Indeed, both life and time-receptivity—in their intimacy and congenitality—can be mutually defined as nothing but self-interments.1 Only by retreating inwards, into fluency with its own system-states, does the organism progressively separate itself from the causal absolutism of the surrounding milieu, obtaining ever more functional leeway and behavioural lability via increasing delamination from its immediate environs. (This is why the CNS has long been seen as the organ of individuation.) The ability to do things is arrived at in this way: this goes for the capacity to digest the outside world as much as the possibility of motile—rather than sessile—modes of life within it. Locomotive autonomy—across all relevant modalities, whether bioenergetic or biomechanical—is bequeathed by potentiating implosivity. First emerging as the outpouching of a complexifying gut, then as the innervating escape into the organism’s own CNS-simulation, and finally as the deposition of an empowering yet finitude-entrenching recognitive encasement, evolution’s ongoing investment into its own systemic insularity migrates outwards from gastronomic, to phaneroscopic, to juridical domains—all in step with incremental chronognostic range. Again, orienting yourself on the planet would be impossible without all these layers in play. Orientation has a prehistory.
And of course, after the archenteron’s gastrulating introversion into a complexified alimentary tract, the neurulation of the nervous system provides the frontier of collapse shared by all eumetazoans. The centralizing nervous system and its spinal support represent the next portentous stage in the sealing off of the organism into its own globally enclosing world-model.
For only by variegating the ways in which a system reliably and differentially actuates and effects itself (thus further generating criteria of saliency and relevancy for adaptively beneficial representings) does a robust and differentiated external world increasingly arise without (in parallel with the divarication and tumefaction of axonal projections and sensory arrays within). Therefore, the centralization of nervous architectures (the centripetal involution of simple radial cnidarian neuroid nets into segmented bilateral annelid systems, etc.) presents, across phanerozoic time, the procedural building of a world (or ‘worlds’, depending on one’s phyletic ecumenism).2 Since 1925, this world-generating structure has been referred to as a chronotope, a term that emerged from the intersection of biosemiotics, neuroanatomy, and earth systems science in Soviet proto-cybernetics. Proposed by the Russian neurophysiologist A.A. Ukhtomsky (1875–1942), it refers to the way in which the organism nervously generates, and inhabits, its own globally unified space-time through the active coordination of inputs and excitations. With an explicitly acknowledged Kantian heritage, Ukhtomsky’s notion of the chronotope (хронотоп) highlights the fact that time and space (and hence a coherent world) are outcomes dynamically generated by the complexifying CNS.3
This conception therefore confirms that the more the organism implodes intradermally—exaggerating its synaptic architectures of fluency with itself—the further an extradermal universe will explode for it. (This is the consecration of what Charles Sanders Peirce called a ‘phaneron’. Ergo, the phaneron, properly considered, is a phanerozoic inheritance.)4
The CNS, accordingly, represents an egress from immediacy (and a chronotopic escapement) to the exact degree that it is the generation of an entirely artefactual reality (‘kept honest’, and thus teleofunctionally utile, by the ‘constraining affordances’ of incoming sense-data).5 It is, then, paradoxically, a self-propelling reality escape—via informatic and chronotopic invagination—that endows the interned organism with the power over reality first presaged by the emergence of brain-masses in predatory flatworms, and which blossoms forth in the simulative universe of the encephalizing craniate cortex.6 A cosmogony belated by some 13.3 billion years. Indeed, it truly is a form of ‘egress’ in that it is only via productive forgetting that such a system generates salient (and therefore adaptively utile) worldedness.7 The CNS operates as an emulator that doesn’t emulate its own emulating procedures (i.e., we do not experience ourselves as a ganglia stack), and in consequence we (as system-denizens) feel in direct and immediate contact with the reality emulated (or within which we are interned). A nervous system, then, is a ‘reality escape’ precisely in so far as it is a generator of ‘artificial reality’. Redacting upstream processes in its own pipeline of world-manufacture, nervous enclosure makes naive realists of us all.
