint labor,” in any case. Plus, as was reported about the Koloa Sugar Company, the Japanese were “capable and industrious but given to strikes,” a trait that vitiated any virtues they might possess. Despite this knowledge, the Kilauea Sugar Plantation at the turn of the century hired 267 field laborers of Japanese origin out of a force of 372. The query was posed bluntly: “will white or European labor work in the fields stripping cane? And if not, why?” The reply was a forthright no, since the labor was “monotonous, disagreeable and unhealthy.” Thus, somehow planters had to muddle along with Japanese workers, though as was said of those employed by the Ewa Plantation Company, they were “industrious to a fair degree,” but “frequently unruly and hard to manage” and increasingly “have become more so.” Workers of Portuguese origin did “rank first” in terms of capability, industry, and reliability, but there were simply not enough of them to go around, even if they were to be regarded as wholly white.¹² As a congressional committee put it, “There remains the all-important consideration that even if white men could labor in the cane fields, and were willing to undertake such work, there is no possibility of obtaining from any quarter, and least of all from the United States mainland, a sufficient number to fill our needs.” Thus, it was said with reluctant finality, “Japan is the only source of our labor supply.”¹³

Yet continually Hawaiian employers sought to recruit Euro-American or European adult male laborers,¹⁴ while their employment rolls continued to be replete with workers of Asian origin.¹⁵ Though there was much bluster otherwise—“the Australian adoption of White Labor for its sugar plantations has been the greatest contribution yet made to practical solution of the problem whether the white man can do agricultural work in the tropics,” said one overly optimistic writer¹⁶—the holy grail of melanin-deficient labor was quite elusive.

And for the longest, so were workers of Japanese origin. “As late as 1883,” said the Hawaiian foreign minister, “our statistics show but 116 Japanese in the country” but the king’s historic journey to Japan unleashed a tsunami of labor that also turned out to be of enormous diplomatic significance.¹⁷ Well before this radical departure, the U.S. minister in Honolulu sensed the global significance, instructing a colleague that “an envoy of the Hawaiian government sails for Japan today for the purpose of endeavoring to negotiate a treaty with Japan. . . . I think it would be your policy to oppose the consummation of such a treaty by every means in your power.”¹⁸

Still, in 1880, before the presence of workers of Japanese origin became formidable, Honolulu's consul in Hobart, Tasmania—where indigenes had only recently been decimated—spoke brightly of the “class of emigrants obtainable from Madras” and how they “would suit [the islands'] climate exceedingly well, [as] they are well known for their quiet plodding ways.” He told his bosses, “I think they would compare most favorably with the Chinese now coming to your shores and should I be able to assist you in any way arranging for them, I shall be only too pleased to do so.”¹⁹ Honolulu was informed curtly that none of the colonial governments wanted East Indians or Eurasians sent to the Australian colonies and wondered if Hawaii might be interested.²⁰ But the consul apparently did not recognize that the elites on the U.S. mainland were wary of bringing more British subjects to this strategically positioned chain of islands. In any case, the Australian colonies themselves were concerned about what they saw as Hawaii expansionism and were hardly enthusiastic about aiding the construction of a regime that was styling itself as pro-indigene. In 1883, a Honolulu official in Sydney advised his counterpart in Melbourne, “[It would] not be desirable at the present juncture to specially draw attention by means of the press to the course lately pursued by the Hawaiian Government in protesting against the Pacific annexations, because I think that such a course might be construed as being hostile to what will doubtless prove to be the unanimous action of the Australian governments, with all of whom His Majesty's Government is on the most friendly footing; as evidenced by the King's contemplated visit to and promise of cordial reception by them.”²¹

Actually this advice might have emboldened those who lusted after Hawaii itself. Still, when an aggressive assortment of planters deposed the kingdom in 1893, sober-minded analysts could well have charged them with blatant overreaching in that this was bound not to go down very well with the rising power that was Japan, whose population dwarfed that of Hawaii. The overthrow, nonetheless, was a surprise only to those not paying sufficient attention. As early as the spring of 1891, Hawaii's representative in New South Wales reported that a “cable appeared in the Sydney newspapers stating that it was *expected* that the American cruiser *Charleston* would be ordered to Honolulu where a revolution was likely to occur.”²²

Yet as this fateful moment approached, there were clear signs of trouble looming for the planter class. Late in 1890, Honolulu's representative in Japan warned Tokyo that the “unexpected passage of the new U.S. tariff law making sugar free of duty in the United States on imports from Brazil, Cuba, Java, the Philippine Islands [and] other countries, as well as beet sugar from France and

Germany, has completely done away with the advantages heretofore enjoyed by Hawaii in its reciprocity treaty with America." Thus, planters in Hawaii were "threatened with serious losses and industrial panic," which inevitably would impact the flow of Japanese laborers to the islands—and, it could have been added, exacerbate the continuing issue of deprivation of the suffrage rights of the Nipponese already resident.²³

Certainly that was the tack adopted by Viscount Sinzo Aoki of the Foreign Ministry, who expressed what seemed to be sincere regret for the difficulties encountered by the planters—then added pointedly that "[he] should . . . remind" the Hawaiian authorities about the ticklish matter of voting rights.²⁴

Sensing that this devilish matter was not disappearing anytime soon, Robert Walker Irwin, Honolulu's representative in Japan, told his premier in 1892 that Portugal no longer enjoyed extraterritoriality and he recommended that Hawaii move unilaterally to institute the same policy with regard to Nippon. "This act," he reasoned, "would make us very popular with the government and people of Japan and conserve greatly our vital interest in emigration." As early as 1881 during the king's visit, Honolulu offered to abandon this policy but Tokyo was "not then ready to accept"; but "now they are more than ready, [even] eager," not least since that would place the increasingly sensitive Japanese on par with a European power—though the fact that the nation in question (Portugal) was not deemed as being altogether white gave this concession limited utility.²⁵

When the coup occurred, the Japanese newspapers were full of Hawaiian affairs.²⁶ "The Japanese public feeling is rather nervous over Hawaiian events," Irwin repeated.²⁷ He took his worrisome concern directly to the doorstep of Sanford B. Dole, president of the so-called provisional government that had deposed the kingdom. Irwin had met with the Japanese foreign minister who informed him that a "strong current of public opinion in the press and among politicians and the people was showing itself in reference to the extension of Japanese residents in Hawaii of the privilege of the electoral franchise." The Japanese press, he emphasized, was "unanimous on the question." Honolulu must accede on this matter, he stressed, otherwise "some action will be taken in the next session of the Japanese Parliament which may endanger our great industrial Emigration Convention."²⁸

Repeatedly, Irwin informed his superiors of the growing anger in Japan about the deprivation of Nipponese voting rights. Thus, in July 1893 there was a very large public meeting in Tokyo "at which speeches were made by Mr. Hoshi, President of the House of Representatives and others urging the Japanese Government to press forward the question of granting the Japanese the

electoral franchise in Hawaii.” Temperatures were rising and pulses were racing in Tokyo, he underscored in his briefing of Dole. “Every day,” he said, “articles on the subject appear in the newspapers and the matter will be strongly brought before the Japanese Parliament when it meets next November.”²⁹

The Japanese elite ignored such pressures at their peril as the nation, which was expanding at breakneck speed in its climb to full-scale imperialist status, was undergoing the resultant severe strains. It was in that context that an attempt to assassinate Japanese leader Count Okuma was made. A dynamite bomb was thrown into his open carriage, which, exploding, shattered the bones of his leg below the knee, resulting in amputation of the leg above the knee. Capping off this orgy of bloodletting, the assassin immediately killed himself by cutting his throat. The wounded Okuma was not a man of great physical strength, which was just one more reason he was guarded by a detective and twelve policemen³⁰—but to no avail, as the fury of some Japanese bubbled over.

So moved, on the “12th day, the 4th month, the 27th year of Meiji,” the chief foreign affairs spokesman of the increasingly nationalistic Japanese denounced Honolulu’s “unfair discrimination” and insisted on “actual equality of treatment with the subjects and citizens of other Treaty Powers”; these were Tokyo’s “just and reasonable expectations,” he added.³¹ Tokyo was becoming more and more insistent about the contours of Hawaiian policy, raising the specter of a *de facto* annexation—a prospect that was chilling for a planter class who found this possible eventuality difficult to reconcile with white supremacy. Irwin, who proudly acknowledged that his ancestor was Benjamin Franklin, was facing the grim possibility of being a founding father of not only a failed state but one to be swallowed by a rising Asian power.³²

A demarche noted that the so-called Bayonet Constitution of 1887, which continued in force under King Kalakaua and Queen Liliuokalani until 1893, excluded not just Japanese but all Asiatics from citizenship. Then in 1894 “during the sitting of the Constitutional Convention [a] strong diplomatic demand was made by the Japanese authorities that Japan should no longer be excluded from the right to vote. To avoid granting the franchise to Japanese the Republic of Hawaii was forced to frame its Constitution in such a manner as to stop all naturalization.”³³ Japan was neither placated nor amused.

“The Imperial Government have no wish to question the right of the Government of Hawaii to limit or suspend immigration,” insisted the Japanese consul in Honolulu, Hisashi Shimamura, “provided such limitation or suspension is general and equally applicable to all foreigners.” He urged that Honolulu give this matter “careful reconsideration,” but in an era when Jim Crow on the mainland was assuming ironclad status, it was not easy for the new government



FIGURE 14: The Japanese consul's residence in Honolulu: After overthrowing the monarchy, the Euro-American elite chose to refuse full voting rights and equality to those of Japanese ancestry. This infuriated Tokyo and contributed to tensions that led to the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941. Courtesy of the Bishop Museum.

in Hawaii to extend the privileges of whiteness to Asians—even well-armed ones in Japan.³⁴

In reality, Japan had a strong case. With precision Tokyo forwarded to Honolulu a detailed list of Hawaii's treaties with various European powers that suggested powerfully through implication how Nipponese were being treated discriminatorily.³⁵

There were other complications. Though Japan was presumably protesting against restrictions targeting all Asiatics, their war with China in 1895 made Tokyo object when a reliable source informed them that Honolulu “has decided through a Cabinet meeting . . . to make the proportion of laborers for the future to be one-third Japanese and two-thirds Chinese and all planters have been notified.”³⁶ Tokyo was not pleased either when apprised of “hostile legislation on the part of Hawaii” that was “directed especially if not exclusively against Japanese sake.”³⁷ Was it possible that the plurality of Japanese laborers in Hawaii had sparked such laws? When the Japanese consulate general in Honolulu was “raised to the rank of a Legation,” the Hawaiian authorities did not know whether to celebrate the upgrade³⁸ or worry that it was a further signal that Tokyo was targeting the former Sandwich Islands. It was becoming ever clearer that it was going to be exceedingly difficult to maintain a small outpost of white supremacy in the middle of the Pacific—unless it had the protective umbrella of a major power like the United States. Irwin forwarded a lengthy analysis to Honolulu in August 1894 providing prescient predictions about future Japanese aggression, especially in China. “I do not anticipate any trouble in Hawaii between Japanese and Chinese,” he added, “but it might be well to take precautions quietly.”³⁹

Irwin may have had reasons to worry. In an interview in March 1893 with a Mr. Fugii of Tokyo's consulate in Honolulu, this Japanese official was pressed about the presence of armed and trained Japanese military in Hawaii itself. He refused to deny this; there were, it was reported, between 1,000 and 1,500 soldiers among the Japanese living on the island. Irwin admitted that there were probably some, which may explain why he chose to retain the article containing this assertion.⁴⁰

Already Washington's representative in Honolulu was filing away reams of articles pointing in the direction of annexation by the United States. “This country,” said one typical piece, “seems to have arrived at the parting of the ways, which will decide its fate, either as an Asiatic or Caucasian colony.” Since the local European and Euro-American elite could not stand up to Tokyo, annexation by the United States was the way out. This was not just a favor to this elite group, it was thought. As one journalist put it, “All that

Malta and Cyprus could be to England in battle with Russia, these islands [i.e., Hawaii] would be to America in struggle with Great Britain. On the other hand, if they should be defaulted to England, the United States would feel the menace of another Bermuda.”⁴¹

According to his sympathetic biographer, Sanford Ballard Dole, who led the nascent Hawaiian republic, affirmed that King Kalakaua’s visits to China and Japan were disturbing because they did not favor either group, especially after their problems with contract labor.⁴² The question of white supremacy was rarely far from the calculations of those on both sides of the barricades. When a prominent U.S. senator and four other congressmen arrived in Honolulu during this turbulent decade, the leading solon assured indigenes that under the United States they would be able to vote “just as blacks did in the American South,” unaware that those listening knew enough not to believe that blacks were enjoying freedom and equality. As the scholar Noenoe K. Silva put it, they “knew that race hatred was the root of what had been said about Kalakaua—that his father was not Kapa‘akea but an ex-slave named Blossom and they remembered Thurston’s 1894 speech to the American League justifying the disfranchisement of American blacks. On October 23 *Ke Aloha Aina* [a journal for indigenes] ran an editorial entitled . . . “Are Hawaiians Going to Be Like Blacks?” . . . in response to Morgan. It said that the haole [white] hatred for and fear of the blacks and the Indians . . . was well understood. . . . At the end, the editorial said that yes, Hawaiians will be like American blacks if the islands are annexed because their freedom will be taken away.”⁴³ The dislodged Queen Liliuokalani asked plaintively why the United States would move aggressively against her kingdom “in order that another race problem shall be injected into the social and political perplexities” with which this huge nation was already struggling.⁴⁴

On the other hand, London had a churlish view of the self-styled republic, with its representative in Honolulu complaining in May 1893 that the “Provisional Government continues to enroll men of the lowest character who constitute a danger to the country, and who are insubordinate. In fact, the Government at the present time is a sort of ‘military despotism’”—he might have added that it was a “despotism” that targeted the indigenes.⁴⁵ London’s representative, James Wodehouse, was a veteran and experienced diplomat and had been in Hawaii for thirty years by the time of the coup. There was more than one obstacle he had to hurdle⁴⁶ in that his nation was routinely vilified, notably underlined was the “fanatical Anglophobe” atmosphere that supposedly prevailed at the *Washington Post*.⁴⁷ But his major project—countering U.S. influence—had been monumentally unsuccessful, partly due to a failure of imagination on

London's part in that it had difficulty coming to grips with an independent kingdom with wide influence in the subregion.⁴⁸ However, by 1894 he had a confidential interview with the queen and learned that "she would not yield to the Republican government" and that "she had determined to fight. Her plans were all made. . . . The rising would take place in a few days but ample warning would be given to the British Consul-General."⁴⁹

Subsequently, a group of indigenes called the Hui Aloha Aine, also known as the Hawaii Patriotic League, requested London's intervention on their behalf.⁵⁰ Perhaps such seditious contacts shed light on why in 1894 authorities granted permission to the USS *Philadelphia* and even the Japanese cruiser *Kongo* to land their men in drilling exercises, but forbade the HMS *Champion*. "The government [was] much dissatisfied with the 'attitude of reserve' which I had maintained," sniffed Wodehouse. "[I was told that] the Government [was] angry with [me] for 'doing [my] duty.' They wanted me to take sides, their side, and [I] very properly refused to do so."⁵¹ U.S. naval officer Lucien Young expressed the sentiments of many of his comrades when he said of the British in Hawaii that the "majority of them are imbued with a sense of superiority" and, moreover, were "sympathizers with the corrupt royalty and constantly intriguing against American influences."⁵²

But in the run-up to the U.S. annexation, a good deal of emphasis was placed on the supposed threat from Tokyo, more so than London. Elite leader Lorrin Thurston was wringing his hands about Japan in early 1897, observing, "The present extraordinary movement from Japan to Hawaii is part of a systematic plan with the full approval of the Japanese government, to gain control of the islands."⁵³ The minister in Honolulu told Washington "that the United States must decide whether Hawaii was to be an American or an Asiatic country." In April 1897, the *Honolulu Star* declared, "It is the white race against the yellow."⁵⁴ The influential *Washington Evening Star* seemed to suggest that the impending war against Spain was a proxy conflict to preempt Japan as worry was expressed about Tokyo seizing the Philippines, adding, that Japan did not fear Spain.⁵⁵ Honolulu, increasingly concerned about Japan itself, was hedging, with some urging, this republic to be neutral in case of a Spanish-American war, as the "superiority of the Spanish fleet near the Philippines over the American Asiatic squadron is acknowledged by all naval authorities in the States and Europe."⁵⁶ U.S. Secretary of State John Sewall was informed similarly in May 1898, suggesting that annexation of Hawaii was also driven by defensive concerns.⁵⁷ Thus, the congruence of the annexation of Hawaii as the war with Spain was being launched may not have been coincidence. Annexation seemed to arrive in June 1898 in response to a flutter of neutrality in Honolulu, nervous about irking

Japan—which was an overall concern given Tokyo’s militant response to the deprivation of suffrage rights to those of Nipponese origin.⁵⁸ As the then-republic’s foreign minister, F. M. Hatch, observed in 1897, Tokyo “had entered a strong protest against annexation on the ground that it would change existing conditions in the Pacific and might therefore cause international difficulties and also might interfere with the rights of Japanese citizens in Hawaii.”⁵⁹

Like many indigenes, numerous African-Americans viewed the annexation with a distinct unease, which was an extension of how they viewed the dislodging of the kingdom itself. One Negro newspaper termed the Euro-American aggressors as “not a particle less piratical than the infamous man-stealers of antebellum days.” Outrage was expressed concerning the “dishonorable role which this [U.S.] government was made to play in the diabolical proceeding. There is not the least ground for doubt but for aid rendered the adventurous buccaneers by the demonstrations made in their favor by our navy—particularly by our man-of-war Philadelphia.” When the so-called Republic of Hawaii began inching toward annexation, there was no less indignation. “And now the same gang of robbers,” it was said in a thinly veiled reference to the coterie surrounding Sanford B. Dole, “are moving heaven and earth to induce this [U.S.] government to shoulder the whole burden of their villainy by becoming the receiver of their stolen property.”⁶⁰ Another newspaper with reason to know declared, “The ‘Negro Press’ has no sympathy for the Hawaiian annexation hippodrome.”⁶¹ No, it was reported, African-American hostility to annexation was wide and deep.⁶² Dole himself was termed the “prince of hypocrites” with Hawaii seen as analogous to the dankest Jim Crow precincts as “it is run upon the American plan, Japanese and Negroes not being consulted, while the natives are not thought of.”⁶³

Yet the smashing victory over Spain, accompanied by seizure of the Philippines and annexation of Hawaii, did not end a gnawing concern about the rise of Japan. A few years after the flames of war had died down, the U.S. Department of Commerce was informed that in Hawaii on most of the plantations the labor force “is so overwhelmingly Japanese that this nationality now completely controls the labor situation.” “The Japanese laborers realize this,” it was reported, “and are becoming aggressive and self-assertive in their dealings with the employers. Within the past two months strikes of considerable importance have occurred on the plantations. One of the strikes, involving about 1400 Japanese, necessitated the calling out of the entire police force and the National Guard of the territory and resulted in the killing of one Japanese striker and the wounding of two others.” More and more, the desire was felt in many quarters to “teach the Japs a lesson.” Indicative of their increased assertiveness was the

fact that the Japanese in Hawaii had “begun a movement to demand the recall of their Consul for not properly protecting their interests and should they effect a change the next Consul might prove over-zealous in protecting their rights as subjects of the Japanese government.”⁶⁴

Theodore Roosevelt, the highly race-conscious U.S. leader, remained in the vortex of these debates. As president, he told the acting governor of the territory, “I will help you in every way in your purpose to try to secure a white population of actual land tillers who are small land owners,” but this proved to be a task beyond his ken.⁶⁵ He informed a later governor about the intense feelings of bitterness welling up in those of Japanese origin in Hawaii due to racism inflicted by the *haole*.⁶⁶

Then Roosevelt was told that Japanese in Hawaii were requesting that one of their battleships be stationed there. “[The] Japanese here have all along been steadily gaining in strength, numbers, influence and financial matters,” said a worried correspondent, “until now they practically control all of the labor and mechanical occupations in the plantations and are the traders, merchants and mechanics and builders of our city driving out American citizens. . . . [The] Japs,” it was said crudely, “have our planters cooned up in a tree.” This recent demand was actually “the first time that they have ventured into print, ostensibly to invite the aid of their nation.” The correspondent was explicit: “The Japanese are asking for a battleship, but we are the ones that ought to be asking for a battleship and a first class one at that stationed here all the time.”⁶⁷ Fears were not allayed when shortly thereafter a Japanese ship arrived in Hawaii with more than 560 aboard, supposedly looking for jobs; the “discovery of the customs officials that many of the men who have arrived by the vessel are ex-Japanese soldiers and they brought their uniforms with them” was unsettling. The “standard of the men appeared to be much higher than what would ordinarily be expected with a common laborer,” according to one journalist on the scene. Among other things, “the men were better educated.”⁶⁸

There was more bad news for the defenders of white supremacy. A high level commission reconfirmed in 1905—the year Japan affirmed its own mettle by subduing Russia in war—that “with the exception of the Portuguese the supply of whom is no longer available, white laborers are found to be unfitted for tropical work.” Indeed, it was avowed, “white men cannot and will not stand the work in the cane fields.” Thus, it seemed Hawaii was doomed to rely on Asian labor. “There are those who feel that it would be unwise,” said Gorham D. Gilman of the influential Lake Mohonk Conference, “to increase further this already large number of Japanese elated and self-confident over the success of the late war. Who can foresee the relations which may govern

the future trade of the Pacific?" He reverted back to China. "Why is he so much desired? For very good reasons. He is a more quiet person naturally [while] the Japanese have more frequently the opposite qualifications." So more Chinese should be admitted. Unfortunately, that collided frontally with the raging anti-Chinese sentiment then reigning on the West Coast of the United States and was a nonstarter.⁶⁹

Soon the Mohonk Conference had moved to a higher level of hysteria. The "Chinese and the Japanese whose touch and intermingling with our race today constitutes the race problem not only of Hawaii, but . . . the American republic and largely of the whole world," was the theme. And this race problem in Hawaii was tied up with the labor question. What was the remedy then? There should be a kind of "racial protectionism," it was thought, just as one seeks to "protect our infant industries." "Competition [was] good [but] *up to a certain degree*," it was thought, just as "bad money will drive out good money . . . every practical business man recognizes the soundness of Gresham's law." As they examined the world, these U.S. elites thought there was, to "repeat, a competition that kills."⁷⁰

This perception was growing steadily among mainland elites and had penetrated the consciousness of the top U.S. military strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan. "I myself early in life was in Japan for more than a year at the time of the revolution which immediately preceded the era of the Meiji," he recalled later in the *London Times*. Thus, he felt he had good reason to conclude, "[It is] reasonable that a great number of my fellow citizens, knowing the problem we have in the colored race among us, should dread the introduction of what they believe will constitute another race problem; and one much more difficult; because the virile qualities of the Japanese will still more successfully withstand assimilation."⁷¹

Mahan, who casually referred to "niggers," drew analogies between the "menacing appearance of the Japanese questions" and that of the Negro.⁷² "I feel strongly," he insisted, "that with the black race question on our hand we must withstand a further yellow one," lest these two questions merge with disastrous consequences all around for white supremacy. This served to "point to a time when Great Britain may have to consider her relations to Japan in the light of those to the United States and Australia, where the 'white' feeling also prevails."⁷³ This time arrived in December 1941 when these three powers were aligned against Tokyo but well before then, as he informed the *New York Times*, he was quite worried about a "new race problem" as the United States contained a "population predominantly Asiatic on the Pacific slope west of the Rocky Mountains."⁷⁴

What Mahan was observing was manifested curiously when the African-American boxer Jack Johnson traveled to Australia for a match where he encountered an “orgy of Anglo-Saxonism” generated by the visit of a U.S. fleet, a visit that reinforced Australia’s sense of itself as what poet Roderic Quinn had termed the “World’s White Outpost.”⁷⁵ By then Australia was well on its way in developing its infamous “White Australia” policy, a policy that not only was assisted enormously by trans-Pacific trends but was materially aided by the deportation of unfree labor from the South Seas. Like neighboring Fiji, the “lucky country” also contained a robust chapter of the Ku Klux Klan, who also happened to be a staunch and robust advocate of a “White Australia.”⁷⁶

As the Portuguese in Hawaii learned to their utter dismay, the hallowed halls of whiteness did not necessarily encompass all from Europe. Thus, more than a century after “White Australia” had been proclaimed, the *Sydney Morning Herald* in seeking to provide a legal rationale for contemporary Asian migrants noted how in 1903 an English-speaking German immigrant ran afoul of Canberra’s strict racial policies and how “Australia’s first boat person, the Czech writer Egon Kisch . . . jumped ship in Melbourne in 1934 [and] was tested in Scottish Gaelic. He also failed, despite speaking 10 European languages. The then Menzies government’s smug amusement, however, was short-lived. Kisch proved in court that his Gaelic test had been mistranslated and won the right to stay.”⁷⁷

Thus, by the time of Pearl Harbor the stage had been set for a “race war” of tragic proportions.⁷⁸ This conflict unfolded, *inter alia*, in the South Seas, which not so long ago had been ravaged by the depredations of blackbirding, a good deal of it at the hands of U.S. nationals like “Bully” Hayes. The indigenes of the Solomon Islands, Guadalcanal, the New Hebrides, and elsewhere may have had a hard time accepting the democratic pronouncements of the allies as a result.⁷⁹

It is unclear when this practice of body-snatching ceased, in any case. Thus, in 1892 a California journalist named W. H. Brommage reported on a blackbirding enterprise under the joint management of San Francisco and Central American capital, as South Sea Islanders were brought illicitly to Guatemala to labor, suggesting that like its hated predecessor the African Slave Trade, blackbirding was eminently malleable and adaptable. The mostly U.S. crew visited eleven islands of the Gilbert group and delivered 388 imprisoned laborers to wealthy Spanish plantation owners in San Jose de Guatemala. Not mincing words, he called the vessel of delivery a slave ship that ultimately anchored in San Francisco Bay at the end of its six-month voyage.

Born in Britain, Brommage had arrived in Brooklyn in 1868 and came to the city by the bay in 1887. The reporter had engaged in masquerade to get on board and acknowledged that their mission was “generally known” before they left San Francisco, dismissing the typical plea that the crew had been duped. They passed through Honolulu looking for “niggers” and some of this despised Pacific indigene group were also taken to Mexico. How did they do it? “The best way to proceed,” he detailed, “was to get all the young people, [and] then their parents and relatives would accompany them rather than part with them.” So, they grabbed a little boy and “the mother and father rather than stand on the shore and watch the ship go down behind the horizon to a far-off port and unknown world with their boy aboard, signed the articles and laid down their fate with his. . . . These stories were enacted over and over again.” Aboard the slave ship was “Black Tom,” a “nigger sailor who had been to sea in English vessels and had spent some time on a Mexican plantation as a laborer”; he “was in sympathy with the natives and traveling from island to island . . . used every endeavor to prevent the natives leaving their homes.” He “was the means of keeping many hundreds at home who would otherwise have signed a contract.” Brommage also raised the specter of South Sea Islanders decamping in the United States itself in his discussion of Melanesians in league with slavers who arrived in San Francisco,⁸⁰ which brings the story of the United States and the Pacific full circle and also raises the intriguing possibility that some in the Americas (including the United States) who have heretofore been thought to be African-American may not be, at least not in the sense they imagine.

This is a perversely appropriate point to consider, given that contrary to popular belief, slavery in the United States did not end altogether in 1865. It thrives today in a new form, as an estimated 10,000 captive laborers are toiling at any given moment in the United States. Cases occur in at least ninety cities nationally with the greatest concentration in California, Texas, Florida, and New York: 46 percent of these victims toil in sex services such as prostitution and strip clubs, 27 percent in domestic work, 10 percent in agriculture, 5 percent in sweatshop/factory jobs, and 4 percent in restaurants and hotels.⁸¹ During the late 1990s, there were several notorious farm labor servitude cases in Florida and forced prostitution cases involving hundreds of Mexican and Thai women; U.S. authorities estimate that 800,000 people are trafficked against their will between nations each year, and that many hundreds more are enslaved within their own nations. The government also estimates that about 15,000 people are trafficked to the United States each year.⁸² Though the International Labor Organization long had been concerned with this pestilence of slavery, it continues to persist.⁸³

MEANWHILE, HAWAII in 1959 had become the fiftieth state. However, as 2005 dawned a serious and far-reaching movement had developed—as the *New York Times* put it—“to take the 50th star off the flag and to create a government that does its negotiating with the State Department, not Interior.” In short, the idea had taken root, particularly among indigenes, of revisiting annexation and statehood and pushing for independence. In response, Congress was contemplating a bill that undercut this dream by adjusting the status of Hawaiian indigenes.⁸⁴ According to the *Los Angeles Times*, “The majority of Hawaii residents” support “sovereignty,” with the exception of “political conservatives, mostly Caucasian.” Indigenes, on the other hand, see this movement “as the only way to right the wrong of 1893 when the U.S. helped overthrow the Hawaiian monarchy, leading to annexation and statehood.” As in the nineteenth century, leaders of French Tahiti are now in close contact with indigenous Hawaiians as they seek to coordinate their mutual drive for independence.⁸⁵ The Hawaiian sovereignty movement gathered steam in 1993, a century after the Hawaiian revolution when in a joint resolution signed into law by President Clinton, the so-called Apology Bill was passed, which skirted the issue of responsibility but commemorated the 100th anniversary of the coup that toppled Queen Liliuokalani, though it did apologize.⁸⁶

South Sea connections with African-Americans also survived the new century. In Hawaii, Haunani-Kay Trask, a leader of the indigenous movement, titled her critically acclaimed manifesto about the plight of her people *From a Native Daughter*, in conscious imitation of works by both Richard Wright and James Baldwin.⁸⁷ This was an ironic confirmation of the point that the conclusion of the U.S. Civil War, which abolished African slavery, unleashed enormous changes in the Pacific.

Meanwhile in Fiji, the scene of stormy events that had roiled the waters of the region, the advent of British colonialism had brought an influx of South Asian laborers, descendants of whom spoke of the “unspeakable hardship, humiliation” they suffered “under an evil and cruel system akin to slavery.” “As part of their religious upbringing, Hindus are averse to taking their own life,” yet “statistics show a high rate of suicide among indentured laborers in Fiji,” that is, “20 times higher than that prevalent in their homeland in India and worse than in any other British colony which used Indian indentured laborer.”⁸⁸ In nearby Australia, the close connection with the United States continues, as figures as diverse as Russell Crowe, Rupert Murdoch, and Heath Ledger seem so seamlessly integrated into U.S. culture that one could easily suspect they were born here—as opposed to the South Seas. In this they trod the path blazed by Errol Flynn, born in

Tasmania, site of one of the most devastating assaults on indigenes in the region.

Thus, as a new century dawns, trends that were set in motion over two hundred years ago, when Captain Cook arrived in the Hawaiian Isles and dis-solute Irish and British were dumped in Australia, continue to create ripples and waves. The “White Pacific” with all that continues to suggest about a racially skewed distribution of wealth and resources remains a reality—so far.

Notes

Introduction

1. "Memorandum on the Claims of Citizens of the United States to Lands in Fiji," September 1903, *Correspondence on the Subject of the Claims of United States Citizens to Lands in Fiji, National Archives of Fiji-Suva*. (Except in titles of works, note that British spelling appearing in this and other sources quoted throughout this book has not been retained.)

2. Thomas Dunbabin, *Slavers of the South Seas*, Box 67, Folder 404, Frank Clune Papers, National Library of Australia-Canberra. See also Thomas Dunbabin, *Slavers of the South Seas* (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1935).

3. Reverend D. Macdonald, *The Labour Traffic Versus Christianity in the South Sea Islands* (Melbourne: Hutchinson, 1878), 24.

4. Grant McCall and John Connell, *A World Perspective on Pacific Islander Migration: Australia, New Zealand and the U.S.A.* (Kensington, New South Wales: Center for South Pacific Studies, University of New South Wales, 1993), 2, 3.

5. T. Damon I. Salesa, "'Travel Happy' Samoa: Colonialism, Samoa Migration and a 'Brown Pacific,'" *New Zealand Journal of History* 37, no. 2 (October 2003): 171–188, 186. By way of comparison, the estimate of southern Native Americans sold in the British Slave Trade circa 1670–1715 was between 24,000–32,000 at the low end and 51,000 at the high end.

6. Thomas Dunbabin, *Slavers of the South Seas* (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1935), 235. See also *Living on the Fringe: Melanesians in Fiji* (Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, 2001), 49:

Until the mid-1960s the prevailing view was that the trade was characterized by fraud, violence and a high-level of outright kidnapping. . . . Since termed the "kidnapping myth" [this thesis] was challenged by historians of the new Pacific historiography being developed at the Australian National University under the leadership of J. W. Davidson. . . . Beginning with Deryck Scarr . . . and continuing

with more detailed work of Peter Corris . . . labor recruiting came to be seen as involving an earlier period of coercion . . . that required the cooperation of the Islanders, who exercised a considerable degree of control over the process. . . . Clive Moore presented the notion of “cultural kidnapping” to denote the advantage that one side held over the other.

However, “Michael Panoff and Adrian Graves comprehensively and explicitly reject the voluntarist interpretation. In German New Guinea, Panoff . . . observes that kidnapping was widespread.”

This book, since it focuses on U.S. nationals who were unabashed blackbirders, leans toward Panoff and away from the idea that blackbirding involved cultural misunderstandings. See also Michael Berry, *Refined White: The Story of How South Sea Islanders Came to Cut Sugar Cane in Queensland and Made History Refining the White Australia Policy* (Innisfail, Queensland: Australia Sugar Industry Museum, 2001, 17): “Much of the history about this period has been written by white Europeans whose analysis and interpretations of events is often markedly different from that of the descendants of those first South Sea Island laborers.”

Yet, see Michael Salman, *The Embarrassment of Slavery: Controversies over Bondage and Nationalism in the American Colonial Philippines* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 238: “Slavery was such a familiar practice that even the United States’ act of abolition in the Civil War did not include definitions of the institution. Immediately afterward, however, the problem of defining slavery haunted the legislature and the courts. The program of universal abolition prompted comparative analyses of slavery by administrators, advocates and scholars but the analyses have been vexed ever since by the variations of bondage and submission across cultures as well as within each one. Scholars still cannot resolve the disputes.”

See also Martin A. Klein, ed., *Breaking the Chains: Slavery, Bondage and Emancipation in Modern Africa and Asia* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993); Anthony Reid, *Slavery, Bondage and Dependency in Southeast Asia* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1993).

7. Merze Tate and Fidele Foy, “Slavery and Racism in South Pacific Annexations,” *Journal of Negro History* 50, no. 1 (January 1965): 1–21, 3.

8. Eric T. L. Love, *Race over Empire: Racism and U.S. Imperialism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 80.

9. Haskell Springer, ed., *America and the Sea: A Literary History* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1995), 2.

10. Frenise Logan, “The British East India Company and African Slavery in Benkulen, Sumatra, 1687–1792,” *Journal of Negro History* 41, no. 4 (October 1956): 339–348, 339.

11. “An Account of Two Hawaiian Chiefs Blackbirded. From the ‘Sun’, London, 1820,” Bishop Museum-Honolulu. See also Mary Zweip, *Pilgrim Path: The First Company of Women Missionaries to Hawaii* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991); Hiram Bingham, *A Residence of Twenty-one Years in the Sandwich Islands* (Rutland, VT:

Tuttle, 1981); Pauline King, ed., *Journal of Stephen Reynolds* (Salem: Peabody Museum, 1989).

12. Jean Ingram Brooks, *International Rivalry in the Pacific Islands, 1800–1875* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1941), 187.

13. H. E. Maude, *Slavers in Paradise: The Peruvian Slave Trade in Polynesia, 1862–1864* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), 4, 29, 43.

14. Report from Henry Jones, November 24, 1865, FO 58/124, Public Records Office-London.

15. Litton Forbes, *Two Years in Fiji* (London: Longmans Green & Co., 1875), 157.

16. *Fiji Times*, February 19, 1870.

17. Vox Populi, “British Despotism in the South Sea Islands and the Persecution of Mr. W. J. Hunt by Sir Arthur Gordon, High Commissioner under the Western Pacific Orders in Council, 1877–1879” (Wellington: New Zealand Times, 1883), 1, 3. This flexibility about nationality was not just of benefit to the United States. Thus, the notorious former Confederate and blackbird James T. Proctor was for years a “recruiting agent” for the Deutsche Handelsund Plantagen-Gessellschaft of Germany. See Deryck Scarr, “Recruits and Recruiters: A Portrait of the Pacific Islands Labour Trade,” *Journal of Pacific History* 2 (1967): 5–24, 20. Similarly, when this enterprise became concerned in 1891 that a “possible U.S. annexation of the Gilbert Islands might deprive its Samoan plantations of laborers from an important secondary recruiting area, the DHPG urged that Britain be asked to annex the group itself.” See Doug Munro and Stewart Firth, “Company Strategies–Colonial Policies,” in *Labour in the South Pacific*, ed. Clive Moore et al., 3–29, 18 (Townsville: James Cook University, 1990). Of course, though my focus is on the United States, I realize that there were other major players in the region.

18. *Auckland Weekly News*, June 18, 1870.

19. Caroline Ralston, “The Pattern of Race Relations in 19th Century Pacific Port Towns,” *Journal of Pacific History* 6 (1971): 39–60, 45.

20. John Young, *Adventurous Spirits: Australian Migrant Society in Pre-Cession Fiji* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1984), 319.

21. Caroline Ralston, *Grass Huts and Warehouses: Pacific Beach Communities of the Nineteenth Century* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1978), 170.

22. See, for example, Douglas Rannie, *My Adventures among South Sea Cannibals: An Account of the Experiences and Adventures of a Government Official among the Natives of Oceania* (London: Seeley, 1912), 242: “Some of the most expert thieves and worst criminals in the world have been sent to Noumea, New Caledonia.”

23. Wilson Heflin, *Herman Melville’s Whaling Years* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2004), 122.

24. Statement, n.d., MS 52, T. D. Taylor Papers, National Library of New Zealand.

25. Kay Saunders, *Workers in Bondage: The Origins and Bases of Unfree Labour in Queensland, 1824–1916* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1982), 54.

26. See Walter Nugent, “Frontiers and Empires in the Late Nineteenth Century,” in *The American West: The Reader*, ed. Walter Nugent and Martin Ridge, 40 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999); see also Gregory H. Nobles, *American Frontiers: Cultural Encounters and Continental Conquest* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1997); Robin W. Winks, “Australia, the Frontier, and the Tyranny of Distance,” in *Essays on Frontiers in World History*, ed. Philip Wayne Powell et al., 135–163 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1983); William G. Robbins, *Colony and Empire: The Capitalist Transformation of the American West* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1994).

27. Malcolm J. Rohrbough, “We Will Make Our Fortunes—No Doubt of It,” in *Riches for All: The California Gold Rush and the World*, ed. Kenneth N. Owens, 55–70, 60 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002).

28. L. G. Churchward, “Australian-American Relations during the Gold Rush,” *Historical Studies, Australia and New Zealand* 2, no. 5 (April 1942): 11–24, 14.

29. See David Igler, “Diseased Goods: Global Exchanges in the Eastern Pacific Basin, 1770–1850,” *American Historical Review* 109, no. 3 (June 2004): 693–719, 705: “Based on the 953 ships entering California waters, 6.8 percent arrived between 1786 and 1799, 5.7 percent in the decade after 1800, 7.6 percent in the 1810s, 24 percent in the 1820s, 22 percent in the 1830s, and 34 percent in the first eight years of the 1840s.”

30. Norman Graebner, *Empire on the Pacific: A Study in American Continental Expansion* (New York: Ronald Press, 1955), 218.

31. David F. Long, *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations: Diplomatic Activities of U.S. Naval Officers, 1798–1883* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988), 252.