What then is the spinal column, if not a megalith raised to the mineralizing trace of the organism’s diaspora into its own bloating sensorium—each level of axial segmentation a monument to further neural self-entanglement—dorsally fulgurating our cephalocaudal axis, an outward memory of inward collapse? Indeed, despite the fact that cephalopods exhibit extravagantly complex nervous organization, the most integrated and encephalized CNSs belong unequivocally to vertebrates, for whom metameric spinal regionalization repeats into compartmentalizing brain.8 A pulsing paradox, intelligence enters the worldly scene by emigrating into its own chronotope.9
Nature attempts to escape itself by creating a nervous system. Indeed, when the patient of this phyletic reality escape becomes, in some small degree, capable of reflecting upon itself as such, it first attains the ability to model itself modelling and, by conjointly becoming capable of directed intervention, exhibits minimal self-consciousness. Capturing the fallibility of one’s perception forces one to reflect on the distinction between oneself and world. Apperception pieces itself together henceforth as escape velocity, or jailbreak, from claustrophobic union with inertial world-immersion: for, by migrating the abiogenetic energetic gradient of ‘intradermal’ and ‘extradermal’ into properly temporal and modal dimensions, via the inauguration of language-use and coterminous expansion of working memory, mere attentional economy involutes into executive function, goal-directedness—and mental time travel.10
Baptized by evolutionary psychologists as ‘proscopic chronesthenia’ or ‘autonoetic consciousness’, the tendency to actively manipulate futures presents the most ostentatious reality egress since our ancestral cerebrospinal entrapment.11 (Debate persists concerning nonhuman capacities in this department.)12 Becoming first able to wield subjunctives and conditionals, intellect now feeds on newfound disequilibrations between ‘the possible’ and ‘the merely actual’ such that it cannot but orient itself toward redesigning the world, because it can now not only imagine things otherwise but also reverse-engineer their workings.13 Moreover, the ability to talk about the possible—rather than being trapped within the exigent present—is what extends the human chronotope or Umwelt to encompass immense illimitable spatiotemporal distances, allowing it to prospect unseen, unexampled, and non-present perils and possibilia.14 Eventually triggering rational prognosis (which first coalesces with the late-mediaeval emergence of insurance industries, financial markets, and speculation upon them) the ‘Art of Conjecture’ is incepted, and possible futures increasingly come to infiltrate the present.15 This increasing tilt toward the long term is the core characteristic of modernity.
Indeed, having been cranially outsourced by the seventeenth-century invention of calculus, and fully automated with the explosion in computation following the Second World War, simulation (at last fully externalized from the CNS via prosthetic delegation) now comes to progressively reverse-engineer the very structure of possibility itself.16 For a science that incrementally relies on simulation (in the form of forecast) is a science that, at least in part, creates its own objects. This, in turn, engenders the tendency for us to live, more and more, in a world entirely of our own making. The distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ progressively collapses, as we see today in fields ranging from synthetic biology to genome editing, from climate engineering to nanotech to materials research.17 Now unfurling on a global scale, prediction computes contingencies and provokes real-world preventative procedures, yet the exponential thickening of predictive infrastructures breeds ever more—and ever more novel—contingencies to predict.
Risk escalation is utterly endogenous to the world-interior of advanced modernity, as the friction of its mechanism (just as it is with the gigantized external sensorium of planetary computation, so it is with individual nervous systems: recalcitrance is systemically ineliminable, inasmuch as no model can exhaustively model itself modelling without falling into infinite—and thus impossibly expensive—recursion).18 This is how the project of planetary forecast progressively parochializes actuality, ghettoizing the ‘merely real’. Reality escape attains a whole new significance as in silico realities begin to exert causal efficacy upon our own. In ‘the petabyte-scale period of science’ we no longer passively model nature but unavoidably remould it: the artefactual nature of nervous world-manufacture spills out of the skull as computational science unleashes an artificialization of nature on a planetary scale.19 Nervous organ maturates into technoscientific organon. Chronotopes, perforce, have a tendency to leak.20