32. Charles A. Price, *The Great White Walls Are Built: Restrictive Immigration in North America and Australasia, 1836–1888* (Canberra: Australia National University Press, 1974), viii, ix. Price adds, “A wider context, more comparison between countries, enables one to fit events into a larger picture, to see what at first sight appear to be local oddities are actually particular manifestations of wider trends to understand that obscure origins are a complex but not unusual interplay of forces at work everywhere.” Moreover, the “volume of material published on the restrictive procedures of the United States might have been of greater value had more authors cocked at least an occasional eye at restriction elsewhere.”

33. Captain A. T. Mahan et al., *Is Hawaii of Strategic Value to the United States?* (Washington, DC: Gibson Bros., 1898). See also *New York Journal*, February 10, 1898.

34. “An Address by the Hawaiian Branches of the Sons of the American Revolution, Sons of Veterans and Grand Army of the Republic to their Compatriots in America Concerning the Annexation of Hawaii,” Washington, DC: Gibson Bros., 1897, Huntington Library–San Marino, California.

35. Commodore George W. Melville, “The Strategic and Commercial Value of the Nicaraguan Canal, the Future Control of the Pacific Ocean, the Strategic Value of Hawaii and its Annexation to the United States,” Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1898, Washington State Historical Society–Tacoma.

36. See, for example, L. G. Churchward, “Australian-American Relations during

the Gold Rush,” *Historical Studies, Australia and New Zealand* 2, no. 5 (April 1942): 11–24, 14.

37. H. Stonehewer Cooper, *Coral Lands, Volume II* (London: Bentley & Son, 1880), 9.

38. U.S. Consul to William Seward, August 31, 1864, Roll 6, *Despatches from United States Consuls in Sydney*, New South Wales, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

39. C. Hartley Grattan, *The United States and the Southwest Pacific* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1961), 64.

40. Edward Crapol, *James G. Blaine: Architect of Empire* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2000), 46.

41. See, for example, Thomas Schoonover, *Uncle Sam’s War of 1898 and the Origins of Globalization* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky), 2003.

42. See Keith Sinclair, ed., *Tasman Relations: New Zealand and Australia, 1788–1988* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1987). See also Ron Crocombe, *Pacific Neighbors: New Zealand’s Relations with Other Islands* (Christchurch: Center for Pacific Studies, University of Canterbury, 1992).

43. Stephen Hoadley, *New Zealand–United States Relations: Friends No Longer Allies* (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 2000), 22, 23.

44. Raymond Evans et al., *Race Relations in Colonial Queensland: A History of Exclusion, Exploitation and Extermination* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1975), 75.

45. Report by Colonial Secretary, May 15, 1888, SRS 5253, COL/A546, Queensland State Archives-Brisbane.

46. Stuart Stanley to Governor of Queensland, July 24, 1887, SRS 5253, COL/A546, Queensland State Archives-Brisbane.

47. Matthew Guterl and Christine Skwiot, “Atlantic and Pacific Crossings: Race, Empire and ‘The Labour Problem’ in the Late Nineteenth Century,” *Radical History Review* 91 (Winter 2005): 40–61, 41.

48. A. Zeelandelaar Employment Agency, San Francisco, to S. G. Wilder, November 25, 1878, S. G. Wilder Papers, Hawaiian Mission Children’s Society Library-Honolulu.

49. Wallace Nelson, *Facts, Figures and Arguments on the Black Labour Question* (Brisbane: Metcalf, 1892), 2, 3, 13, 14.

50. Thomas Dunbabin, *Slavers of the South Seas* (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1935), *passim*.

51. See, for example, Thomas Adams Upchurch, *Legislating Racism: The Billion Dollar Congress and the Birth of Jim Crow* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2004).

52. Eric. T. L. Love, *Race over Empire: Racism and U.S. Imperialism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 8.

53. Shirley Ann Moore, “‘Do You Think I’ll Lug Trunks?’ African-Americans in Gold Rush California,” in *Riches for All: The California Gold Rush and the World*, ed.

Kenneth N. Owens, 161-175, 164 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002): "African-Americans traveled under the constant menace of enslavement by slave hunters and bandits."

54. *New York Amsterdam News*, June 30-July 6, 2005.

55. See, for example, Barry Higham, "Jamaicans in the Australian Gold Rush," *Jamaica Journal* 10, no. 2 (December 1976): 38-43; Robert Hill, ed., *Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro Improvement Association Papers, Volume IV: 1 September 1921-September 1922* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 573.

56. Henry Gyles Turner, *Our Own Little Rebellion: The Story of the Eureka Stockade*, n.d., 103, Box 1, Walter Hitchcock Papers, National Library of Australia-Canberra.

57. *Melbourne Argus*, December 11, 1863; October 28, 1863; August 3, 1863.

58. Rayvon Fouche, *Black Inventors in the Age of Segregation: Granville T. Woods, Lewis Latimer & Shelby J. Davidson* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 28, 214. Note that the author adds to the mystery by observing, "I contend that Woods was not an American Negro."

59. *Journal of Sylvia Moseley Bingham*, June 20, 1820, Box 2, Bingham Family Papers, Yale University.

60. Kathryn Waddell Takara, "The African Diaspora in Nineteenth Century Hawaii," in *They Followed the Trade Winds: African-Americans in Hawaii*, ed. Miles M. Jackson, 1-23, 10, 11, 16, 17 (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2004).

61. Marc Scruggs, "Prelude to a New Century," in *They Followed the Trade Winds: African-Americans in Hawaii*, ed. Miles M. Jackson, 53-69, 55 (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2004).

62. Census Data on Blacks in Oregon, 1850, Box 2, Folder 9, Oregon Black History Project Papers, Oregon Historical Society-Portland. See also Ernest Dodge, *New England and the South Seas* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 43: "The dominance of American whaling is shown by the fact that in 1843 out of 140 whaling vessels arriving at the Hawaiian Islands, 132 were American. In 1844, 160 whaling vessels visited Honolulu and 326 whalers arrived at the port of Lahaina." Many of the sailors aboard were Negroes and exemplifying the objective tie that existed between this group, Hawaii and Tokyo was the point that "the Islands received a further increase in visiting whale ships upon the discovery of the rich whaling grounds off the coast of Japan."

63. *Negro World*, January 27, 1923, Box 97-1, Stewart-Flippin Papers, Howard University.

64. Kenneth Porter, "Notes on Negroes in Early Hawaii," *Journal of Negro History* 19, no. 1 (January 1934): 193-197, 197.

65. Memo to FBI Director from Chicago Bureau, October 3, 1957, File of W. D. Fard, FBI Reading Room, Washington, DC.

66. *The Final Call*, May 24, 2005.

67. Barack Obama, *Dreams from My Father: A Story of Race and Inheritance* (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2005), 25.

68. William J. Ewins, "Early Migration to Fiji of Man at Present Known as the

Fijian Race,” *Transactions of the Fijian Society* (1918): 3–6, 4, 5. See also Frank Burnett, *Through Tropic Seas* (London: Francis Griffiths, 1910), 151: “Fijian words were identical in construction and meaning with those used in Central Africa to denote a like subject. . . . Taga Ni Ika (pronounced Tanganyika) is Fijian for bag of fish while Tanganyika Lake, near the Congo Free State, means, in the dialect of that district, Fish Lake.”

69. William R. Davis, “Pioneering the Pacific: Imagining Polynesia in U.S. Literature from 1820 to 1940” (PhD diss., Claremont Graduate School, 2002), 111.

70. Eric T. L. Love, *Race over Empire: Racism and U.S. Imperialism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 109, 166.

71. For an explication of this phrase see, for example, Gerald Horne, *Race War! White Supremacy and the Japanese Attack on the British Empire* (New York: New York University Press, 2004).

72. Count Okuna Shigenobu to Robert Walker, Hawaii Minister in Japan, “29th day, the 9th Month, the 21th year of Meiji,” circa 1889, Series 404-15-252c, Hawaii State Archives-Honolulu. See also Kiyoshi K. Kawakami, *Asia at the Door: A Study of the Japanese Question in Continental United States, Hawaii and Canada* (London: Fleming H. Revell, 1914).

73. See, for example, Gerald Horne, *Race War! White Supremacy and the Japanese Attack on the British Empire* (New York: New York University Press, 2004); in this sense, the book at hand is a prequel to this one.

74. M. P. Lissington, *New Zealand and the United States, 1840–1944* (Wellington: A.R. Shearer, 1972), 2. See also R. M. Dalziel, *The Origins of New Zealand Diplomacy: The Agent-General in London, 1870–1905* (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 1975).

75. Thomas Bayard to “Sir,” April 12–13, 1887, FO&EX34, Hawaii State Archives.

76. V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism: A Popular Outline* (London: Pluto Press, 1996); J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1938).

Chapter 1: Toward a “White Pacific”

1. J. S. Levi and G. F. J. Bergman, *Australian Genesis: Jewish Convicts and Settlers, 1788–1850* (Melbourne: Rigby, 1974), 13: “During the first three quarters of the eighteenth century, over 60,000 men and women [were] transported to the plantations of Virginia and Maryland. They were England’s unwanted population.” The revolution “closed off these trans-Atlantic dumping grounds” so the unfortunates were placed on “hulks” on the Thames, then considered as substitutes before Australia was selected were “Gibraltar, Gambia, Senegal, South America, and the Cape of Good Hope.” See also Peter Parley, *Tales about America and Australia* (London: Darton and Clark, 1835), 176.

2. Kay Saunders, *Workers in Bondage: The Origins and Bases of Unfree Labour in Queensland, 1824–1916* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1982), 4, 5, 8. See

also Muriel McGivern, *Australia and North America: Early Similarities* (Bayswater, Victoria: Lincoln Press, n.d.), no pagination, John Oxley Library-Brisbane, Queensland. Gambia was also considered for UK convicts; there is evidence that the Portuguese in the late 1790s engaged in slave trading in Melville Island near northern Australia.

3. Report by Sir J. Banks, July 7, 1806, Volume IV, Australia, 1801–1820, p. 264, Banks Papers, Brabourne Collection, State Library of New South Wales.

4. P. G. King to J. Piper, August 13, 1806, p. 529, *Governor King's Letter Book, 1797–1806*, State Library of New South Wales.

5. C. Hartley Grattan, *The United States and the Southwest Pacific* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1961), 79.

6. Memorandum by Sir J. Banks, June 8, 1806, Volume IV, Australia, 1801–1820, pp. 252–253, Banks Papers.

7. H. A. Lindsay, “An American Settlement in Australia,” *Quadrant* 5, no. 2 (Autumn 1961): 43–47, 43, State Library of New South Wales.

8. Sharom Ahmat, “Some Problems of the Rhode Island Traders in Java, 1799–1836,” *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 6, no. 1 (March 1965): 94–106.

9. Beverley Boissery, *A Deep Sense of Wrong: The Treason, Trials and Transportation to New South Wales of Lower Canadian Rebels after the 1838 Rebellion* (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1995), xii, 167, 174. See also U.S. House of Representatives, *Message from the President of the United States: American Citizens-Prisoners in Van Dieman's Land*, 27th Cong., 1st sess., July 16, 1841, doc. no. 39, State Library of New South Wales.

10. Nigel Wace and Bessie Lovett, *Yankee Maritime Activities and the Early History of Australia* (Canberra: Australia National University, Research School of Pacific Studies, 1973), 17.

11. Alan Villiers, *The Coral Sea* (London: Museum Press Ltd., 1949), 217, 218. Boyd was also “working on a grand scheme which would put even his ‘empire’ in Australia to shame. He proposed to take over personally the development and the government of the Solomon Islands. His idea was to found a state similar to Sarawak in Borneo.”

12. Thomas Jefferson Jacobs, *Scenes, Incidents and Adventures in the Pacific Ocean or the Islands of Australasian Seas, during the Cruise of the Clipper under Captain Benjamin Morrell* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1844), 242, 243.

13. Julie Carr, *The Captive White Woman of Gipps Land: In Pursuit of the Legend* (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2001). See also Kathryn Cronin, *Colonial Casualties: Chinese in Early Victoria* (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1982); Frank Clune, *Rascals, Ruffians and Rebels of Early Australia* (North Ryde, NSW: Angus & Robertson, 1987); G. C. Bolton, *A Thousand Miles Away: A History of North Queensland to 1920* (Brisbane: Jacaranda Press, 1963).

14. Levi Holden to “Dear Charles,” May 10, 1949, MSS9001-H, Levi Holden Papers, Rhode Island Historical Society-Providence. Emphasis in original.

15. Lieutenant George M. Colvocoresses, *Four Years in a Government Exploring Expedition* (New York: Cornish, Lamport & Co., 1852), 104. See also Gordon Greenwood,

Early American-Australian Relations: From the Arrival of the Spaniards in America to the Close of 1830 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1944).

16. Eleanor Roosevelt Seagraves, ed., *Delano's Voyage of Commerce and Discovery: Amasa Delano in China, the Pacific Islands, Australia and South America, 1789-1807* (Stockbridge: Berkshire House, 1994), 48-49. Given the apparent resemblance of these indigenes to Africans, it is worth speculating about the possibility that some in North America and elsewhere who consider themselves of African origin may not be—at least not in the sense they imagine. See Nigel Wace and Bessie Lovett, *Yankee Maritime Activities and the Early History of Australia* (Canberra: Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1973). See also “American Vessels in Australian Waters to 1836, From the State Library of Australia,” August 30, 1968, RF 28, G. W. Blunt White Library-Mystic, Connecticut.

17. H. E. Maude, *Slavers in Paradise: The Peruvian Slave Trade in Polynesia, 1862-1864* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), 126, 133.

18. Mrs. Charles Meredith, *My Home in Tasmania: Nine Years in Australia* (New York: Bunce and Brothers, 1853), 152.

19. George West to State Department, July 15, 1858, Roll 3, *Despatches from United States Consuls in Bay of Islands and Auckland*, National Archives and Records Administration-College Park, Maryland.

20. John B. Williams to “My Dear Mother,” in *The New Zealand Journal, 1842-1844, of John B. Williams of Salem, Massachusetts*, ed. Robert W. Kenny, 12 (Providence: Brown University Press, 1956).

21. J. Beckham to R. Fitz Roy, Gov. NZ, 1/10, January 16, 1845, Desp. from Gov. NSW-Enclosures, 1845, pp. 3201, 3205-7, A1267-22, State Library of New South Wales.

22. W. Patrick Strauss, “Pioneer American Diplomats in Polynesia, 1820-1840,” *Pacific Historical Review* 31, no. 2 (1962): 21-30, 26, 28-29. See also Robert W. Kenny, ed., *The New Zealand Journal, 1842-1844, of John B. Williams of Salem, Massachusetts* (Providence: Brown University Press, 1956).

23. Robert Gilikson, *Early Days in Central Otago* (Auckland: Whitcombe & Tombs, 1936), 28; J. G. Steele, *Brisbane Town in Convict Days, 1824-1832* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1975), 157-158. According to George Browning (qtd. in Steele), “In some of the islands, Americans are more esteemed than English, probably from runaways being identified with the latter. But the English are preferred in others, especially in the Missionary Islands.” See also Bill Thorpe, *Colonial Queensland: Perspectives on a Frontier Society* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1996).

24. Charles D. Ferguson, *Experiences of a Forty-niner in Australia and New Zealand* (Melbourne: Gaston Renard, 1979), 112.

25. See, for example, Kenneth N. Owens, ed., *Riches for All: The California Gold Rush and the World* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002).

26. Narrative of John Parkinson, (see attached letter from G. N. Parkinson dated September 2, 1959), California Historical Society-San Francisco.

27. "Affidavit of Robert Sherson Swanston," in *Further Papers on the Subject of the Claims of Citizens of the United States to Land in Fiji*, National Archives of Fiji-Suva.

28. Norman Bartlett, *1776–1976: Australia and America through 200 Years* (Sydney: URE Smith, 1976), 123.

29. Sherman L. Richards and George M. Blackburn, "The Sydney Ducks: A Demographic Analysis," *Pacific Historical Review* 42, no. 1 (February 1973): 20–31, 20.

30. Letter from George Francis Train (December 16, 1853), in *A Yankee Merchant in Gold Rush Australia: The Letters of George Francis Train*, ed. E. Daniel Potts and Annette Potts, 92 (Melbourne: Heinemann, 1970).

31. Russel Ward, "The American in Australian Folklore," *Brolga Review*, no. 10 (April–May 1958): 3–8, 33–38, 38.

32. Ray Aitchison, *Americans in Australia* (New York: Scribner's, 1972), x. See also W. Patrick Strauss, *Americans in Polynesia, 1783–1842* (Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1963); Michael Foss, *Beyond the Black Stump: Tales of Travelers to Australia, 1787–1850* (London: O'Mara, 1988).

33. E. Daniel Potts and Annette Potts, *Young America and Australian Gold Americans and the Gold Rush of the 1850s* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1974), 75, 1.

34. L. G. Churchward, "The American Contribution to the Victorian Gold Rush," *Victorian Historical Magazine* 19 (June 1942): 85–95, 87, 90.

35. Jay Monaghan, *Australians and the Gold Rush: California and Down Under, 1849–1854* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).

36. John P. Crampton to "My Lord," "Earl of Clarendon," October 31, 1853, in *Confidential Despatches & Circulars to the Governor of Victoria, 1852–1860*, CY Reel 3344, State Library of New South Wales.

37. Clive Turnbull, *Bonanza: The Story of George Francis Train* (Melbourne: Hawthorn, 1946), 22, 24.

38. Governor LaTrobe to Duke of Newcastle, January 16, 1854, in *Further Papers Relative to the Discovery of Gold in Australia* (London: Eyre, 1855), John Oxley State Library-Brisbane, Australia. See also Davis McCaughey et al., *Victoria's Colonial Governors, 1839–1900* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1993).

39. Davis Calwell to Parents (April 25, 1854), in Davis Calwell Papers, State Library of Victoria-Melbourne.

40. Davis Calwell to Parents (April 25, 1855), in Davis Calwell Papers, State Library of Victoria-Melbourne.

41. "Proceedings on the Trials of These Informations in the Supreme Court of the Colony of Victoria," 1855, Supreme Court of Victoria-Melbourne. See also Frank Cusack, *Bendigo: A History* (Kangaroo Flat: Bendigo Modern Press, 2002).

42. *The Age* [Melbourne], February 14, 1855; "The Queen vs. John Joseph," VPRS 5527, Victoria State Archives-Melbourne. See also in the same archive "Brief for the Prosecution, Case No. 16, Criminal Sessions, Melbourne," 1855: Patrick Lynott, private of the 20th Regiment said, "I saw prisoner Joseph with a pike in his hand standing inside the stockade fence, this while we were approaching. I fired at him. . . . I saw

the black man Joseph taken from one of the tents inside the stockade by one of the police.” His testimony was corroborated by others.

43. Governor Sir Charles Hotham to the Right Hon. Sir George Gray (February 28, 1855), in *Further Papers Relative to the Discovery of Gold in Australia* (London: Eyre, 1855), John Oxley State Library-Brisbane, Australia. See also L. G. Churchward, “Americans and other Foreigners at Eureka,” *Historical Studies, Australia and New Zealand* (Supplement, December 1954): 43–49.

44. John Molony, *Eureka* (Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin, 1984), 191. See also Ian Macfarlane, ed., *Eureka: From the Official Records* (Melbourne: PRO, 1995).

45. Jay Monaghan, *Australians and the Gold Rush: California and Down Under, 1849–1854* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), 268–269. See also Weston Bate, *Lucky City: The First Generation at Ballarat: 1851–1901* (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2003).

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48. B. Lyon Milne to the Earl of Aberdeen (March 1, 1855), CY Reel 1468, *Despatches from the Lieutenant Governor of Victoria to the Secretary of State for Colonies*, State Library of New South Wales.

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50. Lloyd Robson, *A History of Tasmania: Van Dieman's Land from the Earliest Times to 1855, Volume I* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1983), 482.

51. Thomas Dunabin, “How the Stars and Stripes Floated around Early Australia,” *Navy League Journal* 6, no. 3 (July 1925): 22–28, 24.