Many of these notions were already present in Ukhtomskii’s neurological conceptions and those of his Soviet compatriots. Ukhtomskii had postulated that the organismic chronotope—by facilitating increasingly long-range control over its environment—was the initial trigger behind life’s tendency to reformat its surroundings at progressively greater spatiotemporal scales.21 Yet it was Ukhtomskii’s contemporary, the biogeochemist Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadskii (1862–1945), who fully elaborated this suggestion in his cosmist notion of the incipient noösphere (ноосфера). Vernadskii followed Louis Pasteur in noticing that organic chemistry, because of its chiral features, is defined by dissymmetry in space,22 further arguing, however, that biotic matter is likewise identified by dissymmetry in time. Life produces its own time, or, life is the generation of a temporal arrow.23 Directional time is, then, the collective secretion of earth’s biosphere (биосфере—another term popularized by Vernadskii). This temporality-generative ‘symmetry breaking’ at the core of living process neatly explains the seemingly directional nature of macroevolution, which Vernadskii explicitly links to cephalization and the ‘evolution of matter in a single, headward direction’.24 Cephalization, Vernadskii concluded, converges upon homo sapience, which is inaugural of the noösphere, or, in a phrase that Vernadskii borrowed from the American geologist Joseph Le Conte, that psychozoic era of terrestrial history defined by the wholesale capture of earth systems by intentional activity.25 Vernadskii’s noösphere—a downstream product of cephalizing chronoreceptivity—announces a globe turned artefact, with eventual erasure of the distinction between frontal cortex, higher nervous function, and geocosmic mass.26 A relentless promulgator of orthogenesis, Vernadskii’s fellow traveller Teilhard de Chardin wrote of how cephalization provides the ‘Ariadne’s thread’ of time, whereby ‘nerve ganglions concentrate; they become localized and forward in the head’:
Life is the rise of consciousness, we have agreed. If it is to progress still further it can only be because, here and there, the internal energy is secretly rising up under the mantle of the flowing earth. Here and there, at the base of nervous systems, psychic tension is doubtless increasing […] the active phyletic lines grow warm with consciousness towards the summit. But in one well-marked region at the heart of the mammals, where the most powerful brains ever made by nature are to be found they become red hot. And right at the heart of the glow burns a point of incandescence. […] We must not lose sight of that line crimsoned by the dawn. After thousands of years rising below the horizon, the flame bursts forth at a strictly localized point. Thought is born.27
He went on to claim that,
[s]ince, in its totality and throughout the length of each stem, the natural history of living creatures amounts on the exterior to the gradual establishment of a vast nervous system, it therefore corresponds on the interior to the installation of a psychic state on the very dimensions of the earth.28
This, then, is how bone armature interlocks with discursive architectonic (as its phanerozoic precursor) and consequently also with the deep upswells of terrestrial history as well as the longest-range futurity. It is how we came to think like a planet. It is why the sun’s downward onslaught of insolation triggers synapsing spines to tendentiously rise; for the uphill struggle inherited by all negentropic systems is simultaneously, and ineluctably, also a falling inward. And the outward marker of life’s coiling collapse, the great monument raised to implosion, is the cephalocaudal surge of the spinal cord and its vertebral mast; in this way, the conglomerating backbone and its axon fasciculations become legible to us as the legacy trace of the influx of time into the organism’s being. And so, although spines rise from the planet, scraping cautiously skyward toward the star that initiated their uphill struggle, this apparent phototropism (growth towards light) is in fact an instance of chronotaxis (departure into time—escapement from the immediate and orientation within a history grander than oneself) volatized by the congenitality of agitation and anticipation at the dawn of life.29
The spine is a tautegory for the long-durational gestation of futurity—a symbol that expresses its object not by mediating it but by manifesting it. But if, in becoming sensitive to time, the organism also conquers it (as exampled all the way from the rudimentary cell’s heat-shock proteins up to humanity’s present-day apparatus of cosmological forecasting), this feedforward encroachment of future behaviours into present ones, this lurch into futurity, also comes at a price.
1. ‘We found ourselves working as slave components of systems whose scales and complexities we could not comprehend. Were we their parasites? Were they ours? Either way we became components of our own imprisonment’. S. Plant, Zeroes and Ones: Digital Women + The New Technoculture (London: Fourth Estate, 1998), 4.
2. It appears that nervous systems are not monophyletic and are instead examples of homoplasy: they have emerged separately several times through convergent evolution. See L. Moroz, ‘On the Independent Origins of Complex Brains and Neurons’, Brain, Behavior and Evolution 74:3 (2009), 177–90. To expropriate a phrase from Kuhn, this insinuates the existence of different clades ‘practicing their trades in parallel worlds’. T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 150.
3. Ukhtomsky’s conviction was that ‘we perceive the world as anticipations of its future’. See I. Tuomi, ‘Chronotopes of Foresight: Models of Time-Space in Probabilistic, Possibilistic and Constructivist Futures’, Futures and Foresight Science 1:1 (2019), 2. Inspired by his studies in how functional coordination emerges from phase synchronization and heterochronia in the activity of nerve centres, Ukhtomsky was led to propose that the CNS actively generates temporality. See A. Kurismaa, ‘Perspectives on Time and Anticipation in the Theory of Dominance’, in M. Nadin (ed.), Anticipation: Learning from the Past—The Russian/Soviet Contributions to the Science of Anticipation (New York: Springer, 2015), 37–58. A chronotope, therefore, becomes legible as the organism’s ‘frame of anticipation’ wherein ‘[p]erceiving an object automatically implies the anticipation of its world line’. (Ukhtomsky had borrowed Minkowski’s term world line to express an object’s path in 4-dimensional time-space.) As Chebanov glosses, Ukhtomsky thought that the ‘organization of these worlds [can] be thought of in terms of geometrodynamics’ and, accordingly, they become amenable to ‘mathematical description’. This, in turn, allows a comparative neuroanatomy of worlds, or, a ‘non-hominoid thesaurus’ for differing states of worldedness. See S.V. Chebanov, ‘Ukhtomsky’s Idea of Chronotope as Frame of Anticipation’, in Nadin (ed.), Anticipation, 137–50. Moreover, the semiotician M.M. Bakhtin duly inherited Ukhtomsky’s notion and applied it to analysing the preconscious organisational principles embedded across fictional worlds: thus initiating a comparative history (or, perhaps, palaeontology) of the semantic phases of human worldedness.
4. C.S. Peirce, Collected Papers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 8 vols., 1931), vol. 1, 141.
5. L. Floridi, ‘A Plea for Non-Naturalism as Constructionism’, Minds and Machines 27 (2017), 269–85.
6. H.B. Sarnat and M.G. Netsky, ‘The Brain of the Planarian as the Ancestor of the Human Brain’, Canadian Journal of Neurological Sciences 12:4 (1985), 296–302. Recent phylogenomics suggests the possibility of an even more basal urbilaterian origin for brain development, however. See N. Riebli and H. Reichert, ‘The First Nervous System’, in S.V. Shepherd (ed.), The Wiley Handbook of Evolutionary Neuroscience (Oxford: Blackwell, 2017), 125-52: 126.
7. Again taking chronoception as our example, simultaneity is achieved, as Metzinger argues by way of Pöppel, by the ‘opening of time windows’ precisely via system-wide deletion of ‘information about [the system’s] own physical processuality’ (this is achieved ‘by not defining temporal relations between elements given within such a basal window of simultaneity’). Concordantly, our sense of synchronous integration (i.e. temporal simultaneity) is achieved by productive elimination of the asynchronous operations that produce it. Metzinger, Being No One, 129–39.
8. B.U. Budelmann, ‘The Cephalopod Nervous System: What Evolution Has Made of the Molluscan Design’, in O. Breidbach and W. Kutsch (eds.), The Nervous Systems of Invertebrates: An Evolutionary and Comparative Approach (Birkhäuser Verlag: Switzerland, 1995), 115–38.
9. This is simply another way of acknowledging that everything in intelligence is self-earnt, or, there is nothing arrogated therein.
10. T. Suddendorf and M.C. Corballis, ‘The Evolution of Foresight: What is Mental Time Travel, and is it Unique to Humans?’, Behavioural and Brain Sciences 30:3 (2007), 313–51.
11. E. Tulving, ‘Chronothesia: Conscious Awareness of Subjective Time’, in D.T. Stuss and R.T. Knight (eds.), Principles of Frontal Lobe Function (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 311–25.
12. G. Martin-Ordas, ‘With the Future in Mind: Toward a Comprehensive Understanding of the Evolution Future-Oriented Cognition’, in K. Michaelian, S.B. Klein and K.K. Szpunar (eds.), Seeing the Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 306–27.
13. ‘[T]he ability to reason using modal notions is characteristic of humans, and is certainly remarkable, arguably playing an important role in our evolution and setting us apart from other intelligent beings’. A. Borghini, A Critical Introduction to the Metaphysics of Modality (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 19.
14. A. Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 127–8.
15. B. de Jouvenel, The Art of Conjecture, tr. N. Lary (New York: Basic Books, 1967).
16. G. Gramelsberger, ‘Introduction’, in G. Gramelsberger (ed.), From Science to Computational Sciences: Studies in the History of Computing and its Influence on Today’s Sciences (Zurich: Diaphanes, 2011), 13.
17. G. Gramelsberger, ‘From Science to Computational Sciences: A Science History and Philosophy Overview’, in Gramelsberger (ed.), From Science to Computational Sciences, 41.
18. Benjamin Bratton uses the example of a high-fidelity simulation of global climate systems: the power consumption required for suitably high-resolution modelling would entail that the primary climatological event modelled would be itself. See B. Bratton, The Stack: On Software and Sovereignty (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016), 102.