52. A. G. Evans, *Fanatic Heart: A Life of John Boyle O'Reilly, 1844–1890* (Nedlands: University of Western Australia Press, 1997), 214, 216. See also J. S. Levi and G. F. J. Bergman, *Australian Genesis: Jewish Convicts and Settlers, 1788–1850* (Melbourne: Rigby, 1974), 20: The Jewish-Australian Moses Joseph “picked the wrong side in the American Civil War and invested 250,000 [pounds] in the Confederate States.”

53. Adrian Pearce, “An Account of the Stay of the ‘CSS Shenandoah’ in Melbourne, Australia, January 25th to February 18th, 1865,” February 1971, Subject Files: Shenandoah, State Library of Victoria-Melbourne.

54. Letter from Downing Street to Queensland Governor (December 26, 1861), Volume II, 1861, RSI 3382, A46196, *Original Despatches from the Secretary of State*, Queensland State Archives-Brisbane.

55. *The Weekend Magazine*, September 6–7, 1980, Subject Files: Shenandoah, State Library of Victoria-Melbourne.

56. Norman Bartlett, 1776–1976: *Australia and America through 200 Years* (Sydney: URE Smith, 1976), 147.

57. Roy W. Parker, *Civil War Veterans in Australia* (Wetherill Park, NSW: Bright

Print, n.d.). For example, John Hubert Keon “chose to join the Confederate army” in Kentucky and decamped to Australia after the war; “his brother . . . had been in the Colony since 1845 and was a New South Wales Custom Officer . . . [and] Police Magistrate. . . . His maternal uncle John Hubert Plunkett was the first Attorney-General of New South Wales.”

58. Lowell H. Harrison, “The CSS Shenandoah,” *Civil War Times Illustrated* 15, no. 4 (July 1976): 4–9, 8. See also Benjamin Franklin Gilbert, “The Shenandoah Down Under: Her Sojourn at Melbourne,” *Journal of the West* 5 (1976): 321–355.

59. Cornelius Hunt, *The Shenandoah; or the Last Confederate Cruise* (New York: G. W. Carleton, 1867), 95, 97, 100, 104, 108, 113, 115. See also Cyril Pearl, *Rebel Down Under: When the ‘Shenandoah’ Shook Melbourne* (Melbourne: Heinemann, 1970).

60. Lowell H. Harrison, “The CSS Shenandoah,” *Civil War Times Illustrated* 15, no. 4 (July 1976): 6.

61. Kathleen Young, “Librarian” to “Dear Madam” (November 13, 1980), State Library of Victoria. See also *Melbourne Argus*, March 17, 1864; March 18, 1865; February 17, 1865.

62. William Blanchard to William Seward (February 23, 1865), Roll 3, *Despatches from United States Consul in Melbourne*, National Archives and Records Administration-College Park, Maryland.

63. Narrative of John Sessions Bishop, 1849–1951, University of California-Berkeley.

64. Ralph S. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, 1854–1874: Twenty Critical Years* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1953), 35.

65. Merze Tate, “Great Britain and the Sovereignty of Hawaii,” *Pacific Historical Review* 31 (1962): 327–348, 330. See also Merze Tate and Fidele Foy, “Slavery and Racism in South Pacific Annexations,” *Journal of Negro History* 50, no. 1 (1965): 1–21.

66. Jacob Adler, ed., *The Journal of Prince Alexander Libolibo: The Voyages Made to the United States, England and France in 1849–1850* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1967), 108.

67. William Little Lee to “My Dear Sir,” March 3, 1849, Box 1, William Little Lee Collection, University of California-Berkeley.

68. See, for example, *The Polynesian*, January 26, 1850.

69. Earl of Aberdeen to “Sir,” September 29, 1843, FO&EX2, Series 375, Box 4, Hawaii State Archives.

70. Lord Clarendon to William Miller, November 28, 1854, FO&EX, Series 375, Box 4, Hawaii State Archives.

71. G. P. Judd to “My Dear Sir,” March 28, 1851, Wilkes Family Papers, Duke University-Durham, North Carolina.

72. Letter to “My Dear Sir,” December 12, 1848, Wilkes Family Papers.

73. Nathan Philbrick, *Sea of Glory: America’s Voyage of Discovery; the U.S. Exploring Expedition* (New York: Penguin, 2003), 238.

74. Charles Wilkes, *Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition during the Years 1838, 1839, 1840, 1841, 1842, Volume 3* (Philadelphia: C. Sherman, 1844), 58.

75. Charles Wilkes, *Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition during the Years 1838, 1839, 1840, 1841, 1842, Volume 2* (Philadelphia: C. Sherman, 1844), 163.

76. Charles Wilkes, *Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition during the Years 1838, 1839, 1840, 1841, 1842, Volume 5* (Philadelphia: C. Sherman, 1844), 258.

77. Stanley Brown, *Men from under the Sky: The Arrival of Westerners in Fiji* (Rutland, VT: Charles Tuttle, 1973), 114. See also Claudia Knapman, *White Women in Fiji, 1835–1930: The Ruin of Empire?* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986); W. R. Johnston et al., *Imperialism and Racism in the South Pacific* (Brisbane: Brooks, 1983).

78. “Extracts from Logs,” June 7, 1835, Box 1, Fiji Papers, E21, Peabody Essex Museum-Salem, Massachusetts.

79. Ernest Dodge, *New England and the South Seas* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 101.

80. R. A. Derrick, *A History of Fiji* (Suva: Printing and Stationery Department, 1946), 95.

81. See, for example, Nigel Randell, *The White Headhunter: The Story of a 19th Century Sailor Who Survived a South Seas Heart of Darkness* (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2003), 221.

Chapter 2: Blackbirding

1. *Pacific Islands Monthly*, May 15, 1941; “Interview with Ben Tanggaham by Shawna Maglangbayan and Carlos Moore in Dakar on 16 February 1976,” *Association of African Historians Newsletter* 1, nos. 9 and 10: 1. Here it is said that blackbirding began in Australia in the 1840s.

2. Nigel Randell, *The White Headhunter: The Story of a 19th Century Sailor Who Survived a South Seas Heart of Darkness* (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2003), 168.

3. Alan Villiers, *The Coral Sea* (London: Museum Press Ltd., 1949), 231.

4. John Inglis, “Report of a Missionary Tour in the New Hebrides,” *Journal of the Ethnological Society of London* 3 (1854): 53–72, 67.

5. Reverend Joseph Copeland, “Remarks,” in *The Slave Trade in the New Hebrides, Being Papers Read at the Annual Meeting of the New Hebrides Mission Held at Aniwa*, ed. Reverend John Cay (Edinburgh: Edmonston & Douglas, 1872), John Oxley Library-Brisbane. See also Robert Steel, *The New Hebrides and Christian Missions: With a Sketch on the Labour Traffic and Notes of a Cruise through the Group in Mission Vessel* (London: Nisbet, 1880).

6. Blagden Chambers, *Black and White: The Story of a Massacre and Its Aftermath* (Richmond, Victoria: Methuen, 1988). See also Judith A. Bennett, *Wealth of the Solomons: A History of a Pacific Archipelago, 1800–1878* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1987).

7. James A. Michener and A. Grove Day, *Rascals in Paradise* (New York: Random House, 1957), 226.

8. Angus Ross, *New Zealand Aspirations in the Pacific in the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 71–72.

9. See, for example, Gerald Horne, *The Deepest South: The U.S. & Brazil and the African Slave Trade* (New York: New York University Press, forthcoming).

10. See, for example, Gerald Horne, *Black and Brown: African-Americans and the Mexican Revolution, 1910–1920* (New York: New York University Press, 2005).

11. Christopher Legge and Jennifer Terrell, “James Toutant Proctor,” *Journal of Pacific History* 5 (1970): 65–84, 66, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 76, 77, 80, 81.

12. John Cromar, *Jock of the Islands: Early Days in the South Seas, the Adventures of John Cromar, Sometime Recruiter and Lately Trader of Marovo British Solomon Islands Protectorate Told by Himself* (London: Faber & Faber, n.d.), 166, 206.

13. Administrator to J. G. Goodenough, Commanding Australian Station, April 6, 1875, *Ministry of Foreign Relations, Outward Correspondence*, National Archives of Fiji-Suva.

14. Administrator, Fiji, to Consul-San Francisco, April 7, 1875, *Ministry of Foreign Relations, Outward Correspondence*, National Archives of Fiji-Suva.

15. Charles Drury to Hamilton Fish, July 17, 1876, Roll 4, *Despatches from United States Consuls in Lauthala, 1844–1890*, National Archives and Records Administration-College Park, Maryland.

16. Statement from James T. Proctor, July 7, 1876, Roll 5, *Despatches from United States Consuls in Lauthala, 1844–1890*, National Archives and Records Administration-College Park, Maryland.

17. Report of Charles Drury, August 22, 1876, *Despatches from United States Consuls in Lauthala, 1844–1890*, National Archives and Records Administration-College Park, Maryland.

18. Hugh Roxburgh to Sir. J. Thurston, December 27, 1892, S00627, FO534, Great Britain Foreign Office, Pacific Islands, University of Hawai‘i-Mānoa.

19. Kay Saunders, *Workers in Bondage: The Origins and Bases of Unfree Labour in Queensland, 1824–1916* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1982), 55.

20. See, for example, H. E. Maude, *Slavers in Paradise: The Peruvian Slave Trade in Polynesia, 1862–1864* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), 4, 26, 37: “An American hotel-keeper named B.D. Clark . . . formed a company in Lima for recruiting islanders in the New Hebrides. . . . [Another slaver was] Joseph Brolaski . . . who belonged to an old Philadelphia family . . . [and yet another was] an American from New York named Byron Lee Knapp, who had lived in Tahiti.” Routinely, slavers were found “flying the U.S. flag. . . . [Another slaver was] fitted out by an American, Albert Horn.”

21. H. Marsh, Crown Solicitor, to William Stevenson, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Mauritius (December 16, 1857), “Deposition Taken before the Crown Solicitor,” circa 1858 CGS906, 4/754.1, New South Wales State Records Authority-Sydney. See also *Barbados Sunday Advocate*, November 1, 1970: “During the early cultivation of the sugar cane plant in Barbados, the supply of African slaves was ex-

tremely limited and the English traders took to raiding the other islands and capturing the Carib Islands so as to sell them as slaves. The usual habit was to invite the Indians on board the ship, get them drunk, and then tie them up and sail to some other port and sell them. This was a lucrative business while it lasted.” Such practices, which persisted in the seventeenth century, were being exercised in the late nineteenth century in the Pacific.

22. Ja. McNair to Commodore Lambert, Australian Squadron, October 22, 1868, FO58/126, Public Records Office-London.

23. George Palmer to Commodore Lambert, April 5, 1869, FO881/1701, Public Records Office-London.

24. George Palmer to Commodore Lambert, March 22, 1869, FO881/1701, Public Records Office-London.

25. Statement from J. G. Paton, Chairman, and Joseph Copeland, Clerk, September 7, 1867, “The New Hebrides Mission,” FO58/125, Public Records Office-London.

26. Thomas Dunbabin, *Slavers of the South Seas* (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1935), 162.

27. Captain George Palmer, *Kidnapping in the South Seas: Being a Narrative of Three Months’ Cruise of HM Ship Rosario* (Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas, 1871), 108.

28. O. W. Parnaby, *Britain and the Labour Trade in the Southwest Pacific* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1964), 51. See also Andrew Ure, *The Cotton Manufacture of Great Britain Systematically Investigated* (London: Charles Knight, 1836); James Montgomery, *A Practical Detail of the Cotton Manufacture of the United States of America and the State of the Cotton Manufacture of That Country Contrasted and Compared with That of Great Britain* (Glasgow: John Niven, 1840); *How to Abolish Slavery in America and to Prevent a Cotton Famine in England with Remarks Upon Coolie and African Emigration by a Slave-Driver* (London: Alfred W. Bennett, 1858). The latter three items were all viewed at the Huntington Library in San Marino, California.

29. Alan Villiers, *The Coral Sea* (London: Museum Press Ltd., 1949), 221.

30. Hy Ling Roth, *The Sugar Industry in Queensland: The Labour Difficulties It Has to Contend with; an Exposure of Some of the Fallacies which Have Been Stated Concerning It* (Queensland: Mackay Standard, 1883), 2.

31. Henry Jones to “My Lord,” November 24, 1865, FO58/124, Public Records Office-London.

32. Carl Norman Haywood, “American Whalers and Africa” (PhD diss., Boston University, 1967), 133.

33. Jean Ingram Brooks, *International Rivalry in the Pacific Islands, 1800–1875* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1941), 273.

34. “Extract of Paper of Mr. C. R. Forwood, K.A. . . . dated December 8, 1873,” A2218(A2218/1), in *Printed Papers Relating to the Islands of the Pacific*, National Archives of Australia-Canberra.

35. Sir George F. Bowen to Earl of Carnarvon, November 16, 1866, FO58/125, Public Records Office-London.

36. S. W. Blackall to Earl Granville, April 16, 1869, FO58/126, Public Records Office-London.

37. Edward March, UK Consul, to Foreign Office, FO58/127, Public Records Office-London.

38. Raymond Evans et al., *Race Relations in Colonial Queensland: A History of Exclusion, Exploitation and Extermination* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1975), 150.

39. Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Thornton, September 2, 1869, FO881/1701, Public Records Office-London.

40. Gerald Horne, *The Deepest South: The U.S. & Brazil and the African Slave Trade* (New York: New York University Press, forthcoming).

41. G. Tryon, Rear Admiral, HMS *Miranda*, Sydney, to Secretary of Admiralty, (January 21, 1887), *Correspondence Relating to Proposals for an International Agreement Regulating the Supply of Arms, Ammunition, Alcohol and Dynamite to Natives of the Western Pacific* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1887), John Oxley Library-Brisbane, Queensland.

42. Thomas Bayard, U.S. State Department, to "L. Sackville West" (April 11, 1885), *Correspondence Relating to Proposals for an International Agreement Regulating the Supply of Arms, Ammunition, Alcohol and Dynamite to Natives of the Western Pacific* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1887).

43. Interview with John G. Paton, July 28, 1891, in *Cuttings Collected by the Rev. Dr. John G. Paton*, Pacific Manuscripts Bureau-University of Hawai'i-Mānoa.

44. Deryck Scarr, *Fragments of Empire: A History of the Western Pacific High Commission, 1877–1914* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1967), 189.

45. Litton Forbes, *Two Years in Fiji* (London: Longmans Green & Co., 1875), 107.

46. *Fiji Times*, August 14, 1872.

47. Louis Becke, *The Pearl Divers of Roncador Reef and Other Stories* (London: James Clarke, 1908), 185, 187.

48. *Fiji Times*, July 18, 1874.

49. Gerald Horne, *The Deepest South: The U.S. & Brazil and the African Slave Trade* (New York: New York University Press, forthcoming).

50. Edward March, UK Consul in Fiji and Tonga, to Earl Granville, July 27, 1871, FO5/129, Public Records Office-London.

51. James A. Michener and A. Grove Day, *Rascals in Paradise* (New York: Random House, 1957), 226, 229: "The reason we know so much about the depredations of the blackbirders is that their operations were mostly directed against natives who had already been converted, because the docility taught by the missionaries made them more tractable in the fields."

52. Alderman McArthur, MP, "The Annexation of Fiji and the Pacific Slave Trade," Speech in House of Commons on June 13, 1873, published for Aborigines' Protection Society, State Library of New South Wales.

53. Edward Wybergh Docker, *The Blackbirders: The Recruiting of South Sea Labour*

for *Queensland, 1863–1907* (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1970), 158. See also Nigel Randell, *The White Headhunter: The Story of a 19th Century Sailor Who Survived a South Seas Heart of Darkness* (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2003), 159.

54. Michael Berry, *Refined White: The Story of How South Sea Islanders Came to Cut Sugar Cane in Queensland and Made History Refining the White Australia Policy* (Innisfail, Queensland: Australia Sugar Industry Museum, 2001), 45.

55. Nigel Randell, *The White Headhunter: The Story of a 19th Century Sailor Who Survived a South Seas Heart of Darkness* (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2003), 158.

56. *Fiji Times*, March 25, 1874.

57. *Fiji Times*, April 5, 1871.

58. *Fiji Times*, May 29, 1872.

59. I. M. Brower to State Department, January 25, 1869, Roll 4, *Despatches from United States Consuls in Lauthala*, National Archives and Records Administration-College Park, Maryland.

60. George Robinson, Secretary of the Navy to Commander W. T. Truxton, USS *Jamestown*, n.d., Roll 4, *Despatches from United States Consuls in Lauthala, 1844–1890*, National Archives and Records Administration-College Park, Maryland.

61. Dr. T. P. Lucas, *Cries from Fiji and Sightings from the South Seas* (Melbourne: Dunn & Collins, n.d.), National Archives of Fiji-Suva.

62. *Brisbane Courier*, June 10, 1862.

63. Litton Forbes, *Two Years in Fiji* (London: Longmans Green & Co., 1875), 20, 66, 325.

64. *Fiji Times*, June 14, 1871.

65. Robert Galloway, Levuka, to Minister of Native Affairs, October 9, 1871, *Cabokau Government, Ministry of Interior Affairs, Application by Planters for Service of Fijian Labourers/Ministry of Native Affairs, Inward Correspondence*, National Archives of Fiji-Suva. [hereafter designated as MNA/IC]

66. James Harding, Sergeant of Police in Levuka to Ministry of Native Affairs (January 8, 1872), MNA/IC.

67. P. M. Ducker to Ministry of Native Affairs, June 3, 1872, *Cabokau Government, Ministry of Native Affairs, Inward Correspondence—Gen.*, National Archives of Fiji-Suva.

68. *Fiji Times*, January 10, 1874.

69. I. M. Brower to Hamilton Fish, January 30, 1870, Roll 5, *Despatches from United States Consuls in Lauthala, 1844–1890*, National Archives and Records Administration-College Park, Maryland.

Chapter 3: “Bully”

1. Deposition of Henry Gardner, September 27, 1874, Governor General, G4/7, Archives of New Zealand-Wellington.

2. Deposition of A. E. Dupuis, Commander; James L. Whitney, Staff-Surgeon,

Lewis T. Joens, Lieutenant of HMS Rosario, n.d., Governor General, G4/7, Archives of New Zealand-Wellington. See also Deposition of William Hicks, a half-caste Fiji man: "About two and a half years ago he [Hayes] got a young girl from Penjelap, took her on shore at Providence Island and violently assaulted her and ravished her. The girl cried out and was much hurt. She was taken on board the ship where she was for about two and a half months and was then taken back to Penjelap. The girl was very young, quite a child."

3. "Bully Hayes and the Pingalap Girl," n.d., George E. L. Westbrook Papers, National Library of New Zealand.

4. But see *Honolulu Advertiser*, September 24, 1859: Hayes was born in Cleveland in 1829. See also Frank Coffee, *Forty Years on the Pacific* (San Francisco: Oceanic Publishing, 1920), 347; J. B. Musser, "Bully Hayes—Pirate Deluxe," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 53, no. 9 (September 1927): 956-961; William B. Churchward, *My Consulate in Samoa: A Record of Four Years Sojourn in the Navigator Islands, with Personal Experiences of King Malietoa Laupepa, His Country, and His Men* (London: Bentley, 1887).

5. Account of W. H. Hayes, March 20, 1913, James Lyle Young Papers, Pacific Manuscripts Bureau, University of Hawai'i-Mānoa.

6. Report, April 10, 1914, Arthur Moore Papers, National Library of New Zealand.

7. Sidney Spencer Broomfield, *Kachalola or the Early Life and Adventures of Sidney Spencer Broomfield: Ivory Hunter, Prospector, Specimen Collector, Pioneer, Pearl Fisher and Doctor of Medicine* (London: Peter Davies, 1930), 223.

8. Arthur Moore to "Dear Sir," April 8, 1914, Arthur Moore Papers, National Library of New Zealand.

9. Clifford Gessler, *Tropic Landfall: The Port of Honolulu* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1942), 102.

10. Edward Reeves, *Brown Men and Women or the South Sea Islands in 1895 and 1896* (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1898), 5.

11. Frank Burnett, *Summer Isles of Eden* (London: Sifton, 1923), 108. See also A. J. Duffield, *Recollections of Travels Abroad* (London: Remington, 1889); Julian Thomas, *Cannibals and Convicts: Notes of Personal Experiences in the Western Pacific* (London: Cassell & Co., 1886); Wallace Deane, ed., *In Wild New Britain: The Story of Benjamin Danks, Pioneer Missionary* (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1933); Robert Steel, *The New Hebrides and Christian Missions, with a Sketch of the Labour Traffic and Notes of a Cruise through the Group in the Mission Vessel* (London: James Nisbet, 1880).

12. Arthur Moore to "Dear Sir," March 3, 1914, Arthur Moore Papers, National Library of New Zealand.

13. Description of W. H. Hayes, n.d., George Westbrook Papers, National Library of New Zealand.

14. Statement by Frank Coffee, 1920, Box 2, Folder 3, M-141, State Archives of Hawaii-Honolulu.

15. Edward Reeves, *Brown Men and Women or the South Sea Islands in 1895 and 1896* (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1898), 9.

16. *The Friend* [Honolulu], June 1, 1860.

17. See, for example, Arthur Johnstone, “‘Bully’ Hayes in Hawaii,” in *Hawaiian Almanac*, ed. Thomas J. Thrum, 120–133 (Honolulu: Thrum, 1907).

18. James Michener and A. Grove Day, *Rascals in Paradise* (New York: Random House, 1957), 147.

19. Basil Lubbock, *Bully Hayes: South Seas Pirate* (Boston: Charles E. Lauriat, 1931), 19.

20. *Hawaiian Gazette*, November 15, 1876.

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50. James Harding to Ministry of Native Affairs, January 15, 1872, Cakobau Government, Ministry of Native Affairs, Inwards Correspondence—Gen., National Archives of Fiji.

51. James Harding to Ministry of Native Affairs, September 9, 1872, Cakobau

Government, Ministry of Native Affairs, Inwards Correspondence, Set 43, National Archives of Fiji.

52. Letter to Minister of Finance, March 1, 1872, Cakobau Government, Ministry of Native Affairs, Inwards Correspondence—Gen., National Archives of Fiji.

53. Henry Freeman, Under Secretary to Isaac Brower, March 19, 1871, Provisional Government, Chief Secretary's Office, Outwards Correspondence, Volume: Chief Secretary's Office (Ministry of Foreign Relations), National Archives of Fiji.

54. See, for example, Smith & Wilson to Ministry of Native Affairs, July 1, 1873, Cakobau Government, Ministry of Native Affairs, Inwards Correspondence, Set 43, National Archives of Fiji: "To assign the prisoners recently made by the King's troops to planters . . . we are in possession of extensive premises which will enable us to temporarily accommodate a considerable number of prisoners. . . . Our fees would, we presume, be paid by the parties hiring the men [so] no extra expenses would be entailed on the administration." In same file, see "Cakobau Rex. No. 27. An Act to Regulate the Hiring and Services of Fijian Laborers. Assented to July 23, 1872."

55. *Fiji Times*, February 14, 1872.

56. *Fiji Times*, November 12, 1873.

57. *Fiji Times*, November 22, 1873.

58. Letter to Ministry of Native Affairs, March 22, 1872, Cakobau Government, Ministry of Native Affairs, Inwards Correspondence—Gen., National Archives of Fiji.

59. Letter to Government, October 20, 1871, Cakobau Government, Ministry of Interior Affairs, Application by Planters for Service of Fijian Labourers/Ministry of Native Affairs, Inwards Correspondence, June 1871–January 1872, National Archives of Fiji.

60. Letter, October 21, 1871, Cakobau Government, Ministry of Interior Affairs, Application by Planters for Service of Fijian Labourers/Ministry of Native Affairs, Inwards Correspondence, June 1871–January 1872, Set 41–43, National Archives of Fiji.

61. See Letter to Ministry of Native Affairs, November 17, 1871, Cakobau Government, Ministry of Interior Affairs, Application by Planters for Service of Fijian Labourers/Ministry of Native Affairs, Inwards Correspondence, June 1871–January 1872, Set 41–43, National Archives of Fiji: "Twenty six of the Fijian Government laborers supplied by your Government . . . ran away from here, they swam." See also November 19, 1871 letter in same file: "Men you have sent me have absconded from my service. . . . I tried to stop them but they were too quick for me. I applied to Moore who assisted me with a party of armed men, we captured them the same evening. . . . Lend some officers to assist . . . in keeping order."

62. William Schwedler to Ministry, February 25, 1872, Cakobau Government, Ministry of Native Affairs, Inwards Correspondence—Gen., National Archives of Fiji.

63. Granger & Smith, November 17, 1871, Cakobau Government, Ministry of Interior Affairs, Application by Planters for Service of Fijian Labourers/Ministry of Native Affairs, Inwards Correspondence, June 1871–January 1872, Set 41–43, National Archives of Fiji: "Men coming upon our plantation and keeping our men from

their work and threatening us with clubs and guns and as these men are subjects of Cakobau . . . we would be sorry to use violence but if these men annoy us much more, we shall have to use firearms in our defense.” In same file see letter December 15, 1871: “[After] flogging of Government laborer with a long whip . . . some of them threatened to take the life of our overseer with knives—the case required immediate action, we flogged the men ourselves & they complained.”

64. See, for example, Edward Hicks et al. to Ministry of Native Affairs, December 22, 1871, Cakobau Government, Ministry of Interior Affairs, Application by Planters for Service of Fijian Labourers/Ministry of Native Affairs, Inwards Correspondence, June 1871–January 1872, Set 41–43, National Archives of Fiji.

65. Wilson to Ministry, January 26, 1872, Cakobau Government, Ministry of Interior Affairs, Application by Planters for Service of Fijian Labourers/Ministry of Native Affairs, Inwards Correspondence, June 1871–January 1872, Set 41–43, National Archives of Fiji. See also Benjamin Levack to Chief Secretary, May 10, 1872, Cakobau Government, Ministry of Native Affairs, Inwards Correspondence—Gen., National Archives of Fiji: “Annoyances commenced with general trespassing amongst the cotton sometimes necessitating the replacing of the same, our remonstrances were laughed at, and seeing they could act so with impunity, they have become emboldened and gone on from bad to worse, they have lately killed one of our finest pigs, all our ducks and drakes have been killed and the fowls are fast disappearing.”

66. Letter, August 26, 1872, Cakobau Government, Ministry of Native Affairs, Inwards Correspondence, Set 43, National Archives of Fiji.

67. Letter to Ministry of Native Affairs, August 27, 1872, Cakobau Government, Ministry of Native Affairs, Inwards Correspondence, Set 43, National Archives of Fiji.

68. See letter to Ministry of Native Affairs, October 23, 1872, Cakobau Government, Ministry of Native Affairs, Inward Correspondence, Set 43, National Archives of Fiji.

69. Inspector Martin to Ministry of National Affairs, May 16, 1872, Cakobau Government, Ministry of Native Affairs, Inwards Correspondence—Gen., National Archives of Fiji. See also W. Hawkins to Ministry, March 20, 1872, Cakobau Government, Ministry of Native Affairs, Inwards Correspondence—Gen., National Archives of Fiji: This Levuka resident complained of “very great losses and annoyance from the natives coming upon my plantation and stealing. . . . [They] broke into a house belonging to me and stole.”

70. Sir J. B. Thurston, Chief Secretary, to Commodore James G. Goodenough, December 15, 1873, Provisional Government, Chief Secretary’s Office, Outwards Correspondence, Volume: Chief Secretary’s Office (Ministry of Foreign Relations), National Archives of Fiji.

71. Sydney Burt to Edward March, January 25, 1872, Provisional Government, Chief Secretary’s Office, Outwards Correspondence, Volume: Chief Secretary’s Office (Ministry of Foreign Relations), National Archives of Fiji.

72. Sir J. B. Thurston to Edgar Leopold Layard, Esq., UK Consul to Fiji and Tonga, January 16, 1874, Provisional Government, Chief Secretary’s Office, Out-

wards Correspondence, Volume: Chief Secretary's Office (Ministry of Foreign Relations), National Archives of Fiji.

73. Sub-Inspector of Police to Chief Secretary, October 5, 1871, Cakobau Government, Ministry of Interior Affairs, Application by Planters for Service of Fijian Labourers/Ministry of Native Affairs, Inwards Correspondence, June 1871–January 1872, Set 41–43, National Archives of Fiji.

74. Letter from Inspector of Police, December 30, 1871, Cakobau Government, Ministry of Interior Affairs, Application by Planters for Service of Fijian Labourers/Ministry of Native Affairs, Inwards Correspondence, June 1871–January 1872, Set 41–43, National Archives of Fiji.

75. Letter from James Harding, Police Sergeant, Levuka, Cakobau Government, Ministry of Interior Affairs, Application by Planters for Service of Fijian Labourers/Ministry of Native Affairs, Inwards Correspondence, June 1871–January 1872, Set 41–43, National Archives of Fiji: In “reference to the muzzle loading revolvers sent down,” he said, “I am compelled to decline them for the following reasons: that in this human tropical atmosphere reliance cannot be placed upon the percussion cap or muzzle loaded charge for twelve hours. . . . Therefore they have to be so frequently emptied and replenished that great waste is entailed, whereas the breech loading cartridge need only be discharged for practice or positive service. That the comparative speeds of loading are so greatly in favor of the breech as to more than double the effectiveness of that species of arm, in this respect alone.” Why procure “these expensive inefficient weapons when cheaper efficient ones may be so readily obtained?” he asked.

76. Sir J. B. Thurston to Edgar Leopold Layard, February 11, 1874, Provisional Government, Chief Secretary's Office, Outwards Correspondence, Volume: Chief Secretary's Office (Ministry of Foreign Relations), National Archives of Fiji.

77. Sir J. B. Thurston to “Sir,” September 8, 1873, Cakobau Government, Chief Secretary's Office, Outwards Correspondence, Set 13, Volume I–IV, National Archives of Fiji.

78. Memorandum for the Cabinet from Robert Swanston, circa 1873, Cakobau Government Council, Correspondence and Other Papers Relating to the Conduct of the Ba War & to the Court Martial of Major Fitzgerald, National Archives of Fiji.

79. *Fiji Times*, December 14, 1872.

80. *Fiji Times*, February 15, 1873.

81. William Burns to G. A. Woods, Ministry of Native Affairs, February 11, 1872, Cakobau Government, Ministry of Native Affairs, Inwards Correspondence, Set 43, National Archives of Fiji.

82. Letter from William Burns, January 5, 1872, Cakobau Government, Ministry of Interior Affairs, Application by Planters for Service of Fijian Labourers/Ministry of Native Affairs, Inwards Correspondence, June 1871–January 1872, Set 41–43, National Archives of Fiji.

83. Letter from William Burns, n.d., Cakobau Government, Ministry of Interior Affairs, Application by Planters for Service of Fijian Labourers/Ministry of Native Af-

airs, Inwards Correspondence, June 1871–January 1872, Set 41–43, National Archives of Fiji. Emphasis in original.

84. Letter from L. Ryan, November 18, 1871, Cakobau Government, Ministry of Interior Affairs, Application by Planters for Service of Fijian Labourers/Ministry of Native Affairs, Inwards Correspondence, June 1871–January 1872, Set 41–43, National Archives of Fiji.

85. Alexander Hamilton Gordon, Robert F. Harris, Rich Miller, et al. to Robert Swanston, May 6, 1873, Cakobau Government Council, Correspondence and Other Papers Relating to the Conduct of the Ba War & to the Court Martial of Major Fitzgerald, National Archives of Fiji.

86. King Cakobau to King Kamehameha, September 4, 1871, Provisional Government, Chief Secretary's Office, Outwards Correspondence, Volume: Chief Secretary's Office (Ministry of Foreign Relations), National Archives of Fiji.

87. Letter to Minister of Foreign Relations, Hawaii, circa 1871, Provisional Government, Chief Secretary's Office, Outwards Correspondence, Volume: Chief Secretary's Office (Ministry of Foreign Relations), National Archives of Fiji.

88. Chief Secretary, Fiji, to UK Consul, September 5, 1871, Provisional Government, Chief Secretary's Office, Outwards Correspondence, Volume: Chief Secretary's Office (Ministry of Foreign Relations), National Archives of Fiji.

Chapter 6: Hawaiian Supremacy?

1. Merze Tate, "Hawaii's Interest in Polynesia," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 7, no. 2 (November 1961): 232–244, 232.

2. Report from Charles St. Julian, March 25, 1870, 404-43-686, Hawaii State Archives-Honolulu. For more on Hawaiian supremacy, see Charles St. Julian to Charles C. Harris, March 30, 1871, 404-43-687, Hawaii State Archives.

3. Michael Dougherty, *To Steal a Kingdom: Probing Hawaiian History* (Waimanalo, HI: Island Style Press, 1992), 129.

4. *The Polynesian*, January 26, 1850; Ralph S. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I: 1778–1854, Foundation and Transformation* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1965), 386.

5. *Paradise of the Pacific*, March 1893, Bishop Museum-Honolulu.

6. "An Address by the Hawaiian Branches of the Sons of the American Revolution, Sons of Veterans, and Grand Army of the Republic to Their Compatriots in America concerning the Annexation of Hawaii" (Washington, DC: Gibson Bros., 1897), Huntington Library-San Marino, California.

7. *The Polynesian*, March 13, 1841; Ralph S. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I: 1778–1854, Foundation and Transformation* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1965), 275.

8. *Paradise of the Pacific*, December 1893, Bishop Museum-Honolulu.

9. Lucien Young, *The Boston at Hawaii or the Observations and Impressions of a Naval Officer During a Stay of Fourteen Months in Those Islands on a Man-of-War* (Washington, DC: Gibson Bros., 1898), 289, 290. See also Sally Engle Merry, *Colonizing Hawaii: The Cultural Power of Law* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

10. But see, for example, E. M. Willis Parker, *The Sandwich Islands as They Are, Not as They Should Be* (San Francisco: Burgess, Gilbert, 1852), 17: “Should annexation to the United States ever be contemplated, our government must consider well whether it is worth their while to raise again the vexed question of slavery or anti-slavery on the extreme verge of the western world; and where, too, from the nature of the climate, slavery *will certainly exist*, ere many years passed.” Emphasis in original. See also William H. Meyers, *Journal of a Cruise: To California and the Sandwich Islands in the United States Sloop-of-War Cyane, 1841–1844*, ed. John Haskell Kemble (San Francisco: The Book Club of California, 1955). See also Edward James Carpenter, *America in Hawaii: A History of United States Influence in the Hawaiian Islands* (Boston: Small, Maynard & Company, 1899).

11. Merze Tate, “Slavery and Racism as Deterrents to the Annexation of Hawaii, 1854–1855,” *Journal of Negro History* 47, no. 1 (January 1962): 1–18, 4, 5, 12, 13.

12. Jacob Adler, ed., *The Journal of Prince Alexander Libolibo: The Voyages Made to the United States, England & France in 1849–1850* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1967), 108.

13. Merze Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom: A Political History* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1965), 15.

14. Merze Tate, “Slavery and Racism as Deterrents to the Annexation of Hawaii, 1854–1855,” *Journal of Negro History* 47, no. 1 (January 1962): 1–18, 17, 18. See also Albert W. Palmer, *The Human Side of Hawaii: Race Problems in the Mid-Pacific* (Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1924).

15. See *Sydney Morning Herald*, February 5, 1855, 404–42–677, Hawaii State Archives.

16. Michael Dougherty, *To Steal a Kingdom: Probing Hawaiian History* (Waimanalo, HI: Island Style Press, 1992), 82.

17. See Margaret A. Ramsland, “The Forgotten Californians” (typescript narrative, University of California–Berkeley, 1974): “When John Sutter arrived in the islands . . . and needed recruits to bring his ship on to San Francisco, the Hu-hina-nui, Kal-o-la allowed . . . grandson of Ka-i-ana to go with Sutter to the mainland.”

18. Letter to “Dear Sir,” August 16, 1849, Box 1, William Little Lee Collection, University of California–Berkeley.

19. Janice K. Duncan, “Minority without a Champion: Kanakas on the Pacific Coast,” n.d., MSS 2436, Oregon Historical Society–Portland.

20. Margaret A. Ramsland, “The Forgotten Californians” (typescript narrative, University of California–Berkeley, 1974).

21. Sylvester K. Stevens, *American Expansion in Hawaii, 1842–1898* (Harrisburg: Archives Publications of Pennsylvania, 1945), 62–63.

22. C. Hitchcock to R. Wylie, January 8, 1852, Miscellaneous: Foreign and Ex., Hawaii State Archives.
23. Charles St. Julian to “Sir,” April 25, 1856, 404-42-679, Hawaii State Archives.
24. Ralph S. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, 1854–1874: Twenty Critical Years* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1953), 177.
25. Ralph S. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume III, 1874–1893: The Kalakaua Dynasty* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1967), 127.
26. Ralph S. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, 1854–1874: Twenty Critical Years* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1953), 186.
27. “Copy” of “Extracts from the Log of Mr. Blake, Government Agent, ‘Storm-bird,’” December 7, 1886, FO&EX33, Hawaii State Archives.
28. S. W. Griffith to A. B. Webster, January 11, 1887, FO&EX33, Hawaii State Archives.
29. F. Hornbrook to Polynesian Inspector, Brisbane, January 3, 1887, FO&EX33, Hawaii State Archives.
30. Interrogation of Captain Phillips, April 10, 1887, FO&EX33, Hawaii State Archives.
31. Gary Y. Okihiro, *Cane Fires: The Anti-Japanese Movement in Hawaii, 1865–1945* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 59.
32. Letter to William Seward, circa 1869, *Despatches from United States Consuls in Honolulu, 1820–1903, Volume 11*, Hawaii State Library-Honolulu. See also *Hawaiian Gazette*, February 17, 1869.
33. *Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, November 18, 1871: The journal added, “this wretched traffic in men is not yet stopped, nor will it be so long as the planters will pay high prices for the stolen ‘labor’ and the strong arm of civilized governments is not interposed between the islanders and the kidnappers.”
34. *Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, August 19, 1871. See also *Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, April 27, 1872.
35. Diary of J. Degreaves, Hawaiian Government Immigration Agent of Pomare to Jaluit and New Hebrides Recruiting Labor, July 26 to Feb. 26, 1881, M-235, Hawaii State Archives. See also Log of Brig Pomare, kept by William Ramm, Honolulu to New Hebrides, July 26, 1880–March 2, 1881, Hawaii State Archives.
36. Letter signed by Samuel G. Wilder, Minister of the Interior and President of the Board of Immigration, July 22, 1880, M-40, J. Degreaves Papers, Hawaii State Archives.
37. Report by President of Board of Immigration, Hawaii, circa 1882, Roll 15, *Despatches from United States Consuls in Honolulu*, Hawaii State Library-Honolulu.
38. Report from Consul, July 13, 1869, FO58/126, Public Records Office-London.
39. Remarks by “L. McCully, Secretary Pro Tem” of Planters Society, n.d., M-123, Planters Society Papers, Hawaii State Archives.
40. Resolution, n.d., M-123, Planters Society Papers, Hawaii State Archives.
41. R. C. Wylie to Charles St. Julian, April 15, 1863, 403-22-336, Hawaii State Archives.

42. A. S. Webster to Minister of Foreign Affairs, May 5, 1876, 404-43-690, Hawaii State Archives.

43. A. S. Webster to Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 25, 1876, 404-43-690, Hawaii State Archives. Emphasis in original.

44. A. S. Webster to Minister of Foreign Affairs, June 30, 1876, 404-43-690, Hawaii State Archives. Emphasis in original.

45. “Clippings Gathered by Martha W. Beckwith, Most of Them Not Dated from Honolulu Papers,” Box 53, Theo H. Davies Papers, Bishop Museum-Honolulu.

46. A. S. Webster to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 8, 1881, 404-43-690, *Hawaii State Affairs*.

47. William Hillebrand, “Report on Supply of Labor” to the “Honorable Board of Immigration,” Honolulu, 1867, HD 4875.H3 H55, Hawaii State Archives.