19. Nordmann writes that ‘technoscience knows only one way of gaining new knowledge and that is by first making a new world’. See A. Nordmann, ‘Collapse of Distance: Epistemic Strategies of Science and Technoscience’, Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 41:1 (2006), 7–34: 8. Mansnerus, similarly, writes that ‘the metaphor of “experimenting with Nature” could be upgraded to regard simulation models as artificial nature, subject to interrogative manipulation’. See E. Mansnerus, ‘Explanatory and Predictive Functions of Simulation Modelling’, in Gramelsberger (ed.), From Science to Computational Sciences, 177–93. ‘Simulation’, Gramelsberger adds, ‘can be used for both rational prognosis and “numerical breeding”’ (Gramelsberger, ‘Introduction’, 42). In other words, simulative artefacts do not merely mimic realities but produce new ones. We live in an age of the numerical breeding of new worlds, as is evident in materials research, synthetic biology, or nanotechnology. Such vocations, Floridi notes, ‘are increasingly “artificializing” or “denaturalizing” the world […] as well as what qualifies as real’. See Floridi, ‘A Plea for Non-Naturalism as Constructionism’, 271.In world-historical terms, this is all downstream of the fact that, because a nervous system can only represent the world through translating world states into neural artifice, the activity of nerve-bound agents tends towards artificializing the world itself.
20. Yet, as certain futurists have argued, this outward eversion may revert back into wholesale inward collapse, as neural implosion segues into computational implosion: the ‘transcension hypothesis’ posits as an attractor common to the space of all possible civilizations something called ‘STEM compression’: a tendency to densify and miniaturize in the pursuit of informatic efficiency—to the point of receding into black holes, and not just figurative ones. J. Smart, ‘The Transcension Hypothesis: Sufficiently Advanced Civilizations Invariably Leave our Universe, and Implications for METI and SETI’, Acta Astronautica 78 (2012): 55–68.
21. P.V. Simonov, The Motivated Brain: A Neurophysiological Analysis of Human Behaviour, tr. L. Payne (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1991), 15.
22. See V. Serdyuk, Scoliosis and Spinal Pain Syndrome: New Understanding of their Origin (Delhi: Byword Books, 2014), 31–3.
23. G.S Levit, W. Krumbein, and R. Grübel, ‘Space and Time in the Works of Vernadsky’, Environmental Ethics 22:4 (2000), 377–96.
24. G.M. Young, The Russian Cosmists: The Esoteric Futurism of Nikolai Fedorov and his Followers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 156. Vernadskii took the phrase ‘cephalization’ from the American geologist James Dwight Dana (1813–1895), who had coined the term whilst classifying crab nervous architectures, exclaiming that ‘This centralization is literally a cephalization of forces’. See J.D. Dana, ‘A Review of the Classification of Crustacea’, American Journal of Science and Arts 22 (1856), 14–29: 15. Later, Dana wrote of how the nervous system—‘that feeling, knowing, outreaching and inworking thing’—converges irreversibly headwards into the ‘development of the brain in Man’. See J.D. Dana, ‘The Classification of Animals Based on the Principle of Cephalization’, American Journal of Science and Arts 35 (1863), 321–53. Although such orthogenetic ideas were popular in the early nineteenth century, they tend to be rejected by contemporary science. Dana’s idea of inevitable cephalization is likely an artefact of our own biases. See C.H. Lineweaver, ‘Paleontological Tests: Human-Like Intelligence Is Not a Convergent Feature of Evolution’, in J. Seckbach and M. Walsh (eds.), From Fossils to Astrobiology: Records of Life on Earth and the Search for Extraterrestrial Biosignatures (New York: Springer, 2009), 355–70. As Gould said, ‘Homo sapiens is an entity, not a tendency’. S.J. Gould, Wonderful Life (London: Hutchinson Radius, 1990), 320.
25. J. Le Conte, Elements of Geology (New York, 1878), 557–70.
26. No responsibility without risk, of course: ‘If man [does] not use his brain [for] self-destruction, an immense future is open before him’. V. Vernadskii, ‘The Biosphere and the Noösphere’, American Scientist 33:1 (1945), 1–13: 8. The nervous system may well be the geocosm’s prime executive.
27. P.T. de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man (London: Collins, 1955), 153–60.
28. Ibid., 146.
29. The palaeontologist Mark A.S. McMenamin establishes that the roots of the Vernadskian ‘noösphere’ can be traced all the way back to Ediacaran ‘chemocognition’. M.A.S. McMenamin, The Garden of Ediacara: Discovering the First Complex Life (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 239–51.