48. See, for example, Michael Ewanchuk, *Hawaiian Ordeal: Ukrainian Contract Workers, 1897–1910* (Winnipeg: Ewanchuk, 1986).

49. Ralph S. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I: 1778–1854, Foundation and Transformation* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1965), 329.

50. William Haywood, Consul General, to Thomas Cridler, U.S. State Department, May 11, 1899, *Despatches from United States Consuls in Honolulu, 1820–1903*, Hawaii State Library.

51. “An Address by the Hawaiian Branches of the Sons of the American Revolution, Sons of Veterans, and Grand Army of the Republic to Their Compatriots in America Concerning the Annexation of Hawaii” (Washington, DC: Gibson Bros., 1897), Huntington Library-San Marino, California.

52. Letter to Thomas Cridler, Assistant Secretary of State, from Consul General, April 28, 1903, *Despatches from United States Consuls in Honolulu, 1820–1903*, Hawaii State Library.

53. Letter from A. Zeehandelaar Employment Agency to Samuel G. Wilder, November 25, 1878, Samuel G. Wilder Papers, Hawaiian Mission Children’s Society Library-Honolulu. Emphasis in original.

54. Arthur Alexander, *Koloa Plantation, 1835–1935: A History of the Oldest Hawaiian Sugar Plantation* (Honolulu: Star-Bulletin, 1937), 22. Emphasis in original.

55. Letter to “Dear Sir,” May 8, 1866, Castle and Cook Papers-Hawaiian Mission Children’s Library-Honolulu.

56. Report from Charles St. Julian, June 25, 1859, 404-43-684, Hawaii State Archives.

57. Charles St. Julian to Charles C. Harris, September 27, 1871, 404-43-688, Hawaii State Archives. Emphasis in original.

58. Charles St. Julian to Charles C. Harris, September 27, 1871, 404-43-688, Hawaii State Archives. Emphasis in original. See also Charles St. Julian to Minister of Foreign Affairs, October 26, 1871, 404-43-688, Hawaii State Archives: St. Julian “impressed upon such of the leading men of Fiji as I had been in confidential communi-

cation with, on the subject of a possible establishment of Fijian nationality under Hawaiian auspices and sovereignty.”

59. Merze Tate, “Hawaii’s Early Interest in Polynesia,” *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 7, no. 2 (November 1961): 232–244, 241.

60. Report from Charles St. Julian, March 25, 1870, 404–43–686, Hawaii State Archives. Emphasis in original.

61. George Oakley to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 5, 1873, 404–26–409, Hawaii State Archives.

62. See, for example, *Melbourne Age*, January 28, 1873; *Melbourne Express*, April 4, 1873; April 10, 1873.

63. James H. Okahata, ed., *A History of Japanese in Hawaii* (Honolulu: United Japanese Society of Hawaii, 1971), 135.

64. Franklin Odo and Kazuko Sinoto, *A Pictorial History of the Japanese in Hawaii, 1885–1924* (Honolulu: Bishop Museum, 1985), 17.

65. Letter from Yokhama, March 14, 1881, FO&EX28, Hawaii State Archives. Emphasis in original.

66. William N. Armstrong, *Around the World with a King* (New York: Stokes, 1904), 62.

67. Samuel Eliot Morison, “Boston Traders in the Hawaiian Islands, 1789–1823,” *Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings* 54 (October 1920–June 1921): 9–47, 10.

68. Hilary Conroy, *The Japanese Frontier in Hawaii, 1868–1898* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953). Emphasis in original.

69. Memorandum on Chinese Population, n.d., M-58, Frances Hatch Papers, Hawaii State Archives. See also Arlene Lum et al., eds., *Sailing for the Sun: The Chinese in Hawaii, 1789–1989* (Honolulu: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Hawai‘i, 1989).

70. David McKinley to State Department, October 30, 1884, Roll 16, *Despatches from United States Consuls in Honolulu, 1820–1903*, Hawaii State Library.

71. Katharine Coman, *The History of Contract Labor in the Hawaiian Islands* (New York: Arno Press, 1978), 36. Originally published in 1903.

72. Journal of William Armstrong, December 5, 1880, Box 5, William Armstrong Papers, Yale University.

73. Memorandum from the United Chinese Society, August 9, 1907, M-58, Frances Hatch Papers, Hawaii State Archives.

74. Ronald Takaki, *Pau Hana: Plantation Life and Labor in Hawaii, 1835–1920* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1983), 25. See also Alan Takeo Moriyama, “Imingaisha: Japanese Emigration Companies and Hawaii, 1894–1908” (PhD diss., UCLA, 1982); Dorothy Ochiai Hazama and Jane Okamoto Komeji, *Okage Sama De: The Japanese in Hawaii, 1885–1985* (Honolulu: Bess Press, 1986); Masayo Umezawa Duus, *The Japanese Conspiracy: The Oahu Sugar Strike of 1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

75. Journal of William Armstrong, December 12, 1880, Box 5, William Armstrong Papers, Yale University.

76. William Hunter, “Annual Report,” November 25, 1879, with attached letter of September 15, 1879 from “Mr. Whitney,” Roll 15, *Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Honolulu, 1820–1903*, Hawaii State Library.

77. “Excerpts from the Very Fragmentary Journals of Dr. G. P. Judd, labeled by him ‘Memoranda,’” April 22, 1840, Bishop Museum–Honolulu.

78. Franklin Odo and Kazuko Sinoto, *A Pictorial History of the Japanese in Hawaii, 1885–1924* (Honolulu: Bishop Museum, 1985), 13. See also Andrew Lind, *Hawaii’s Japanese: An Experiment in Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946).

79. Van Reed to Charles C. Harris, March 22, 1870, 404-15-241, Hawaii State Archives.

80. Journal of William Armstrong, March 6, 1881, Box 5, William Armstrong Papers, Yale University.

81. Van Reed to “My Dear Sir,” December 22, 1871, 404-15-242, Hawaii State Archives.

82. Report from Hawaii Consul General in Tokyo, December 21, 1882, 404-15-250, Hawaii State Archives.

83. Consul General in Tokyo to Walter Gibson, November 23, 1883, 404-15-250, Hawaii State Archives. Emphasis in original.

84. George Oakley to Ernest Smith, September 3, 1886, 404-43-693, Hawaii State Archives.

85. Ernest Smith to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 4, 1889, 404-44-696, Hawaii State Archives.

Chapter 7: Hawaii Conquered

1. Ralph S. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I: 1778–1854, Foundation and Transformation* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1965), 206.

2. Merze Tate, “Great Britain and the Sovereignty of Hawaii,” *Pacific Historical Review* 31 (1962): 327–348, 330.

3. Lord Aberdeen to William Miller, September 28, 1843, Series 375, Box 4, Hawaii State Archives.

4. Mr. McBride to Mr. Seward, October 9, 1863, *Papers Relating to the Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1893), Huntington Library–San Marino, California. See also Andrew Ure, *The Cotton Manufacture of Great Britain Systematically Investigated* (London: Charles Knight, 1836).

5. Jean Ingram Brooks, *International Rivalry in the Pacific Islands, 1800–1875* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1941), 263, 270, 273.

6. Walter A. McDougall, *Let the Sea Make a Noise: A History of the North Pacific from Magellan to MacArthur* (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), 339, 340.

7. Letter to William Seward, October 15, 1868, *Despatches from United States Consuls in Honolulu, 1820–1903*.

8. Ralph S. Kuykendall, “American Interests and American Influence in Hawaii in 1842,” *39th Annual Report of the Hawaii Historical Society for the Year 1930*, 48–67, 48, 49, Hawaii State Archives.

9. Lord Clarendon to William Miller, December 31, 1855, Series 375, Box 4, Hawaii State Archives.

10. Ralph S. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume III: 1874–1893, The Kalakaua Dynasty* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1967), 6.

11. Ralph S. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume II: 1854–1874, Twenty Critical Years* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1953), 201.

12. Report from James Wodehouse, FO58/132, Public Records Office-London.

13. Eric T. L. Love, *Race over Empire: Racism and U.S. Imperialism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 92, 93.

14. Report from James Wodehouse, FO58/132, Public Records Office-London.

15. Report from James Wodehouse, FO58/132, Public Records Office-London.

16. Anonymous to James G. Blaine, November 19, 1881, 327 ANY, Hawaii Historical Society.

17. Edward Crapol, *James G. Blaine: Architect of Empire* (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 2000), 76, 78.

18. *An Italian Baroness in Hawaii: The Travel Diary of Gina Sobrero, Bride of Robert Wilcox, 1887* (Honolulu: Hawaii Historical Society, 1991), 7.

19. Michael Dougherty, *To Steal a Kingdom: Probing Hawaiian History* (Waimanalo, HI: Island Style Press, 1992), 148, 149, 156.

20. Ralph S. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume III: 1874–1893, The Kalakaua Dynasty* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1967), 315, 318, 331.

21. James Wodehouse to “My Lord,” August 30, 1872, FO58/132, Public Records Office-London. See also letter to “My Lord,” August 30, 1872, Series 375, Box 4, Hawaii State Archives.

22. “Confidential” letter from Foreign Office, May 31, 1887, Series 375, Box 4, Hawaii State Archives.

23. J. Pounceforte, Foreign Office, to Major Wodehouse, April 28, 1887, Series 375, Box 4, Hawaii State Archives.

24. Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Malet, May 31, 1887, Series 375, Box 4, Hawaii State Archives.

25. Charles Scott to Marquis of Salisbury, July 28, 1887, Series 375, Box 4, Hawaii State Archives.

26. “Report of Consul General Travers, Special Commissioner Concerning Affairs in Samoa” to “His Highness Prince von Bismarck,” December 8, 1886, Box 1, Folder 14, George Bates Papers, University of Delaware.

27. D. S. Parker to George Bates, September 6, 1886, Box 1, Folder 12, George Bates Papers, University of Delaware.

28. George Bates, “Some Aspects of the Samoan Question,” April 1889, in *The Century Magazine*, 945–949, Box 2, Folder 24, George Bates Papers, University of Delaware.

29. “Report on the Condition of the Samoan Islands by Mr. J. B. Thurston, CMG (British Commissioner), Colonial Office, January 1887, United Kingdom, Box 1, Folder 15, George Bates Papers, University of Delaware.

30. “British Despotism in the South Sea Islands and the Persecution of Mr. W. J. Hunt by Sir Arthur Gordon, High Commissioner under the Western Pacific Orders in Council, 1877–1879, by Vox Populi” (Wellington: New Zealand Times, 1883), Box 1, Folder 4, George Bates Papers, University of Delaware.

31. *New York Herald*, January 22, 1889. See also Peter J. Hempenstall, *Pacific Islanders Under German Rule: A Study in the Meaning of Colonial Resistance* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1978); R. P. Gilson, *Samoa, 1830–1900: The Politics of Multi-Cultural Community* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1970).

32. Paul M. Kennedy, *The Samoan Tangle: A Study in Anglo-German Relations, 1878–1900* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1974), 81, 159, 305.

33. See, for example, J. W. Davidson, *Samoa Mo Samoa: The Emergence of the Independent State of Western Samoa* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1967). See also R.W. Robson, *Queen Emma: The Samoan-American Girl Who Founded an Empire in 19th Century New Guinea* (Sydney: Pacific Publications, 1979). At the Hawaii Historical Society in Honolulu, see the Papers of Henry Poor, which contains information on the Hawaii legation in Samoa.

34. Walter Gibson to H. A. Carter, January 18, 1887, FO&EX34, Hawaii State Archives.

35. John Bush to Walter Gibson, February 1, 1887, FO&EX34, Hawaii State Archives.

36. King Malietoa to “My Dearest and Good Brother,” circa 1887, FO&EX34, Hawaii State Archives. But see A. Gordon to “My Lord,” January 14, 1877, G4/7, Archives of New Zealand: “Two chiefs, both named Malietoa, aspire to rule in Samoa. The parties of these two men are in point of numbers about equally matched but the aid of white men, moral and material, will doubtless decide the issue. . . . Money can be obtained with great ease in the United States for objects of this kind. . . . Every prospect of serious difficulties arising in our neighborhood from the love of excitement and adventure prevalent among certain classes of Americans.”

37. Mr. Wilson to “Marquis of Salisbury,” August 10, 1887, Series 375, Box 4, Hawaii State Archives.

38. James Wodehouse to “My Lord,” March 6, 1872, FO58/132, Hawaii State Archives.

39. Consul Cusack-Smith to Earl of Rosebery, January 23, 1893, FO534, Great Britain. Pacific Islands, S00627, University of Hawai‘i-Mānoa. See Thomas Trood, *Island Reminiscences* (Sydney: McCarron, 1912), 126: Moors “has played in many respects an important part in the political history of Samoa during the last twenty years. . . . When Mataafa returned [in 1898,] he was ever found in the thick of the fray supporting the claims of candidates for kinship, who he believed, was the most eligible and thereby drawing upon himself the wrath of cliques professing an opposite opinion.”

40. Thomas Trood, *Island Reminiscences* (Sydney: McCarron, 1912), 126.
41. H. Stonehewer Cooper, *Coral Lands, Volume I* (London: Bentley & Sons, 1880), 38, 174–175.
42. Clipping, n.d., circa 1880s, South Sea Islands: Newspaper Cuttings, Q988S, State Library of New South Wales-Sydney.
43. Thomas Trood, *Island Reminiscences* (Sydney: McCarron, 1912), 78, 48.
44. Lord Carnarvon to “Sir,” March 27, 1877, G4/7, Archives of New Zealand-Wellington.
45. Report from U.S. Consul, January 2, 1873, Roll 3, *Despatches from United States Consuls in Apia*, National Archives and Records Administration-College Park, Maryland.
46. J. M. Coe to Second Assistant Secretary of State, July 28, 1874, Roll 3, *Despatches from United States Consuls in Apia*, National Archives and Records Administration-College Park, Maryland.
47. Walter Gibson to H. A. Carter, May 7, 1887, FO&EX34, Hawaii State Archives.
48. See “Copies of a Treaty between Samoa and Hawaii Officially Published . . . the Treaty is one of Political Confederation,” March 29, 1887, Roll 23, *Despatches from United States Ministers in Hawaii*, National Archives and Records Administration.
49. Translation of document, circa 1887, FO&EX34, Hawaii State Archives.
50. H. A. Carter to “Sir,” April 9, 1887, FO&EX34, Hawaii State Archives.
51. H. M. Sewall, “Partition of Samoa and the Past Relations between that Group and the United States Read before the Hawaiian Historical Society, May 11, 1900,” *7th Annual Report of the Hawaii Historical Society*, 1900, 11–27, 14, Hawaii Historical Society.
52. Secretary of State Frelinghuysen to H. A. Carter, December 6, 1883, FO&EX34, Hawaii State Archives.
53. Walter Gibson to “Sir,” January 18, 1887, FO&EX34, Hawaii State Archives.
54. Ralph S. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume III: 1874–1893, The Kalakaua Dynasty* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1967), 313.
55. Walter Gibson to H. A. Carter, April 9, 1887, FO&EX34, Hawaii State Archives.
56. “Interview between Mr. Bayard and Mr. Carter,” April 28, 1887, FO&EX34, Hawaii State Archives.
57. H. A. Carter to Godfrey Brown, November 10, 1887, FO&EX34, Hawaii State Archives.
58. Paul M. Kenney, *The Samoan Tangle: A Study in Anglo-German Relations, 1878–1900* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1974), 13.
59. His Majesty King Kalakaua to “Sir,” April 12, 1889, MS B K 128, David Kalakaua Papers, Hawaii Historical Society.
60. Joseph Waldo Ellison, “The Partition of Samoa: A Study in Imperialism and Democracy,” *Pacific Historical Review* 8, no. 3 (September 1939): 259–288, 260.

61. Edward Crapol, *James G. Blaine: Architect of Empire* (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 2000), 116.
62. L. Sackville West to “My Lord,” November 4, 1887, Series 375, Box 4, Hawaii State Archives.
63. Report from James Wodehouse, May 28, 1874, FO58/132, Public Records Office.
64. Report from James Wodehouse, August 21, 1874, FO58/132, Public Records Office.
65. Merze Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom: A Political History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), 52.
66. Lorrin H. Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution* (Honolulu: Advertiser, 1936), 70.
67. Report from David McKinley, October 14, 1884, Roll 16, *Despatches from United States Consuls in Honolulu*, Hawaii State Library-Honolulu.
68. “An Act to Organize the Military Forces of the Kingdom,” October 5, 1886, Roll 23, *Despatches from United States Ministers in Hawaii*, Hawaii State Library-Honolulu.
69. John H. Portman to James D. Porter, July 26, 1887, Roll 17, *Despatches from United States Consuls in Honolulu*, Hawaii State Library-Honolulu.

Chapter 8: A Black Pacific?

1. Michael Dougherty, *To Steal a Kingdom: Probing Hawaiian History* (Waimanalo, HI: Island Style Press, 1992), 147.
2. Susan Bell, *Unforgettable True Stories of the Kingdom of Hawaii* (Pearl City: Press Pacifica, 1986), 53.
3. Mary H. Krout, *Hawaii and a Revolution* (London: John Murray, 1898), 189.
4. Michael Dougherty, *To Steal a Kingdom: Probing Hawaiian History* (Waimanalo, HI: Island Style Press, 1992), 165.
5. Michael Dougherty, *To Steal a Kingdom: Probing Hawaiian History* (Waimanalo, HI: Island Style Press, 1992), 89.
6. Eric T. L. Love, *Race over Empire: Racism & U.S. Imperialism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 81, 83.
7. Noenoe K. Silva, *Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American Colonialism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 53.
8. *Pittsburgh Courier*, April 13, 1937.
9. Susan Bell, *Unforgettable True Stories of the Kingdom of Hawaii* (Pearl City: Press Pacifica, 1986), 49. See also William Atherton Du Puy, *Hawaii and Its Race Problem* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1932); W. R. Johnston et al., *Imperialism and Racism in the South Pacific* (Brisbane, Australia: Brooks, 1983).
10. James A. Michener and A. Grove Day, *Rascals in Paradise* (New York: Random House, 1957), 10.

11. Lloyd L. Lee, "A Brief Analysis of the Role and Status of the Negro in the Hawaiian Community," *American Sociological Review* 13, no. 4 (August 1948): 419–437, 421, 422.

12. Willard B. Gatewood, *Black Americans and the White Man's Burden, 1898–1903* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975), 14, 15, 297, 298, 299.

13. Kenneth Porter, "Notes on Negroes in Early Hawaii," *Journal of Negro History* 19, no. 1 (January 1934): 193–197, 194, 195.

14. Bradford Smith, *Yankees in Paradise: The New England Impact on Hawaii* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott), 1956, 53.

15. Susan Bell, *Unforgettable True Stories of the Kingdom of Hawaii* (Pearl City: Press Pacifica, 1986), 54.

16. Harold Whitman Bradley, *The American Frontier in Hawaii: The Pioneers, 1789–1843* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1942), 38–39.

17. Journal of Sylvia Moseley Bingham, June 20, 1820, Box 2, Bingham Family Papers, Yale University.

18. See, for example, *Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, August 31, 1867: William Livingston, a Negro, arrived in Hawaii in 1808 and left then returned in 1824, when he developed an admirable reputation for his work on stone buildings. He passed away in 1867.

19. Michael Dougherty, *To Steal a Kingdom: Probing Hawaiian History* (Waimanalo, HI: Island Style Press, 1992), 77. See also A. Grove Day, ed., *Melville in the South Seas* (New York: Hawthorn, 1970); Charles Robert Anderson, *Melville in the South Seas* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939).

20. Frederick W. Horway, "Negro Immigration into Vancouver Island in 1858," *British Columbia Historical Quarterly* 3 (April 1939): 101–114; James William Pilton, "Negro Settlement in British Columbia, 1858–1871" (master's thesis, University of British Columbia, 1951).

21. Adelbert von Chamisso, *Excerpts from Chamisso's Werke (Chamisso's Works)*, Vol. III, trans. Maria and Helmuth Hormann (Honolulu, 1970), Hawaii State Archives.

22. Letter from Titus Coan, July 18, 1836, Sandwich Islands Mission Collection, Hawaii Mission Children's Society Library-Honolulu. See Titus Coan, *Life in Hawaii: An Autobiographical Sketch* (New York: Randolph, 1842). See also "Census Data on Blacks in Oregon," 1850, Box 2, Oregon Black History Project, MSS 2854, Oregon Historical Society-Portland: A number of Negroes were born in Hawaii by the mid-nineteenth century. See also "Autobiography of Henry W. Bigler," 1857, Henry W. Bigler Papers, Huntington Library-San Marino, California: Visiting Maui in the 1850s he observed, "We called on the American Counsel and through him we got an introduction to the Governor of the Island, who was a half breed. . . . We told the Governor that we were missionaries and anxious to learn the native language and preach to the people. He said that if we did learn the language and preach to the people it would be hard to get the natives out of their old belief and traditions."

23. Edith Armstrong Talbot, *Samuel Chapman Armstrong: A Biographical Study* (New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1904), 3, 257. See also Robert C. Ogden, *Samuel Chapman Armstrong: A Sketch* (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1894).

24. William N. Armstrong, *Around the World with a King* (New York: Stokes, 1904), 89.

25. Norman E. Gabel, *A Racial Study of the Fijians* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), 4. See also David Duncan, comp., *Descriptive Sociology; Or, Groups of Sociological Facts Classified and Arranged by Herbert Spencer . . . Types of Lowest Races, Negrito Races and Malango-Polynesian Races* (New York: Appleton, circa 1874).

26. Thomas Trood, *Island Reminiscences* (Sydney: McCarron, 1912), 14.

27. Journal of Milo Calkin, circa 1833, Huntington Library-San Marino, California.

28. H. Stonehewer Cooper, *Coral Lands, Volume I* (London: Bentley & Son, 1880), 205.

29. See "The Natives of Hawaii: A Study of Polynesian Charm," in *Publications of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, no. 305 (July 1901): 9-17, Bingham Family Papers, Yale University.

30. H. Stonehewer Cooper, *Coral Lands, Volume 2* (London: Bentley & Son, n.d.), 87.

31. "Fifty Years Ago, Old Sydney Harbour, 1911," micro 0749, MS 0150, Louis Becke Papers, National Library of New Zealand. For similar usage, see Claude Cumberland, *Master Mariner* (London: Peter Davies, 1936), 33. See also Captain H. E. Raabe, *Canibal Nights: The Reminiscences of a Free-Lance Trader* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1927), 13.

32. Gilbert Bishop, *The Beachcombers or Slave Trading under the Union Jack* (London: Ward & Downey, 1889), 109.

33. Edward Reeves, *Brown Men and Women on the South Sea Islands in 1895 and 1896* (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1898), 191. In the Cook Islands, where the British and particularly New Zealanders held sway, the indigenes were referred to as "niggers."

34. Thomas Dunbabin, *Slavers of the South Seas* (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1935), vii.

35. Gilbert Bishop, *The Beachcombers or Slave Trading under the Union Jack* (London: Ward & Downey, 1889), 129.

36. "The Slave Trade in the New Hebrides," pamphlet in *Deportation of South Sea Islanders: Dispatch from Secretary of State with Correspondence Respecting* (Sydney: Richards, 1871), National Library of Australia-Canberra.

37. James Cowan, *Suwarrow Gold and Other Stories of the Great South Sea* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1936), 47.

38. George Palmer to "My Lord," circa 1869, FO58/130, Public Records Office-London.

39. Thomas Dunbabin, *Slavers of the South Seas* (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1935), 182.

40. See, for example, Gerald Horne, *The Deepest South: The U.S. & Brazil and the African Slave Trade* (New York: New York University Press, forthcoming).

41. Baron von Hubner, *Through the British Empire* (London: John Murray, 1886), 400–401, 403, 404.
42. Tom Harrison, *Savage Civilization* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1937), 5.
43. James A. Brook, *Jim of the Seven Seas: A True Story of Personal Adventure* (London: Heath Cranton, 1940), 151.
44. Nigel Randell, *The White Headhunter: The Story of a Nineteenth Century Sailor Who Survived a South Seas Heart of Darkness* (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2003), 42.
45. John Gaggin, *Among the Man-Eaters* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1900), 115–116, 165.
46. James Cowan, *Suwarrow Gold and Other Stories of the Great South Sea* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1936), 23.
47. James Fussell, *A Kanaka Slave* (London: Arthur H. Stockwell, 1903), 23.
48. Robert B. Minturn, Jr., *From New York to Delbi by Way of Rio de Janeiro, Australia and China* (New York: D. Appleton, 1858), 36.
49. Robert Louis Stevenson to Adelaide Boodle, January 4, 1892, in *Selected Letters of Robert Louis Stevenson*, ed. Ernest Mehew, 497 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).
50. Kay Saunders, *Workers in Bondage: The Origins and Bases of Unfree Labour in Queensland, 1824–1916* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1982), 31.
51. Deposition of Thomas Powell, January 6, 1870, Samoa-BCS, 7/2a, Archives of New Zealand.
52. Report, n.d., Q988/n, State Library of New South Wales-Sydney.
53. James Cowan, *Suwarrow Gold and Other Stories of the Great South Sea* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1936), 103–104, 229–230.
54. See Testimony of Harold Sewall, U.S. Consul General in Samoa, before U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 1, 1889, Box 2, Folder 18, George Bates Papers, University of Delaware-Newark.
55. William Hillebrand, “Report on Supply of Labor” to the “Honorable Board of Immigration” (Honolulu: Government Press, 1867), HD 4875 .H3 H55, Hawaii State Archives: The author adds,

If the Chinese laborer not only supplants the Malay and Negro but outdoes the Javanese and Hindoo in their own countries, where wages do not range higher than five rupees per month (\$2.50) and now even begins to rival the white man in his domain, there must be some potent reason for this which overbalances the undeniable great moral defects inherent in the race; [at] supposed wrongs or insults, a Chinese will at once oppose by force, while the Indian accepts them with apparent submission, quietly biding his time. With him poison takes the place of the knife. Their relations to the white race are alike unsatisfactory, but altogether different. The Chinese, in the vain conceit of the superiority of his race and civilization, looks on the white man as an inferior being—at least in his country. The Hindoo, under the external grab of submissiveness, bears and nourishes towards his white master [an] intense hatred.

56. Z. Y. Squires, “The Planters’ Mongolian Pets or Human Decoy Act,” 1884, Hawaiian Historical Society.

57. Edward D. Beechert, *Working in Hawaii: A Labor History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 181.

58. Julius A. Palmer, Jr., *Memories of Hawaii and Hawaiian Correspondence* (Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1894), 104.

59. Letter from Mark Twain, April 1886, in *Mark Twain’s Letters from Hawaii*, ed. A. Grove Day (New York: Appleton-Century, 1966), 75. See also Frederick Anderson et al., eds., *Mark Twain’s Notebooks and Journals, Volume I, 1855–1873* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Walter Francis Frear, *Mark Twain and Hawaii* (Chicago: Lakeside, 1947).

60. Arthur G. Pettit, “Mark Twain and the Negro, 1867–1869,” *Journal of Negro History* 56, no. 2 (April 1971): 88–96, 89. See also Edwin Hoyt, *Pacific Destiny: The Story of America in the Western Sea from the Early 1800s to the 1980s* (New York: Norton, 1981).

61. William R. Davis, “Pioneering the Pacific: Imagining Polynesia in U.S. Literature from 1820 to 1940” (PhD diss., Claremont Graduate School, 2002), 111, 149.

62. Report to William Seward from Vice Consul, April 20, 1868, *Despatches from United States Consuls in Honolulu*, Hawaii State Library-Honolulu.

63. William A. Russ, Jr., “Hawaiian Labor and Immigration Problems before Annexation,” *Journal of Modern History* 15, no. 3 (September 1943): 207–222, 208, 211.

64. Merze Tate, “Decadence of the Hawaiian Nation and Proposals to Import a Negro Labor Force,” *Journal of Negro History* 47, no. 4 (October 1962): 248–263, 256, 258.

65. Willard B. Gatewood, *Black Americans and the White Man’s Burden, 1898–1903* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975), 298.

66. Report, circa 1905, Gov. 2–7, Territory of Hawaii, Report of Labor Committee, Book No. 1, Hawaii State Archives.

67. *Report of Subcommittee on Pacific Islands and Porto Rico on the Labor Question and Views of the Minority* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1902), Hawaii Historical Society.

68. Walter Coote, *Wanderings South and East* (London: Sampson, Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington, 1882), 67–68.

69. “Further Papers on the Subject of the Claims of Citizens of the United States to Land in Fiji,” June 1901, Correspondence on the Subject of the Claims of United States Citizens to Land in Fiji, August 1902, National Archives of Fiji.

70. Governor Sir J. B. Thurston to Mr. Chamberlain, October 17, 1896, Correspondence on the Subject of the Claims of United States Citizens to Land in Fiji, National Archives of Fiji.

71. A. G. Ross, “The Future of the Fijian,” *Transactions of the Fijian Society* (1910): 43–50, 48. See also Timothy M. Macnaught, *The Fijian Colonial Experience: A Study of the Neo-Traditional Order under British Colonial Rule prior to World War II* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1982).

72. Thomas Trood, *Island Reminiscences* (Sydney: McCarron, 1912), 78. For another account of this incident, see James Cowan, *Suwarrow Gold and Other Stories of the Great South Sea* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1936), 210.

73. James Cowan, *Suwarrow Gold and Other Stories of the Great South Sea* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1936), 210.

74. Julian Dana, *Gods Who Die: The Story of Samoa's Greatest Adventurer* (New York: Macmillan, 1935), 25–43, 101–102, 107, 159.

75. W. B. Churchward, *Blackbirding in the South Pacific or the First White Man on the Beach* (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1888), 4–5, 6–8, 20–21, 28, 178.

76. Niel Gunson, ed., *The Changing Pacific: Essays in Honor of H. E. Maude* (New York: Oxford, 1978), 264.

77. Elizabeth D. Rechebei and Samuel F. McPhetres, *History of Palau: Heritage of an Emerging Nation* (Koror, Palau: Ministry of Education, 1997), 110. See also Lawrence Klingman and Gerald Green, *His Majesty O'Keefe* (Honolulu: Mutual Publishing, 1993), 132.

78. "Somerset" to Colonial Secretary, January 1, 1872, SRS 5275, Gov/a5, Queensland State Archives-Brisbane.

79. E. Daniel Potts and Annette Potts, *Young America and Australian Gold Americans and the Gold Rush of the 1850s* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1974), 46, 57, 66, 74–75, 157, 217, 238.

Chapter 9: Toward a "White" Australia

1. Marilyn Lake, "The White Man under Siege: New Histories of Race in the Nineteenth Century and the Advent of White Australia," *History Workshop Journal* 58 (Autumn 2004): 41–62, 41, 48, 51, 55, 56. See also Abigail Belfrage, "Citizenship and the Vote at the Time of Australian Federation" (BA thesis, La Trobe University, 1993).

2. Christopher Hitchens, *Blood, Class and Empire: The Enduring Anglo-American Relationship* (New York: Nation Books, 2004), 169.

3. *Melbourne Age*, August 12, 1872.

4. Merze Tate, "The Australasian Monroe Doctrine," *Political Science Quarterly* 76 (1961): 264–284, 264, 276, 282. See also *London Daily Mail*, September 13, 1901.

5. From Melbourne to "Earl of Aberdeen," February 6, 1855, *Despatches from the Lieutenant Governor of Victoria to the Secretary of State for the Colonies*, CY Reel 1468, State Library of New South Wales-Sydney. See also Julian Thomas, *Cannibals and Convicts: Notes of Personal Experiences in the Western Pacific* (London: Cassell, 1887), 114, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124: This British subject complained about the "convicts" pouring into New Caledonia and the perceived threat this presented to Australia. "The natives of New Caledonia despise and hate the prisoners," he said. "They know that they are degraded whites [and that] amongst these filibusters some military genius might arise and entire portions of Australia would be for a time conquered. . . . [After

all,] William Walker ruled Central America with but a handful of desperate white men.” Perhaps worse was that some of the prisoners on Nou Island were Communists and “worse treated than the vilest criminals.” These Reds were “cruel, debauched, idle, atheistic; at war with art, at war with property, at war with all the truths of God.”

6. G. Von Oertzen, “Western Melanesia with Special Reference to the Supply of Labourers to Samoa,” in *German Interests in the South Seas, Abstracts of White Book, 1884 and 1885*, CGS 906, 4/849, Colonial Secretary, Special Bundles, Annexation of New Guinea, 1883–1884, New South Wales State Records Authority. See also *Further Correspondence Respecting New Guinea* (London: Eyre, 1883), National Library of Australia–Canberra.

7. L. G. Churchward, “Australian-American Relations during the Gold Rush,” *Historical Studies, Australia and New Zealand* 2, no. 5 (April 1942): 11–24, 20. See also Jane Samson, *Imperial Benevolence: Making British Authority in the Pacific Islands* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1998).

8. Evelyn Wareham, *Race and Realpolitik: The Politics of Colonialism in German Samoa* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2002), 163.

9. T. Damon I. Salesa, “‘Travel Happy’ Samoa: Colonialism, Samoan Migration and a ‘Brown Pacific,’” *New Zealand Journal of History* 37, no. 2 (October 2003): 171–188, 186. See also Peter Corris, *Passage, Port and Plantations: A History of Solomon Islands Labour Migration, 1870–1914* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1973).

10. “Papers Relating to South Sea Islanders . . .,” circa 1876, Immigration Office, Brisbane, G4/12, National Archives of New Zealand–Wellington.

11. Kay Saunders, *Workers in Bondage: The Origins and Bases of Unfree Labour in Queensland, 1824–1916* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1982), 167. There were also Pacific indigenes toiling in New Zealand. See *New Zealand Parliamentary Debates’ Fifth Session of the Fourth Parliament*, week ending June 18, 1870, Legislative Council and House of Representatives, no. 1 (Wellington: Didsbury, 1870), Public Records Office–London: “Mr. Swan asked the Premier whether the government was acquainted with the fact that a cargo of South Sea Islanders had been imported into the Province of Auckland for the working of flax fields.”

12. See, for example, G. T. Bettany, *The Red, Brown and Black Men of America and Australia and Their White Supplanters* (London: Ward, Lock, 1890).

13. Ray Aitchison, *Americans in Australia* (New York: Scribner’s, 1972), x.

14. Norman Bartlett, *1776–1976: Australia and America Through 200 Years* (Sydney: URE Smith, 1976), v.

15. L. G. Churchward, “Australian-American Relations during the Gold Rush,” *Historical Studies, Australia and New Zealand* 2, no. 5 (April 1942): 11–24, 20.

16. Ray Aitchison, *The Americans in Australia* (Melbourne: A. E. Press, 1986), 71.

17. David Mosler and Bob Catley, *America and Americans in Australia* (Westport: Praeger, 1998), 20. See also Conway B. Stone, *Saints on the Seas: A Maritime History of Mormon Migration* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1983).

18. M. P. Lissington, *New Zealand and the United States, 1840–1944* (Wellington: A. R. Shearer, 1972), 5.

19. Angus Ross, *New Zealand Aspirations in the Pacific in the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 109.
20. F. L. W. Wood, *New Zealand in the World* (Wellington: Department of Internal Affairs, 1940), 53.
21. General Stuart Stanley to Governor of Queensland, March 5, 1888, SRS 5253, COL/A546, General Correspondence, Colonial Secretary, Queensland State Archives-Brisbane, Australia.
22. General Stanley to Governor of Queensland, July 24, 1887, SRS 5253, COL/A546, General Correspondence, Colonial Secretary, Queensland State Archives-Brisbane, Australia.
23. Internal Memorandum, October 4, 1887, SRS 5253, COL/A546, General Correspondence, Colonial Secretary, Queensland State Archives-Brisbane, Australia.
24. Letter of Protest, July 10, 1855, CGS 906, 4/7170, 1855–1856, Colonial Secretary, Special Bundles, New South Wales State Records Authority-West Sydney, Kingswood.
25. Letter from Captain W. B. Birch, February 10, 1870, CGS906, 4/7170, 1855–1856, Colonial Secretary, Special Bundles, New South Wales State Records Authority-West Sydney, Kingswood.
26. R. W. Cameron to Chief Secretary, July 10, 1877, CS, SB, CGS906, 4/811.1, New South Wales State Records Authority-West Sydney, Kingswood.
27. R. W. Cameron to Chief Secretary, May 15, 1877, CS, SB, CGS906, 4/811.1, New South Wales State Records Authority-West Sydney, Kingswood.
28. Letter to “Honorable Chief Secretary, Sydney,” April 10, 1878, CS, SB, CGS906, 4/811.1, New South Wales State Records Authority-West Sydney, Kingswood.
29. R. W. Cameron to Chief Secretary, July 9, 1877, CS, SB, CGS906, 4/811.1, New South Wales State Records Authority-West Sydney, Kingswood.
30. R. W. Cameron to William Foster, Agent General for NSW, January 9, 1878, CS, SB, CGS906, 4/811.1, New South Wales State Records Authority-West Sydney, Kingswood.
31. E. Eagar to J. T. Bigge, October 19, 1819, J. T. Bigge–Report, appendix (3081–3082), BT Box 19, State Library of New South Wales-Sydney.
32. E. Eagar to Earl Bathurst, November 6, 1822, J. T. Bigge–Report, appendix (6840–6855), BT Box 28, State Library of New South Wales-Sydney.
33. To Governor of New South Wales, November 27–30, 1840, NSW Enclosures, 1839–1840, 2501–2510, Correspondence between U.S. Consul in New South Wales and Colonial Secretary of New South Wales, 6/11–7/9, 1840, State Library of New South Wales-Sydney.
34. Sir C. A. FitzRoy’s Desp., no. 24, January 30, 1847, NSW Gov. Desp., volume 53, 717–724, State Library of New South Wales-Sydney.
35. John Thompson to J. W. Thompson, December 5, 1851, AT 44, State Library of New South Wales-Sydney.

36. Jeremy Mount, “After California: Later Gold Rushes of the Pacific Basin,” in *Riches for All: The California Gold Rush and the World*, ed. Kenneth N. Owen, 264–295, 269, 280 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002). Emphasis in original.

37. Mark Twain, *Following the Equator: A Journey around the World* (Hartford: American Publishing Company, 1897), 129.

38. Gilbert Parker, *Round the Compass in Australia* (Melbourne: E.W. Cole, n.d.), 213, 228, 250, State Library of New South Wales.

39. Carl Lumholtz, *Among Cannibals: Account of Four Years Travels in Australia, and of Camp Life with the Aborigines of Queensland* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1988), 8. Originally published in 1888.

40. See, for example, “Clark & Ryman’s Minstrels Songster . . . Containing the Latest and Most Popular Songs of the Day” (San Francisco: Francis, Valentine, 1882), John Oxley Library, State Library of Queensland-Brisbane: The inside cover contains a picture of a Negro with his mouth wide open and the song “Cincinnati Hams” with these lyrics: “Joseph Johnson gave a ball, and he invited the darkeys all; the nigs they came in from miles around, to flap their feet on the ground . . . big fat coon.” See also “Colored Hop Ball” with the lyrics “Here we are, two lively nigs . . . we love to throw around, flap our feet on the ground”; “The Whistling Coon” with the lyrics “Oh! I’ve seen in my times some very funny folks; but the funniest of all I know is a colored individual, as sure as you’re alive, as black as any black crow . . . this very funny queer old coon . . . he’s got a pair of lips like a pound of liver split, and a nose like an ingun-rubber shoe; he’s a limpy, happy, chuckle-headed, huckleberry nig, and he whistles like a happy killy loo . . . with a cranium like a big baboon . . . one day a fellow hit him with a brick upon the mouth, and his jaw swelled up like a balloon; now he goes shaking like a monkey in a fit.”

41. See Tomahawk Joe, “Lost for Six Years in the Wilds of Queensland” (Newcastle: Derkenne, circa 1925), John Oxley Library, State Library of Queensland:

[Kazan Champion was known as] King of the Borora tribe of Queensland blacks. [He] knew Buffalo Bill personally and who rode, shot and roped with Hoot Gibson [but] for six years from February 14, 1915 Joe was lost in the northwest of Queensland. [Previously, he] went with big-game hunter Seymour across [the] Belgian Congo to Sierra Leone [and] knocked about South Africa. [He was a] remarkable wild white man [with] long, brown hair streaming behind him in the wind [and a] Winchester was slung across his shoulders, whilst from his belt hung a Smith and Wesson shooting iron, a tomahawk, and a bowie knife. His voice was in strange contrast with his romantic garb, being soft and musical, something between a tenor and a baritone, [while his attire affirmed that he] believes that the average man wears too much clothing; [he] talked with an easy abandon of the scholar on history, metaphysics, and the highest inductive logic. [He was] born at Santa Rosa, California in 1865 [and attended] high school in Chicago; [he] entered the New York University and graduated from there after a

five year term; [his] first job was that of a stockman on Brunette Station in the Territory. Here he became an expert rifleman and subsequently crossed to Melville Island and engaged in buffalo hunting; [he] has since shot lions and tigers in their native jungle [as] the call of the Australian bush [was] insistent.

His resonance with the region was suggested when “the horse allotted him was used only by the aboriginals and it refused to be handled by other than a darkie. There was only one thing to do and Champion did it. He blackened his face and hands and found the animal quite tractable.” His trajectory was foreseen when “between the ages of three and twelve, some imperious instinct demanded that [he] should see fresh blood every morning.”

42. Michael Cannon, ed., *Mark Twain in Australia and New Zealand* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), 123.

43. U.S. Consul to William Marcy, January 27, 1857, Roll 1, *Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Melbourne*, National Archives and Records Administration-College Park, Maryland.

44. “Return of Aliens Naturalized during the Last Five Years, from August 1880 to August 1885—Numbering 2320” and “Laid Upon the Table of the Legislative Assembly by Command and Ordered to be Printed, 26th August 1885,” Queensland State Archives.

45. U.S. Consul General O. M. Spencer to Governor of Queensland, December 22, 1884, SRS 5275, Gov/N1, Queensland State Archives.

46. See also “Imperial and Colonial Acts Relative to the Pacific Island Labour Trade and Regulations and Instructions for the Guidance of Government Agents” (Brisbane: Gregory, 1884), Z6376, PRV/7121/1, COL/409, Queensland State Archives.

47. Petition to Governor, December 19, 1884, Z6378, PRV/7125/1, COL/410, Queensland State Archives.

48. Petition to Governor, n.d., Z6378, PRV/7125/1, COL/410, Queensland State Archives.

49. Petition, n.d., Z6376, PRV/7121/1, COL/409, Queensland State Archives.

50. Petition, n.d., Z6376, PRV/7121/1, COL/409, Queensland State Archives.

51. Report of Chief Justice Charles Lilley, May 20, 1889, Z6376, PRV/7121/1, COL/409, Queensland State Archives. See also Ronald Lawson, *Brisbane in the 1890s: A Study of an Australian Urban Society* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1973).

52. Hugh Hastings Romilly, *From My Verandah in New Guinea: Sketches and Traditions* (London: David Nutt, 1889), 202.

53. Minister of Justice to Chief Justice Charles Lilley, October 21, 1889, Z6376, PRV/7121/1, COL/409, Queensland State Archives.

54. Edward Palmer, *Early Days in North Queensland* (London: Angus & Robertson, 1983), 152, 179, 183, 213. See also Maurice French, *Conflict and the Condamine: Aborigines and the European Invasion* (Toowoomba: Darling Downs Institute Press, 1989).

55. See, for example, Daniel and Annette Potts, eds., *A Yankee Merchant in Gold-*

rush Australia: The Letters of George Francis Train (Melbourne: Heinemann, 1970), 152: In Melbourne, said Train, “the natives were made to throw the boomerang—for their crooked minds would never appreciate a civilized weapon; our Northern American Indian is a prince in comparison.” Train, an eccentric U.S.-born millionaire capitalist was born in Boston in 1829; his father married the daughter of a Baltimore slave owner. See Clive Turnbull, *Bonanza: The Story of George Francis Train* (Melbourne: The Hawthorn Press, 1946), 7. See also Frederick T. Wallace, ed., *The Experiences of a Forty-Niner during Thirty-Four Years Residence in California and Australia* (Cleveland: Williams Publishing, 1888), 308, 432: Speaking of Australia he said, “There were at that time a large number of Wadagalac blacks there, the tribe numbering some two hundred, now they are extinct—the ultimate fate of the savage when civilized man enters his domain.” After his indigenous guide to gold was hit in the head and survived, he said, “I had often heard of the thickness of the skull of the blacks.” After arriving in New Zealand, he was horrified at the trouble Britain had in subduing Maoris. Britain, he thought, “cannot fight and skulk, and that is the method of Maori warfare.” But as for indigenous Australians, he “would class them as being the lowest grade of humanity. . . . Their skull is said to be more than twice as thick as a white man’s.” See also Owen Ritter, ed., *Rajah Brooke & Baroness Burdett Coutts: Consisting of the Letters from Sir James Brooke, First White Rajah of Sarawak, to Miss Angela (Afterwards Baroness) Burdett Coutts* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1935). For a notable exception to this trend, see Michael Cannon, ed., *Mark Twain in Australia and New Zealand* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), 260. In Tasmania, said Twain, “the white population numbered 40,000 in 1831; the black population numbered *three hundred*. Not 300 warriors but 300 men, women and children. The whites were armed with guns, the blacks with clubs and spears. The whites had fought the blacks for a quarter of a century, and had tried every thinkable way to capture, kill or subdue them.”

56. S. H. Romilly, ed., *Letters from the Western Pacific and Mashonaland, 1878–1891 by Hugh Hastings Romilly* (London: David Nutt, 1893), 147. See also Dorothy Shineberg, *They Came for Sandalwood: A Study of the Sandalwood Traffic in the South-West Pacific, 1830–1865* (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1967).

57. Hugh Hastings Romilly, *From My Verandah in New Guinea: Sketches and Traditions* (London: David Nutt, 1889), 194, 202–207.

58. Sworn Statements by William Blanchard, June 25, 1886, *Correspondence Relating to Proposals for an International Agreement Regulating the Supply of Arms, Ammunition, Alcohol and Dynamite to Natives of the Western Pacific* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1887), John Oxley Library, State Library of Queensland.

59. Kay Saunders, *Workers in Bondage: The Origins and Bases of Unfree Labour in Queensland, 1824–1916* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1982), 16, 31, 40, 47, 49. See also Clive Moore et al., eds., *Labour in the South Pacific* (Townsville: James Cook University of Northern Queensland, 1990); Charles H. Eden, *My Wife and I in Queensland: An Eight Year Experience in the Above Colony* (London: Longmans, Green, 1872).

60. Tom Dutton, *Queensland Canefields English of the Late Nineteenth Century* (A

Record of an Interview with Two of the Last Surviving Kanakas in North Queensland, 1964 (Canberra: Department of Linguistics, Australian National University, 1980), 5, 6, John Oxley Library, State Library of Queensland.

61. U.S. Merchants in Melbourne to William Seward, October 24, 1866, Roll 3, *Despatches from United States Consuls in Melbourne*, National Archives and Records Administration-College Park, Maryland.

62. Report from George Latham, February 7, 1868, Roll 3, *Despatches from United States Consuls in Melbourne*, National Archives and Records Administration-College Park, Maryland. Emphasis in original.

63. Report from George Latham, February 20, 1868, Roll 3, *Despatches from United States Consuls in Melbourne*, National Archives and Records Administration-College Park, Maryland.

64. From HMS *Pearl* at Sea to Governor of Queensland, April 29, 1874, SRS 5275, Gov/a7, Queensland State Archives. In same file see also Statement by Mary Ann Charlesworth, April 27, 1874: She had arrived in Brisbane in an emigrant ship and there she met a fellow female emigrant who convinced her and others that if they went

with the native chiefs [they] should be treated like ladies and live in comfort and have servants. . . . She prevailed on us three to consent to marry three natives of Lifu [*sic*]. We had never seen these natives before, [though they] consented and in that room we were married the same evening; [however,] after we married, we were sorry [since] we had no friends in that colony, no home and no money and we therefore determined to go away to Lifou [*sic*] with our black husbands. . . . When I came I found he had another wife. . . . My husband beat me, ill treated me and I was half-starved, had no clothes to wear and his black wife threatened me. . . . As many as forty girls were deceived into marrying returning laborers under similar inducements but they were warned in time to prevent their leaving Brisbane. . . . I am now leaving with an Englishman in Noumea. All the other girls have come to Noumea and are kept by white men, except Annie. . . . I am over a little over sixteen years of age.

Inevitably, there was not an equal concern about mating with indigenous women across racial lines. See, for example, Michael Sturma, *South Sea Maidens: Western Fantasy and Sexual Politics in the South Pacific* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002). See also Eckhard Hollman, *Paul Gauguin: Images from the South Seas* (New York: Prestel Munich, 2001), 37, 38, 71, 110: The famed artist lived with a thirteen-year-old girl in Tahiti—while his wife remained in Europe—then had a child out of wedlock with a fifteen-year-old, then contracted syphilis.

65. Kay Saunders, *Workers in Bondage: The Origins and Bases of Unfree Labour in Queensland, 1824–1916* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1982), 103.

66. Janette Nolan, *Bundaberg: History & People* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1978), 126.

67. Anthony Trollope, *N.S. Wales & Queensland* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1874), 165. See also his *Australia and New Zealand* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1873).
68. A. G. Russell, *Colour, Race and Empire* (London: Victor Gallancz, 1944), 145.
69. “A Bill to Restrict the Influx of Chinese into New South Wales,” 1881, CS, SB, CGS906, 4/829.1, New South Wales State Records Authority–West Sydney, Kingswood.
70. Colonial Secretary of New Zealand to Colonial Secretary New South Wales, July 21, 1880, CS, SB, CGS906, 4/829.1, New South Wales State Records Authority–West Sydney, Kingswood.
71. *Sydney Morning Herald*, January 19, 1881.
72. Representatives from the Colonies and New Zealand to the Earl of Kimberley, January 25, 1881, CS, SB, CGS906, 4/829.1, New South Wales State Records Authority–West Sydney, Kingswood.
73. John Hamill, *The Strange Career of Mr. Hoover under Two Flags* (New York: William Faro, 1931), 42.
74. *Sydney Morning Herald*, May 29, 1880.
75. Edward Dowling, *Australia and America in 1892: A Contrast* (Sydney: Potter, 1893), 72–74.

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1. Edward Dowling, *Australia and America in 1892: A Contrast* (Sydney: Potter, 1893), 73.
2. E. W. Cole, *The White Australia Question* (Melbourne: Cole, 1903), 7.
3. See the fascinating pictures and documents vividly illustrating these points in Franklin Odo and Kazuko Sinoto, *A Pictorial History of the Japanese in Hawaii, 1885–1924* (Honolulu: Bishop Museum, 1985).
4. *Japan Daily Mail*, June 21, 1887, Series 404-15-252b, Hawaii State Archives.
5. Ralph S. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume III: The Kalakaua Dynasty, 1874–1893* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1969), 174, 178.
6. See John James Mahlmann, *Reminiscences of an Ancient Mariner* (Yokohama: Japan Gazette, 1918), 55: “It has been said that the natives of Ponape are descendants of Japanese, which may be the case to a more or less extent, as some of them show a resemblance to Japanese in build and physiognomy.” See also Stephen Gerard, *Strait of Adventure* (Dunedin: A. H. & A. W. Reed, 1938).
7. William A. Russ, “Hawaiian Labor and Immigration Problems before Annexation,” *Journal of Modern History* 15, no. 3 (September 1943): 207–222, 208.
8. Ralph S. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume III: The Kalakaua Dynasty, 1874–1893* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1969), 183.
9. Report of Labor Committee, Volume I, Statement by Samuel Gompers, Gov. 2-7, Territory of Hawaii, Hawaii State Archives.

10. Katharine Coman, *The History of Contract Labor in the Hawaiian Islands* (New York: Arno Press, 1978), 46–47. Originally published in 1903.

11. Ralph S. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume III: The Kalakaua Dynasty, 1874–1893* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1969), 48.

12. Reports by Honolulu Trades and Labor Council, Gov. 2–7, Territory of Hawaii, Hawaii State Archives.

13. *Report of Subcommittee on Pacific Islands and Porto Rico on the Labor Question and Views of the Minority* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1902), Hawaii Historical Society.

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15. See, for example, “Labor Requirements,” 1884–1885, Box 53, Folder 1, Theo H. Davies Papers, Bishop Museum-Honolulu.

16. J. W. Gregory, *The Menace of Colour: A Study of the Difficulties Due to the Association of White & Coloured Races, with an Account of Measures Proposed for Their Solution & Special Reference to White Colonization in the Tropics* (London: Seeley Service, 1923), 225.

17. “Report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the President of the Republic of Hawaii for the Biennial Period Ending December 31, 1897,” Roll 30, *Despatches from U.S. Ministers in Hawaii, 1843–1900*, National Archives and Records Administration-College Park, Maryland. See also Ronald Takaki, *Pau Hana: Plantation Life and Labor in Hawaii, 1835–1920* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1983), 25.

18. Edward M. McCook to General Van Valkenburgh, August 3, 1867, *Papers Relating to the Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1898).

19. Audley Coote to William Jarrett, March 9, 1880, Series 404-12-201, Hawaii State Archives.

20. T. G. Clarke to Audley Coote, January 20, 1880, Series 404-12-201, Hawaii State Archives.

21. Ernest O. Smith to George Oakley, November 23, 1883, Series 404-43-692, Hawaii State Archives.

22. Ernest O. Smith to Frank Hastings, Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs, August 4, 1891, Series 404-44-698, Hawaii State Archives. Emphasis in original.

23. Robert Walker Irwin to Viscount Sinzo Aoki, December 19, 1890, Series 404-15-253a, Hawaii State Archives.

24. Viscount Sinzo Aoki to Robert Walker Irwin, “21st day, the 1st month, the 24th year of Meiji,” Series 404-15-253a, Hawaii State Archives.

25. Robert Walker Irwin to Samuel Parker, July 15, 1892, Series 404-15-253d, Hawaii State Archives.

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27. Robert Walker Irwin to Frank Hastings, April 28, 1893, Series 404-15-253d, Hawaii State Archives.

28. Robert Walker Irwin to Sanford B. Dole, April 27, 1893, Series 404-15-253e, Hawaii State Archives.

29. Robert Walker Irwin to Sanford B. Dole, July 13, 1893, Series 404-15-253e, Hawaii State Archives.

30. Letter by Jonathan Austin from Tokyo, October 21, 1889, Series 404-15-252d, Hawaii State Archives.

31. Mutus Munemitus to Robert Walker Irwin, circa 1894, Series 404-15-253f, Hawaii State Archives.

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33. "Memorandum as to Relations between Hawaii and Japan," circa 1894, Series 404-15-263, Hawaii State Archives.

34. Hisashi Shimamura to Henry Cooper, January 22, 1896, Series 404-15-262a, Hawaii State Archives.

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40. Clipping, *Advertiser*, March 1893, Roll 19, *Despatches from the U.S. Consul in Honolulu*, National Archives and Records Administration-College Park, Maryland. See also Patsy Sumie Saiki, *Early Japanese Immigrants in Hawaii* (Honolulu: Japanese Cultural Center of Hawaii, 1993).

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42. Helena G. Allen, *Sanford Ballard Dole: Hawaii's Only President, 1844-1926* (Glendale: Arthur H. Clark, 1988), 115.

43. Noenoe K. Silva, *Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American Colonialism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 148.

44. Liliuokalani, *Hawaii's Story by Hawaii's Queen* (Rutland, VT: Charles Tuttle, 1991), 311.

45. Major Wodehouse to the Earl of Rosebury, May 10, 1893, S00627, no. 8, FO534, Great Britain, Foreign Office, Pacific Islands, University of Hawai'i-Mānoa. See also Gregory Lawrence Garland, "Southern Congressional Opposition to Hawaiian Reciprocity and Annexation, 1876-1898" (MA thesis, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, 1983).

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62. *Indianapolis Freeman*, July 9, 1898.
63. *Richmond Planet*, April 23, 1898.
64. Letter to Departments of Commerce and Labor, June 15, 1905, Gov. 2-7, Carter, Hawaii State Archives.
65. Theodore Roosevelt to A. L. C. Atkinson, May 17, 1906, Gov. 2-7, Hawaii State Archives.
66. Secretary to the President to Hon. George R. Carter, August 21, 1906, Gov. 2-7, Hawaii State Archives.
67. P. F. Ryan to Theodore Roosevelt, August 11, 1906, Gov. 2-7, Hawaii State Archives.
68. *Hawaiian Star*, January 7, 1907, John Francis Gray Stokes Papers, Hawaii Historical Society.
69. "Proceedings of the Twenty-third Annual Meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conference of Friends of the Indian and Other Dependent Peoples," 1905, Hawaiian Historical Society.

70. “Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Annual Meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conference of Friends of the Indian and Other Dependent Peoples,” 1907, Hawaiian Historical Society. See also William Eleroy Curtis, *The United States and Foreign Powers* (Meadville, PA: Chautauqua-Century Press, 1892); John W. Foster, *American Diplomacy in the Orient* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1904). Emphasis in original.

71. Letter to Editor, June 13, 1913, in *Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Volume III*, ed. Robert Seager II and Doris D. Maguire, 498 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1975).

72. Alfred Thayer Mahan to S. A. Ashe, December 12, 1858, in *Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Volume I*, ed. Robert Seager II and Doris D. Maguire, 498 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, n.d.), 33.

73. Alfred Thayer Mahan to Leopold J. Mase, May 30, 1907, in *Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Volume III*, ed. Robert Seager II and Doris D. Maguire, 498 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1975), 214. Actually Mahan had a point connecting Tokyo with African-Americans in that both had a distinct distaste for white supremacy. Another aspect is reflected in the case of Masumizu Kuninosuke, one of the first Japanese emigrants to the United States who settled in Sacramento. “In 1869, he married Carrie Wilson, the daughter of a former slave from Missouri. Their four ‘mixed blood’ children thus became the first Nisei, the second generation of Japanese-Americans.” See Furukawa Tetsushi, “Black Asian Relations” in *Africana: The Encyclopedia of the African & African American Experience*, by Kwame Anthony Appiah and Henry Louis Gates, Jr., 479–480 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

74. Letter by Alfred Thayer Mahan to the *New York Times*, April 2, 1912, in *Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Volume III*, ed. Robert Seager II and Doris D. Maguire, 498 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1975), 214.

75. Geoffrey C. Ward, *Unforgivable Blackness: The Rise and Fall of Jack Johnson* (New York: Knopf, 2004), 117.

76. Fred Iway, KKK-Moose Jaw, Canada, April 9, 1928, A458(A458), 745/1/333, National Archives of Australia. In same file see also Secretary to Stanley Bruce, May 22, 1928.

77. *Sydney Morning Herald*, May 10, 2005.

78. See Gerald Horne, *Race War! White Supremacy and the Japanese Attack on the British Empire* (New York: New York University Press, 2004).

79. See also Hermann Joseph Hiery, *The Neglected War: The German South Pacific and the Influence of World War I* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1995).

80. *Weekly Magazine*, October 20, 1892, Bishop Museum-Honolulu. See also John B. Thurston to Marquis of Ripon, January 6, 1893, S00627, no. 8, Great Britain, Foreign Office, Pacific Islands, University of Hawai‘i-Mānoa: Reference here is made concerning recruiting of “natives of the Gilbert Islands for employment on plantations in Guatemala” (404 names were attached).

81. Julia Collins, “America’s Hidden Slave Trade Exposed,” *Boalt Hall Transcript* 38, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 14–15, 14.

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84. *New York Times*, July 12, 2005.
85. *Los Angeles Times*, July 21, 2005. See also *New York Times*, July 17, 2005.
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88. National Farmers Union, *Children of the Indus, 1879–2004* (Suva: NFU, 2004), 1.

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